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COMMENT
Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The Implementation of
Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina
We look to the jury box as to a sacred shrine, the place where human
justice holds the scales to measure out the dues of man.I
For most of the twentieth century, all states have permitted prosecutors to
exercise peremptory challenges2 --the removal of prospective jurors from the ve-
nire "without cause, without explanation and without judicial scrutiny.' 3 Since
1868, however, the fourteenth amendment4 has forbidden states to discriminate
against racial and other protected groups without constitutionally sufficient rea-
sons for treating those groups differently. 5 The conflict between these two fea-
tures of the American justice system is inescapable.6 By exercising peremptory
challenges, the prosecutor can exclude entire groups of individuals from the jury
without having to provide any, let alone constitutionally sufficient, justifications.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, to the contrary, re-
quires that government officials adequately explain actions directed against
1. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 19, fyers v. Boice Hardwood Co., 201 N.C. 75, 159 S.E. 3
(1931) (No. 651).
2. Although the peremptory challenge is centuries old and embedded in the Anglo-American
judicial process, the government's right to exercise peremptory challenges was not firmly established
until the beginning of the twentieth century. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES:
OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATiVE PANELs 150 (1977); Brown, McGuire &
Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials" Traditional Use or
Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REv. 192, 195 (1978); infra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
3. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965).
4. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
5. See, eg., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.2, at 525 (3d
ed. 1986) (equal protection clause ensures that government does not make arbitrary classifications);
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 365 (1949) (classifi-
cations made by government must be reasonably related to the purpose of the law). The equal
protection clause originally was intended to protect black persons from discrimination. Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879). Since then, the Supreme Court has held that the fourteenth
amendment also applies to nonracial classifications, although the level of its protection varies with
the classification. See, eg., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)
(mental capacity); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (gender); Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (age); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,483-87 (1970)
(number of children); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955) (profession).
6. Jurists and commentators also have argued that the peremptory challenge conflicts with
other constitutional provisions. Some have contended that the prosecutor's peremptory removal of
specific groups from the jury violates the defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury drawn from a
fair cross-section of the community. See, e.g., McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1131 (2d Cir.
1984); Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Proce-
dures, 64 N.C.L. REv. 501, 541-63 (1986). In 1990, however, the Supreme Court rejected this con-
tention. See Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 807-11 (1990). At least one commentator has argued
that because peremptory challenges are exercised arbitrarily and capriciously, prosecutorial peremp-
tory challenges deprive defendants of their fifth and fourteenth amendment rights to due process of
law. See Note, Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 HARV. L. REv.
1013, 1024-33 (1989).
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members of protected groups. "The Equal Protection Clause says in essence,
'When the government treats people differently, it has to have a reason.' The
peremptory challenge says in essence, 'No, it doesn't.' "7
Nevertheless, both the equal protection clause and the peremptory chal-
lenge exist to secure fundamental rights. The equal protection clause aims to
protect the fundamental human right to freedom from invidious discrimination.
The peremptory challenge seeks to ensure the right to an impartial jury.8 Con-
sequently, in spite of the ever-present tension between the equal protection
clause and the peremptory challenge, the United States Supreme Court has
searched for ways to guarantee equal protection to protected groups while pre-
serving the State's right to exercise peremptory challenges. In the landmark
case of Batson v. Kentucky,9 decided in 1986, the Court embarked on its most
recent attempt to reconcile the arbitrary nature of the peremptory challenge
with the dictates of the equal protection clause. Five years later, the question
arises whether lower courts charged with implementing Batson have made pro-
gress toward the Court's Solomonic goal of ending the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges without abolishing the peremptory challenge entirely.
This Comment explores that question as it applies to the appellate courts of
North Carolina.
The clash between the peremptory challenge and the equal protection
clause is the latest battle in a conflict that racial and ethnic minorities and the
states have been waging since the ratification of the fourteenth amendment: the
fight over how far the equal protection clause reaches to protect minorities
against unconstitutionally motivated exclusion from jury service by the State. 10
At first, states attempted to preclude minorities from being called to jury service
altogether.11 After minorities won the right to be included on jury lists, prose-
cutors began to use peremptory challenges to bar minority persons from sitting
on juries. 12 In 1986 the Batson Court recognized that the problem of racially
motivated peremptory challenges had become widespread.13 The Court, how-
ever, refused to address the problem by abolishing the peremptory challenge
altogether. 14 Instead, the Court attempted to provide defendants with an effec-
tive means of proving discrimination. Under Batson, the prosecutor must come
forward with race-neutral reasons for her peremptory challenges once the de-
7. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 203 (1989).
8. The sixth amendment provides, in part, that "[i]n all criminal proceedings, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a... trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
10. See, eg., Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 327 (1970) (substantial underrepresentation
of minorities on jury lists); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 561 (1953) (discriminatory formation of
jury lists); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 387-88 (1880) (jury service limited to qualified voters;
black persons not qualified to vote); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879) (per se
statutory prohibition of jury service by black persons).
11. Neal, 103 U.S. at 387; Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
12. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 150; Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL.
L. REv. 235, 283 (1968).
13. Batson, 476 U.S. at 101 (White, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 99 n.22.
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fendant makes a threshold showing of an inference of discrimination. 15 The
Court left to state and lower federal courts the task of fleshing out the eviden-
tiary framework--determining what evidence gives rise to an inference of dis-
crimination and what proffered reasons rebut such an inference. In effect,
having prescribed the relevant constitutional rules, the Batson majority chal-
lenged the lower courts to take racial prejudice out of jury selection.
Several critics, most notably Justice Marshall, have charged that under Bat-
son the lower courts will be unable to end prosecutorial discrimination. Only by
prohibiting peremptory challenges entirely, they claim, can minorities be assured
freedom from discrimination injury selection. 16 Though these critics ultimately
may be correct that Batson cannot achieve its own goals and that a more drastic
solution is appropriate, such a conclusion is impossible to reach at this point.
Rather than use the decision as a blueprint for eliminating discriminatory jury
selection practices, some lower courts have tried to minimize the decision's im-
pact on the operation of the peremptory challenge. As a result, these courts
have required defendants to meet unduly high standards of prima facie proof.17
When defendants have been able to satisfy these standards, the courts routinely
have accepted prosecutors' explanations as sufficient to rebut the prima facie
case.18 In sum, lower courts have failed to implement fully the spirit, and in
some cases the letter, of Batson. Until they do, the debate will continue whether
aggressive application of Batson might solve the problem of jury selection dis-
crimination without resort to abolition of the peremptory challenge.
Illustrative of the incomplete implementation of Batson is the North Caro-
lina experience. Neither the North Carolina Supreme Court nor the North Car-
olina Court of Appeals ever has held for a defendant on the merits of a Batson
claim. 19 In part, this result is attributable to the courts' misapprehension of the
operation of the Batson prima facie evidentiary system.20 In part, it also arises
from the courts' undue deference to the findings of trial courts.2 1 As a result of
these misapplications of Batson, North Carolina has'yet to contribute meaning-
fully to the debate over the decision's continuing validity, much less to achieve
its nondiscrimination goal.
This Comment begins with a brief review of the common-law origin and
theoretical functions of the peremptory challenge, its introduction into the
American judicial system, and its reception by the legislature and courts of
15. Id. at 96-97.
16. Eg., id. at 102-05 (Marshall, J., concurring); Chew v. State, 71 Md. App. 681, 717, 527
A.2d 332, 350 (1987); Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 519 Pa. 236, 261-64, 546 A.2d 1101, 1113-14
(1988) (Nix, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1169 (1990); Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A
Half Step in the Right Direction (Racial Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges Under the Heav-
ier Confines of Equal Protection), 72 CORNELL L. Rlv. 1026, 1039 (1987).
17. See infra notes 159-201 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 235-56 and accompanying text.
19. In one case, the supreme court found a procedural error and remanded the proceedings to
the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on Batson issues. See State v. Green, 324 N.C. 238, 240-41,
376 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1989).
20. See infra notes 159-89 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 276-83 and accompanying text.
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North Carolina. 22 Next, the Comment discusses the constitutional background
of Batson and reviews the Batson decision, paying particular attention to the
Court's goals and to the issues it left to state and lower federal courts.23 The
Comment then examines the North Carolina appellate courts' implementation
of Batson and shows that the courts have been true to neither the letter nor the
spirit of the decision. The Comment suggests doctrinal revisions that are better
suited to achieving Batson's goals.24 Many of these recommended procedures
and standards derive from the implementation of Batson in other states. The
Comment concludes that the North Carolina courts' unduly constrictive view of
Batson has rendered the decision ineffective in North Carolina. Therefore, revi-
sions are necessary to guarantee North Carolina criminal defendants and poten-
tial jurors equal protection of the laws.25
I. HIsToRicAL BACKGROUND: THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
The peremptory challenge has long been a part of the Anglo-American ju-
dicial process, although the degree to which it has been approved and employed
has varied. 26 It developed during the twelfth century, when the English jury
was transformed "from a body of fact knowers to one of fact finders."'2 7 The
new fact-finding system required jurors to determine the facts based not on per-
sonal favoritism, but on evidence presented in court. 28 The peremptory chal-
lenge evolved as one safeguard 29 of jury impartiality.30
In theory, peremptory challenges promote impartiality in three ways. First,
attorneys may use them to remove prospective jurors with suspected, but un-
provable, prejudice or bias. 31 Second, peremptory challenges facilitate the exer-
22. See infra notes 26-54 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 55-144 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 202-18, 261-74, 292, 313-16 and accompanying texts.
25. See infra text accompanying note 340.
26. Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note 2, at 193; see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-
13 (1965).
27. Gobert, The Peremptory Challenge-An Obituary, 1989 CRIM. L. REv. 528, 528; see 3. VAN
DYKE, supra note 2, at 2. Originally, jurors were chosen because they had some knowledge of the
facts and the parties. Gobert, supra, at 528. During the reign of Henry II (1154-89), the Crown
began to impanel men who had knowledge of the case to decide whether a suspect should be
charged. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 2. This system, analogous to the modem grand jury,
employed the first juries of fact-finders and provided the foundation for the modern jury. Id. at 2-3.
28. Gobert, supra note 27, at 528.
29. In addition to the peremptory challenge, two practices designed to promote impartial juries
developed. First, jurors were selected only from among those citizens thought capable of deciding
cases fairly and objectively. Id. Professor Alschuler has noted that these persons were an elite group
of propertied men. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 164-65. Second, the challenge for cause evolved
whereby the parties could remove from the panel an unlimited number of jurors with demonstrable
bias. Gobert, supra note 27, at 528. To this day, to exercise a challenge for cause attorneys must
"1assign cause" for the challenge; they must explain their reasons for believing the juror is partial and
the judge must agree. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 139-41.
30. Gobert, supra note 27, at 528.
31. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965); J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 146;Babcock, Voir Dire. Preserving "Its Wonderful Power" 27 STAN. L. Rev. 545, 551 (1975). More-
over, the peremptory challenge permits counsel to remove these jurors without embarrassing them
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cise of challenges for cause, which are themselves designed to remove biased
potential jurors.3 2 Third, the challenges foster the appearance of impartiality,
since the parties may dismiss without explanation jurors they perceive to be bi-
ased, whether or not the potential jurors are in fact biased . 33
Originally the Crown enjoyed an unlimited number of peremptory chal-
lenges. 34 In 1305, recognizing that this practice produced juries that were bi-
ased in favor of the prosecution, Parliament abolished the right of prosecutors to
exercise peremptory challenges. 35 It still, however, viewed peremptory chal-
lenges as necessary for defendants; accordingly, defendants retained the right to
remove jurors peremptorily. 36 Despite Parliament's command that prosecutors
challenge potential jurors only for cause, the English courts soon construed the
1305 statute to reinstate, in effect, the prosecutor's right to exercise peremptory
challenges. 3 7 The courts permitted the prosecutor to "stand aside" prospective
jurors and postpone assigning cause for his challenges. 38 The prosecutor had to
assign cause only if too few jurors remained to constitute a jury after the defend-
ant exercised his challenges. 39  Since this contingency rarely occurred, the
Crown effectively enjoyed the right to exercise peremptory challenges.40
Although early American courts and legislatures readily accepted the de-
fendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges as part of the common law, the
prosecutor's right was more uncertain.41 Some states permitted prosecutorial
peremptory challenges, but severely limited them in number.4 2 Other states did
not allow prosecutors to exercise peremptory challenges at all.43 It was not until
with public accusations of bias or with public revelation of their prejudices. Babcock, supra, at 553-
54; see Gobert, supra note 27, at 529-30.
32. An attorney often can uncover the prejudices of a prospective juror necessary to justify a
challenge for cause only by asking the juror probing and personal questions; the availability of per-
emptory challenges alleviates the attorney's fear of incurring a juror's hostility during this question-
ing, because the attorney knows that if he alienates a juror, he may strike the juror peremptorily.
Thus, the availability of the peremptory challenge prevents a chilling effect on the voir dire question-
ing that facilitates the challenge for cause. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219-20; Babcock, supra note 31, at
554-55.
33. This satisfies Justice Frankfurter's maxim that "justice must satisfy the appearance of jus-
flee." Ofutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). By furthering the litigants' belief in the
system's impartiality, peremptory challenges also promote confidence in and respect for the criminal
justice system. See Babcock, supra note 31, at 552; Gobert, supra note 27, at 529.
34. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 147; Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note 2, at 194;
Massaro, supra note 6, at 525. The defendant was permitted thirty-five peremptory strikes. 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *354.
35. The Ordinance of Inquests, 33 Edw., ch. 4 (1305). Furthermore, the unlimited number of
prosecutorial peremptory challenges subjected trials to substantial delays. See COKE ON LrrrLETON
156 (14th ed. 1791), quoted in Swain, 380 U.S. at 213.
36. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 147; Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note 2, at 194.
37. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 213; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 148; Brown, McGuire & Win-
ters, supra note 2, at 194.
38. Swain, 380 U.S. at 213; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 148.
39. Swain, 380 U.S. at 213; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 148.
40. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 148.
41. Id.; Brown, MeGuire & Winters, supra note 2, at 194; Massaro, supra note 6, at 525.
42. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 149. As late as 1856, the Supreme Court held that
prosecutors in federal court had no common-law right to engage in the practice of "standing aside."
United States v. Shackleford, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 588, 590 (1856).
43. The two most populous original states, New York and Virginia, did not allow prosecutors
1991] 1537
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1870 that peremptory challenges for the prosecution became "the rule rather
than the exception." 44 By 1900 "the government's right to exercise peremptory
challenges was firmly established."
'45
North Carolina was among the first American jurisdictions officially to rec-
ognize the defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges, the prosecutor's
right to "stand aside" prospective jurors, and the prosecutor's right to exercise
peremptory challenges. 46 In 1777 the North Carolina General Assembly codi-
fied common-law practice by granting capital defendants thirty-five peremptory
challenges. 47 Then, in 1829, the North Carolina Supreme Court formally ap-
proved the practice of "standing aside."48 Most dramatically, in 1827 the North
Carolina General Assembly broke with five centuries of English practice and
became one of the first state legislatures to allow prosecutors to exercise peremp-
tory challenges. 49
At first the North Carolina prosecutor's privilege existed only in capital
cases and was limited to four peremptory strikes,50 in sharp contrast to the de-
fendant's thirty-five peremptory challenges. 51 Throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, the North Carolina General Assembly periodically revised the number of
peremptory challenges exercisable by defendants and by the State, narrowing the
gap between the two sides.52 Finally, in 1977 the general assembly granted the
to exercise peremptory challenges in felony cases until 1858 and 1919 respectively. See Act of April
17, 1858, ch. 332, § 1, 1858 N.Y. Laws 557 (current version at N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 270.25
(McKinney 1982)); VA. CODE ANN. § 4898 (1919) (statutory revision pursuant to Act of March 8,
1918, ch. 108, 1918 Va. Acts 211) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-262 (1990).
44. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 150; see Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note 2, at 195.
45. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 150; see Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note 2, at 195.
Several developments account for the eventual acceptance of prosecutorial peremptory challenges.
By the mid-nineteenth century, the mistrust of government that characterized the Revolutionary
period gave way to greater acceptance of state power. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 150. More-
over, in light of the growing heterogeneity in many American cities, the Supreme Court determined
that the government had a legitimate interest in exercising peremptory challenges to keep certain
"elements" offjuries. See Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70-71 (1887). Eventually the Court found
the right to exercise peremptory challenges to be inherent in the right to jury trial. See Lewls v.
United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892); Babcock, supra note 31, at 556.
46. See State v. Benton, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 196, 204 (1836) (practice of standing aside
"has ... prevailed in the courts of this state"); J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 14849, 171 n.47.
47. Act of Nov. 15, 1777, ch. 2, § 94, J. IREDELL, LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
317 (1791) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217(a)(1) (1988)); see also State v. Arthur,
13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 217,220 (1829) (purpose of peremptory challenge is to ensure that the prisoner has
a jury "free from all objection"). The general assembly later extended the right to exercise peremp-
tory challenges to defendants not on trial for their lives. Act of Nov. 16, 1801, ch. 592, § 1, 2 H.
POTTER, LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 953 (1821).
48. Arthur, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 219.
49. Act of Nov. 19, 1827, ch. 10, 1827 N.C. Sess. Laws 15 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1217 (1988)). Only four states authorized their governments to exercise peremptory chal-
lenges earlier than North Carolina: Delaware (1782), Pennsylvania (1813), Tennessee (1821), and
Georgia (1822). . VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 171 n.57.
50. 1827 N.C. Sess. Laws 15.
51. Id. In addition, the prosecutor had to exercise all of his peremptory challenges before he
tendered the prospective jurors to the defendant. Id.
52. See, eg., Act of Feb. 26, 1907, ch. 415, § 1, 1907 N.C. Sess. Laws 608 (current version at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217(b)(2) (1988)) (allowing the State two peremptory challenges per de-
fendant in noncapital cases); Act of March 1, 1913, ch. 31, §§ 3, 4, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 55, 56
(current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217 (1988)) (reducing defendants' peremptory chal-
lenges to twelve in capital cases and four in noncapital cases); Act of May 11, 1935, ch. 475, §§ 2, 3,
[Vol. 691538
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State the same number of peremptory challenges as the defendant.5 3 In equaliz-
ing the number of peremptory challenges allowed, the general assembly brought
North Carolina practice in line with that of most states.5 4 Unfortunately, dur-
ing the same period in which North Carolina prosecutors received this increased
power to exercise peremptory challenges, prosecutors around the country began
to use their peremptory challenges to deny racial minorities the opportunity to
serve on juries.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: FROM STRAUDER TO SWAIN
In the wake of the Civil War, the American people ratified three constitu-
tional amendments whose common purpose was to secure equal rights for newly
freed black citizens.55 The second of these, the fourteenth amendment, prohibits
the states from denying any person "equal protection of the laws."' 56 One of the
earliest United States Supreme Court decisions construing the equal protection
clause did so in the context of jury selection.
In Strauder v. West Virginia57 a black man had been charged with mur-
der.5 8 At the time, West Virginia law authorized only white males to serve as
jurors.5 9 A state court rejected Strauder's claim that the statute denied him
equal protection of the laws; he was convicted by an all-white jury and his ap-
1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 834, 835 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217 (1988)) (increasing
defendants' peremptory challenges from 12 to 14 in capital cases and from four to six in noncapital
cases; increasing State's peremptory challenges from four to six in capital cases and from two to four
for each defendant in noncapital cases); Act of March 11, 1971, ch. 75, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 56
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-21(b) (1971)) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1217(a)(2) (1988)) (increasing State's peremptory challenges to nine in capital cases). The
general assembly abolished the practice of "standing aside" in 1913. Act of March 1, 1913, ch. 31,
§ 4, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 55, 56 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217 (1988)); see State
v. Ashburn, 187 N.C. 717, 720-21, 122 S.E. 833, 834 (1924).
53. Act of June 23, 1977, ch. 711, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 853, 858 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1217 (1988)). In capital cases today each defendant is entitled to 14 peremptory chal-
lenges and the State is entitled to 14 challenges per defendant; in noncapital cases, each defendant
may exercise six peremptory challenges and the State may exercise six challenges per defendant. In
selecting alternate jurors, each party may use any unused challenges plus one peremptory challenge
for each alternate juror to be selected. Id.
54. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217 official commentary (1988). One possible explanation for
North Carolina's early acceptance of peremptory challenges for both parties in criminal cases is the
state's apparent tradition of allowing attorneys freedom in selecting juries. North Carolina trial
judges generally allow attorneys wide latitude in questioning jurors during the jury selection process.
R. PRICE, NORTH CAROLINA CRIMINAL TRIAL PRACTICE § 18-11, at 289 (1980); see also 2 G.
WILSON, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 47-3, at 121 (1989) ("trial judge must grant suffi-
cient leeway ... so that counsel can develop meaningful information"). Prior to 1977, attorneys
often were able to see the jury list, thus enabling them to shape the jury selection by altering their
strategy appropriately. DeMent, Jury Selection and the Criminal Jury Trial in Superior Court, in
NORTH CAROLINA ACADEMY OF TRIAL LAWYERs, PERSUASION AND THE ART OF ADVOCACY &
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-TRIAL AND APPEAL: NEW G.S. 15A, § 5, at 1 (1978). Indeed, in 1978,
seminar material from the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers claimed that "control of jury
selection by the litigants is the rule." Id. at 4.
55. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872).
56. The equal protection clause provides in part that "[n]o State shall... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
58. Id. at 304.
59. Id. at 305.
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peal eventually reached the Supreme Court.
6°
The Supreme Court agreed with Strauder that the West Virginia statute
contravened the equal protection clause. The Court explained that the purpose
of the equal protection clause is to end racial discrimination by state govern-
ments. 6 1 It found that the West Virginia statute discriminated against black
persons in two ways. First, the statute denied black defendants equal protection
by providing that they were to be tried by juries from which members of their
race had been purposely excluded, while entitling whites to juries selected from
persons of their own race.62 The Court held that although no defendant has a
right to a jury consisting of members of his race,63 a state may not summarily
deprive anyone of that possibility. 4 Second, the statute denied black prospec-
tive jurors equal protection by refusing them the privilege of participating
equally in the administration ofjustice.65 Strauder thus became a powerful pre-
cedent proscribing racial discrimination in jury selection.
Strauder was the first shot fired in a more than one-hundred-year war over
the extent of the equal protection clause's reach in regulating jury selection prac-
tices. Throughout the century following Strauder, the Court consistently reaf-
firmed the case's fundamental pronouncement outlawing jury selection
procedures that discriminate against racial minorities.66 Moreover, the Court
extended Strauder, which had involved a facially discriminatory statute, by for-
bidding the states from applying facially neutral statutes in a discriminatory
manner 67 and by prohibiting purposeful, substantial underrepresentation of mi-
60. Id. at 304.
61. Id. at 306-07, 310. The Court wrote:
What is [the meaning of the fourteenth amendment] but declaring that the law in the States
shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether [black] or white,
shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the [black] race, for whose
protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made
against them by law because of their color?
Id. at 307. During the past 100 years, the Court has expanded this interpretation so that the equal
protection clause now protects against governmental discrimination on grounds other than race,
although the protection exists to different extents depending upon the identity of the protected
group. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 5, at §§ 14.11-.25; L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTrrrUoNAL LAW §§ 16-23 to -31 (2d ed. 1988).
62. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.
63. Id.; accord Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1879) (companion case to Strauder,
mere fact that black defendant was convicted by all.white jury did not warrant reversal when de-
fendant made no showing of racial discrimination); cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)
(defendant not entitled to a jury of any particular composition).
64. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.
65. See id. at 308. The Court explained:
The very fact that [black] people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all right
to participation in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though
they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon
them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race
prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice
which the law aims to secure to all others.
Id.
66. See, eg., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 492-93 (1977); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396
U.S. 320, 329 (1970); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 549-50 (1967); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
559, 561 (1953); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935).
67. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954); see Avery, 345 U.S. at 562-63 (although
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norities on jury lists. 68
Prior to 1965 the Court's equal protection-jury selection cases were limited
to claims of discrimination in the formation of jury pools. 69 As the Court struck
down states' discriminatory practices in this area and black persons finally were
included on jury lists, however, prosecutors found other ways to prevent black
persons from sitting on juries.70 One method prosecutors used was exercising
peremptory challenges at trial to strike black potential jurors from the venire.7 1
The Court addressed the constitutionality of this practice for the first time in
Swain v. Alabama.72
Swain, a black man, was charged with rape.73 At trial he moved to strike
the venire and to declare void the all-white jury, contending that both had been
chosen in a discriminatory manner. Specifically, Swain claimed that the prose-
cutor had exercised his peremptory challenges unlawfully against all of the black
persons on the venire. 74 The trial court denied Swain's motions and the Ala-
bama Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence. 75
The United States Supreme Court first dismissed Swain's argument that the
State intentionally excluded black persons from the jury pool. 7 6 The Court then
considered his claim that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges
purposely to exclude all black persons from the jury in violation of the equal
protection clause. In its analysis, the Court recognized the inherent tension be-
tween peremptory challenges and the fourteenth amendment. It acknowledged,
on the one hand, that settled constitutional principles prohibiting racially dis-
criminatory state jury selection practices apply not only to discrimination in
selecting persons for jury service, but also to discrimination in selecting the ju-
rors in a particular case. 77 On the other hand, the Court noted that peremptory
challenges historically have been thought to facilitate the selection of fair and
impartial juries-both in fact and as perceived by the parties. 78 The Court con-
statute was facially neutral, State used different color record cards to identify black persons and to
make it easier for jury commissioners to avoid selecting blacks for jury service); Norris, 294 U.S. at
589-91 (despite statute permitting black persons to serve as jurors, no black person ever was called to
jury service); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 371-73, 394 (1881) (finding equal protection violation
when statute authorized only qualified voters to be jurors and state law prohibited black persons
from voting).
68. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 493; see Whitus, 385 U.S. at 550-51.
69. See, eg., Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 478-79; Avery, 345 U.S. at 561; Patton v. Mississippi, 332
U.S. 463, 464 (1947); Norris, 294 U.S. at 590-93.
70. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 150; Kuhn, supra note 12, at 283.
71. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 150; Kuhn, supra note 12, at 283.
72. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
73. Id. at 203.
74. See id. at 203, 205-06, 209-10.
75. Id. at 203.
76. Id. at 209. The Court noted that eight black persons had been on the venire and that Swain
failed otherwise to prove purposeful discrimination. Id. at 205-09.
77. See id. at 224 (holding that the peremptory challenge may not be used to deny black per-
sons the right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice that white persons
enjoy).
78. Id. at 212-20. The sixth amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a ... trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. For a
discussion of the history of the peremptory challenge and its adoption into the American legal sys-
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cluded that challenging black prospective jurors on account of race does not
necessarily violate the equal protection clause.79 Peremptory challenges, the
Court reasoned, are necessarily discretionary. To remove all jurors they believe
are biased, litigants must be permitted to exercise peremptory challenges on the
basis of prospective jurors' looks, gestures, habits, and group affiliations.80 This
principle holds true particularly in light of the limited knowledge litigants nor-
mally have about prospective jurors.81 Moreover, the Court explained, since all
persons are equally subject to being challenged peremptorily, black prospective
jurors are disadvantaged by peremptory challenges no more than white prospec-
tive jurors.82 The Court presumed that prosecutors use peremptory challenges
to obtain impartial juries, not because of racial animus. 83 Accordingly, it held
that a defendant can never prove an equal protection violation solely from the
prosecutor's peremptory challenges in his case.84 To give meaning to Strauder
and its progeny, however, the Court added that a defendant may prove an equal
protection violation by showing that the "prosecutor . . . in case after case,
whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or
victim may be, is responsible for" peremptorily striking all qualified black per-
sons.85 Such evidence would show that the prosecutor challenged members of
the defendant's race not to ensure an impartial jury, but rather to deny them
categorically and unconstitutionally the opportunity to serve as jurors.8 6
Swain's standard for proving a fourteenth amendment violation-system-
atic discrimination by the prosecutor over many cases-soon proved almost im-
possible for defendants to satisfy. In the twenty years following Swain, virtually
no defendants successfully challenged prosecutors' uses of peremptory chal-
lenges.87 The continuing practice of prosecutors peremptorily striking all or
most blacks caused the Supreme Court in 1986 to re-examine, in Batson, the
Swain standard of proof.
III. BATSON V. KENTUCKY
A. The Batson Opinions
James Kirkland Batson, a black man, was charged with second-degree bur-
glary and receipt of stolen goods.8 8 On the first day of his trial in a Kentucky
circuit court, the judge excused a number of jurors for cause and then permitted
tern, see supra notes 26-54 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how, in theory, the peremp-
tory challenge facilitates the selection of impartial jurors, see supra notes 31-33 and accompanying
text.
79. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221.
80. See id. at 220-21.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 221.
83. Id. at 222.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 223.
86. Id. at 224.
87. See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1118 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Swain has led most courts to
reject all constitutional challenges to the prosecutor's alleged discriminatory use of peremptories.").
88. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82.
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the attorneys to exercise peremptory challenges.8 9 The prosecutor used his per-
emptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the venire.90 Batson's
counsel objected to the prosecutor's actions and moved to discharge the jury.9 1
He argued that striking the black persons violated Batson's sixth and fourteenth
amendment rights to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community92
and his fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the laws.93 The trial
court denied the motion, and Batson was convicted by the all-white jury.94 The
Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. 95 Relying on Swain, the court found that
Batson had neither alleged nor proved the prosecutor's systematic exclusion of
black persons.96 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed Batson's conviction. 97
Justice Powell wrote for a seven-justice majority. Once again, the Court
reaffirmed the basic constitutional principle that the State may not engage in
racial discrimination when selecting juries. 98 "The harm from discriminatory
jury selection," Justice Powell remarked, "extends... to touch the entire com-
munity" by undermining public confidence in the fairness of the judicial sys-
tem. 99 The Court then overruled Swain's holding that a defendant can prove
unconstitutional discrimination only by showing systematic discrimination over
time. 100 The Court explained that the equal protection clause proscribes not
only those peremptory challenges that are motivated by racial animus, but also
those that are based on the patently erroneous assumption that members of the
defendant's race as a group are biased.10 1 This holding was a stark departure
from Swain, which had held expressly that group affiliations are constitutionally
proper bases for peremptory challenges. 102 Moreover, the Batson Court recog-
89. Id. at 82-83.
90. Id. at 83.
91. Id.
92. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. It is applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). The
Supreme Court has construed this clause to guarantee the defendant a jury drawn from a fair cross-
section of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
93. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 84.
96. Id. Batson did not press his equal protection claim in the Kentucky Supreme Court, appar-
ently conceding that he could not meet the Swain standard of systematic exclusion of blacks over
time. In analyzing Batson's sixth amendment claim, however, the Kentucky Supreme Court held
that the Swain standard also applied when the defendant alleged a fair cross-section violation as a
result of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges. Id. at 83-84.
97. Id. at 84.
98. Id. Batson never raised an equal protection claim in the Supreme Court. Rather, he relied
solely on the sixth amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.
Nevertheless, the majority declined to address the sixth amendment claim and reversed Batson's
conviction exclusively on equal protection grounds. This action spurred a vehement dissent from
Chief Justice Burger. See id. at 112-18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 87.
100. Id. at 92-93.
101. See id. at 86.
102. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965); supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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nized that Swain's requirement of systematic discrimination over time saddled
defendants with a "crippling burden of proof" 10 3 while leaving prosecutors' per-
emptory challenges "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny."'1 4 The
Court held that defendants may prove equal protection violations from the per-
emptory challenges exercised in their cases alone.105
Justice Powell then announced the particular manner in which defendants
may prove discrimination. 106 Initially, the defendant must establish a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination.10 7 The prima facie case has three ele-
ments. First, the defendant must be a member of a cognizable racial group and
the prosecutor must have exercised peremptory challenges against members of
that group.10 8 Next, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact that peremptory
challenges "permit[] 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discrimi-
nate.' "109 Last, the defendant must show that these facts and any other rele-
vant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory
challenges to remove prospective jurors on account of race.110 Once the defend-
ant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to come
forward with "clear and reasonably specific" race-neutral reasons for the per-
emptory challenges under attack.11' This explanation need not rise to a level
that would justify a challenge for cause, but it must be more than an assertion of
good faith." 12 The defendant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on the
issue of the prosecutor's purposeful discrimination.' 13
The Batson Court instructed that this burden-shifting evidentiary system
would operate in the same manner as the evidentiary system used in "disparate
treatment" employment discrimination cases under Title VII 114 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.115 Justice Powell already had explained the purpose of such
103. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
104. Id. at 93-94.
105. Id. at 95-98; see id. at 100-01 (White, J., concurring). Because the Court believed that the
peremptory challenge makes an important contribution to the justice system, however, it expressly
declined to abolish the challenge. Id. at 98-99 & n.22.
106. In formulating the standard of proof, the Court was guided by the general principle that
governmental action alleged to be discriminatory must be traced to a racially discriminatory pur-
pose. This requirement emerged from the Court's landmark equal protection cases of the 1970.. See
id. at 93 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)).
107. See id.
108. Id. at 96 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)). Since 1986, the Court has
retreated from the position that the defendant and the challenged juror must be of the same race. In
1991, the Court held that a white defendant has standing to allocate peremptory challenges exercised
against members of other, constitutionally recognizable racial groups. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S, Ct.
1364, 1370, 1373 (1991).
109. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
110. Id.
I 11. Id. at 97-98 & n.20 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
258 (1981)).
112. Id. at 97-98. A prosecutor may not claim simply that in her intuitive judgment the chal-
lenged jurors would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race. Id. at 97.
113. Id. at 94 n.18. Since the trial court's findings will turn largely on credibility evaluations, the
Court held, appellate courts should give those findings great deference. Id. at 98 n.21; see infra notes
277-83 and accompanying text.
114. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
115. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18 (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
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a system in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine :116 it "serves to
bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to [the] ultimate ques-
tion"117 whether the party in question engaged in illegal discrimination. At is-
sue in discrimination cases is alleged improper intent or motivation. A person's
intent is difficult to prove by objective evidence. 118 Furthermore, the alleged
discriminating party naturally has superior access to proof of his own reasons
for the questioned conduct. By shifting the burden of coming forward to the
party whose actions are at issue once the complaining party provides threshold
prima facie evidence, the burden-shifting system provides persons alleging dis-
crimination with "the kind of detailed discovery that would make it possible for
them to prove illicit intent." 119 To effectuate this discovery purpose, Burdine
explicitly held that "[t]he burden of establishing a prima facie case... is not
onerous." 120 Likewise, therefore, the prima facie burden under Batson is not
burdensome. 121
Justice White, the author of Swain, concurred in the decision to overrule
Swain.122 That case, he explained, had been a warning that removing black
persons on the assumption that they could not judge black defendants fairly
would contravene the equal protection clause. 123 Since discriminatory peremp-
tory challenges remained widespread despite this warning, Justice White argued
that defendants, in appropriate cases, should have an opportunity to inquire into
prosecutors' reasons for challenging black potential jurors. 124
460 U.S. 711,714-15 (1983); see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,252-56
(1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973)). Numerous lower courts
have interpreted Batson as relying on the Court's Title VII cases to explain the operation of the
burden-shifting rules. See, eg., People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 177, 184, 544 N.E.2d 357, 381, 384
(1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990); Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 60, 542 A.2d 1267, 1271-72
(1988); Chisolm v. State, 529 So. 2d 635, 637 (Miss. 1988); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 63 (Mo.
1987) (en banc), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 497-98, 391 S.E.2d
144, 150 (1990).
116. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
117. Id. at 253.
118. See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (shifting burdens of proof
under Title VII designed to assure that " 'plaintiff [has] his day in court despite the unavailability of
direct evidence'" of discriminatory intent (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (lst
Cir. 1979))); 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 50.10, at 10-6 (1990)
(employers are "too sophisticated to profess their prejudices on paper or before witnesses"); Blumoff
& Lewis, The Reagan Court and Title VIP A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutoiy Task, 69 N.C.L.
REV. 1, 9 (1990) (direct evidence of discriminatory intent is often unavailable).
119. Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VII. United States Postal Service
Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1206 (1982); see also 2 A. LARSON & L.
LARSON, supra note 118, § 50.10, at 10-5 (prima facie case may be established from objective evi-
dence); E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343, at 968 (3d ed. 1984) (one reason for having
burden-shifting presumptions is simple fairness, including situations in which opposing party has
superior means of access to proof).
120. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; accord, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186
(1989).
121. Stanley v. State, 313 Md. App. 50, 71, 542 A.2d 1267, 1277 (1988), cert. denied, 322 Md.
240, 587 A.2d 247 (1991); Blume, Racial Discrimination in the State's Use of Peremptory Challenges:
The Application of the United States Supreme Court's Decision in Batson v. Kentucky in South Caro-
lina, 40 S.C.L. REV. 299, 330 (1989).
122. Batson, 476 U.S. at 101 (White, J., concurring).
123. Id. (White, J., concurring).
124. See id. (White, J., concurring).
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Justice Marshall's concurrence was not nearly as approving of the majority
opinion as Justice White's. Although he did characterize the Court's opinion as
an "historic step toward eliminating the shameful practice of racial discrimina-
tion in the selection of juries," 125 Justice Marshall opined that Batson's new
standard of proof would not bring about the end of discrimination. 126 He feared
that prosecutors easily could evade Batson by proffering pretextual, facially non-
racial explanations that the courts could not second-guess. 127 Stressing that the
peremptory challenge is not of constitutional magnitude, Justice Marshall ar-
gued that the peremptory challenge should be banned entirely.1 28
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger
also predicted that Batson would not eradicate discrimination in jury selec-
tion.129 The Chief Justice came to the opposite conclusion from Justice Mar-
shall, however, asserting that the peremptory challenge is essential to assure the
appearance of justice.130 He argued that since all groups are subject to the per-
emptory challenge in a given case, striking jurors because of group affiliation
does not violate the equal protection clause in the particular case.131 The Chief
Justice thus would have reaffirmed Swain and upheld Batson's conviction. 132
125. Id. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 102-05 (Marshall, J., concurring) (predicting that all but the most flagrant violations
of the rule would remain unassailable).
127. Id. at 105-06 (Marshall, 3., concurring).
128. Id. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring). In addition to the concurring opinions by Justices
White and Marshall, Justice O'Connor wrote to argue that the decision should not be applied retro-
actively, see id. at 111 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and Justice Stevens wrote to justify the Court's
decision to resolve the case on equal protection grounds, even though Batson had not argued that
issue before the Court, see id. at 108-11 (Stevens, J., concurring).
129. The Chief Justice had several other criticisms of the majority's analysis and holding. He
doubted that prosecutors exercising peremptory challenges could meet the burden of providing neu-
tral explanations for their action. Batson, 476 U.S. at 129 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). He also was
skeptical that prosecutors could offer explanations somewhere between that required for a peremp-
tory challenge (no explanation) and that required for a challenge for cause; permitting any inquiry
into the basis for a peremptory challenge would "force 'the peremptory challenge [to] collapse into
the challenge for cause."' Id. at 127 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Clark, 737
F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984)).
130. Id. at 120 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 122-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 118-31 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). In a separate dissenting opinion joined by Chief
Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist asserted the importance of the peremptory challenge as a part of
the system of trial by jury. He added that "[t]he use of group affiliations, such as age, race, or
occupation... based on the assumption or belief that members of one group are more likely to favor
defendants who belong to the same group, has long been accepted as a legitimate basis for the State's
exercise of peremptory challenges." Id. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's argu-
ment that members of the defendant's race may be assumed to be biased in favor of the defendant,
however, even if true, cuts two ways. Consider, for example, the common case with a black defend-
ant and a white victim and prosecutor. Justice Rehnquist's theory states that black members of the
jury may be biased for the defendant. Consequently, the prosecutor should be permitted to remove
those black jurors peremptorily. Justice Rehnquist's argument necessarily implies, however, that
white persons may be assumed to be biased in favor of whites. It follows that the white jurors may
be assumed to be biased in favor of the victim and prosecutor, and against the defendant. Since in
most cases more white persons will be on the venire than black persons, the defendant will not be
able to remove as great a percentage of the whites as the prosecutor will be able to remove of the
blacks, and the result will not be an impartial jury, but rather one in which the "subtle group biases
of the majority... operate, while those of the minority [are] silenced." Commonwealth v. Soares,




Batson struck a new balance in the ongoing conflict between the equal pro-
tection clause and the peremptory challenge. It made clear that, despite nor-
mally being exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner, the peremptory
challenge is subject to the strictures of the fourteenth amendment. 133 As a fed-
eral appeals court later remarked, the case's core principle is that " 'a defendant
[has] the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to
nondiscriminatory criteria.' "134 More specifically, Batson sought to provide a
more effective means than Swain of ensuring that members of racial minorities
are not excluded from juries on account of race. 135
The Court expressly refused, however, to specify the implementation of the
Batson evidentiary scheme. 136 Instead, it assigned to state and lower federal
290-91. Even if Justice Relmquist's assumption were true, therefore, it would operate in favor of
restrictions on the right to exercise peremptory challenges on the basis of race.
133. In a footnote, Justice Powell wrote: "The standard we adopt ... is designed to ensure that
a State does not use peremptory challenges to strike any black juror because of... race." Batson,
476 U.S. at 99 n.22. At least one commentator has criticized the Batson Court for seeking "to
manifest its symbolic opposition to racial discrimination while doing as little as possible to alter the
peremptory challenge." Alschuler, supra note 7, at 199. While it is possible that the subjective
intention of the Batson majority was simply to oppose racial discrimination symbolically, courts
must take the Supreme Court at its word when implementing the decision.
134. United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at
85-86). The court noted that Batson's command is to eliminate, not merely minimize, racial discrim-
ination in jury selection. Id. at 1571.
135. Commonwealth v. McCormick, 359 Pa. Super. 461, 474, 519 A.2d 442, 449 (1986).
136. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 & n.24. In addition to implementation issues, Batson left unan-
swered a panoply of questions regarding the scope of its application. For example, the decision did
not address whether the use of peremptory challenges against minorities may be attacked as a viola-
tion of the sixth amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 n.4. Four years later, however, the Court held that the sixth amendment does
not forbid prosecutors from striking jurors on account of race. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803,
811 (1990).
The Court also left unanswered what constitutes a "cognizable group" entitled to Batson pro-
tection. Lower courts have held that Hispanics are one such group. See, e.g., State v. Sandoval, 105
N.M. 696, 700, 736 P.2d 501, 505 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Ramos, 574 A.2d 1213, 1216 (R.I. 1990);
State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 596 (Utah 1988). Native Americans are another. See, e.g., United
States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436, 441 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989); United States
v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987); State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 499, 391 S.E.2d 144,
151 (1990). The courts have split, however, on whether women constitute a cognizable Batson
group. Compare United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1422 (9th Cir. 1990) (prohibiting per-
emptory challenges on the basis of gender) with State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 870 (R.I. 1987)
(women not a cognizable group). See also People v. Blunt, 162 A.D.2d 86, 88-89, 561 N.Y.S.2d 90,
92 (1990) (state constitution's equal protection clause prohibits peremptory challenges on basis of
gender); Sagawa, Batson v. Kentucky: Will It Keep Women on the Jury?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 14, 37-44 (1987-88) (arguing that Batson proscribes exclusion of women through peremptory
challenges).
The question whether white persons may assert Batson claims has arisen in two contexts. One
issue is whether white defendants have standing to challenge the striking of black prospective jurors.
Batson's language suggests that white persons have no such standing, since one of the elements of the
Batson prima facie case is that members of the defendant's race were struck. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
In 1991, however, the Court held that the defendant's race is irrelevant to the issue of standing to
raise an equal protection claim. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370, 1373 (1991). The second
issue regarding the standing of white defendants is whether they may attack peremptory challenges
exercised against white jurors on account of race. The few courts that have addressed this question
have answered it in the affirmative. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 365 F.2d 59, 64 (3d
Cir. 1989); State v. Smith, 515 So. 2d 149, 150 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (dictum).
A hotly debated issue left unanswered by Batson is whether the defendant is precluded by the
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courts 13 7 the task of determining what evidence gives rise to a prima facie infer-
ence of discrimination and what prosecutorial explanations rebut a prima facie
case. 138 In effect, having laid down the relevant constitutional guidelines, the
Court challenged the lower courts to eradicate .discriminatory jury selection
practices.
One of the major side effects of Batson's evidentiary standard is that it fun-
damentally changes the prosecutorial peremptory challenge. By definition, per-
emptory challenges require no explanation. Thus, when prosecutors must give
reasons for their peremptory challenges, those challenges are no longer peremp-
tory. Lower courts implementing Batson can handle this consequence in several
ways. They can require a low threshold showing by the defendant to raise a
prima facie inference of discrimination, in which case prosecutors will have to
explain their challenges more often. They also can scrutinize prosecutors' rebut-
tal explanations closely, causing more prosecutorial challenges to be found un-
constitutional. Although the attack on discrimination might be successful, the
effect would be to sacrifice the peremptory challenge's peremptory nature. Al-
ternatively, the courts can require a high level of prima facie proof and not scru-
tinize prosecutors' proffered reasons so closely. Although this approach would
protect the peremptory challenge from serious intrusion, it might render Batson
no more effective than Swain in rooting out discrimination. One answer to this
apparent dilemma lies in the purpose of Batson: the Court specifically stated
that it intended to ensure that no state strikes any juror because of race. 139 Ar-
guably, therefore, lower courts should construe any doubt in favor of combating
discrimination, even at the expense of the peremptory challenge. By technically
permitting the implementing courts to operate within this range of options, Bat-
son's language gives these courts considerable power to define the extent to
which the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges and the peremptory chal-
Constitution from exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of race. In his Batson dissent, Chief
Justice Burger contended that "'[b]etween [the defendant] and the state the scales are to be evenly
held.'" 476 U.S. at 126 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70
(1887)). Thus, Batson also should apply to the defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges. Id. at 125-26 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Alschuler, supra note 7, at 197-98 (defend-
ants' peremptory challenges are "state actions" subject to the strictures of the fourteenth
amendment); Note, Discrimination by the Defense" Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 355, 365-68 (1988) (prosecutors should have third-party standing to
assert rights of jurors excluded by defendants). In 1990 New York became the first state to prohibit
racially motivated peremptory challenges by the defendant. See People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 650,
554 N.E.2d 1235, 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 653, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990). Some commenta-
tors have argued, however, that the defendant's use of peremptory challenges is not a "state action"
subject to the strictures of the fourteenth amendment. Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's
Use of Peremptory Challenges On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV,
808, 838 (1989); see Note, Defendant's Discriminatory Use of the Peremptory Challenge After Batson
v. Kentucky, 62 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 46, 57 (1987).
137. Although the equal protection clause by its terms applies only to actions of state govern-
ments, the right to equal protection, and thus Batson, applies to actions of the federal government
through the fifth amendment. United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1544 n.2 (11th Cir. 1989)
(citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364 n.4 (1974)).
138. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 & n.24. The Court cited the "variety of jury selection practices" in
state and federal trial courts as its reason for not dictating how to implement the decision. Id. at 99
n.24.
139. Id. at 97.
1548 [Vol. 69
CRIMINAL LAW
lenge itself survive. In short, the lower courts have become laboratories experi-
menting with whether and how the equal protection clause and the peremptory
challenge can coexist in the American judicial system.
Several critics have echoed Justice Marshall's opinion that the peremptory
challenge and the equal protection clause cannot coexist and have called for the
abolition of peremptory challenges as the only effective way of ending discrimi-
natory jury selection. 140 They have noted that "a prosecutor can easily assert
facially neutral reasons for striking a juror," thus rendering Batson's constitu-
tional protections illusory. 14 1 Before a sufficient number of lower courts apply
Batson rigorously, however, it would be premature to toss out the decision and,
with it, the eight-hundred-year old peremptory challenge. 142 As is evident from
North Carolina's experience, some states have failed to implement Batson ag-
gressively, instead adopting an unduly constricted view of the decision. 143 As a
result, the jury remains out on Batson, while defendants and prospective jurors
continue to suffer the invidious effects of racially discriminatory jury selection
practices. 44
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BATsON IN NORTH CAROLINA
In his concurring opinion, Justice White predicted that "[m]uch litigation
[would] be required to spell out the contours of the Court's equal protection
holding."145 In the five years since Batson, state and federal courts have heard
literally hundreds of Batson claims. Nevertheless, no consensus has emerged on
how best to implement the decision. As a result, Batson's impact has varied
from state to state. In North Carolina, neither the supreme court nor the court
of appeals ever has found a prosecutor guilty of violating Batson.146 This section
examines how North Carolina has implemented the decision and considers why
no North Carolina defendant has won a Batson claim.
140. See Chew v. State, 71 Md. App. 681, 717, 527 A.2d 332, 350 (1987); Commonwealth v.
Hardcastle, 519 Pa. 236, 261-64, 546 A.2d 1101, 1113-14 (1988) (Nix, CJ., dissenting), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1169 (1990); Note, supra note 16, at 1039; see also Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note
2, at 234 (prosecutor's peremptory challenges should be abolished); Massaro, supra note 6, at 560-63
(same); Note, The Use of Peremptory Challenges to Exclude Blacks from Petit Juries in Civil Actions:
The Case for Striking Peremptory Strikes, 4 REv. OF LITIGATION 175, 212-13, 215 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Note, The Case for Striking Peremptory Strikes] (peremptory challenges should be abolished in
civil cases).
141. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring); see Hardcastle, 519 Pa. at 261, 546 A.2d
at 1113 (Nix, C.J., dissenting); Note, supra note 16, at 1036-38.
142. See Note, Batson v. Kentucky and the Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and
Capricious Equal Protection?, 74 VA. L. Rv. 811, 818 (1988).
143. See Blume, supra note 121, at 300 (unduly restrictive view of Batson adopted in South
Carolina).
144. In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall scolded that "[m]isuse of the peremptory chal-
lenge to exclude black jurors has become both common and flagrant." Batson, 476 U.S. at 103
(Marshall, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 102 (White, J., concurring).
146. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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A. The Prima Facie Case
Batson set forth the three elements of the prima facie case. The prosecutor
must have peremptorily challenged members of a cognizable racial group. Sec-
ond, the defendant may rely on the fact that the peremptory challenge is a device
susceptible to being used in a discriminatory manner. Third, the defendant must
show that these facts and "other relevant circumstances" raise an inference of
discrimination.147 The North Carolina Supreme Court and the North Carolina
Court of Appeals have dealt almost exclusively with the third element, and thus
this question: What facts and circumstances raise an inference of purposeful
discrimination? 148
The North Carolina appellate courts have identified several circumstances
that are relevant to this prima facie inquiry. Some of these circumstances tend
to support an inference of discrimination. They include a pattern of peremptory
challenges against black persons, use of a disproportionate number of challenges
against black persons, questions and remarks by the prosecutor during voir dire
that suggest racial animus, and the prominence of racial issues in the case. 149
Other circumstances the courts have recognized, in contrast, tend to refute an
allegation of discrimination. Those circumstances include the acceptance rate of
minority jurors by the State' 50 and the ultimate racial composition of the
jury.151
Only once, however, has a North Carolina appellate court found the cir-
cumstances of a case sufficient to raise a prima facie inference of discrimina-
147. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96; see supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
148. The North Carolina courts have not focused on the first element of the prima facie case
because only a few cases have considered Batson when the defendant was not black. See State v.
Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 499, 391 S.E.2d 144, 151 (1990) (Native Americans are racial group cogniza-
ble for Batson purposes); State v. Agudelo, 89 N.C. App. 640, 647-48, 366 S.E.2d 921, 925-26 (deny-
ing Hispanic defendant's Batson claim without deciding whether Hispanics are cognizable group),
disc rev. denied, 323 N.C. 176, 373 S.E.2d 115 (1988). The courts have not addressed the second
"element" of the prima facie case because it is merely a proposition upon which the defendant may
rely when attempting to show discrimination. It is not a fact to be established, and thus has gener-
ated no litigation.
149. See State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 121, 400 S.E.2d 712, 724 (1991); State v. Porter, 326 N.C.
489, 498, 391 S.E.2d 144, 150-51 (1990); State v. Crandell, 322 N.C. 487, 502, 369 S.E.2d 579, 588
(1988); State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 255, 368 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110(1989); State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 490-91, 356 S.E.2d 279, 294-95, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918
(1987).
150. Smith, 328 N.C. at 121, 400 S.E.2d at 724. Prior to Smith the North Carolina Supreme
Court had held, in effect, that any time the State's acceptance rate of black potential jurors was 40%
or greater, then no prima facie inference of discrimination arose. See State v. Allen, 323 N.C. 208,
219, 372 S.E.2d 855, 862 (1988) (prosecutor accepted 41% of black prospective jurors), vacated on
other grounds, 110 S. Ct. 1463 (1990); Crandell, 322 N.C. at 502, 369 S.E.2d at 588 (prosecutor
accepted 50% of black prospective jurors); State v. Abbott, 320 N.C. 475, 481-82, 358 S.E.2d 365,
369-70 (1987) (prosecutor accepted 40% of black prospective jurors); State v. Belton, 318 N.C. 141,
159, 347 S.E.2d 755, 766 (1986) (prosecutor accepted 50% of black prospective jurors). This rule
was inconsistent with Batson because it permitted prosecutors to strike peremptorily up to 60% of
the minorities tendered virtually without fear of Batson consequences. Thus, by recognizing that the
acceptance rate of minorities by the State is relevant to, but not dispositive of, the prima facie in-
quiry, the Smith decision brought North Carolina practice in line with the dictates of the Batson
Court.




tion. 152 In State v. Smith,1 5 3 decided in 1991, the prosecutor struck twelve out
of the twenty-one black prospective jurors tendered to him. 154 He used his first
three peremptory challenges, six of his first seven, and twelve out of a total of
fifteen exercised, to remove black persons. 155 In addition, the case, which in-
volved an interracial killing, was so polluted with racial emotions that its venue
had been changed to another county.156 Most significantly, the prosecutor's re-
marks during jury selection suggested strongly that his peremptory challenges
were racially motivated. The district attorney complained that the defendant
had struck several white prospective jurors and then stated:
I submit to the Court that the State, the victim in this case is also
entitled to a fair representation of those jurors who are seated there.
The victim is white, they ought to have a fair representation as to the
number of black/white jurors that are on there, and at the rate that
we're going, we'll have-if it's any wish apparently of the defendant,
we'll have nine-nine/three or worse.157
The court held that the pattern of discrimination, the exercise of a dispropor-
tionate percentage of the State's challenges against black persons, the racially-
charged nature of the case, and the prosecutor's race-conscious remarks together
established a prima facie inference of discrimination. 158
The North Carolina appellate courts have found only this one blatant prima
facie case to have been established in the five years since Batson, primarily be-
cause they have misapplied the Batson rule by taking into account the voir dire
responses of challenged jurors when evaluating the strength of the prima facie
inference.1 59 State v. Robbins 160 illustrates this misapplication. In Robbins a
152. In some cases, trial courts have found that the defendant made out a prima facie case. See
infra note 224.
153. 328 N.C. 99, 400 S.E.2d 712 (1991).
154. Id. at 121, 400 S.E.2d at 724.
155. Id. at 123, 400 S.E.2d at 725.
156. Id. at 122, 400 S.E.2d at 725.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 123, 400 S.E.2d at 725. The court then found that the prosecutor adequately rebutted
the prima facie case, and thus was not guilty of aBatson violation. Id. at 126-27, 400 S.E.2d at 727-
28.
159. Another way in which the North Carolina Supreme Court has misapplied the Batson prima
facie case is by holding that the racial composition of the impaneled jury mirroring the racial compo-
sition of the county in which the trial took place is relevant evidence refuting an allegation of dis-
crimination. See State v. Belton, 318 N.C. 141, 159, 347 S.E.2d 755, 766 (1986); see also Smith, 328
N.C. at 124, 400 S.E.2d at 726 (ultimate racial makeup of jury relevant to determination that Batson
not violated); State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 500, 391 S.E.2d 144, 152 (1990) (fact that jury mirrored
racial composition of county is relevant to determination that Batson not violated). The relationship
between the racial composition of the jury and the racial composition of the county is relevant only
to the question whether the defendant was tried by a jury made up of a cross-section of the commu-
nity. The right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community is guaranteed by the sixth
amendment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). Batson, however, is grounded solely
on the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, which prohibits any discriminatory peremp-
tory challenge regardless of the racial composition of the eventual jury. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has held that the racial composition of the jury is irrelevant to Batson. See Alvarado v. United
States, 110 S. Ct. 2995, 2996 (1990) (per curiam) (reversing decision of court of appeals, which had
denied Batson claim on ground that the jury chosen satisfied the sixth amendment fair cross-section
concept).
160. 319 N.C. 465, 356 S.E.2d 279, cerL denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
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black man was charged with first degree murder, robbery with a firearm, and
kidnapping.161 Of the seventy-six potential jurors questioned during voir dire,
twenty-one were black. 162 The state challenged ten of the black persons for
cause because of their unequivocal opposition to the death penalty,163 and the
trial court excused two blacks on its own motion. 164 The prosecutor then exer-
cised peremptory challenges against seven of the nine remaining black prospec-
tive jurors.' 65 An all-white jury convicted Robbins and sentenced him to
death. 16 6
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected Robbins's conten-
tion that the prosecutor's striking seven black potential jurors established a
prima facie inference of discrimination. The court first emphasized that judges
must consider "all relevant circumstances" when determining whether prima
facie cases exist. 167 The fact that the jury was composed entirely of white per-
sons, the court held, did not necessarily imply discrimination. 168 Moreover, the
court noted that the prosecutor had examined all potential jurors in the same
manner; nothing in his questions or statements indicated a discriminatory mo-
tive. 169 Most significantly, however, the court relied on facts that the challenged
jurors themselves had revealed in response to voir dire questioning: three of
them had reservations about their ability to impose the death penalty; one was
related to some of the defense witnesses; and two had been exposed to some
pretrial publicity.' 70 The court found that these facts dispelled any possible in-
ference that the prosecutor struck the prospective jurors because of their race. 171
Considering the challenged jurors' voir dire responses when deciding
whether a prima facie inference of discrimination exists has been a common
practice of the North Carolina appellate courts. In every such case, the courts
161. Id. at 481, 356 S.E.2d at 289.
162. Id. at 491-92, 356 S.E.2d at 295.
163. The racial implications of jury selection are magnified in capital cases for two reasons.
First, studies have shown that race is an important factor in the imposition of the death penalty;
black defendants who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of being sentenced to death. See
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987). Second, statistically, black persons oppose capital
punishment more often than do whites. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 85 (H. Bedau 3d
ed. 1982); Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury Bias, and Use of
Psychological Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53, 62 (1970). As
a results, blacks are at a greater risk of being removed for cause on those grounds. See Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 175 (1986) (absolute moral opposition to death penalty valid grounds for
challenge for cause in capital case); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) (same).
164. Robbins, 319 N.C. at 492, 356 S.E.2d at 295.
165. Id. The defendant peremptorily challenged one black potential juror; the other black per-
son sat as an alternate juror in the case. Id.
166. Id. at 491, 356 S.E.2d at 295.
167. Id. at 489, 356 S.E.2d at 293 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97).
168. Id. at 494-95, 356 S.E.2d at 297.
169. Id. at 493-94, 356 S.E.2d at 296.
170. See id. The courts cited similar voir dire responses in rejecting prima facie cases in State v.
Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 619, 386 S.E.2d 418, 424 (1989) (potential juror held reservations about impos-
ing death penalty), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2587 (1990); State v. Aytche, 98 N.C. App. 358, 365, 391
S.E.2d 43, 47 (1990) (potential juror previously convicted of manslaughter); and State v. Batts, 93
N.C. App. 404, 409, 378 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1989) (potential juror knew members of defendant's family
and attended school with defendant's brother).
171. Robbins, 319 N.C. at 494, 356 S.E.2d at 296.
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have held that the facts disclosed by the jurors refuted any possible inference of
prosecutorial discrimination. Thus, for example, no inference of discrimination
has arisen when voir dire questioning revealed that the challenged black jurors
previously had been convicted for nonsupport and writing bad checks; 172 that
the potential juror had served on a jury within the previous four years;1 7 3 that
she had worked with youth who had drug and alcohol problems;'17" that she had
a "hard look on her face"; 175 and, in a case in which the defendant was twenty
years old, that the juror had three grown children.17 6
By factoring in the challenged jurors' voir dire responses, North Carolina
courts have confused facts that are relevant only to the prosecutor's rebuttal
with facts that are relevant to the prima facie case. For example, in determining
whether an inference of discrimination arose in Robbins, the court took into
account statements by one challenged juror who had said she was related to
some of the defense witnesses, two who had said they had been exposed to pre-
trial publicity, and one who had expressed reservations about imposing the
death penalty. 177 These are not circumstances surrounding the disputed per-
emptory challenges, but are merely possible reasons why the prosecutor might
have challenged the jurors. The distinction between the circumstances sur-
rounding the prosecutor's peremptory challenges and the prosecutor's possible
reasons for those challenges is crucial because, according to Batson, courts are
supposed to consider only the circumstances surrounding the challenges at the
prima facie stage; the prosecutor is supposed to proffer her reasons for the chal-
lenges once the defendant has established a prima facie case. 178
The circumstances surrounding the prosecutor's peremptory challenges
consist of the prosecutor's handling of the jury selection, and the conditions that
characterize the jury selection and the case itself. Specifically, they include the
manner in which the prosecutor questioned prospective jurors, the racial compo-
sition of the jury, the pattern of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges, and the
172. Batts, 93 N.C. App. at 409, 378 S.E.2d at 213.
173. Davis, 325 N.C. at 619, 386 S.E.2d at 424.
174. Id.
175. State v. Melvin, 99 N.C. App. 16, 30, 392 S.E.2d 740, 748 (1990).
176. Davis, 325 N.C. at 619, 386 S.E.2d at 424.
177. State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 492, 356 S.E.2d 279, 295, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987);
see supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
178. In Tolbert v. State, 315 Md. 13, 553 A.2d 228 (1989), the Maryland Court of Appeals
stated: "What reasons a prosecutor may advance for his challenges are not relevant to a prima facie
showing vel non. It is the 'circumstances' concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
which may create a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors ... ." Id. at 18, 533 A.2d
at 230. See also People v. Trevino, 39 Cal. 3d 667, 692 n.26, 704 P.2d 719, 733 n.26, 217 Cal. Rptr.
652, 666 n.26 (1985) (en bane) ("It is neither the function nor the duty of the trial courts, or the
appellate courts on review, to speculate as to prosecutorial motivation .... "); People v. Harris, 129
Ill. 2d 123, 184, 544 N.E.2d 357, 384 (1989) ("court should not presume, or infer from the facts of
the case, that an unarticulated neutral explanation exists"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990);
Raphael, Discriminatory Jury Selection: Lower Court Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky, 25
WILLAMETrE L. R V. 293, 315 (1989) ("Most courts consider the prosecutor's reasons for chal-
lenges only after a prima facie case has been established."). This is not to say that prosecutors'
possible reasons for exercising the questioned peremptory challenges are irrelevant to whether the
prosecutors violated Batson; indeed, Batson violations ultimately turn on the prosecutors' motivation
for striking the prospective jurors. Rather, the argument is merely that such reasons are irrelevant
to determining whether a prima facie case of Batson discrimination exists.
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racial overtones of the case.179 The potential reasons for the prosecutor's chal-
lenges, in contrast, are the substantive statements that prospective jurors reveal
during voir dire, and any characteristics of the prospective jurors that might
cause the prosecutor to strike the jurors.180 They might include, for example,
the fact that the juror previously had been a criminal defendant or that the juror
is related to the defendant.
A hypothetical situation illustrates further the distinction between "circum-
stances" and "reasons." Suppose ten black prospective jurors are on the venire.
Assume further that nothing in the prosecutor's questions or statements during
jury selection suggests racial animus; the prosecutor, however, exercises peremp-
tory challenges against all ten black jurors. These events and conditions are the
circumstances surrounding the prosecutor's peremptory challenges. The prose-
cutor's apparently evenhanded conduct during the voir dire is a circumstance
weighing against an inference of discrimination; contrarily, the overwhelming
pattern of challenges against black jurors is a circumstance weighing in favor of
an inference of discrimination. If the trial judge finds an inference of discrimina-
tion, under Batson the prosecutor then must show that the peremptory chal-
lenges were not racially motivated. To do that, the prosecutor might explain
that she removed the jurors not because of their race, but because, in response to
voir dire questioning, the jurors indicated that they were related to the defend-
ant, had reservations about the death penalty, had been exposed to pretrial pub-
licity, or the like. These responses would be the prosecutor's reasons for the
challenges.
Taking into account at the prima facie stage what would normally be the
prosecutor's rebuttal reasons is contrary to the letter of Batson and seriously
compromises Batson's ability to provide defendants with an effective means of
proving discrimination. The language of Batson specifically commands that
prosecutors provide legitimate reasons for their peremptory challenges once de-
fendants establish a prima facie case.181 If the lower courts consider prosecu-
tors' potential reasons before the prosecutors state those reasons themselves, this
command becomes meaningless.
More importantly, taking prosecutors' anticipated reasons into account at
the prima facie stage prevents the proper functioning of the Batson prima facie
case.182 As noted above, Batson's burden-shifting evidentiary system requires
179. The "relevant circumstances" that the Robbins court listed as examples all fit this descrip-
tion. See Robbins, 319 N.C. at 490-91, 356 S.E.2d at 294-95 (pattern of strikes against blacks; strik-
ing of disproportionate number of blacks; questions and remarks by prosecutor; fact that victim and
defendant are of different races; racial issues bound up with the conduct of the trial). For a listing of
other "circumstances," see infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 235-51 and accompanying text. Indeed, the purpose of questioning jurors is
to alert the attorneys to facts that might cause the attorneys to challenge the juror.
181. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
182. The term "prima facie case" has several connotations. In one sense, it is the burden on the
party asserting a claim or affirmative defense to produce enough evidence to permit the jury to
decide the issue. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2494, at 379 (Chad-
bourne rev. 1981). The standard of proof for this type of prima facie case is evidence sufficient to
permit a reasonable juror to find the material facts asserted. E. CLEARY, supra note 119, § 338, at
953. In another context, "prima facie case" denotes the establishment of a rebuttable presumption
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that prosecutors explain their allegedly discriminatory actions upon a mere
threshold showing by the defendant. It does not require the defendant to estab-
lish her prima facie case with evidence of actual discriminatory intent on the
prosecutor's part.183 The purpose of this system is to provide the defendant
with the hard-to-obtain information she needs to prove a discriminatory prose-
cutor's illicit intent.18 4 To effectuate this purpose, the prima facie burden is not
onerous. 185 In fact, a Pennsylvania court has held expressly that "in a close case
it is prudent for a court to err on the side of finding a prima facie case and
requiring a neutral explanation."' 186 The North Carolina courts' practice of con-
sidering prosecutors' potential rebuttal explanations at the prima facie stage is
inconsistent with this type of prima facie case in several respects. Most obvi-
ously, it makes establishing prima facie cases much more difficult than if the
court does not take those facts into account. The potential reasons for prosecu-
tors' peremptory challenges are facts that necessarily weigh against an inference
of discrimination. Accordingly, when courts consider those facts at the prima
facie stage, defendants must produce more affirmative evidence of discrimination
to overcome the suggestion of nondiscrimination that the possible reasons
evoke.187 Furthermore, Batson proscribes all peremptory challenges that are ac-
tually racially motivated-not merely those for which no possible legitimate ex-
planation exists. When a court rejects a prima facie case on the basis of the
prosecutor's potential reasons for the disputed challenges, however, the court
upholds the prosecutor's peremptory challenges based not on what actually mo-
tivated the prosecutor, but on what the court believes the prosecutor reasonably
could have (and indeed would have) asserted as the reasons for the challenges,
had he been asked. No one knows whether the prosecutor would have offered
those, or any, credible reasons for the challenges in question."8 ' Finally, even if
that requires the opposing party to come forward with some answer to the prima facie case. 9 J.
WIGMORE, supra, § 2494, at 379. "Prima facie case" in the Batson context is the latter type. Cf.
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.- Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981) ("prima facie case" in
Title VII cases denotes rebuttable presumption).
183. See supra notes 107-21 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987) (striking single
juror may be sufficient); State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla.) (any doubt whether defendant has
met his initial burden should be resolved in his favor), cert denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988); Stanley v.
State, 313 Md. App. 50, 71, 542 A.2d 1267, 1277 (1988) (Batson prima facie showing threshold is
"not an extremely high one-not an onerous burden to establish"), cert. denied, 322 Md. 240, 587
A.2d 247 (1991); see also Blume, supra note 121, at 330 (prima facie case may be established on
minimal evidence in order to allow reasonable inquiry into defendant's claims). The lower prima
facie threshold does not materially disadvantage the prosecutor, because the weaker prima facie case
presumably is easier to rebut. See Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 327, 357 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1987).
186. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 386 Pa. Super. 29, 52, 562 A.2d 338, 349 (1989), appeal denied,
525 Pa. 631, 578 A.2d 926 (1990).
187. This result is antithetical to the burden-shifting evidentiary system employed in Batson,
which specifically recognizes and attempts to compensate for objective evidence of discriminatory
intentions being difficult to obtain. See 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 118, § 50.10, at 10-6
("Employers are.., too sophisticated to profess their prejudices on paper or before witnesses."); E.
CLEARY, supra note 119, § 343, at 968 (burden-shifting presumptions may be used when opposing
party has superior access to the proof).
188. For example, it is possible that, if required to explain their peremptory challenges, prosecu-
tors who strike jurors on account of race would not say that the juror had been exposed to pretrial
publicity or was connected somehow to the defendant. Rather, the prosecutor might offer some
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the prosecutor would have proffered the facts revealed during the voir dire as the
reasons for the peremptory challenges, considering those "reasons" without re-
quiring the prosecutor to state them deprives the trial court of the opportunity
to evaluate the prosecutor's credibility.18 9 Thus, courts cannot possibly evaluate
whether the facts revealed by the challenged jurors genuinely motivated the
prosecutor's peremptory challenges or whether the prosecutor would have as-
serted them merely as pretexts for discrimination.
Numerous circumstances are relevant to the question whether an inference
of discrimination exists, but do not constitute possible reasons for disputed per-
emptory challenges. The North Carolina Supreme Court already has recognized
many of them.190 These circumstances include the disproportionate removal of
minorities;191 the nature of the crime;192 the presence of racial issues in the
case; 193 disparate treatment of prospective jurors who are similar in all relevant
respects except race; 194 and whether the prosecutor failed to question minority
jurors, questioned them only perfunctorily, or questioned them differently from
nonminorities.19 5 Not all of the circumstances that are relevant to the inference
of discrimination tend to prove discrimination, however. The manner in which
the prosecutor conducts jury selection, for instance, is a circumstance that may
weigh against an inference of discrimination. 196
Illustrative of circumstances that tend to negate an inference of discrimina-
tion is State v. Davis.197 In Davis the potential jurors entered the courtroom
separately for voir dire and the attorneys examined each one individually. 198 As
a result, the prosecutor did not know how many minority persons were on the
other explanation that more plainly would be a pretext for discrimination. Under North Carolina
practice this situation is not likely to get past the prima facie stage; the trial judge would be permit-
ted to assume incorrectly that the prosecutor struck the juror because of the exposure to pretrial
publicity or the connection to the defendant and not because of race.
189. This practice is inconsistent with Batson, which noted that "the trial judge's findings...
largely will turn on evaluation of credibility." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21.
190. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
191. See, eg., Exparte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 622 (Ala. 1987); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377
Mass. 461, 490, 387 N.E.2d 499, 517, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Robbins, 319 N.C.
465, 490-91, 356 S.E.2d 279, 294, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
192. United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 748 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988).
193. Id. (race of the defendant and the victim are relevant circumstances).
194. United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989); Branch, 526 So. 2d at 623.
195. Branch, 526 So. 2d at 623; People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282, 583 P.2d 748, 764, 148
Cal. Rptr. 890, 906 (1978); Slappy v. State, 503 So. 2d 350, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 522
So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988).
Other examples of circumstances relevant to the prima facie case include the following: the fact
that the only characteristic the challenged jurors shared was race, see Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583
P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 176, 184, 380 S.E.2d 1, 5,
aff'd on rehearing, 9 Va. App. 169, 384 S.E.2d 343 (1989) (en banc); Note, supra note 142, at 824;
and the fact that the challenged jurors had characteristics or a background ordinarily thought
favorable to the prosecution, such as having been a crime victim or a police officer, see People v.
Turner, 42 Cal. 3d 711, 719, 726 P.2d 102, 106, 230 Cal. Rptr. 656, 660 (1986).
196. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
197. 325 N.C. 607, 386 S.E.2d 418 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2587 (1990).
198. Id. at 620, 386 S.E.2d at 424. Under North Carolina jury selection procedures, the trial
judge in a capital case may permit prospective jurors to be sequestered before and after selection.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214(j) (1988); R. PRICE, supra note 54, § 18-4, at 283.
1556 [Vol. 69
venire, or whether the next persons called would be minorities. 199 Three of the
first four jurors seated were black.20 0 Because the prosecutor accepted the three
black jurors at the beginning of the selection process when he did not know how
many blacks remained in the jury pool, the North Carolina Supreme Court
found that the circumstances suggested that the black persons the prosecutor did
remove peremptorily were not struck on account of their race.20 1 The court
properly found no prima facie case, because the circumstances surrounding the
prosecutor's peremptory challenges substantially refuted the defendant's claim
of discrimination. By considering only prima facie stage circumstances such as
these, and not possible explanations for the prosecutor's peremptory challenges,
the courts can adhere to Batson's letter and subserve, rather than subvert, the
purposes of the Batson prima facie case.
Given that the North Carolina courts should not consider the prosecutor's
potential reasons for disputed peremptory challenges at the prima facie stage,
the question remains: What circumstances are sufficient to raise a prima facie
inference of discrimination? Ordinarily, courts will weigh the totality of the rel-
evant circumstances to determine if a prima facie inference exists. The North
Carolina courts, however, reasonably can promote Batson's goal of easing the
evidentiary burden on defendants trying to prove discrimination by focusing on
one question in particular: whether prosecutors exercised peremptory chal-
lenges disproportionately against minority prospective jurors. In Smith and
Robbins the supreme court acknowledged that disproportionate strikes against
minorities were relevant to a prima facie inference of discrimination. 20 2 Like
most appellate courts, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court has not indi-
cated how trial courts should determine disproportionate effect, and how much
weight the trial courts should give it when evaluating the prima facie case.
An excellent illustration of the application of a disproportionate effects test
is the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Soares.20 3 In Soares the prosecu-
tor exercised peremptory challenges against thirty-two white prospective jurors,
thirty-four percent of the white persons available.204 The prosecutor challenged
199. Davis, 325 N.C. at 620, 386 S.E.2d at 424.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465,490, 356 S.E.2d 279, 294, cerL denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987);
accord United States v. Johnson, 873 F.2d 1137, 1140 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 304
(1990); Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 623 (Ala. 1987); Ward v. State, 293 Ark. 88, 92, 733
S.W.2d 728, 730 (1987); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 386 Pa. Super. 29,49 n.5, 562 A.2d 338, 348 n.5
(1989), appeal denied, 525 Pa. 631, 578 A.2d 926 (1990); Williams v. State, 712 S.W.2d 835, 841
(rex. Crim. App. 1986).
203. 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). Massachusetts was one
of a handful of states that, prior to Batson, had prohibited the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges on state constitutional grounds. The evidentiary methodology these states employed to
prove state constitutional violations was substantially the same as that employed in Batson. See id.
at 486-88, 387 N.E.2d at 516-17; People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-78, 583 P.2d 748, 761-63,
148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 903-04 (1978); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984); State v. Crespin, 94
N.M. 486, 488, 612 P.2d 716, 718 (Ct. App. 1980); People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 106-10, 435
N.Y.S.2d 739, 752-55 (1981).
204. Soares, 377 Mass. at 473 & n.7, 387 N.E.2d at 508 & n.7.
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only twelve black prospective jurors.205 Because only thirteen black persons
were available on the venire, however, this number amounted to ninety-two per-
cent of the available blacks. 206 Thus, although the prosecutor struck more than
two-and-one-half times as many whites as blacks (thirty-two as compared to
twelve), the impact of the peremptory challenges was two-and-one-half times as
great upon the black prospective jurors as upon the whites (ninety-two percent
removed as compared to thirty-four percent removed). The court held that the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges had a disproportionate impact on the
black potential jurors.207 It concluded that the disparity suggested a possible
discriminatory motivation and thus justified an inquiry into the prosecutor's rea-
sons for his challenges. 208
The Soares test, comparing the percentage of minorities removed, with the
percentage of nonminorities removed, is useful for many reasons. First, it is
highly relevant; whether the prosecutor uses peremptory challenges to remove a
significantly greater percentage of minorities than nonminorities has a direct log-
ical bearing on the strength of an inference that race motivated the use of those
challenges. Second, it possesses a built-in control against the danger of pure
statistics carrying too much weight in the prima facie determination. If the dis-
parity between the percentages of blacks and whites challenged is striking, then
statistics will play a greater role; if the disparity is small, statistics will have little
probative value on the issue of discrimination.2°9 Third, the test can be applied
in every case. Consequently, it reduces the possibility of arbitrary decisions,
since the supreme court routinely may impose it as a limitation on the trial
court's otherwise nearly unfettered discretion to decide what circumstances are
relevant to the prima facie case. Fourth, it is an objective test. As a result, it is
amenable to appellate review. 210 Fifth, it helps guard against discriminatory
prosecutors who leave a few minority jurors on the jury to insulate their other,
race-based strikes.211 Most important, the disproportionate effects test com-
ports with the purpose and function of the Batson prima facie case. The test is
not onerous. It permits the defendant and the court to draw preliminary infer-
ences of discrimination from the information available to the defendant. It thus
facilitates the exposure of the prosecutor's illicit motives by providing enough
evidence to justify requiring the prosecutor to explain her reasons for the dis-
205. Id. at 473, 387 N.E.2d at 508.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 490, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
208. Id.; see also Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 326, 357 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1987) (disparity of
23.8 percentage points between proportion of blacks on jury panel and proportion of blacks on jury
sufficient to show discriminatory effect).
209. Some courts have noted the significance of statistics in jury selection discrimination cases.
See Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75, 78-79, 365 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1988); cf McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 294-95 (1987) (dictum) (statistics have greater role in jury selection discrimination cases
than in cases regarding the discriminatory impact of the death penalty).
210. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
211. Racially motivated prosecutors who strike a number of minority jurors but leave one or two
on the jury will not necessarily be insulated from Batson because the percentage of minority jurors
struck will be high.
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puted peremptory challenges. 2 12
The most difficult aspect of the disproportionate effects test is determining
what degree of disparity gives rise to a prima facie inference of discrimination.
Batson implied that disproportionate effect, like any other relevant circum-
stance, would be just one factor in the prima facie inquiry; the required degree of
disparity, therefore, ordinarily should depend on the other circumstances sur-
rounding the peremptory challenges in dispute. To bring about Batson's goals
more effectively, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court should determine
a threshold disparity above which a prima facie case automatically is estab-
lished. A threshold figure recognizes that when prosecutors strike minorities at
a certain substantially greater rate than they strike whites, the risk of an uncon-
stitutional motive is substantial enough to further the inquiry by having the
prosecutors explain their challenges, regardless of the absence of other evidence
of discrimination.
Support for a per se disproportionate effects criterion comes from three
states-Connecticut, Missouri, and South Carolina. Each of these states has
adopted Batson procedures whereby the prosecutor must explain her peremp-
tory challenges any time the defendant raises a Batson claim and demonstrates
that he belongs to a cognizable group from which persons were challenged pe-
remptorily.213 These procedures avoid difficult case-by-case evaluations of the
circumstances and ensure consistency.2 14 More importantly, they advance the
inquiry into the prosecutor's motivations.2 15 Although these procedures are not
required by Batson,2 16 they further the purposes of the Batson prima facie case
212. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 142, at 823
('[B]oth the prosecution and the defendant are likely to have better access to evidence on the issue of
intent" if the Batson claim is heard at trial rather than after appellate review.).
213. See State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-46, 553 A.2d 166, 171-72, cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1071 (1989); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 64 (Mo. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017
(1988); State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54, 57-58, 358 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1987). But see United States v.
Montgomery, 819 F.2d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 1987) (Batson does not require specific mathematical
formula); State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 21 (Fla.) (rejecting bright-line test), cerL denied, 487 U.S.
1219 (1988); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 176, 183, 380 S.E.2d 1, 4 (same), aff'd on
rehearing, 9 Va. App. 169, 384 S.E.2d 343 (1989) (en bane). In Holloway and Jones the courts
simply held that to promote the goals of Batson more effectively trial courts should require the
prosecutor to explain her peremptory strikes whenever the defendant is a member of a cognizable
racial group and the prosecutor exercises peremptory challenges to remove members of that racial
group. See Holloway, 209 Conn. at 646, 553 A.2d at 171-72; Jones, 293 S.C. at 57, 358 S.E.2d at 703.
In Antwine the court noted that, as a practical matter, determining whether an inference of discrimi-
nation exists requires the court to consider the prosecutor's explanation of the manner in which she
employed her challenges. Therefore, the court directed trial judges to consider the prosecutor's
explanation as part of the process of determining whether a defendant has established a prima facie
case. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d at 64. Although this method confuses the separate questions of the
prima facie case and the prosecutor's rebuttal, it has the effect of requiring a prosecutorial explana-
tion whenever the defendant raises a Batson issue.
214. Jones, 293 S.C. at 57, 358 S.E.2d at 703.
215. As the Connecticut Supreme Court wrote: "[B]ecause [the Batson] issue is of such vital
importance to our real and perceived adherence to the rule of law... in all. . . cases in which the
defendant asserts a Batson claim, we deem it appropriate for the state to provide ... a... response
consistent with the explanatory mandate of Batson." Holloway, 209 Conn. at 645-46, 553 A.2d at
171-72.
216. Batson mentioned that a "'pattern' of strikes against black jurors" was merely illustrative
of the circumstances that courts could consider when evaluating the prima facie case. Batson, 476
U.S. at 97.
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by providing defendants with a practical way to get to the next stage of the
evidentiary scheme. While these procedures suffer from the drawback of permit-
ting defendants to hunt for Batson claims without providing any evidence of
discrimination other than the fact that the prosecutor struck members of their
race,217 the North Carolina courts can modify them to avoid this problem. By
requiring that there be a specified degree of disproportionate effect before a
prima facie case arises, the North Carolina courts can take advantage of the
benefits of these procedures while avoiding their flaws. The self-executing na-
ture of this approach would advance the inquiry into the prosecutor's motives
and promote consistency. The requirement of a significant disparity, however,
would make it difficult for the defendant to fish for Batson claims. Therefore,
the North Carolina courts should hold that a prima facie case of Batson discrim-
ination is established whenever the prosecutor strikes minorities at a rate a spe-
cific number of times greater than the rate at which he strikes whites.218 When
the prosecutor strikes minorities at a rate lower than the threshold comparison
figure, the percentage of minorities struck would be just one relevant circum-
stance considered.
B. The Prosecutor's Rebuttal
Once the defendant raises a prima facie inference of discrimination, the bur-
den shifts to the prosecutor to come forward with race-neutral explanations for
the disputed peremptory challenges. 219 Assessing prosecutors' explanations is
arguably the most difficult aspect of Batson for the courts,220 given the ease with
which prosecutors can offer facially neutral reasons for their peremptory chal-
lenges.221 Because attorneys normally may exercise peremptory challenges for
any reason, the peremptory challenge is "uniquely suited to masking discrimina-
tory motives."' 222 Batson's success at this stage, therefore, depends largely on
courts adequately scrutinizing prosecutors' proffered reasons to determine
whether those reasons are genuine or merely pretexts for discrimination.223
The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined the role of the trial courts
in evaluating prosecutors' rebuttals.224 The trial court must " 'satisfy itself that
217. See Note, supra note 142, at 823.
218. See Williams v. State, 712 S.W.2d 835, 841 (rex. Crim. App. 1986) (striking disproportion-
ate number of minority persons so as to render minority representation on the jury impotent can be
enough to make out a prima facie showing).
219. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 497, 391 S.E.2d 144, 150 (1990).
220. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
222. State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 20 (Fla.), cert denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988); see Batson, 476
U.S. at 96 (peremptory challenge permits those who want to discriminate to do so).
223. See Raphael, supra note 178, at 318 ("'Rubber stamp' approval of all nonracial explana-
tions... would cripple Batson's commitment .... ) (quoting State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 268
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 327, 357 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1987)).
224. The North Carolina appellate courts have reached the issue of the prosecutor's rebuttal in
several ways. In some cases, the trial court found that the defendant established a prima facie case.
See State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 253, 368 S.E.2d 838, 839 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. I110
(1989); State v. Sanders, 95 N.C. App. 494, 498, 383 S.E.2d 409, 412, disc. rev. denied, 325 N.C. 712,
388 S.E.2d 470 (1989); State v. Cannon, 92 N.C. App. 246, 252, 374 S.E.2d 604, 608 (1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 326 N.C. 37, 387 S.E.2d 450 (1990). In one case the prosecutor waived argument on
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the explanation is genuine"' by undertaking a "'sincere and reasoned attempt
to evaluate [it].' ",225 This inquiry requires appraising both the race-neutrality of
the explanation and the prosecutor's credibility in proffering the explanation.
The court "should take great care to assure that [the prosecutor's] reasons are
bona fide and not simply 'sham excuses belatedly contrived.' -226 Trial judges'
determinations should reflect the circumstances of the case, their knowledge of
trial techniques, and their observations of the way in which the prosecutor con-
ducted jury selection. 227 Finally, the court should consider the offered explana-
tion in light of the strength of the prima facie case.
228
The North Carolina courts also have identified factors specifically for as-
sessing the genuineness of prosecutors' explanations. Trial courts should con-
sider the susceptibility of the case to racial discrimination and should make note
of the races of the defendant, the victim, and key witnesses.229 The ultimate
racial composition of the jury is also relevant, though not dispositive.230 In ad-
dition, trial courts should factor in whether the prosecutor appeared to deliber-
ate carefully before exercising the peremptory challenges in question. 23 1 Last,
trial courts should evaluate the given reasons themselves. 232 These factors are
similar to those recognized in other states. 233 The supreme court has made
whether a prima facie case existed and explained the reasons for his challenges. See State v. Porter,
326 N.C. 489, 499, 391 S.E.2d 144, 151 (1990). In another case the trial court assumed, without
deciding, that the prima facie ease was established, and then considered the prosecutor's explanation.
See State v. McNeill, 326 N.C. 712, 719, 392 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1990). Finally, in a few cases the
prosecutors explained their challenges, notwithstanding that the trial court did not find that the
defendants had established prima facie cases. See State v. McNeil, 99 N.C. App. 235, 241, 393
S.E.2d 123, 126 (1990) (although not required, State articulated the reasons for its peremptory chal-
lenges); State v. Aytche, 98 N.C. App. 358, 365, 391 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1990) (prosecutor explained
challenges when asked to do so by the defendant); State v. Attmore, 92 N.C. App. 385, 397, 374
S.E.2d 649, 657 (1988) (court requested, but did not require, that the prosecutor explain peremptory
challenges because of vague possibility of future Batson claim), disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 248, 377
S.E.2d 757 (1989). Since in all of these cases the prosecutors proffered explanations for their per-
emptory strikes, the sole issue before the appellate courts was the sufficiency of those explanations.
In addition, in one case the supreme court found that the defendant established a prima facie case,
and thus proceeded to consider the prosecutor's reasons for the disputed peremptory challenges.
State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 124, 400 S.E.2d 712, 726 (1991).
225. Sanders, 95 N.C. App. at 499, 383 S.E.2d at 412-13 (quoting People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161,
167, 672 P.2d 854, 858, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 75 (1983)).
226. Id. at 500, 383 S.E.2d at 413 (quoting Jackson, 322 N.C. at 260, 368 S.E.2d at 843 (Frye, J.,
concurring)).
227. Id. at 499, 383 S.E.2d at 413; see Porter, 326 N.C. at 498, 391 S.E.2d at 151.
228. Porter, 326 N.C. at 498-99, 391 S.E.2d at 151.
229. Id. at 498, 391 S.E.2d at 150-51.
230. State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 124, 400 S.E.2d 712, 726 (1991). For a criticism of the court's
holding that the racial makeup of the defendant's jury is relevant to Batson, see supra note 159.
231. Porter, 326 N.C. at 498, 391 S.E.2d at 151. Deliberation may tend to show that the prose-
cutor did not have a predetermined intention to strike minorities, but instead made an individualized
decision to strike the juror based on the juror's overall characteristics.
232. Id.
233. Other states have also recognized several other factors central to evaluation of the suffi-
ciency of the prosecutor's rebuttal, including whether the prosecutor failed to strike white persons
who had the same characteristics as the challenged minority jurors, see People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d
161, 168, 672 P.2d 854, 858, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76 (1983) ("strongly suggestive of bias"); Slappy v.
State, 503 So. 2d 350, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1219 (1988), and whether the proffered reasons were vague and inherently subjective and the
prosecutor failed to probe sufficiently to determine if the juror was actually biased. See People v.
Turner, 42 Cal. 3d 711, 727, 726 P.2d 102, 111-12, 230 Cal. Rptr. 656, 665-66 (1986) (good faith of
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clear, however, that no one determinant necessarily demonstrates pretext:
"[r]arely will a single factor control the decision-making process."234
In applying these guidelines, the North Carolina appellate courts have al-
ways found the prosecutor's explanations adequate to rebut the prima facie case.
Two cases, State v. Jackson 235 and State v. Porter,236 aptly illustrate the variety
of reasons that the courts have held sufficient. In Jackson the prosecutors had to
justify four peremptory challenges exercised against black persons.237 They first
explained generally that the State had certain criteria for selecting jurors: stabil-
ity, pro-government orientation, steady employment, ties to the community, and
"a mind-set... that would... pay more attention to the needs of law enforce-
ment than the fine points of individual rights. ' 238 They then revealed the rea-
sons for striking each of the four black prospective jurors. Two of the jurors
were unemployed. 239 One of these jurors had "answered [the prosecutors] hesi-
tantly and... appeared indifferent or hostile about.., being a member of a jury
or indifferent or hostile to [the prosecutors]." 240 The other had been a student
counselor at Shaw University; the prosecutors felt that her background and de-
meanor indicated that she was "too liberal." 24 1 The third black prospective ju-
ror was a law student at the University of North Carolina and had been taught
by professors of "somewhat liberal views."'242 The fourth juror had a son of
approximately the same age as the defendant; although the juror also had a
daughter the same age as the victim, the prosecutors feared that she would iden-
tify with the defendant and not the prosecution. 24 3 The supreme court held that
the prosecutors' stated criteria for choosing a jury were legitimate and approved
the prosecutor's explanations.244
In Porter the state peremptorily challenged ten Native Americans.24 5 The
prosecutor required follow-up question that quickly would have clarified the matter); People v. Har-
ris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 188, 544 N.E.2d 357, 386 (1989) (courts should assess the extent of State's efforts
to discover the unknown information), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990).
234. Porter, 326 N.C. at 501, 391 S.E.2d at 152; see State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 257, 368
S.E.2d 838, 841 (1988) (recognizing that nonchallenged white persons had same characteristics as
challenged black persons, but noting that additional factors distinguished them), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1110 (1989).
235. 322 N.C. 251, 368 S.E.2d 838 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989).
236. 326 N.C. 489, 391 S.E.2d 144 (1990).
237. Jackson, 322 N.C. at 252-53, 368 S.E.2d at 839.
238. Id. at 253, 368 S.E.2d at 840. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Frye warned
against the danger of abuse of such stated criteria or "profiles." Id. at 260, 368 S.E.2d at 843 (Frye,
J., concurring).
239. Id. at 253, 368 S.E.2d at 839; see also State v. Sanders, 95 N.C. App. 494, 501, 383 S.E.2d
409, 414 (juror had worked three jobs in previous ten months), disc, rev. denied, 325 N.C. 712, 388
S.E.2d 470 (1989).
240. Jackson, 322 N.C. at 253, 368 S.E.2d at 839; see also State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 125, 400
S.E.2d 712, 727 (1991) (jurors appeared "nervous" and "uncertain"); State v. McNeil, 99 N.C. App.
235, 241, 393 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1990) (juror seemed "unsure of himself"); Sanders, 95 N.C. App. at
501, 383 S.E.2d at 414 (juror had "headstrong and overbearing personality").
241. Jackson, 322 N.C. at 253, 368 S.E.2d at 839.
242. Id.
243. Id.; see also Smith, 328 N.C. at 125, 400 S.E.2d at 726 (jurors had sons of approximately the
defendant's age).
244. Jackson, 322 N.C. at 256-57, 368 S.E.2d at 841.
245. State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 499, 391 S.E.2d 144, 151 (1990).
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prosecutor proffered reasons for each challenge. Many of the challenged jurors
knew one or both of the defense attorneys.2 46 Several of the prospective jurors
previously had been prosecuted for driving while intoxicated.247 The employ-
ment histories of others reflected unemployment or irregular employment.248
Two seemed to believe that racism was present in the case.249 One prospective
juror "made constant eye contact with defense counsel, had majored in sociol-
ogy, and read Rolling Stone magazine." 250 On appeal, the supreme court af-
firmed the trial court's acceptance of these reasons as legitimate nonracial
criteria for challenging the Native Americans.251
The wide range of explanations that the North Carolina courts have found
sufficient to rebut a prima facie case illustrates the difficulties courts face in ap-
plying this part of the Batson evidentiary system. Prosecutors easily can proffer
facially neutral reasons for their peremptory challenges. All of the reasons the
prosecutors asserted in Jackson and Porter are facially race-neutral and thus
technically proper under Batson.252 Many of them, however, are completely
subjective and difficult to disprove. The Jackson court, for instance, accepted
the explanation that a challenged juror "appeared indifferent or hostile;"2 5 3 sim-
ilarly, the Porter court found sufficient the explanation that the challenged juror
"made constant eye contact with defense counsel."'254 Furthermore, several of
the reasons that the courts have accepted appear nonracial, but actually may be
a proxy for race. In Jackson the prosecutor excused one prospective juror be-
cause she had been a student counselor at Shaw University-a black university.
In Porter the court accepted the prosecutors' assertions that several of the black
prospective jurors had histories of unemployment or unsteady employment; the
unemployment rate for black persons in North Carolina is more than twice that
246. The challenged prospective jurors were acquainted with the defendant's lawyers as a result
of prior representation, being schoolmates, being a student of one of the lawyers, being related by
marriage, or being social acquaintances. Id. at 499, 391 S.E.2d at 151; see also Smith, 328 N.C. at
125, 400 S.E.2d at 727 (juror had "earlier association" with defense counsel); State v. McNeill, 326
N.C. 712, 719, 392 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1990) (juror knew defendant, though had not seen him in five
years); State v. McNeil, 99 N.C. App. 235, 241, 393 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1990) (juror knew proposed
defense witness); State v. Cannon, 92 N.C. App. 246, 252-53, 374 S.E.2d 604, 608 (1988) (five of six
challenged jurors connected to defendant, defendant's family, or a state witness), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 N.C. 37, 387 S.E.2d 450 (1990).
247. Porter, 326 N.C. at 499, 391 S.E.2d at 151; see also Smith, 328 N.C. at 125, 400 S.E.2d at
727 (State's victim-witness coordinator thought juror had a nephew "in trouble with drugs"); Mc-
Neil, 99 N.C. App. at 241, 393 S.E.2d at 126 (jurors had prior convictions for driving under the
influence, had been falsely accused of crime, or had relatives on probation); State v. Aytche, 98 N.C.
App. 358, 365, 391 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1990) (juror previously convicted of manslaughter); Cannon, 92
N.C. App. at 253, 374 S.E.2d at 608 (juror recently fined for traffic violation, although claimed to be
innocent).
248. Porter, 326 N.C. at 499, 391 S.E.2d at 151.
249. Id. at 500, 391 S.E.2d at 152.
250. Id. This potential juror also previously had been a witness for the defendant's attorney in a
different case. Id.
251. Id.
252. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
253. State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 253, 368 S.E.2d 838, 839 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. II10
(1989).
254. Porter, 326 N.C. at 500, 391 S.E.2d at 152.
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for white persons.25 5 As Justice Marshall warned: "If such easily generated
explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor's obligation to justify his
strikes on nonracial grounds, then the protection erected by the Court... may
be illusory,"'2 56 because only the most flagrant and explicit Batson violations
would be caught.
The courts implementing Batson thus face this question: Which party
should bear the burden of overcoming the difficulty of evaluating the genuine-
ness of prosecutors' explanations? The courts generally have two choices. On
the one hand, the courts can put this burden on defendants and accept all
facially nonracial explanations. On the other hand, they can put the burden on
prosecutors and reject certain facially neutral reasons that are particularly sus-
ceptible to abuse as pretexts. Accepting all facially nonracial explanations is
supported by the literal language of Batson, which requires only that prosecutors
proffer "neutral explanation[s]." 257 This approach also would minimize the in-
trusion on the prosecutor's right to exercise peremptory challenges, since all per-
emptory challenges for which the prosecutor can offer a neutral explanation-
effectively most of them-would be acceptable. This tactic, however, would fa-
cilitate prosecutorial efforts to hide discriminatory motives and evade Batson's
constitutional proscription. Rejecting certain facially neutral reasons, alterna-
tively, better effects Batson's ultimate purpose of eradicating racially motivated
peremptory challenges. It would snare more racially motivated peremptory
challenges and have a greater deterrent effect on future discriminatory chal-
lenges. This alternative, however, would seriously intrude on the prosecutorial
peremptory challenge. Courts nationwide have responded differently to this ap-
parent quandary.258
Batson implicitly furnishes an answer to the dilemma: the State should bear
the burden of Batson's inherent weaknesses and courts should be slow to accept
prosecutorial explanations for which there is a high risk of abuse, even though
such an approach threatens the traditional, capricious nature of the peremptory
challenge. First, by creating a system that requires prosecutors to explain their
255. According to recent statistics from the U.S. Department of Labor, the unemployment rate
for blacks in North Carolina in 1989 was 6.3% while the unemployment rate for North Carolina
whites was only 2.8%. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTIcS, NORTH CAROLINA
UNEMPLOYMENT IN 1989 (Press Release, May 11, 1990).
256. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
257. Id. at 97.
258. Compare United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 1987) (intuitive nonra-
cial reasons are sufficient); United States v. Allen, 666 F. Supp. 847, 853 (E.D. Va. 1987) (same),
aff'd sub nor. United States v. Harrell, 847 F.2d 138 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 944 (1988);
People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 20, 538 N.E.2d 453, 457 (1989) (juror's demeanor acceptable basis for
peremptory challenge), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 3290 (1990); State v. Manuel, 517 So. 2d 374, 376
(La. Ct. App. 1987) (same) and Porter, 326 N.C. at 500, 391 S.E.2d at 152 (failure to make eye
contact with prosecutor and excessive eye contact with defense counsel acceptable reasons for per-
emptory challenge) with United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 745 (3d Cir.) ("intuitive judgment"
not sufficient), cert denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th
Cir. 1987) (explanation that State struck juror "based upon his background and other things in his
questionnaire" insufficient); State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 23-24 (Fla.) (must be support in the
record for the reasons given), cert denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Jackson, 386
Pa. Super. 29, 55, 562 A.2d 338, 350 (1989) (abuse of discretion to accept explanation not supported
by record), appeal denied, 525 Pa. 631, 578 A.2d 926 (1990).
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peremptory challenges, Batson expressly sanctions intrusion on the traditional
arbitrary use of peremptory challenges. Furthermore, the Batson decision was
rooted in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; its primary
goal of ending discriminatory jury selection practices, unlike the peremptory
challenge, is thus of constitutional magnitude. 25 9 Most importantly, the.Batson
Court specifically noted that the purpose of the evidentiary system it set forth is
"to ensure that a state does not use peremptory challenges to strike any black
juror because of his race."'2 60 The Court itself thus stressed the predominance of
the nondiscrimination purpose of the decision. In short, the purpose and consti-
tutional basis of Batson require that lower courts do more than satisfy them-
selves that prosecutorial explanations are race neutral; rather, they must
scrutinize the explanations closely to ensure in a practical way that the explana-
tions are not pretexts. This is not because these explanations are technically
improper under Batson, but because they are peculiarly susceptible to being
abused by prosecutors. The North Carolina courts, which in the past have read-
ily accepted even highly subjective prosecutorial explanations, therefore should
revise their approach to conform with this view, which is more in accordance
with Batson's spirit and purpose.
A reasonable, practical way to implement this closer scrutiny is to require
prosecutors to support their peremptory challenges with other on-the-record
reasons whenever their stated explanations involve a substantial risk of being
pretextual. 26 1 Several types of prosecutorial explanations are so susceptible to
abuse that heightened scrutiny of this sort is warranted. One such type involves
reasons that may be proxies for racial animus.262 Professor Raphael has noted,
for example, that because a substantial percentage of black persons live in areas
of high crime or in segregated areas, explanations based upon the challenged
juror's connection with such areas easily may mask underlying discrimina-
tion.263 Likewise, reasons that apply disproportionately to minorities, such as
unemployment, or previous study at a predominately black university, may be
facially neutral substitutes for race-based reasons.264 The second type of
prosecutorial explanation justifying greater scrutiny includes reasons that apply
equally to white prospective jurors whom the prosecutor did not strike.2 65 The
North Carolina Supreme Court already has recognized that disparate treatment
259. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Frazier v. United States,
335 U.S. 497, 505 n.11 (1948); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936); and Stilson v.
United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919)).
260. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.22 (emphasis added); see also United States v. David, 803 F.2d
1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1986) (Batson's command is "to eliminate, not merely to minimize, racial
discrimination in jury selection.").
261. See Blume, supra note 121, at 332 ("[C]ourts should be extremely reluctant to accept gen-
eral and vague reasons for striking a juror, such as the juror was 'sullen,' 'distant,' or 'looked
mean. ").
262. See State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 260, 368 S.E.2d 838, 843 (1988) (Frye, J., concurring)
(court must remain alert to colloquial euphemisms for prejudice), cert. denied, 4.90 U.S. 1110 (1989);
Alschuler, supra note 7, at 175; Raphael, supra note 178, at 322.
263. Raphael, supra note 178, at 322.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 241, 248.
265. See, eg., People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 168, 672 P.2d 854, 858, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76
(1983) (disparate treatment "strongly suggestive of bias"); Raphael, supra note 178, at 323 ("Courts
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of white and minority jurors is a factor for evaluating pretext. 26 6 The third and
most important type of prosecutorial explanation that involves a substantial dan-
ger of being used as a pretext is the vague and highly subjective explanation. 267
This type of explanation is the most difficult for the trial judge and defendant to
verify because the substance of the explanation does not appear in the record
and thus is impossible to review on appeal. 268 Hence, they are the explanations
most susceptible to prosecutorial chicanery. Whenever prosecutors submit one
of these types of explanations, the court should not find the explanation suffi-
cient unless there are some other reasons for the peremptory challenge that are
observable from the record.
Several courts, including those in Florida and Pennsylvania, require that at
least some evidence appear in the record to support the prosecutor's explana-
tions.2 69 Furthermore, some authority calls for requiring objective justifications
for prosecutors' usually discretionary actions when a danger exists that the pros-
ecutors acted unconstitutionally. Prosecutors normally have discretion to de-
cide what charges to bring against a suspect. When a prosecutor adds charges
against a defendant who has successfully appealed his conviction, however, a
danger arises that the prosecutor does so in retaliation for the defendant having
taken the appeal.270 Such conduct, if so motivated, would violate the defend-
ant's right to due process of law.27 1 Because the prosecutor's motives are com-
are most likely to reject a prosecutor's explanations... when the prosecutor failed to challenge other
jurors who were not of defendant's race yet who shared the same characteristic. .. ").
266. State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 501, 391 S.E.2d 144, 152 (1990). The court qualified this
acknowledgement, however, by noting that prosecutors rarely exercise peremptory challenges on the
basis of one reason alone. Id. Of course, the court was correct in asserting that multiple reasons
often underlie peremptory challenges. Nevertheless, disparate treatment is so suggestive of racial
motivation that it warrants greater scrutiny.
267. State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 125, 400 S.E.2d 712, 727 (1991); State v. Jackson, 322 N.C.
251, 253, 368 S.E.2d 838, 839 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989); see supra notes 252-56 and
accompanying text.
268. In Smith the supreme court held that "nervousness or uncertainty in response to counsel's
questions may be a proper basis for a peremptory challenge." Smith, 328 N.C. at 126, 400 S.E.2d at
727. The court then found that "the record supports the... conclusion that the reasons given by the
district attorney were not pretextual." Id. The court thus suggested that the appellate courts can
adequately evaluate the prosecutor's bona fides in proffering vague and subjective explanations.
How the record can support a finding that a juror was "nervous" or "uncertain" absent a direct
statement in the record to that effect, however, is unclear.
269. See State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 23-24 (Fla.) (must be support in the record for the
reasons given to ensure "procedural regularity and racial neutrality"), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219
(1988); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 386 Pa. Super. 29, 55, 562 A.2d 338, 350 (1989) (abuse of discre-
tion to accept explanation not supported by the record), appeal denied, 525 Pa. 631, 578 A.2d 926
(1990). Similarly, several courts have found subjective explanations alone to be insufficient to rebut a
prima facie case. See, ag., United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (1 lth Cir. 1989) ("I just
got a feeling about him" held insufficient); United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 745 (3d Cir.)
(prosecutor's intuitive judgment held insufficient), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988); Ward v. State,
293 Ark. 88, 93-94, 733 S.W.2d 728, 730 (1987) (insufficient to claim that challenged juror seemed
"noncommittal"); Exparte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 623 (Ala. 1987) ("[I]ntuitive judgment or suspi-
cion by the prosecutor is insufficient to rebut the presumption of discrimination."); State v.
Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 65 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) (facially neutral explanations alone held insuffi-
cient), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); State v. Tomlin, 299 S.C. 294, 298-99, 384 S.E.2d 707, 710
(1989) (claim that challenged juror was "extremely sluggish" held insufficient).
270. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974). In addition, defendants might be unconstitu-
tionally deterred from exercising their right to appeal. Id.
271. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 375-76 (1982).
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plex and difficult to prove, the court in these circumstances may presume
"prosecutorial vindictiveness." 272 When this presumption arises, the prosecutor
must provide objective, on-the-record evidence supporting the decision to add
the new charges. 273 Although the decision to bring charges normally is discre-
tionary, the danger of unconstitutionally motivated prosecutorial conduct justi-
fies these limitations on the prosecutor's discretion.274 Similarly, when a prima
facie inference of discrimination arises in the Batson context, the court should
require the prosecutor to give at least some objective, verifiable reason for the
questioned peremptory challenges. Although prosecutors ordinarily may exer-
cise peremptory challenges for any reason, the danger that the prosecutor's ex-
planations will be pretextual warrants limiting prosecutors' discretion.
C. Procedural Issues
In addition to determining what evidence gives rise to a prima facie infer-
ence of discrimination and what prosecutorial explanations rebut such an infer-
ence, the Batson Court assigned to the lower courts the task of formulating
procedures for litigating Batson claims.27 5 The North Carolina courts' holdings
regarding procedural issues parallel their holdings involving the prima facie case
and the prosecutor's rebuttal. In the area of harmless error, for example, as with
the prima facie case, the North Carolina courts have misapprehended Batson's
theoretical underpinnings and, accordingly, have imposed undue burdens on de-
fendants. In the areas of appellate review and cross-examination of the prosecu-
tor, as with the prosecutor's rebuttal, the courts have construed Batson's
language so narrowly that they have failed to promote Batson's fundamental
purpose. In sum, the courts have erected procedural barriers that conflict with
Batson's goal of providing defendants with a more effective means of proving
discrimination.
1. Appellate Review
When formulating a standard of appellate review of trial court findings in
Batson cases, the courts face yet another contradiction inherent in Batson situa-
tions: the trust reposed in prosecutors and trial judges by appellate courts some-
times conflicts with the realities of racial politics. For example, while the Batson
Court observed in a footnote that judges and prosecutors would not fail to per-
form their constitutional duties under Batson,276 the decision itself is a recogni-
tion that government officials sometimes engage in unconstitutional
discrimination. As a result, the degree to which the appellate courts should
yield to the findings of the trial courts is questionable.
272. Id. at 373.
273. Id. at 374.
274. See id. at 376; Perry, 417 U.S. at 28.
275. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 ("We decline ... to formulate particular procedures to be fol-
lowed upon a defendant's timely objection to a prosecutor's challenges.").
276. Id. at 99 n.22.
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In State v. Jackson 277 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that because
a trial court's findings depend on credibility determinations, those findings must
be given "great deference" on appeal. 278 Trial judges must make specific find-
ings of fact,279 and those findings are conclusive on appeal, provided they are
supported by the evidence.280 In reviewing Batson cases, the supreme court and
court of appeals have been true to this standard. In numerous cases, the courts
explicitly have noted that deference to the trial court commanded their decision
to deny defendants Batson relief.281 The courts routinely have declined to strike
down even highly subjective rebuttal explanations on appeal, upholding all
facially nonracial explanations.282 The courts have been reluctant to give much
weight to objective indicators of discrimination, such as disparate treatment of
minority and white prospective jurors. Instead, they have relied on the general
proposition that prosecutors rarely exercise peremptory challenges for single
reasons and have deferred to the trial courts' overall evaluations of the circum-
stances. 283 This extremely deferential approach almost certainly has contrib-
uted to the fact that no North Carolina defendant has won a Batson claim on the
merits in the appellate courts.
While the appellate courts must accord the trial court's findings some defer-
ence, excessive deference has two related undesirable effects. First, it effectively
"insulates the trial court's determinations from meaningful appellate review."'284
Second, it sends to prosecutors the message that they may exercise peremptory
challenges on account of race without fear of exposure by the appellate
courts. 285 Because the second effect in particular is contrary to Batson's funda-
mental purpose, meaningful appellate review is essential to Batson's success.2 86
277. 322 N.C. 251, 368 S.E.2d 838 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989); see supra notes
235, 237-44 and accompanying text.
278. Jackson, 322 N.C. at 255, 368 S.E.2d at 840 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21); see State v.
Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 498, 391 S.E.2d 144, 150 (1990); State v. Allen, 323 N.C. 208, 219, 372 S.E.2d
855, 861-62 (1988). Other states have set forth similar standards of review. See Gamble v. State, 257
Ga. 325, 327, 357 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1987); People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 175, 544 N.E.2d 357, 380
(1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 66 (Mo. 1987) (en
bane), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 176, 184, 380
S.E.2d 1, 5, aff'd on rehearing, 9 Va. App. 169, 384 S.E.2d 343 (1989) (en bane).
279. State v. Sanders, 95 N.C. App. 494, 500, 383 S.E.2d 409, 413, disc rev. denied, 325 N.C.
712, 388 S.E.2d 470 (1989).
280. Id.
281. State v. Gray, 322 N.C. 457, 459-60, 368 S.E.2d 627, 629 (1988); State v. McNeil, 99 N.C.
App. 235, 241, 393 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1990); State v. Robinson, 97 N.C. App. 597, 600, 601, 389
S.E.2d 417, 419, 420, dismissal allowed and review denied, 326 N.C. 804, 393 S.E.2d 904 (1990);
State v. Batts, 93 N.C. App. 404, 410, 378 S.E.2d 211, 214 (1989); State v. Cannon, 92 N.C. App.
246, 253, 374 S.E.2d 604, 608 (1988), rev'don other grounds, 326 N.C. 37, 387 S.E.2d 450 (1990). In
fact, the Jackson court noted: "We might not have reached the same result as the superior court but
giving, as we must, deference to its findings, we hold it was not error to deny the defendant's motion
for mistrial." Jackson, 322 N.C. at 257, 368 S.E.2d at 841.
282. See supra notes 235-56 and accompanying text.
283. See, eg., State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 501, 391 S.E.2d 144, 152-53 (1990).
284. Blume, supra note 121, at 328.
285. Id. at 329. Conversely, if prosecutors know that the appellate courts will review their ac-
tions carefully, they are less likely to engage in discriminatory conduct in the first place.
286. Curiously, in Batson, Justice Powell seemed to suggest that there is little danger of prosecu-
tors exercising peremptory challenges for discriminatory reasons. In justifying his rejection of Jus-
tice Marshall's suggestion that the peremptory challenge be abolished, Justice Powell wrote that no
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Several reasons justify more aggressive appellate review of Batson claims.
First, because of their own unconscious racism, trial judges simply may not be
aware of racial discrimination during jury selection. 28 7 In addition, although
the Batson Court expressed confidence in the ability of trial judges to recognize
Batson claims, 288 the ultimate responsibility within each state for vindicating
rights under the equal protection clause lies with the state supreme court. Fur-
thermore, as with prosecutors' rebuttal explanations,2 89 the ease with which
prosecutors can put forth pretextual but facially neutral explanations necessi-
tates appellate intervention. Most important, appellate courts have a greater
duty to scrutinize trial court findings when constitutional rights are at stake.290
As the Maryland Court of Appeals held in the Batson context: "When a claim is
based upon a violation of a constitutional right it is [the appellate court's] obliga-
tion to make an independent constitutional appraisal from the entire record." 291
Therefore, the North Carolina appellate courts should scrutinize Batson claims
much more closely than in the past. To scrutinize these claims without merely
substituting their judgments on credibility issues for those of the trial judges, the
supreme court and court of appeals should place greater emphasis on objective
reason supports the belief that prosecutors will shirk their duty to exercise peremptory challenges
legitimately. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.22. If that were the case, there might be little need for deter-
rence. The fact that Batson was necessary, however, together with the large number of Batson chal-
lenges brought, is evidence that some prosecutors do exercise peremptories on account of race.
Indeed, Justice White commented that the practice is widespread. Id. at 101 (White, J., concurring).
Thus, aggressive appellate review to deter prosecutors' unconstitutional uses of peremptory chal-
lenges is appropriate.
287. Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("A judge's own conscious or unconscious racism may
lead him to accept ... an explanation as well supported."); Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the
Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 1016, 1026-36 (1988). Professor Johnson asserts that many
judicial actions and inactions are colored by judges' own unconscious racism. She contends that this
undetected racism results in a "blindspot" that causes judges to fail to recognize their own or other
persons' actions as racially connected. She cites three reasons for the fact that unconscious racism is
at present ignored in the reasoning of court decisions involving race and criminal procedure: (1) the
mistaken belief that racism is equivalent to white supremacism, (2) the fear that there would be no
limiting principle, and (3) denial. Id. at 1027-31. See generally Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 328-44 (1987) (dis-
cussing relationship between the unconscious and racially discriminatory practices).
288. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.22; id. at 101 (White, J., concurring) (Court puts "considerable
trust" in the trial judge).
289. See supra notes 252-68 and accompanying text.
290. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 513-14 (1984) (although questions
of fact are normally entitled to deferential appellate review, "actual malice" in constitutional defa-
mation case is subject to independent appellate review because its determination affects first amend-
ment rights).
291. Tolbert v. State, 315 Md. 13, 24, 553 A.2d 228, 232 (1989) (quoting Harris v. State, 303
Md. 685, 697, 496 A.2d 1074, 1080 (1985)); see Commonwealth v. Jackson, 386 Pa. Super. 29, 55,
562 A.2d 338, 350 (1989) (trial court's discretion is not unlimited), appeal denied, 525 Pa. 631, 578
A.2d 926 (1990).
In addition, the role of the state appellate courts in protecting defendants' rights under Batson
may be amplified in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412
(1985). In Wainwright the Court addressed the question whether federal courts, on petitions for
habeas corpus relief, may review state court findings on whether a juror was challenged properly for
cause under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), on account of bias stemming from the
juror's opposition to the death penalty. The Court held that the propriety of the challenge for cause
is a "factual issue" entitled to a presumption of correctness, because'the determination depends
largely on credibility findings. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 428. Since credibility determinations also
are central to Batson inquiries, the scope of federal habeas corpus review may be limited in this
context as well. Consequently, the states must aggressively promote Batson's goals.
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criteria. If objective evidence 292 suggests discrimination, or if the prosecutor's
reasons for challenging the jurors are completely subjective, the courts should
find a Batson error on appeal. Just as with the prosecutor's rebuttal, this focus
on observable, on-the-record criteria does not mean that less easily observable
criteria are irrelevant to the question of whether the prosecutor has exercised
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. Rather, it is an attempt to
promote the goals of Batson more effectively by providing a reasonable, practical
way of reviewing Batson cases.
A threshold requirement for meaningful appellate review is an adequate
record.293 This record must include the number of black and white persons on
the venire, the race of each prospective juror examined, and a transcript of the
voir dire.294 In North Carolina, defendants appealing from the denial of a Bat-
son claim have the burden of providing an adequate record from which to deter-
mine whether the prosecutor challenged jurors improperly at trial.29-
In the five years since Batson, North Carolina defendants consistently have
failed to meet their burden of providing an adequate record for appeal. On
many occasions, the appellate courts pointedly noted these failures in denying
defendants' Batson claims.2 96 These flaws can be eliminated easily, however,
because North Carolina law currently enables defendants to perfect adequate
appellate records. The jury selection statute permits transcription of the jury
selection proceedings upon the defendant's request.297 Thus, at the beginning of
all cases in which Batson may be an issue, defendants can invoke their statutory
right to have the voir dire transcribed. Slightly more problematic is the issue of
preserving for the record the race of each prospective juror. The supreme court
wisely noted in State v. Mitchell 298 that the practice of simply having the court
reporter record the race of each potential juror is prone to error because race is
292. Objective criteria include, for example, a disproportionate number of peremptory chal-
lenges exercised against minorities or disparate treatment of minority and white prospective jurors
with similar pertinent characteristics.
293. See, eg., State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 644, 553 A.2d 166, 172, cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1071 (1989); Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75, 77, 365 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1988); Jackson, 386 Pa. Super,
at 52, 562 A.2d at 349; Note, supra note 142, at 825 ("All of the possible evidence that may bear on
the defendant's prima facie showing depends on the creation of an adequate record [for appeal].").
294. See Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 70 n.11, 542 A.2d 1267, 1277 n.11 (1988). Although a
record consisting solely of the race of the persons struck and of the persons who served on the jury
could "marginally suffice[]" for review, a transcript is necessary as a practical matter to facilitate
appellate courts' meaningful evaluations of the trial court's findings. State v. Sanders, 95 N.C. App.
494, 499, 383 S.E.2d 409, 412, disc, rev. denied, 325 N.C. 712, 388 S.E.2d 470 (1989).
295. See State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 654, 365 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1988). The mere statements
of counsel on appeal regarding what transpired at trial will not suffice. Id.
296. See State v. Payne, 327 N.C. 194, 199-200, 394 S.E.2d 158, 160-61 (1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 977 (1991); State v. McNeill, 326 N.C. 712, 718-19, 392 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1990); State v. Aytche,
98 N.C. App. 358, 364, 391 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1990); State v. Robinson, 97 N.C. App. 597, 601, 389
S.E.2d 417, 420, disc rev. denied, 326 N.C. 804, 393 S.E.2d 904 (1990); Sanders, 95 N.C. App. at
499, 383 S.E.2d at 412; State v. Cannon, 92 N.C. App. 246, 251, 374 S.E.2d 604, 607 (1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 326 N.C. 37, 387 S.E.2d 450 (1990).
297. In capital cases, a record of the voir dire is required by statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1241(a)(1) (1988). In noncapital cases, the jury selection must be recorded if defense counsel so
requests. Id. § 15A-1241(b); R. PRicE, supra note 54, § 18-3.
298. 321 N.C. 650, 365 S.E.2d 554 (1988).
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not always obvious.299 In response to the problem of how to preserve the rec-
ord, however, Mitchell provides that a defendant who believes a prospective ju-
ror is of a particular race may so inform the trial court and ensure that the
information is placed on the record. 30° For defendants to have to question pro-
spective jurors about their race during voir dire to determine officially the race of
prospective jurors, however, is unfair. Such questions might insult the juror and
convey to the jury the impression that the defendant intends to make race an
issue in the trial. Hence, the defendant would have a Hobson's choice: preserv-
ing the record and risking alienating the jury, or not preserving the record at all.
Upon the defendant's pretrial request, therefore, the trial judge should inquire
about each prospective juror's race. Under this practice, the race of the poten-
tial juror becomes a routine piece of requested information no different from the
juror's address; as such, it is less likely to insult the juror. Moreover, because
the judge asks the questions, defense counsel will not antagonize the jury. The
North Carolina Supreme Court has hinted that such a method would be permis-
sible,30 1 but the court should go further and formally adopt it.
2. Examination of the Prosecutor
Another procedural issue that has arisen in North Carolina Batson claims is
whether defendants may cross-examine prosecutors regarding their rebuttal ex-
planations.30 2 In State v. Jackson the supreme court held that defendants have
no such right.30 3 The court feared that the disruption to the trial would out-
weigh any good that could be achieved by the prosecutor's testimony. 3°4 More-
over, the court was confident that trial judges would be able to pass on
prosecutors' credibility without the aid of cross-examination. 30 5 The Jackson
court did hold, however, that once prosecutors advance their reasons for the
peremptory challenges in question, defendants may offer additional evidence to
strengthen the inference of purposeful discrimination or to expose the prosecu-
299. Id. at 655-56, 365 S.E.2d at 557. Moreover, the court reporter's guess for the race of the
potential juror is essentially a racial judgment based solely on appearance, and thus is susceptible to
the same stereotypes that underlie race-based peremptory challenges.
300. Id. at 656, 365 S.E.2d at 557. If there is any question about the juror's race, the trial court
may question the juror to determine it. Id.; see also State v. Payne, 327 N.C. 194, 199-200, 394
S.E.2d 158, 160-61 (1990) (suggesting that prior to trial defendant ask that the trial judge ask pro-
spective jurors to state their race for the record during initial questioning).
301. In Payne, the court wrote: "The trial court noted ... that had the defendant made his
motion prior to jury selection, the court would have had each prospective juror state his or her race
during the court's initial questioning. This would have... preserved an adequate record for appel-
late review." 327 N.C. at 199-200, 394 S.E.2d at 160; see also State v. Attmore, 92 N.C. App. 385,
397, 374 S.E.2d 649, 657 (1988) (trial judge noted race and sex of each person examined during voir
dire), disc rev. denied, 324 N.C. 248, 377 S.E.2d 757 (1989).
302. See Note, Defense Presence and Participation: A Procedural Minimum for Batson v. Ken-
tucky Hearings, 99 YALE L.J. 187, 205-06 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Defense Presence and Participa-
tion]; see also Note, supra note 142, at 832-36 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of
adversarial Batson hearings).
303. State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 258, 368 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110
(1989).
304. Id.; see also Note, Defense Presence and Participation, supra note 302, at 205 (administrative
burden would result from adversarial Batson hearings).
305. Jackson, 322 N.C. at 258, 368 S.E.2d at 842.
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tors' proffered reasons as mere pretexts for discrimination 0 6
In light of the purposes of Batson, the court underestimated the importance
of examining the prosecutor and thus unduly restricted the defendant's ability to
expose unconstitutional discrimination. 30 7 The trial judge's evaluation of credi-
bility is the most important trial-level determination in any Batson inquiry.30 8
Prosecutors easily can assert nonracial reasons for striking any juror; thus, the
primary issue for the court is whether those reasons are genuine or pretextual.30 9
Evaluating the credibility of prosecutors in Batson cases, however, is not a sim-
ple matter. Because of unconscious racism, trial judges may not recognize racial
discrimination. 3 10 Furthermore, many of the reasons that prosecutors advance
are subjective and vague.311 Some of these reasons involve subtle actions by the
prospective juror; others involve no objective indicia at all.312 Trial judges are
unlikely to observe these claimed grounds for the alleged discriminatory per-
emptory challenges unless they search for them. Therefore, the trial judge must
have an adequate opportunity to evaluate the prosecutor's sincerity when the
prosecutor explains her peremptory challenges.
For more than two centuries the belief that "no safeguard for testing the
value of human statements is comparable to that furnished by cross-examina-
tion" has pervaded Anglo-American law. 313 In light of the centrality of the
credibility issue to the Batson inquiry and the inherent difficulty of evaluating
the prosecutor's credibility, the North Carolina Supreme Court should permit
defendants to examine the prosecutors once the prosecutors have explained their
306. See id. (finding "no reason why the defendant could not have offered evidence to strengthen
his case after the State had made its showing"); see also State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 497, 391
S.E.2d 144, 150 (1990) (expressly holding that after State advances its reasons for the disputed chal-
lenges defendant has right of surrebuttal to show that those reasons are pretextual); State v. Green,
324 N.C. 238, 240-41, 376 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1989) (same).
307. The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that because the prosecutor, an officer of the court, is
under a high professional obligation to speak truthfully, no need for cross-examination arises. Peo-
ple v. Young, 128 III. 2d 1, 24-25, 538 N.E.2d 453, 459 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S, Ct. 3290 (1990).
This argument is unpersuasive. Prosecutors are also under a high obligation to obey the fourteenth
amendment, to follow the dictates of the United States Supreme Court, and not to exercise peremp-
tory challenges on account of race. The need for Batson shows that some prosecutors, like other
lawyers; breach their professional obligations. Furthermore, some prosecutors simply are unaware
of the racial underpinnings of their actions. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(unconscious racism may color prosecutor's judgments); Johnson, supra note 287, at 1026-36 (same).
Persons who might be denied their constitutional rights as a result of prosecutors' conscious or
unconscious racism are entitled to adequate procedures to protect those rights. Thus, prosecutors'
obligation to speak truthfully is no substitute for adequate procedures to evaluate their credibility.
308. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (trial judge's findings will depend largely on evaluation of
prosecutor's credibility); Jackson, 322 N.C. at 255, 368 S.E.2d at 840 (reviewing court should give
trial court's findings great deference because it depends on credibility).
309. See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 287.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 253-54.
312. Id.
313. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 182, § 1367, at 32 (Chadbourne rev. 1974); see E. CLEARY, supra
note 119, § 19, at 47. So essential is cross-examination to the accuracy and completeness of testi-
mony, that it is a right and not merely a privilege in trials. E. CLEARY, supra note 119, § 19, at 47.
Wigmore described cross-examination as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth" and "the great and permanent contribution of the Anglo-American system of law to im-




peremptory challenges. 3 14 The Jackson court's concern about and emphasis on
the disruption that might result from adversarial Batson hearings, while under-
standable at first glance, are unwarranted. Permitting examination of the prose-
cutor would not add substantially to the disruption of the trial, since Batson
hearings already involve an interruption of the trial. By the time the defendant
examines the prosecutor, the trial already would have been stopped for the de-
fendant to argue the existence of a prima facie case and for the prosecutor to
explain the disputed peremptory strikes. Furthermore, the defendant already
has the right to introduce further evidence in surrebuttal; examination of the
prosecutor would not take significantly more time. Trial judges can prevent un-
due disruption by exercising their traditional powers to preclude examination
that is badgering, repetitive, or a mere fishing expedition. Moreover, according
to Professor Raphael, most courts simply have not experienced undue disrup-
tions as a result of adversarial Batson hearings. 315 Most important, a small,
additional disruption in the trial cannot justify withholding from defendants the
legal system's most effective tool for exposing the falsity of prosecutors' asser-
tions when the constitutional rights of minority defendants and prospective ju-
rors are at stake.
At the very least, no rationale justifies the North Carolina Supreme Court's
absolute prohibition of examining the prosecutor. When a prosecutor must ex-
plain his peremptory challenges in a hearing on remand from an appellate court,
disruption of the trial is not a concern. In this situation no reason exists for an
absolute prohibition against cross-examining the prosecutor because the problem
at the heart of the Jackson court's rationale for the prohibition is absent.3 16
Moreover, the trial judge is in the best position to determine the value of exam-
ining the prosecutor and the disruption that might result from that examination.
The trial judge, therefore, should at least have the discretion to permit examina-
tion of the prosecutor.
3. Harmless Error
The North Carolina Supreme Court also has addressed the procedural issue
of harmless error under Batson. In State v. Robbins 3 17 the court rejected the
defendant's Batson claim in part because the defendant failed to exhaust his al-
lotted peremptory challenges, the theory apparently being that the defendant
still could have removed jurors with whom he was dissatisfied and thus was not
prejudiced by any Batson errors. 318 This holding once again misconstrues the
314. One commentator has suggested that defendants ordinarily should be permitted to examine
the prosecutor, with exceptions made only if the prosecutor demonstrates that his trial strategy
would be "compromised substantially" as a result of the examination. See Raphael, supra note 178,
at 338.
315. Professor Raphael reported: "The experience of most courts ... indicates that the Jackson
court was in error in fearing that cross-examination of a prosecutor would be disruptive ....
Raphael, supra note 178, at 338.
316. See Note, supra note 142, at 205.
317. See supra notes 160-76 and accompanying text.
318. State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 495, 356 S.E.2d 279, 297 (citing State v. Wilson, 313 N.C.
516, 524, 330 S.E.2d 450, 457 (1985)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); see also State v. Davis, 325
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constitutional principles upon which Batson is based.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's requirement that parties exercise all
of their peremptory challenges to show prejudice derives from cases in which
defendants claimed the trial court improperly denied their challenges for cause.
The court held in those cases that the defendants were not prejudiced by the trial
judge's refusal to excuse the jurors because, if they truly wanted the jurors off
the jury, the defendants could have removed them with their remaining peremp-
tory challenges.3 19 These cases are inapposite, however, to attacks by defend-
ants on prosecutorial peremptory challenges under Batson. When defendants
make Batson claims, they are not necessarily asserting particular dissatisfaction
with the persons who actually served on the jury. Rather, the claim simply is
that some persons were removed unconstitutionally from the jury. This claim is
especially true because, even if the defendants are not harmed by prosecutors'
discriminatory peremptory challenges, such challenges deny the excluded jurors
equal protection of the laws and undermine public confidence in the legal sys-
tem.320 "Prejudice" for the purposes of Batson, therefore, is present when any
person is peremptorily challenged on account of race. The fact that defendants
still had peremptory challenges remaining and could have used them to strike
persons accepted by the prosecutor does not remove this prejudice. Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court has noted that because jury selection goes to the
very integrity of the legal system, harmless error analysis simply does not ap-
ply.321 Thus, the North Carolina Supreme Court's reliance on its previous cases
dealing with prejudice and the use of peremptory challenges is misplaced.
D. Justifications for Suggested Doctrinal Revisions
North Carolina's implementation of Batson has been marked by a constric-
tive view of the decision and a misapprehension of Batson's operation and con-
stitutional underpinnings. The courts have misconstrued the operation of the
prima facie case by improperly considering challenged jurors' voir dire responses
when determining whether an inference of discrimination exists. The courts
N.C. 607, 620, 386 S.E.2d 418, 424 (1989) (finding no prejudice when defendant had three peremp-
tory challenges remaining), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 2587 (1990).
319. See, eg., State v. Quesinberry, 319 N.C. 228, 235, 354 S.E.2d 446, 450 (1987), vacated on
other grounds, 110 S. Ct. 1465 (1990); State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 21, 337 S.E.2d 786, 797 (1985); see
also State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 524-25, 330 S.E.2d 450, 457 (1985) (defendant dissatisfied with
jurors recruited by sheriff during middle of jury selection). These cases applied the North Carolina
jury selection procedures statute, which provides in part: "In order for a defendant to seek reversal
of the case on appeal on the ground that the judge refused to allow a challenge made for cause, he
must have:
(1) Exhausted the peremptory challenges available to him[.]" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214(h)
(1) (1988).
320. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
321. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (Witherspoon error resulting in improper
exclusion of jurors for cause in death penalty case is never harmless); see also Mitchell v. State, 295
Ark. 341, 351, 750 S.W.2d 936, 941 (1988) (Despite evidence of overwhelming guilt, Batson error
requires reversal, since "[w]e are concerned here with prejudice to the system of justice."); ef. State
v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 301, 303, 357 S.E.2d 622, 624-25, 626 (1987) (question is not whether racial
discrimination in selection of grand jury foreperson affected the outcome of the proceedings, but
rather whether there was racial discrimination at all).
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readily have accepted any facially neutral reason put forth by prosecutors as
sufficient to rebut a prima facie case, and have paid excessive deference to trial
court findings of Batson issues.
The courts' narrow views of Batson may be explained by North Carolina's
historical support for the peremptory challenge. North Carolina was one of the
first states to permit the exercise of peremptory challenges and, more particu-
larly, prosecutorial peremptory challenges.3 22 As a result, the North Carolina
courts have sought to give life to Batson without meaningfully changing the ex-
ercise of the peremptory challenge. This phenomenon has been most evident in
the wide range of rebuttal reasons the courts have accepted; they have been un-
willing to reject any facially nonracial explanation that, by definition, is ordina-
rily a proper basis for a peremptory challenge. The result, however, has been a
scheme that has been ineffective in answering Batson's challenge to erradicate
jury selection discrimination. The inherent conflict between the equal protection
clause and the peremptory challenge means that equal protection cannot be
guaranteed without intrusions on the peremptory challenge. Unless the North
Carolina courts revise their approach to Batson and promote in practical ways
the decision's fundamental goal of eliminating discrimination, Batson protection
in North Carolina may become permanently illusory.
The revisions suggested in this Comment are justified for several reasons,
despite their limitations on North Carolina prosecutors' traditional uses of per-
emptory challenges. Most important, the North Carolina Constitution provides
special protections against discrimination in jury selection; indeed, they are
stronger than those contained in the federal constitution. Article 1, section 26 of
the North Carolina Constitution expressly provides that "[n]o person shall be
excluded from jury service on account of sex, race, color, religion, or national
origin.' ' 32 3 This provision is distinct from, and in addition to, the state equal
protection clause.3 24 In State v. Cofield 3 2 5 the supreme court construed section
26 in the context of grand jury foreperson selection. In powerful language, the
court noted that by adopting this constitutional provision the people of North
Carolina
have declared that they will not tolerate the corruption of their juries
by racism, sexism and similar forms of irrational prejudice. They have
recognized that the judicial system of a democratic society must oper-
ate evenhandedly if it is to command the respect and support of those
subject to its jurisdiction.3 26
322. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text. In addition, the North Carolina trial tradi-
tion has been to promote freedom for its attorneys in selecting juries. See supra note 54.
323. N.C. CONsr. art. I, § 26.
324. See id. § 19. This section provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to discrimination by the State because of
race, color, religion, or national origin." Id.
325. 320 N.C. 297, 357 S.E.2d 622 (1987) (Cofield I).
326. Id. at 302, 357 S.E.2d at 625. The supreme court found the need for racially neutral proce-
dures so imperative that in Cofield H the court again reversed the defendant's conviction because of
the grand jury foreperson selection process employed, even though the court was "satisfied that there
was not the slightest hint of racial motivation" in the judge's selection of the foreperson. State v.
Cofield, 324 N.C. 452, 459-60, 379 S.E.2d 834, 839 (1989) (Cofield II).
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The court explicitly acknowledged that this policy applies not only to the selec-
tion of grand jury forepersons, but also to the selection of petit jurors. 327 As
Justice Mitchell explained in his concurring opinion: "[1]t is clear beyond any
doubt that this section of our Constitution was intended as an absolute guaran-
tee that all citizens of this State would participate fully in the honor and obliga-
tion of jury service in all forms; as petit jurors, grand jurors, and as foremen of
the grand jury. ' 328 The supreme court later discussed the specific relationship
of peremptory challenges to section 26 in Jackson v. Housing Authority.3 29 The
Housing Authority court observed: "Although long embedded in our common
law, the use of peremptory challenges is based upon statutory authority and is
not of [state] constitutional dimension. Therefore, the statutory authority to ex-
ercise peremptory challenges must yield to ... constitutional mandate . "... ,,30
The mandate of the people of North Carolina thus requires that the North Caro-
lina appellate courts rigorously protect defendants and prospective jurors from
invidious discrimination, even if it means contraction of a prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges.
This Comment's recommended revisions also are justified because the per-
emptory challenge simply is not of federal constitutional magnitude, 331 and rea-
sonable limitations on its use are essential to the protection of fourteenth
amendment rights. Furthermore, proponents of the prosecutorial peremptory
challenge overstate its historical significance. Professor Van Dyke has noted
that peremptory challenges "have been subject to abuse from the time juries
were first introduced in England. ' 332 This phenomenon was true despite per-
emptory challenges in England being much less sdsceptible to discriminatory use
than those in the United States because of the homogeneity of English society; in
the heyday of the English peremptory challenge, only propertied males could
serve as jurors.333 As times changed and English jurors became more diverse,
Parliament limited, and eventually abolished, the peremptory challenge. 334
Similarily, the historical significance of peremptory challenges in North Caro-
lina is less than overwhelming. Although the North Carolina General Assembly
in 1827 granted prosecutors the right to exercise peremptory challenges, it was
not until one hundred fifty years later that they gave prosecutors the same
327. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 303, 357 S.E.2d at 626; see also State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 653,
365 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1988) (recognizing that Batson and Cofield I stand for analogous propositions
that potential jurors may not be excluded nor grand jury forepersons selected on discriminatory
grounds).
328. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 310, 357 S.E.2d at 630 (Mitchell, J., concurring).
329. 321 N.C. 584, 364 S.E.2d 416 (1988). Jackson prohibited the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges on account of race in civil cases. Id. at 585, 364 S.E.2d at 417.
330. Id. As early as 1887, the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized that "if [the prosecu-
tor's right to stand jurors aside] had been (abused] ... such abuse would have warranted a recall of
the permission." State v. Sloan, 97 N.C. 499, 502-03, 2 S.E. 666, 668 (1887).
331. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S.
583, 586 (1919). The Court has held that the right to peremptory challenge may be withheld with-
out impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury. Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S.
497, 505 n.11 (1948); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936).
332. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 147.
333. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 165.
334. See Gobert, supra note 27, at 528-29.
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number of peremptory challenges as defendants.335
The final justification for this Comment's suggested revisions to North Car-
olina's Batson law is that the practical value of the peremptory challenge is ques-
tionable.336 In a 1978 study, for example, the prospective jurors whom the
prosecutor peremptorily challenged were as likely to favor convictions as were
the jurors actually selected. 337 It follows that the most important function of
the peremptory challenge is not to facilitate the selection of juries that are actu-
ally impartial, but rather to foster the perception of impartiality and thus pro-
mote confidence in the criminal justice system.338 Both Batson and Cofield
teach that when peremptory challenges are used for discriminatory reasons,
"[t]he harm... extends... to touch the entire community" because unconstitu-
tionally motivated challenges "undermine public confidence in the fairness of
our system of justice."'339 Limiting the use of the peremptory challenge to pro-
tect against discrimination, therefore, is not only justified, but is the only way
that the peremptory challenge may perform its function of promoting confidence
in the criminal justice system.
V. CONCLUSION
Five years after Batson, no North Carolina defendant has attacked
prosecutorial peremptory challenges successfully on equal protection grounds.
Batson has been rendered ineffective in North Carolina by the North Carolina
appellate courts' efforts to minimize Batson's impact on the peremptory chal-
lenge, a device historically employed in North Carolina. The American criminal
justice system is not big enough for both the equal protection clause and the
traditional, arbitrary and capricious peremptory challenge; the equal protection
clause and the peremptory challenge are inherently contradictory. Conse-
quently, the North Carolina courts must revise their approach to Batson and
promote more effectively Batson's primary goal of eradicating the discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges. As Justice Frye of the North Carolina Supreme
Court recognized: "[lit is the province of the courts [of North Carolina] to
ensure that [peremptory challenges] are used in such a manner not offensive to
the constitutional rights of our citizens. ' '340
PAUL H. SCHWARTZ
335. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
336. See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 129 (1983) ("no hard
evidence that current systematic jury selection methods are useful in typical felony cases"); Note,
The Case for Striking Peremptory Strikes, supra note 140, at 212-13.
337. Zeisel & Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experi-
ment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REv. 491, 513-18 (1978).
338. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
339. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
340. State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 260, 368 S.E.2d 838, 843 (1988) (Frye, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989).
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NOTES
North Carolina Air Toxics Regulations
The State of North Carolina recently adopted regulations for the control of
toxic air pollutants (TAPs) within its borders.' The regulations are the latest
step in an air toxics program the State began developing in 1985 in response to
reports of increasing in-state emissions of toxic pollutants.2 Although the fed-
eral government purported to control air toxics through section 112 of the Clean
Air Act (CAA),3 federal regulation had proven to be virtually unworkable. Not
only did the federal statutory scheme place unrealistic deadlines upon the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA),4 but it also required the Agency to regu-
late hazardous pollutants with an "ample margin of safety," 5 a particularly
arduous task considering no conclusive scientific data exists for determining
"safe" exposure levels for many pollutants. 6 As a practical matter, individual
states had to regulate air toxics on their own.7
In February 1990, the North Carolina Environmental Management Com-
mission (EMC) adopted a program regulating 105 toxic air pollutants., Because
the air toxic guidelines went into effect as of May 1990, 9 there has been little
opportunity to assess the effectiveness of the North Carolina measures or their
impact on industry. Meanwhile, in November 1990, the federal government
revitalized its regulatory scheme to address more effectively the hazardous air
pollution problem. 10 Title III of the 1990 CAA lists 189 TAPs that the EPA
must regulate by source categories over the next ten years.' 1 The Act delegates
1. NORTH CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, TOXIC AIR EMISSIONS IN NORTH
CAROLINA: AN UPDATE FOR 1989 2 (2d ed. Oct. 1990) [hereinafter NCEDF]. The North Carolina
Environmental Defense Fund analyzes air toxic emissions in North Carolina and prepares yearly
data reports. Id. at 1.
2. Id. at 6. In 1988, North Carolina ranked twelfth nationally in total air toxics emissions by
weight and exceeded the emissions of California and New Jersey. Id. at 22.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988), amended by Clean Air Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301,
104 Stat. 2399, 2531 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 (West Supp. 1991)).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 21-22.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 25-26.
7. See I DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT,
HEALTH, AND NATURAL RESOURCES, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF PUBLIC HEARINGS ON PRO-
POSED AMENDMENTS TO REGULATIONS 15A NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 2D.0535
AND .0902 AND 2H.0602, at I-I (Aug. 1989) [hereinafter HEARINGS]. As of 1986 approximately 38
states had regulated or were in the process of regulating toxic air pollutants. 4 id. app. B at VI-60
(survey of state air toxics programs).
8. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D.1104 (Aug. 1990). The air toxics regulations controlled
emissions for 84 of the toxic substances as of May 1, 1990, and emissions for the remaining 21
beginning May 1, 1991. Id. Vigorous opposition by various industries as well as the requirement of
a lengthy economic impact assessment delayed the promulgation for several years. NCEDF, supra
note 1, at 2; see 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-2.
9. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D.1104 (Aug. 1990).
10. See Clean Air Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301, 104 Stat. 2399, 2531-74 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 (West Supp. 1991)).
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
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the task of developing standards of "maximum achievable control technology"
(MAC'T) for various source categories to the EPA, with such standards to be
developed on an industry-wide basis. 12 In light of the federal government's new
air toxics regulations, the question arises whether the EMC will administer the
North Carolina regulations in their present form or as a supplement to the fed-
eral standards, or whether the Commission will have to revise or abandon the
North Carolina regulations to meet the new federal requirements.
This Note begins by surveying the development of the North Carolina air
toxics regulations and summarizing the substantive provisions of both Title III
of the 1990 CAA amendments and the North Carolina regulations, distinguish-
ing the regulatory approaches of each.13 The Note then suggests that North
Carolina retain its present regulations to remedy the existing problem of toxic
air pollution, demonstrating that these regulations can coexist with the new fed-
eral system of air toxics regulations. The Note further contends that North Car-
olina should not rely on its regulatory scheme as merely a protective measure in
the event of the EPA's default or failure of the federal air toxics program, but
should begin immediate and complete implementation of its own toxic air regu-
lations to ensure that its goals for cleaner air are attained. Unlike the federal
regulations, North Carolina's air toxics guidelines may be better suited to ad-
dress specific problem areas by regulating on a facility-by-facility basis and pro-
viding for additional attention where multiple sources are located. The Note
concludes that, although the uniform regulatory approach used by the CAA
may provide the best "fit" for a national solution to the air toxics problem, the
federal program may overlook localized problem areas. North Carolina must
retain its more flexible regulations, implementing them in conjunction with the
CAA to ensure more comprehensive control of toxic air pollution.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA AIR Toxics REGULATIONS
Congress designed former section 112 of the federal CAA to eliminate the
TAP problem; unfortunately, the statute fell far short of this goal. 14 Section 112
required that the EPA "list" certain toxic substances for which it intended to
promulgate standards.15 Although there were dozens of potential candidates for
regulation, the EPA listed only eight pollutants in the twenty years after section
112 was enacted.16
12. Id. § 7412(d),(e); see J. QUARLES & W. LEWIS, THE NEW CLEAN AIR AcT: A GUIDE TO
THE CLEAN AIR PROGRAM AS AMENDED IN 1990, at 31 (1990).
13. The North Carolina regulations follow a predominately health-based approach, while the
federal regulations, in contrast, follow a technology-based approach. For an explanation of each
regulatory method, see infra text accompanying notes 103-09.
14. See 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at -1 (noting the "relatively limited ability" of § 112 of the
old CAA to control toxic air pollutants).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (1988), amended by Clean Air Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549,
§ 301, 104 Stat. 2399, 2531 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 (West Supp. 1991)); see Note,
Toward Sensible Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants Under Section 112 ofthe Clean Air Act, 63
N.Y.U. L. REv. 612, 617 (1988).
16. Marchant & Danzeisen, "Acceptable" Risk for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REv. 535, 536 (1989). The eight pollutants currently listed are asbestos, benzene, beryllium, coke
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There are several reasons why the EPA has allowed many potentially haz-
ardous pollutants to go unregulated. Part of the problem stems from the statute
itself: the statute's time constraints made expansive listing impracticable. Sec-
tion 112 required the EPA to list substances that the EPA Administrator de-
cided "may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness." 17 Within
180 days after listing a pollutant, the Administrator had to publish proposed
regulations and give notice of public hearings for comment to be held within
thirty days.18 Within 180 days of the proposal publication, the EPA had to
promulgate final emission standards 19 setting "the level which in [the Adminis-
trator's] judgment provide[d] an ample margin of safety to protect the public
health from such hazardous air pollutants."' 20 These time constraints forced the
EPA to conduct the extensive research necessary to determine appropriate emis-
sions standards for a pollutant without time for a thorough assessment. 21 More-
over, after each listing the EPA had to identify all emission sources, investigate
various kinds of control strategies, and obtain information on compliance costs
before it could publish final emissions standards. Such preparation for final
emission standards usually takes a minimum of two years.22 The EPA, knowing
it could not present final emissions standards for numerous TAPs within six
months, began slowing the process by listing only one pollutant at a time.23
Although unrealistic time constraints may have delayed the listing process
somewhat, a more serious problem stemmed from the "ample margin of
safety" 24 concept. Most toxic substances regulated under section 112 are carcin-
ogens that have no known "threshold" below which adverse human health ef-
fects do not occur.2 5 This means that no level of exposure has been identified as
inherently "safe." If no safe exposure level exists, then section 112 literally re-
quired complete and immediate prohibition of all emissions of a pollutant once
the EPA listed it.26 Such an all-or-nothing approach caused the EPA to choose
"nothing" more often than not. Complete elimination of many pollutants may
be technologically impossible. Moreover, outright bans could induce the shut-
down of major industries, resulting in massive social dislocation. 27 To avoid
such dire consequences and in response to pressure from industry, the EPA in-
oven emissions, inorganic arsenic, mercury, radionuclides, and vinyl chloride. National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 40 C.F.R. § 61.01 (1990).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1).
18. Id. § 7412(b)(1)(B).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Graham, The Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcinogens Under
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985 DUKE L.J. 100, 123-24.
22. Id. at 124.
23. Id. at 124-25. Failure to list a pollutant within a reasonable time is legally defensible be-
cause § 112 places no time limit on the listing of a pollutant. Id. at 125.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B).
25. Marchant & Danzeisen, supra note 16, at 536-37; see Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 613, 638 n.43 (1980) (recognizing that no "safe exposure
level" exists for certain pollutants).
26. See Marchant & Danzeisen, supra note 16, at 537.
27. Id.
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stead chose to regulate only a few pollutants. 2 To avert widespread industry
shutdown, the EPA based the few standards it set on "best available" control
technology. 29 In short, the EPA's steadfast refusal to entertain major industry
closings as a solution to the TAP problem rendered Congress's strict health-
based approach to toxic emissions limitations a dead-end path to progressive
pollution control.
Once the federal system proved inadequate, states began filling in the gaps
with their own air toxics legislation. By 1987, several states, including Califor-
nia and New Jersey, already had remedial legislation in place.30 North Caro-
lina, however, had not reacted yet to the growing toxic air emissions problem.
In 1985, North Carolina decided to take action for several reasons. First,
heightened public concern about toxic chemicals in the atmosphere necessitated
action.31 Second, the State was aware that the EPA bad failed to regulate these
pollutants effectively under section 112.32 Third, scientific reports indicated an
increase in the release of numerous TAPs-including carcinogens, mutagens,
and teratogens-into North Carolina skies.3 3
With funding from the EPA, the North Carolina Division of Environmen-
tal Management (DEM) began a survey of sources of North Carolina toxic air
pollutants. 34 After compiling a list of pollutants, DEM initially sought to emu-
late other state programs by proposing a "strict factored approach" to obtain
ambient air levels. 35 This approach uses the threshold limit value (TLV) 36 of a
pollutant multiplied by a particular safety factor.37 Industry strongly objected
to this approach, arguing that the DEM applied the TLVs out of context and
that a constant safety factor was inappropriate under the circumstances. 38
28. Id.
29. Note, supra note 15, at 615. Best available technology (BAT) standards consider both tech-
nological feasibility and economic cost of implementation. Id. The statutory language of § 112,
however, precludes tradeoffs between health factors and nonhealth feasibility factors. See 42 U.S.C.
7412(b)(1)(B); Note, supra note 15, at 613. In fact, Congress envisioned the possible shutdown of
industries in the absence of control technology available to assure zero emissions. See 116 CONG.
REc. 42,385 (1970). At least one court has upheld the EPA's decision to incorporate feasibility
factors in setting emissions standards. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d
1146, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
30. NORTH CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, ToxIc AIR EMISSIONS IN NORTH
CAROLINA: AN UPDATE FOR 1988, at 21 (1989).
31. See 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-3 (listing reasons for instituting a North Carolina air
toxics program).
32. Id.
33. Id. A mutagen is a substance that tends to increase the frequency of alterations in genetic
or hereditary material. 2 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1492 (1976). A
teratogen is a substance that causes developmental malformations in fetuses. Id. at 2358.
34. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-3.
35. Id. at 1-2. For an explanation of a modified (as opposed to a strict) factored threshold limit
value approach, see infra note 54.
36. A threshold limit value (TLV) is the "time-weighted average concentration, for a normal 8-
hour workday and 40-hour workweek, to which nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed,...
without adverse effect." AMERICAN CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRIAL HYGIEN-
ISTS, THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUES AND BIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE INDICES FOR 1988-1989, at 4 (1988)
[hereinafter ACGIH]; NCEDF, supra note 1, app. C.
37. The strict factored approach applies only one safety factor (1/200) to the threshold limit
value of a pollutant to obtain acceptable ambient levels (AALs).
38. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-2.
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Therefore, industry suggested that North Carolina establish an independent sci-
entific panel to develop acceptable ambient levels (AAL) for the pollutants.39
The North Carolina Academy of Sciences established the Air Toxics Panel,
charging it with reviewing the list of proposed toxic air pollutants recom-
mending a suitable approach for determining AALs.4°
In reviewing the list of pollutants the Panel limited its choices to chemicals
that the American Conference of Government and Industrial Hygienists already
had assigned a TLV, that the EPA had listed as carcinogens in the category of
Group A (human carcinogens) or Group B (probable human carcinogens), 4 ' or
that North Carolina Division of Health Services considered to be of public
health concern. The Panel further limited its work to chemicals for which there
was potential exposure in North Carolina.42 Additionally, the scientific panel
proposed a "modified factored approach" 43 in determining the AALs.
After these initial studies, the EMC entered into a contract with Radian
Corporation to do an economic impact study of the proposed regulations." At
public hearings on the proposed regulations, various industrial representatives
argued that the economic impact statement was incomplete and that it underes-
timated the regulations' impact by "ignoring the loss of competitiveness and the
resulting loss of profitability that would accompany a slight increase in prices for
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Group A human carcinogens are those chemicals for which there is sufficient evidence from
epidemiological studies to support a causal association between exposure to the agent and cancer.
Group B probable human carcinogens are chemicals for which there is sufficient evidence of carcino-
genicity from animal studies and limited or inadequate evidence from epidemiological studies. EPA
Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 34,000 (1986). North Carolina's
AALs for carcinogens are based on unit risk factors developed by the EPA's Carcinogen Assessment
Group (CAG). Unit risk factor is an estimate of the incremental lifetime cancer risk over the back-
ground occurring in a population in which all individuals are exposed continuously to a concentra-
tion of 1 ug/m 3 of the agent in the air that they breathe. EPA Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen
Risk Assessment, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,294, 46,299 (1984); 2 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at V-650.
42. NORTH CAROLINA ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
AIR Toxics PANEL OF THE NORTH CAROLINA ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 6 (Sept. 1986), reprinted in
4 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at VI-7 [hereinafter AIR Toxics PANEL]. Limiting the lists of air toxics
to those that pose an actual threat to human health in North Carolina saves both time and money.
The EMC's resources should be allocated properly to control only those pollutants that North Caro-
lina's industries actually emit.
43. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-2; see infra note 54.
44. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-2; see RADIAN CORPORATION, ASSESSMENT OF THE ECO-
NOMIC IMPACTS OF NORTH CAROLINA'S PROPOSED AIR Toxics REGULATION (Apr. 1988) [herein-
after RADIAN]. Section 143-215.107(f) of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that in the
event the federal government has not adopted regulations on a matter, the EMC may not adopt
regulations until it considers "an assessment of the economic impact of the proposed standards."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.107(f) (1990).
The North Carolina legislature adopted this section-called the Hardison Amendment after
Senator Harold Hardison-in 1975. The statute constrains the EMC's development of air quality
standards in two ways. First, the EMC may not adopt standards more stringent than those promul-
gated by the federal government. Second, where the federal government has not regulated, the EMC
must conduct an economic impact assessment before the standards are adopted. Id. The economic
impact study must be part of the rule-making record and include an "estimate of the economic and
social costs to commerce and industry, units of local government, and agriculture necessary to com-
ply with the proposed standards and an examination of the economic and social benefits of such
compliance." Id.
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products produced by North Carolina industries."'45 Further, they argued that
the assessment failed to evaluate certain social impacts of the regulations, in-
cluding job losses and jobs that would not be created.4 6 Environmentalists, in
contrast, asserted that the statute requires only an "estimate" of regulatory
costs, and does not specify with any detail what the assessment should contain,
how extensive it needs to be, or what type of comparisons need to be made.47
Moreover, environmentalists argued that the DEM compiled a legitimate report,
and that the study could be reasonably relied upon given the limited resources
available.48 Following the public hearings, the EMC approved the economic
impact statement4 9 and the new guidelines for TAPs became effective as of May
1, 1990.50
The North Carolina regulations contain a list of TAPs that the Air Toxics
Panel divided into noncarcinogens (acute irritants, acute toxicants, and chronic
toxicants) and carcinogens. 51 The Panel chose acceptable ambient levels for
both types of pollutants. For noncarcinogens, the Panel applied various safety
factors to TLVs to obtain a concentration that protects the human population
exposed outside of the abutting property line of any emissions source. 52 These
safety factors consider variability in human susceptibility, continuous exposure
over a 168-hour week as compared to a 40-hour week, uncertainties inherent in
studies of chronic effects, and the severity of effects.53 The Panel then applied
these factors to the TLVs to determine the concentrations acceptable as ambient
air levels.54
45. 2 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at V-461 (comments by Charles Case on behalf of the Chemical
Industry Council of North Carolina). Radian Corporation's impact study reported that under worst
case conditions less than three percent of 325 North Carolina facilities surveyed would experience
significant economic hardship, and 19% would be able to comply with minimal added controls or by
raising stack height. See RADIAN, supra note 44, at xiii.
46. 2 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at V-461 (comments by Charles Case on behalf of Chemical
Industry Council of North Carolina).
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.107(f) (1990).
48. 2 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at V-550 (comments at public hearing by Steven Levitas on
behalf of the North Carolina Environmental Defense Fund). Environmentalists assert that limited
resources hamper North Carolina's ability to devote the time and energy necessary to achieve a
dynamic air toxics program. NCEDF, supra note I, at 23.
49. The North Carolina Attorney General has ruled that the EMC has the ultimate responsibil-
ity and authority to determine whether an economic impact assessment is sufficiently complete.
HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-88.
50. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D.1104 (Aug. 1990).
51. Id. Acute irritants are chemicals that cause irritation at the site of contact immediately
following exposure of eight hours or less. Acute toxicants are chemicals that cause adverse effects at
sites distant from the point of exposure within eight hours. Chronic toxicants are chemicals that
cause adverse effects after multiple or prolonged exposures. 4 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at VI-32 to
VI-33.
52. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-2.
53. AIR Toxics PANEL, supra note 42, at 11-16.
54. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-2. The application of various safety factors to TLV values is
called a "modified factored approach." The use of several factors is designed to account for the
multiple differences between community and occupational exposures. For example, the Air Toxics
Panel decided on a factor of 10 to account for the variability in human susceptibility. AIR TOXiCS
PANEL, supra note 42, at 12. The TLV does not always reflect this variation because workers are
usually healthy adults. In contrast, the population at large includes children, elderly persons, and
other sensitive subgroups. Id. The Panel also adjusted for continuous community exposure by
adopting a factor of four to account for the difference between a 40-hour workweek and a 168-hour
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The Air Toxies Panel determined the AALs for known carcinogens and
probable carcinogens in a different manner. Carcinogens, as opposed to non-
carcinogens, are nonthreshold agents. 55 Because no data confirm a safe level of
exposure for these chemicals, the Panel had to decide on an "acceptable" level of
risk.56 The Panel first categorized each agent as either a known human carcino-
gen (Group A) or probable human carcinogen (Group B), based on studies by
the Carcinogen Assessment Group of the EPA.5 7 For known carcinogens, the
Panel determined AALs based on a lifetime risk of one incidence of cancer in
one million exposed persons.58 For probable human carcinogens, the Panel de-
termined a less stringent AAL based on a lifetime risk of one incidence of cancer
in 100,000 exposed persons.59 These "acceptable" risk factors are based on cur-
rent federal and state practice and are not considered extreme.6° For known
human carcinogens, the Panel used quantitative risk assessment 61 techniques,
based on available human data, to determine the incremental air concentration
(concentration attributable to an emission source) associated with an additional
lifetime cancer risk of one in a million persons exposed.62 For probable human
carcinogens, the Panel determined AALs similarly, except it used extrapolations
from animal studies to determine the incremental air concentration associated
week. Id. at 12-13. The Panel used a factor of two to adjust for the uncertainty inherent in studies
of chronic effects. Id. at 14. It also decided to apply a safety factor of two to those agents eliciting
irreversible or life-threatening effects at concentrations that might be reasonably expected to occur in
the ambient air. Id. at 14-15.
55. "Nonthreshold" means that there is no "safe" level of exposure. Industrial Union Dept.,
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 638 n.43 (1980); see Comment, The Clean Air
Act: Economic and Technological Feasibility in Setting Standards Under Section 112, 20 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 397, 403 n.73 (1987). A minority of scientists believe that carcinogens do have a
threshold. Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride A Short Course in the Law and Policy of
Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 500, 511 n.42 (1978).
56. The "acceptable" level of risk is not the product of any actual data, but is primarily a policy
decision. AIR Toxics PANEL, supra note 42, at 26.
57. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
58. AIR Toxics PANEL, supra note 42, at 16.
59. Id. Industry officials critical of the AALs established by the Air Toxics Panel noted that
lifetime risk estimates assume that the average life span is 70 years and that exposure to a particular
cancer-causing agent is continuous during life. 2 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at V-522 (comments
Richard V. Hargitt on behalf of E.I. Du Pont de Nemours).
60. EPA, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Food and Drug Admin-
istration use the same criteria for control of carcinogenic chemicals. 2 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at
V472 (comments at public hearing by Dr. Carl M. Shy, M.D., Chairman, Air Toxics Panel, North
Carolina Academy of Sciences).
61. Quantitative risk assessment, as defined by the National Academy of Sciences, is the calcu-
lation of the probability of potentially adverse health effects from human exposure to environmental
hazards. ENvIRoLoGIc DATA, REVIEW OF THE NORTH CAROL1INA PROPOSED AIR Toxics PRO-
GRAM § 1.3 (Jan. 1989), reprinted in 2 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at V-579. The risk assessment
process usually involves four steps: hazard identification, dose-response assessment, exposure assess-
ment, and risk characterization. EPA Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 49
Fed. Reg. 46,294, 46,295 (1984). Hazard identification is a qualitative assessment that looks at the
weight of the evidence to determine whether a chemical poses a hazard to human health. Id. Dose-
response assessment characterizes the relationship between the dose of a chemical and the incidence
of an adverse health effect in humans. This process usually involves extrapolations made from high
to low doses and from animal to human exposures. Id. Exposure assessment estimates the intensity,
frequency, and duration of human exposures to a chemical in the environment. Id. Risk characteri-
zation is the final step of combining exposure and dose-response assessments to reach a quantitative
estimate of the risk. Id.
62. AIR Toxics PANEL, supra note 42, at 16.
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with an additional lifetime cancer risk of one in 100,000 persons exposed.63
The AALs are not strict regulations but merely guidelines that aid the
EMC in deciding whether human health is adequately protected. 64 The regula-
tions provide that a facility may not emit any of the toxic air pollutants listed "in
such quantities that may cause or contribute beyond the premises... to any
significant ambient air concentration that may adversely affect human health."' 65
The EMC is to rely on the AAL guidelines in determining what concentrations
are "significant."'66
To date, North Carolina has established AAL guidelines for 105 TAPs-
eighty-four AALs effective May 1, 1990, and twenty-one AALs effective May 1,
1991.67 With few exceptions, all sources of air toxics must have a permit to emit
any of these air toxics. 68 The regulations require existing sources to apply for a
permit or permit modification 180 days after they receive notice from the DEM
requesting that they apply for a permit to emit TAPs.69 The DEM makes such
notification or "permit calls" on the basis of Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) codes, which group industries of similar type.70 This grouping benefits
both the DEM and industries. It helps reduce the workload of the permitting
staff by calling only a manageable number of industries at one time. Phasing in
the program also spreads out the demand for air pollution control equipment,
making it easier and cheaper for companies to obtain and install required
technology. 71
To acquire a permit, a new source must demonstrate through modeling 72
that the AALs or guidelines will not be exceeded because of the facility's emis-
sions.73 Alternatively, a new source may avoid compliance with AALs by prov-
ing that a greater concentration than that set forth would not adversely affect
human health.74 Although this poses a difficult burden, a new source may sup-
port a request for a higher concentration in one of two ways. First, the new
source may establish that the areas where the ambient concentrations are ex-
pected to exceed the AALs "are not inhabitable or occupied for the duration of
the averaging time of the pollutant of concern." 75 For instance, a new source
63. Id. By definition, probable human carcinogens have no conclusive data based on human
epidemiological studies, but the carcinogenicity may be based on "sufficient" animal studies. See
EPA Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 34,000 (1986) (EPA's defini-
tion of Group B probable human carcinogens).
64. See 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-12 (agency response to comments).
65. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D.1104 (Aug. 1990) (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. NCEDF, supra note 1, at 22; see N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D. 1104.
68. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-3; see N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0610 (Aug. 1990).
With the exception of new sources combusting only unadulterated fossil fuels or wood, all new
sources of air toxics must have a permit. Id.
69. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0610(a)(3).
70. Id. r. 2H.0610(a)(4).
71. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-46.
72. For a discussion of modeling, see infra text accompanying notes 86-98.
73. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0610(b)(1).
74. Id. r. 2H.0610(b)(2).
75. Id. r. 2H.0610(b)(2)(A).
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may assert that the area in question is over a body of water and cannot be inhab-
ited. Of course, for pollutants with a short averaging time,7 6 an owner may still
have difficulty showing that persons will not occupy the area during that time.
For example, even if the area in question is an uninhabited body of water, fishing
or other recreational activities may bring people into the area for short periods
of time. Second, a new source may produce new toxicological data showing that
the AAL for the pollutant in question is too low and the facility's ambient im-
pact is below the level indicated by the new data.77 Such data, however, is not
easy to come by and may prove quite costly to obtain.7 8 Furthermore, because
of the uncertainties inherently involved in air toxics research, it is doubtful that
a source will be able to prove with any degree of accuracy that a higher concen-
tration will not adversely affect human health in any way.
Likewise, existing sources may obtain a permit by demonstrating either that
they will comply with the guidelines, that noncompliance would not adversely
affect human health, or that they qualify for one of three exceptions.7 9 An ex-
isting source may receive a permit, even if it is not in compliance, if it submits a
schedule satisfying the agency that it will comply with the air toxics guidelines
within three years after receiving a permit call. 80 An existing source also may
exceed the guidelines for a pollutant if the source can demonstrate that compli-
ance is technologically infeasible81 or would result in significant economic hard-
ship.82 These exceptions are premised on the belief that it is easier to adapt new
sources to technological innovations in pollution control than to retrofit existing
sources for the same pollution control. Generally, standards are more lax for
existing sources than for new sources. Existing sources falling into a technologi-
cal or economic infeasibility exception have three years after receiving written
76. Each category of toxic pollutants has a different averaging time. For carcinogens, facilities
must average data over a period of a year. See id. r. 2D.1 104(a). For chronic toxicants, acute
systemic toxicants, and acute irritants, facilities must average data for 24 hours, one hour, and 15
minutes respectively. Id. To show that no adverse affects on human health will result from emis-
sions exceeding the AALs, a source must demonstrate that the area in question is uninhabited and
that most persons probably will not occupy the area for the duration of the averaging time. Id. r.
2H.0610(b)(2).
77. Id. r. 2H.0610(b)(2)(B).
78. The Air Toxics Panel collected the best scientific data and used state-of-the-art techniques
for determining AALs. See I HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-14, 19. Further, for carcinogens, the
Panel relied on judgments of the EPA's Carcinogen Assessment Group because it felt that "these
risk assessments, which are made at a national level and are subject to extensive peer review, provide
the State with the best current scientific judgment about carcinogenic risks." 2 id. at V-472 (com-
ments at public hearing by Dr. Carl M. Shy, M.D., Chairman, Air Toxics Panel, North Carolina
Academy of Sciences). To obtain new toxicological data that would meet a facility's burden of
proof, the owner would have to hire a team of experts, which would prove quite costly and offer no
guarantee of success.
79. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0610(c).
80. Id. r. 2H.0610(c)(1).
81. Id. r. 2H.0610(c)(2). "Technologically infeasible" means that the technology necessary to
reduce emissions to a level that does not exceed the AALs does not exist. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7,
at 1-51 to 1-52 (agency response to comments).
82. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0160(c)(3). "'Significant economic hardship' means the
cost of installing the technology necessary to prevent the acceptable ambient levels from being ex-
ceeded would result in a negative net profit when the installation of the technology is amortized over
five years." I HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-52 (agency response to comments).
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notification from the DEM to achieve maximum feasible control 8 3-not neces-
sadly AAL compliance. It may be quite some time, however, before the DEM
decides to notify certain industries. 84
How do owners or operators determine the ambient concentrations around
their facility? Owners are likely to use what is known as dispersion modeling. 85
Dispersion modeling estimates the concentration of a pollutant using mathemat-
ical simulations based on information about atmospheric and stack emission
conditions.86 The purpose of the models is to" 'predict pollutant concentrations
at any point in the neighborhood of the source.' "87 These models operate under
the assumption that a pollutant disperses vertically out of the smokestack and
then "disperses laterally as predicted by the laws of fluid dynamics."88 Disper-
sion modeling analysis typically consists of two stages: the screening stage and
the refining stage.8 9 The screening stage employs relatively simple techniques to
estimate a maximum pollutant concentration by using an array of "worst case"
meteorological data. Using "worst case" meteorology accounts for all possible
atmospheric conditions. This screening model is intentionally designed to over-
predict concentration levelsY0
If the screening model exhibits concentrations in excess of any applicable
state or federal standard for any pollutant, the owner performs refined disper-
sion modeling. The refined modeling is more exacting, time consuming, and
expensive and involves using actual meteorological data. The results of the re-
fined modeling are more precise and invariably predict lower concentrations
than the screening model. 9 1
The modeling process incorporates various facility-specific and meteorolog-
ical conditions by plugging these factors into a mathematical equation as vari-
ables or input. Some of these variables include wind speed, wind direction,
atmospheric stability, temperature, mixing height, emission rate, stack gas tem-
perature, stack gas exit velocity, stack diameter, stack height, and terrain fea-
tures.92 The EPA explains how a slight variation in a few of these parameters
can make a significant difference in ambient concentrations of a pollutant:
"[A] gaseous pollutant emitted over a grassy field will disperse much
83. N.C. ADmIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0610(d). "Maximum feasible control" means "the max-
imum degree of reduction for each pollutant... using the best technology that is available taking
into account, on a case-by-case basis, energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other
costs." Id. r. 2H.0602(6).
84. Cf. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-45 to 1-46 (facilities will receive permit calls only as
quickly and to the extent that the permitting staff can manage the workload).
85. See id. at 1-35 (agency response to comments).
86. Case, Problems in Judicial Review Arising from the Use of Computer Models and Other
Quantitative Methodologies in Environmental Decisionmaking, 10 B.C. ENvTL. AFI. L. REV. 251,
324 n.362 (1982).
87. Id. at 317 n.327 (quoting Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 348 (D.C. Cir.
1980)).
88. Id. at 324 n.362.
89. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-35 (agency response to comments).
90. Id. at 1-35 to 1-36.
91. Id. at 1-36.
92. Id. at 1-37.
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differently than if the pollutant is emitted over a large urban area.
There the dispersion will be affected not only by the local weather con-
ditions but also by the greater turbulence caused by the different types
of surface areas and heat sources throughout a city."' 93
The problem with using so many highly sensitive variables is that modeling is
arguably an inaccurate method of determining ambient concentrations. Some
critics, for example, consider modeling "a very poor approximation of reality."' 94
On the other hand, one must keep in mind that facility owners use modeling for
permit purposes only; modeling determines only operational processes, air pollu-
tion control equipment parameters, and emissions rates to be included in the
permit. 95 Once a permit is issued, its conditions are enforced through monitor-
ing, not modeling.
The EMC chose modeling for this limited purpose because of its concern
with cost-effective methods to achieve its clean air goals. The permit program
itself can prove quite costly to industry, but the use of modeling to determine
ambient concentrations of a pollutant is much cheaper than establishing, main-
taining, and operating an adequate ambient monitoring network.96 Although
modeling is a plus for larger industries, which would be faced with installing
extensive monitoring equipment and hiring qualified personnel to staff their
many monitoring stations, smaller industries may find dispersion modeling to be
the more cumbersome choice.97 Dispersion modeling is highly technical and
requires computer time and expertise that may not be readily available in
smaller industries. The advantage of modeling, however, is that it allows all
calculations to occur on the premises in front of a computer, and industries are
more likely to get results quickly, even if it means sacrificing some accuracy.98
Facilities need permits before operating, and the convenience of modeling en-
sures fast and efficient permit issuance.
Once permits are in place, facilities must use monitoring and reporting de-
vices to determine compliance with the AALs.99 The regulations require facili-
ties with air quality permits to report emissions of listed TAPs.' °° Methods of
quantifying emissions include stack testing, mass balance calculations, and emis-
sions factors.10 1 The owner or operator of the facility is responsible for both the
determination of emission rates and the accuracy of the data.102
93. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1161 (6th Cir. 1978) (quoting
EPA brief).
94. 3 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at V-2486 (comment at public hearings by William M. Deal,
Vice President of Manufacturing, Bernhardt Furniture Co.).
95. 1 id. at 1-36 (agency response to comments).
96. Id. at 1-35.
97. 2 id. at V-716 (comments by Larry Runyan on behalf of the American Furniture Manufac-
turers Association) (refined modeling requires "additional time and expertise which most industries
will not have available in-house").
98. Id. at 1-36 to 1-37.
99. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D.1105.
100. Id. r. 2D.1105(c)(1).
101. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-40.
102. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit 15A, r. 2D.1105; 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-40.
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II. NORTH CAROLINA'S HEALTH-BASED APPROACH TO AIR Toxics
CONTROL
North Carolina adopted acceptable ambient levels for each toxic air pollu-
tant without considering technological or economic infeasibility factors in its
assessment. This health-based approach10 3 presupposes that there is a certain
level of pollution to which the public may be exposed without sacrificing public
health and safety. This approach then establishes an acceptable or ideal limit on
the level of pollutants in the ambient air. The ambient air level is derived by
assessing various health-related factors and deciding on a level of risk that is
acceptable for the maintenance of public health and welfare." ° 4 Subsequently,
control measures are developed to achieve this ambient level. The health-based
approach in its purest form disregards technological or economic feasibility fac-
tors in its analysis.10 5 North Carolina, however, makes exception for existing
sources when compliance with AAL guidelines would constitute economic hard-
ship or when compliance is technologically infeasible.10 6 North Carolina, by
providing this exception, combines its health-based approach with another ap-
proach to pollution control, the technology-based approach.
The technology-based approach focuses on technology or pollution control
measures that are available and feasible in light of the type of industry involved
and often includes an inquiry into whether the industry is an existing or new
source. 107 Then, the best available technology (BAT) 10 8 or a similar standard is
applied regardless of whether any ambient goals are reached.10 9 Title III of the
1990 CAA amendments exemplifies the technology-based approach to pollution
control.
III. TrrLE III OF THE 1990 CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS
In response to the failure of the health-based approach to air toxics regula-
tion in section 112,110 Congress enacted new legislation designed to remedy
some of the problems plaguing the previous CAA amendments.Il First, Con-
103. For a discussion of a technology-based approach to regulation, see infra notes 107-09 and
accompanying text.
104. The goal in setting ambient standards is to ensure that the air we breathe is sufficiently safe,
See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988).
105. The health-based approach provides no room for consideration of technological and eco-
nomic feasibility. It often imposes standards that force industry to develop the control technologies
needed to protect public health fully. Cf. Note, supra note 15, at 619 (provisions of CAA § 112 are
technology-forcing); Marchant & Danzeisen, supra note 16, at 539 (same).
106. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0610(c) (Aug. 1990); see supra notes 81-82 and accom-
panying text.
107. Cf Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1334-37
(1985) (criticizing the best available technology approach for distinguishing between existing and
new sources).
108. The BAT approach contemplates applying the best control technology currently available
to all similar types of industries uniformly. Id. at 1334-37. For the purposes of this Note, the BAT
approach shall be used when referring to a technology-based approach.
109. Graham, supra note 21, at 133.
110. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
111. See Clean Air Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301, 104 Stat. 2399, 2531-74 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A § 7412 (West Supp. 1991)).
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gress took the initiative and established its own list of hazardous air pollutants
instead of delegating "listing" decisions to the EPA.' 12 In the past, the Agency
refused to identify substances producing adverse health effects because it knew
that after listing a pollutant it would not be able to write standards to regulate
it. 113
Instead of creating control standards for individual pollutants, the Admin-
istrator now establishes categories of industrial sources that emit substantial
amounts of each TAP.' 14 The EPA must publish the list of categories by No-
vember 15, 1991, and thereafter must provide an opportunity for public com-
ment on the list. 115 Once the EPA publishes the final list, the Act requires
regulation of all major sources in each category. 1 6 This source-by-source ap-
proach (as opposed to a pollutant-by-pollutant approach), combined with the
mandatory list of pollutants, should speed the regulation process and help pre-
vent foot-dragging by the EPA.
The Administrator must promulgate regulations establishing emission stan-
dards for all categories of major sources and area sources of TAPs. 1 7 The emis-
sion standards
shall require the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of the haz-
ardous air pollutants... that the Administrator, taking into considera-
tion the cost of achieving such emission reduction, and any non-air
quality health and environmental impacts and energy requirements,
determines is achievable for new or existing sources in the category or
subcategory to which such emission standard applies. 118
Industries may implement this so-called maximum achievable control technol-
ogy (MACT) using a wide variety of control measures including installation of
control mechanisms, substitution of materials, change in work-practice method-
ology, and increased operational standards."19 The MACT control standard
represents a marked departure from the strict risk-based or health-based ap-
proach of the old air toxic regulations' 20 and allows the EPA to consider eco-
nomic as well as other non-health-based criteria in determining MACT.
112. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991). Under the 1990 CAA amendments, the EPA
Administrator has discretion to add to the list any pollutants that pose adverse health effects, but the
Administrator may delete pollutants from the list only upon a showing that the substance "may not
reasonably be anticipated to cause any adverse effects to the human health or adverse environmental
effects." Id. § 7412(b)(3)(B). Although it may be in the best interest of some industries to try to
petition for a change, scientific uncertainty will likely obviate any chance of success.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
114. J. QUARLES & W. LEWIS, supra note 12, at 34.
115. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(c)(1).
116. Id. § 7412(d)(1). Further, the EPA must assure that "90 per cent of the area source emis-
sions of the 30 hazardous air pollutants that present the greatest threat to public health in the largest
number of urban areas" achieve compliance within ten years. Id. § 7412(c)(3).
117. Id. § 7412(d)(1).
118. Id. § 7412(d)(2).
119. Id. § 7412(d)(2)(A)-(E). This provision offers greater flexibility in control measures than
was permitted under § 112 of the 1977 amendments. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (1988), amended by 42
U.S.C.A. § 7412(d) (West Supp. 1991).
120. See J. QUARLES & W. LEwis, supra note 12, at 33; supra notes 24-29 and accompanying
text. In the past, the EPA sought to graft such considerations onto the old regulations despite the
fact that the literal language of§ 112 did not allow inclusion of technological or economic feasibility
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As is common to technology-based statutes, 12 1 the 1990 amendments im-
pose more stringent standards on new sources than on existing sources. For new
sources, the MACT may be no less stringent than the emission control currently
achieved in practice by what the Administrator determines is the best controlled
similar source. 122 Existing sources may have less stringent standards than new
sources in the same category; the standard, however, may not be less stringent
than the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing twelve per-
cent of existing sources in the category of thirty or more sources, or the average
emission limitation achieved by the best performing five sources in the category
with fewer than thirty sources. 123 Although new source standards are tougher
than those for existing sources, technological and economic feasibility continue
to be appropriate factors to consider in determining new source MACT.124
The new amendments also provide a schedule for the promulgation of
MACT standards. By November 15, 1992, EPA must establish priorities for its
list of source categories by considering the adverse effects of TAPs on the public
health and the environment, the quantity and location of TAP emissions that
each category will emit, and the efficiency of grouping categories according to
the pollutants emitted. 125 Once the EPA sets priorities, it must promulgate
MACT standards for the first forty categories no later than two years after en-
actment of the 1990 CAA. 126 Within four years, the EPA must establish stan-
dards for twenty-five percent of all of the listed categories. Within seven years
standards must be promulgated for an additional twenty-five percent of the
source categories, and at the end of ten years, all listed categories must have
standards in place. 127
All sources must comply with MACT standards within three years after
promulgation. 128 Congress, however, has built in an incentive for sources to
reduce emissions on their own. The amendments provide that an existing source
may obtain a six-year extension for compliance if it achieves a ninety percent
reduction in emissions prior to the proposal of an applicable MACT stan-
dard.1 29 Existing sources may want to analyze technological mechanisms, eco-
nomic factors, and regulatory schemes to decide whether they can make a few
minor changes now in order to qualify for the six-year extension later.130 Be-
cause these decisions must be made before MACT standards are issued, how-
ever, industry must predict now whether achieving an immediate ninety-percent
reduction will result in a savings over the cost of future compliance. Most likely,
factors in the equation. See supra note 29. Now Congress has chosen to incorporate those factors in
the 1990 amendments. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(d)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
121. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 107, at 1335-36.
122. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(d)(3).
123. Id.
124. Id. § 7412(d)(2), (3); see J. QUARLES & W. LEwis, supra note 12, at 34.
125. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(e).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. § 7412(i)(3)(A).
129. Id. § 7412(i)(5).
130. J. QUARLES & W. LEwis, supra note 12, at 35.
1592 (Vol. 69
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
industries will have to conduct a cost-benefit analysis individually to decide
whether the cost of voluntary reductions now is less than any benefits associated
with a six-year delay of the MACT standards.
Because of the EPA's prior record of laxity in promulgating air toxics con-
trol regulations, 13 1 Congress was not content to leave the implementation of
MACT standards to the Agency completely, so it designed the so-called
"MACT hammer."' 32 If the EPA fails to promulgate MACT standards as re-
quired, sources will become subject to case-by-case MACT standards after states
have their permit programs approved.133 Permits will contain emission limita-
tions for TAPs subject to regulation so that there will be equivalent standards
under this alternative regulatory method.
Once the EPA establishes MACT standards, it must decide whether more
stringent standards are required after application of MACT controls to protect
the public health with an "ample margin of safety... [and] taking into consider-
ation costs, energy, safety, and other relevant factors, [to prevent] an adverse
environmental effect."'134 This plan, designed to address the problem of residual
risks, is one health-based aspect that Congress has not abandoned. The EPA
must promulgate residual risk standards with an ample margin of safety nine
years after establishing MACT standards in the case of the first source categories
regulated and eight years for all other categories. 135 Legislation mandates that
the EPA establish residual risk standards for carcinogens that present a cancer
risk greater than one in one million after MACT controls have been installed. 136
Because of the uncertainty of risk assessment, the 1990 amendments call for the
National Academy of Sciences to review the EPA's risk assessment methodol-
ogy for determining carcinogenic risk associated with air toxics exposure and to
recommend improvements in methodology.1
37
The above regulations primarily deal with normal, everyday releases from
facilities. In addition, the new amendments propose methods of preventing and
responding to accidental releases of toxic substances.' 38 Here, the amendments
require a completely new regulatory program. The EPA must publish, not later
than November 15, 1992, an "initial list of 100 substances which, in the case of
131. See supra 26-29 and accompanying text.
132. J. QUARLES & W. Lawis, supra note 12, at 34.
133. Id.; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 74120). The state-issued permits "shall contain emission limitations
for the hazardous air pollutants... emitted by the source that the Administrator (or the State)
determines, on a case-by-case basis, to be equivalent to the limitation that would apply to such
source if an emission standard had been promulgated in a timely manner." Id. § 74120)(5). This
provision adds a layer of protection in case the EPA fails to promulgate an emissions standard. It
also requires the states to apply the MACT standards required under federal law.
134. 42 U.S.C.A § 7412(f)(2). The EPA must promulgate these more rigorous standards in the
event Congress fails to act on its risk assessment report. Id. § 7412(f)(l)-(2).
135. Id. § 7412(f)(2)(C).
136. Id. The federal act requires that categories of sources emitting a pollutant classified as a
known, probable, or possible human carcinogen reduce emissions to a level associated with a lifetime
cancer risk of less than one in one million. The North Carolina regulations, however, distinguish
between known and probable carcinogens by allowing an acceptable risk of one in 100,000 for prob-
able human carcinogens. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
137. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(f)(2)(A).
138. J. QuARLEs & NV. LEwis, supra note 12, at 36; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r).
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accidental release, are known to cause or may reasonably be anticipated to cause
death, injury, or serious adverse effects to human health or the environment." 139
The amendments identify sixteen pollutants that must be included. 140 By 1993
the EPA must promulgate regulations for the prevention and detection of acci-
dental releases and measures for emergency response, including the preparation
of risk management plans.141 Owners or operators of a facility subject to acci-
dental-release regulations subsequently will be required to develop risk manage-
ment plans that comply with the EPA regulations and include a hazard
assessment, a prevention program, and a response plan.1 42
In sum, the new federal regulation of air toxics has shifted from a health- or
risk-based approach to primarily a technology-based approach, applying MACT
standards to similarly situated sources and allowing for more flexible methods of
control technology.
IV. RETENTION OF NORTH CAROLINA'S AIR Toiacs REGULATIONS
The North Carolina and federal regulations take two different approaches
to the problem of cleaning the ambient air. North Carolina relied on a predomi-
nantly health-based approach in formulating AALs, 143 whereas the 1990 CAA
amendments use a technology-based approach in prescribing emissions stan-
dards. 144 Although both the North Carolina and the federal programs combine
elements of each approach, both are essentially predicated on one theory or the
other. Neither approach to environmental regulation has obtained overwhelm-
ing support. 145 Environmentalists advocate preservation of public health and a
clean environment at any cost and therefore favor a strict health-based ap-
proach. Industrialists, in contrast, view cost minimization as a primary goal and
favor a technology-based approach. As a result, two opposing groups actively
dispute the value of these two methods of regulation.' 46 The choices are not as
clear cut as they may seem, however, for each method contains inherent
weaknesses.
Neither the health-based nor the technology-based approach can be effec-
tive on its own because each addresses different issues. The technology-based
approach responds to immediate problems of scarcity and technological in-
feasibility but fails to project a long-term plan for pollution reduction.147 The
health-based approach, in contrast, takes an idealistic approach to long-term
139. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r)(3).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 7412(r)(7)(B).
142. Id.; see J. QUARLES & W. LEwIS, supra note 12, at 36.
143. See I HEARINGS, supra note 7, at I-11 (agency response to comments).
144. See J. QUARLES & W. LEWIS, supra note 12, at 33.
145. See I HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-66 to 1-69 (agency summary of testimony in favor of
technology-based regulatory scheme); cf. Doniger, supra note 55, at 555-56 (comparing health-based
and technology-based statutes regulating toxics at state and federal levels).
146. See I HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-4 to I-11 (agency summary of the competing arguments
of industry and environmentalists); Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency. Implementation
of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning"Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1293 (1985).
147. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 107, at 1335-37.
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goals, but ignores the short-term problem of limited technical innovation and
resources. 148 In addition to these theoretical difficulties, practical problems
plague both approaches. The efficacy of the health-based approach is limited by
scientific uncertainties associated with risk assessment, 149 while the technology-
based approach avoids the risk assessment difficulties, but faces problems of sub-
stantial cost and limited flexibility needed to address the idiosyncracies of indi-
vidual facilities.' 50
Despite the substantial difficulties encountered in each regulatory approach,
North Carolina should retain its health-based regulations in conjunction with
the federal scheme for several reasons. First, although risk assessment tech-
niques are fraught with uncertainties, the Air Toxics Panel used the best possible
research techniques and based its assumptions on the most current data avail-
able.151 The major problem facing the Panel and agencies applying the health-
based approach to TAP regulation is the treatment of carcinogens and the corre-
sponding risks. Risk assessment, the most common technique used in epidemio-
logical studies, requires scientific determinations under conditions of substantial
uncertainty concerning the risks involved, limited availability of scientific data,
and economic barriers to conducting adequate research.152
Ultimately, the health-based or risk-based approach is subject to the con-
fines of present scientific knowledge. Many statutes using the health-based ap-
proach result in two-part risk assessment analysis. The first part involves a
political decision as to what level of cancer risk is acceptable. The second part is
a scientific determination of the level of exposure to a pollutant which causes
that particular risk.153 Unfortunately, the causal relationship between a pollu-
tant and cancer is often difficult to assess.' 54 Part of the problem is that cancer
is a latent disease that fails to manifest itself until fifteen to forty years after
exposure begins.155 Also, the operation of chemical carcinogens and their effect
on human metabolic processes confound scientists. 156 There is substantial disa-
greement in the scientific community as to how much exposure to a potential
carcinogen actually begins cell mutation. Scientists question whether one brief
exposure is enough or whether several extended exposures within a short period
148. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-68 to 1-69 (agency summary of comments).
149. See Doniger, supra note 55, at 508-14.
150. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-68 (agency response to comments); Ackerman & Stewart,
supra note 107, at 1335-36.
151. See supra note 78.
152. Doniger, supra note 55, at 508-14. These factors prevent agencies from making precise and
informed decisions about risks at varying degrees of pollutant exposure. The limitations of science
and the controversial nature of risk management techniques result in substantial litigation challeng-
ing these acceptable risk levels as unfounded and capricious, leaving the agencies constantly fighting
for ground. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
630-38 (1980).
153. See Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG.
89, 89 (1988).
154. Doniger, supra note 55, at 510. To account for gaps in scientific knowledge, regulators
incorporate conservative estimates into risk assessment models. See Latin, supra note 153, at 94
(noting the inconsistent treatment of uncertainty in risk assessment).
155. Doniger, supra note 55, at 511-12.
156. Id. at 510.
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of time will cause cancer to appear. 157 The most perplexing yet important ques-
tion is what risks can be expected from a varying range of doses.158 If this
correlation was known, risk levels for carcinogens probably could withstand ju-
dicial scrutiny. Because of the lack of human studies, scientists have had to
resort to animal studies to predict human exposure risks. 159 Two problems arise
when using animal studies. First, there is uncertainty in extrapolating dose-re-
sponse levels across species lines. 160 Second, because scientists must use rela-
tively small test groups, 161 chemicals must be administered at high dosages to
establish a strong correlation between the dose and an adverse effect.162 There-
fore, scientists must extrapolate to low doses to mimic the actual exposure level
in the environment. 163
In short, agencies cannot predict how a difference in risk correlates to small
changes in dose strength. The North Carolina Air Toxics Panel had to recom-
mend guidelines with these scientific uncertainties in mind. Thus, the Panel
combined policy decisions with scientific determinations to propose air toxics
regulations. The Panel emphasized that, given scientific uncertainties, its ap-
proach "should not be considered a precise method distinguishing safe from un-
safe levels of contaminants, but rather a means to establish flexible guidelines
which can be used to raise flags of concern and set priorities for action." 164
AALs may be riddled with educated guesses that tend to err on the side of
conservatism in order to protect the public health. Nonetheless, the Panel based
the AALs on value judgments reflecting the best available scientific information
at the time165 and cannot be accused of being arbitrary or capricious.
The second reason North Carolina should apply its regulations in addition
to those established under federal law is that the State has refined its regulatory
system by dividing the hazardous air pollutants into noncarcinogens and carcin-
ogens and using assessment methods that cater to known properties of each. 166
This category-specific approach affords the greatest degree of protection because
guidelines may be more or less stringent based on varying degrees of toxicity.
For the categories of noncarcinogens, the Air Toxics Panel used TLVs for chem-
157. Id. at 510-11. Scientists also differ over whether the human body has defense mechanisms
against a single exposure and the possible effects of combined carcinogenic substances. Id.
158. Id. at 511.
159. Id. at 512.
160. Id. at 513.
161. In order to conduct an animal study with a 95% accuracy rate, the test must involve at
least six million animals. These experiments are not practical because of tremendous expense and
vulnerability to statistical errors. Id.
162. Id. at 512-13. Scientists cannot trace sufficiently low doses of chemicals in small test
groups. Thus, to induce cancer at detectable rates, scientists must administer chemicals to test ani-
mals at much higher doses than humans normally would experience. Id. at 512.
163. Id. at 513.
164. AIR Toxics PANEL, supra note 42, at 5.
165. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-14 (agency response to comments questioning the scientific
data used to determine AALs).
166. See supra notes 51-63. Varying treatment for carcinogens and noncarcinogens not only




icals and multiplied them by various safety factors to come up with AALs.'6 7
The TLVs are limits assigned to industrial chemicals--chemicals found in the
work place by agencies such as the American Conference of Government and
Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) and the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (OSHA).168 The ACGIH has assessed threshold levels of chemi-
cals in the work place for over forty years, and these threshold limits for
noncarcinogenic pollutants are fairly well established. 169 The ACGIH con-
ducted extensive research on limited groups of workers exposed to a limited
number of pollutants at specific times and for an exact duration. The TLV de-
terminations represent the best judgment of safe occupational levels given the
present state of knowledge.170 The Air Toxics Panel took these values and com-
pensated for the differing environment, exposure times, and varying susceptibili-
ties to reflect outdoor conditions. 17 1 These adjustment factors, however, are not
well established and involve discretionary judgments in converting TLVs to le-
gitimate AALs. Industry argued that this modified TLV factored approach was
not appropriate for outdoor exposure, and the addition of strict numerical fac-
tors could not simulate the variance between the work place and continuous
outdoor exposure.' 72 Although this may be true, the final ambient levels were a
product of established scientific data and the best educated assumptions based
on this reliable data. Furthermore, if clean air goals are to be attained, regula-
tors must bite the bullet and undauntedly push for health-based regulatory
schemes in the face of scientific uncertainty.
This same argument applies to the regulation of carcinogens, which inher-
ently involves more uncertainty, requiring even more guesswork. Applying the
most advanced scientific methods, the Air Toxics Panel accepted the risk of one
cancer per million persons exposed, and it performed quantitative risk analysis
to determine the incremental concentration of a pollutant associated with that
risk. 173 Because it is not feasible to conduct experiments on animals or make
human observations to define this low risk level, the Panel had to choose a statis-
tical model to estimate the dose associated with this acceptable low risk. The
modeling process is scientific in that it incorporates principles of extrapolation
and estimation. There is no proof that one particular model is clearly right or
valid, however, and these models usually lead to widely divergent results. The
Panel decided to use the fairly conservative linearized multistage model to extra-
polate from high dose animal studies.' 74 The Panel chose this method because it
167. See supra note 54.
168. See I HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-14 (agency response to comments).
169. Id.
170. See 4 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at VI-35; ACGIH, supra note 36, at 3.
171. See 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-15; AIR Toxlcs PANEi, supra note 42, at 9-16.
172. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-13 to 1-14 (agency summary of comments by industry
representatives).
173. In comments responding to a proposal by the EPA for regulation of benzene in 1988, the
National Resources Defense Council accepted this same risk. The Council relied on various sources
that cite a risk of one in one million as the upper bound for de minimis risk. Marchant & Danzeisen,
supra note 16, at 543-44.
174. Letter from Dr. Carl M. Shy, M.D., Chairman, Air Toxics Panel, North Carolina Academy
of Sciences to Gladys Van Pelt, Ph.D, Chair, Air Quality Committee, Environmental Management
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incorporated an adequate set of conservative assumptions regarding human can-
cer risks at low doses.175 To ensure that the most accurate, up-to-date scientific
information will be used for future regulation, the North Carolina Department
of Environment, Health and Natural Resources is establishing a Secretary's Sci-
entific Advisory Board to advise the EMC and DEM on current developments
in toxicology and health risks of air toxicS. 17 6 This step adds a layer of protec-
tion so that guesswork in establishing acceptable ambient levels is kept to a
minumum.
North Carolina should retain the air toxics regulations because of the flexi-
bility written into its provisions. While maintaining its health-based goals, the
state program makes allowances to exceed AALs and in limited circumstances
permits variances for existing sources. A variance may be granted if a facility
demonstrates that compliance is impracticable due to technological in-
feasibility.1 77 This provision allowing for variances recognizes the difficulty in
retrofitting old sources with control devices. If an existing source is successful in
demonstrating that meeting the ambient standards is technologically infeasible,
then it need only install "maximum feasible control technology." 178 Allowing
for variances represents a melding of the technology-based and health-based ap-
proaches and is one of the most apparent concessions North Carolina made to
industry.
The state regulations also offer flexibility by regulating on a facility-by-facil-
ity basis rather than in the uniform manner applied under the 1990 CAA
amendments. This distinction can be illustrated by comparing aspects of the
North Carolina air toxics program with parallel provisions of the federal
scheme.
First, the North Carolina regulations mandate that each owner or operator
of a facility apply for a permit in order to emit a toxic pollutant. 179 The North
Carolina regulations also require each owner to conduct computer dispersion
Commission (July 29, 1988) (discussing Air Toxic Panel's recommendations), reprinted in 4 HEAR-
INGS, supra note 7, at VI-175.
175. Id. This model assumes that risk is linearly proportional to concentration.
176. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-91; see Division of Environmental Management, Depart-
ment of Environment, Health, and Natural Resources, Draft: Secretary's Advisory Board on Toxic
Air Pollutants (undated) (describing Advisory Board's composition and function), reprinted in 4
HEARINGS, supra note 7, at VI-193.
177. A variance gives a facility an opportunity to avoid the stringent standards and possibly opt
for lesser standards by meeting certain conditions. North Carolina allows variances for existing
sources if they can demonstrate technological infeasibility, see supra note 81, or economic hardship,
see supra note 82, in complying with the ambient guidelines. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r.
2D.0610(c)(2)-(3) (Aug. 1990). An existing source may delay compliance by submitting an accepta-
ble schedule that provides for compliance within three years. Id. r. 2D.0610(c)(1). The Code does
not specify how quickly reductions must proceed during the three-year interval nor whether reduc-
tions must be constant and gradual. In any case, a facility may be able to emit pollutants that exceed
ambient levels for a period of three years if the DEM accepts its schedule. Id. The variance for a
new source is much more difficult to obtain because it requires that the source prove either that its
emissions do not exceed acceptable ambient levels beyond its property boundary, or that such emis-
sions will not adversely affect human health. Id.
178. See supra note 83.
179. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0610(a).
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modeling to determine its ambient contribution for a pollutant.18 0 Based on
these models, the State will implement control technology on an individualized
basis to assure that the facility will not contribute significant amounts of a pollu-
tant into the ambient air.
In contrast, the 1990 CAA amendments require that once the EPA lists a
category of sources, all sources within the category must achieve emission reduc-
tions by applying the MACT standard.18 1 This approach is a highly centralized,
industry-uniform system often used to implement BAT: the standards apply to
all industries of similar types regardless of their geographic location, climate, or
population size of those affected. Uniform standards neglect certain areas and
allow for creation of high concentrations of pollutants in small areas, or so-
called "hot spots.' 18 2
State systems like North Carolina's can alleviate particularly problematic
areas by requiring each source to have a pollution reduction permit and de-
manding that each facility reduce its own emissions so that collective emissions
do not exceed AALs. Whereas uniform controls may prove dysfunctional by
regulating some areas more or less than necessary, highly decentralized controls
can be tailored to redress specific pollution problems. For example, each of sev-
eral sources located in close proximity may comply with uniform federal stan-
dards on an individual basis, yet the combination of their emissions may cause a
significant ambient concentration within the vicinity. A decentralized system
like North Carolina's specifically addresses each facility's emissions based on
ambient concentrations in the neighboring area and thereby can assure that the
ambient concentration in a particular industrial area is not exceeded. Further-
more, North Carolina's regulations require facilities to apply additional control
technology if emissions of two or more sources located in a small area exceed
AALs.1s 3
A highly centralized, uniform approach does have some advantages over a
more individualized approach. They include:
decreased information collection and evaluation costs, greater consis-
tency and predictability of results, greater accessibility of decisions to
public scrutiny and participation, increased likelihood that regulations
will withstand judicial review, reduced opportunities for manipulative
behavior by agencies in response to political or bureaucratic pressures,
reduced opportunities for obstructive behavior by regulated parties,
and decreased likelihood of social dislocation and "forum shopping"
resulting from competitive disadvantages between geographical regions
180. Id. r. 2H.0610(o)(I).
181. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(c) (West Supp. 1991); J. QUARLES & W. LEWIS, supra note 12, at
34.
182. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 107, at 1350.
183. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D.1107(a) (Aug. 1990). "The owner of a facility shall not
be required to conduct [a] multi-facility ambient impact analysis .... This type of analysis shall be
done by the Division of Environmental Management." Id. r. 2D.1 107(c). The Division may require
a facility to install additional control technology if ambient impact analysis reveals that it is neces-
sary to protect the public from the combined effect of multifacility pollutants. Id. r. 2D.1 107(a).
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or between firms in regulated industries.184
At the federal level, this uniform approach has fostered significant improve-
ments in environmental quality with a cost to society that has not proved exces-
sive. 185 Nevertheless, opponents still argue that uniform standards are not cost-
effective.186 Uniform requirements may waste billions of dollars annually by
ignoring variations among plants and industries in the cost of reducing pollution
and by ignoring geographic variations in pollution effects. 187 Some argue that
North Carolina's health-based approach allows for the most cost-effective meth-
ods by regulating facility by facility.188 Only facilities that need emissions re-
duction will put on control technology, and sources that need emissions
reductions will use only those methods that assure that ambient guidelines will
not be exceeded.
This argument also supports North Carolina's use of a health-based regula-
tory system rather than a technology-based system, such as BAT. The technol-
ogy-based approach used by the federal government would prove much more
costly for North Carolina than implementing a health-based approach, because
under the control technology approach, every industry emitting toxic air pollu-
tants would have to install the best control equipment whether or not such con-
trols were necessary to meet the AALs.189 Because the implicit goal of BAT is
the air quality level attainable if every facility installed BAT,190 the technology-
based approach does not assure or even attempt to assure that public health is
protected from any adverse health effects. 191 What happens if the best available
technology is in place and an unacceptable risk to human health is still present?
Additional controls are not technologically or economically feasible in the BAT
scenario. 192 The health-based approach allows for many options to achieve am-
bient goals, including reduced emissions or substitution of materials, because it
is not constrained by best available technology.
Furthermore, BAT approaches, although assuring that sources install es-
tablished control technologies, do not provide a strong incentive for the develop-
ment of new technology. 193 Once BAT is in place, industry has complied with
the standard and no more need be done. Such an approach may even discourage
the development of new technology, and the long-term effect may be devastat-
ing. Similarly, others contend that the "BAT strategy is inconsistent with intel-
ligent priority setting." 194 Merely applying maximum pollution controls to the
pollutant that makes the regulatory agenda may prevent an agency from ad-
184. Latin, supra note 146, at 1271.
185. Id. at 1273. This is not to say that even excessive costs could not be absorbed by society if
necessary.
186. Id. at 1273 n.25.
187. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 107, at 1335.
188. See I HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-68 (agency response to comments).
189. Id. at 1-68 to 1-69.
190. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 107, at 1341.
191. See 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-68 (agency response to comments).
192. Id.
193. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 107, at 1336.
194. Id. at 1337.
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dressing the most serious pollutants first. Once a new pollutant is identified,
BAT requires costly inquiries into the state of control technology in the indus-
tries emitting such pollutants. Then BAT requires implementation of control to
the full extent of available technology for each particular pollutant.195 Not only
is this an inefficient method of prioritizing, it is inefficient in terms of cost.
North Carolina should retain the regulations not only because they better
meet North Carolina's needs, but also because they may meet its needs sooner.
The 1990 CAA amendments contain a complex regulatory timetable. The
amendments do not require facilities to put on control technology until after the
EPA establishes categories of sources and decides how to rank the categories. 196
The EPA then must promulgate emissions standards for each source category.
The schedule requires the EPA to decide on emissions standards for only forty
source categories by November 1992.197 Once the EPA establishes emissions
standards, new CAA provisions require facilities to apply MACT within three
years. 198 This means that it may be November 1995 before the first industries
(listed in the forty source categories) will have to comply with the federal regula-
tions, and it will be November 2000 before fifty percent of the source categories
will be regulated. 199
The North Carolina scheme has the potential to ensure regulation sooner
than Title III. Regulations for eighty-four pollutants became effective in May
1990.200 Already, new sources must apply for permits before beginning con-
struction so that AALs will not be exceeded.20 1 Existing sources must apply for
permits within 180 days after receiving a permit call.202 Once an existing source
applies for a permit, it must apply MACT no later than three years after receiv-
ing notification. Ideally, if the DEM calls existing sources now, they must com-
ply with the air toxics guidelines by May 1993 because, unlike the federal
statutory provisions, the DEM need only call a facility's SIC, and compliance
must follow within three years. 20 3 The DEM need not decide on source catego-
ries and emissions limitations before requiring any control technology.
North Carolina should not only retain its regulations but should strive for
implementation as soon as possible. Accordingly, the DEM should commence
permit calling as soon as feasible. The CAA should not provide an excuse to
hold back implementation of the state regulations and wait for the EPA to set
national emissions standards. Because North Carolina's regulations place no
195. Id. at 1359.
196. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(e) (West Supp. 1991); J. QUARLES & W. LEWIS, supra note 12, at
37-38.
197. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(e). These first categories may or may not include pollutants that are
prevalent in North Carolina.
198. Id. § 7412(i).
199. Id. § 7412(e) (standards for half of the categories must be promulgated by November 1997);
Id. § 7412(i) (industries have three years from promulgation to comply). This timetable assumes no
bureaucratic delay or foot dragging by the EPA and that the EPA has sufficient resources to accom-
plish the CAA regulatory program.
200. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D.1104 (Aug. 1990).
201. Id. r. 2H.0610(a)(1).
202. Id. r. 2H.0610(a)(3).
203. The DEM, however, may call a SIC code at any time. See supra note 84.
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time constraints on the DEM regarding permit calls, the DEM may wait an
indefinite period of time before notifying existing sources. Although such delay
may be permitted by the Code, the DEM would sacrifice public health by its
inaction. North Carolina toxic air pollutants continue to be a major problem
that the federal program may not address for five years. Furthermore, even
when the CAA requires compliance with the first standards within five years
after enactment of the statute, the government-regulated pollutants may not
pose a threat to North Carolina. In other words, state facilities may emit certain
pollutants that the EPA decides warrant a lower priority. In that case, facilities
need not apply control technology until 1997 or later. Finally, the 1990 CAA
amendments do not address North Carolina's "hot spots" sufficiently, whereas
the state regulations contemplate multiple-facility emissions.
V. CONCLUSION
North Carolina has abandoned the industry-uniform, technology-based ap-
proach in favor of a more flexible health-based approach, even though this ap-
proach had proved unworkable at the federal level. The state has not fully
implemented the plan yet and will not know its efficacy for some time. The
North Carolina regulations emphasize goals slightly different from those of the
CAA. First, risk management and public safety are of the utmost importance in
the state system and, as such, the regulators are willing to face the uncertainties
of risk assessment and opt for intelligent guesses based on the best scientific
information available, rather than sacrificing air quality and suppressing uncer-
tainties in a BAT system. The second state goal is improving long-term air qual-
ity by encouraging scientific innovation and variation in control technology at
the industry level. In implementing an individualized facility-by-facility ap-
proach, only those facilities in need of controls install them; this method of regu-
lation is not only cost-effective but also resource-conscious. Finally, the state
program advocates the use of a scientific panel to review listed TAPs and re-
search possible air toxics in trying to assure that the EMC will revise present
standards upon receipt of new scientific data and that facilities will install new
control technology as needed.
North Carolina should retain its regulations in conjunction with the federal
statutes because the state regulations offer a bold, individualized approach to
health-based environmental regulation with a view to cost-effectiveness and op-
portunity for limited variances for economic or technological infeasibility.
North Carolina's decentralized regulations can address specific problem areas
that the federal system of uniform standards may overlook. While the North
Carolina regulations set ambient air concentration guidelines, the CAA amend-
ments require emission reduction based on MACT standards. Theoretically,
neither regulatory system excludes the other and industries can comply with
both.2° 4 Keeping the state's health-based interests in mind, the DEM should
204. 1 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 1-73 to 1-74 (agency response to comments). Furthermore,
the state probably will adopt the EPA's standards. There should be no conflict in having two sets of
standards or regulations-one for emission rates and one for ambient concentrations. See id.
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implement the state guidelines for all sources as quickly as possible. The option
to delay permit calls and subsequent regulatory control may seem attractive to
the DEM now; 20 5 a "wait-to-see" attitude, however, subverts the original intent
behind these health-based regulations. The EMC considered the possibility of
concurrent federal regulations and decided that "[t]o wait for Congress to act
would produce needless and unnecessary delay."' 20 6 If the state sits on its hands
and fails to implement its own program, it gives facility owners a license to
pollute. Where North Carolina has the opportunity and the mechanism to con-
trol its own environmental destiny it should do so, and not rely on a federal
program that contains no assurance of success.
DEANNA SCHMIT
205. Although industry predicts the permitting process will produce a bottleneck because of
limited resources of the permitting staff, the EMC remains convinced that the permit calling process
will spread the workload sufficiently to allow for adequate review of permits. Id. at 1-45 to 1-46.
206. Id. at 1-73.
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Indelible Ink in the Milk*: Adoption of the Inclusionary
Approach to Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in State v. Coffey
It was tragic The defendant had, on several occasions, taken up
with divorced women so he could have access to their children. He had
sexually abused four other children before this little girl. The govern-
ment either couldn't or didn't introduce any of this prior conduct at the
defendant's trial The jury acquitted. When some of the jurors subse-
quently found out about the prior incidents, they were furious. "If only
we'd known about them, we'd have convicted the guy" 1
The issue of admission of uncharged misconduct evidence is the most liti-
gated evidentiary issue in most federal and state appellate courts.2 The multi-
tude of litigation in this area no doubt results from the highly prejudicial effect
this type of evidence has on judges, juries, and lay-persons3 in both civil and
criminal cases.4 The North Carolina Supreme Court, like most state and federal
courts, traditionally recognized the impact of this type of evidence on a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial by adopting a general exclusionary rule, with a limited
number of well-recognized exceptions.5 The court further protected defendants
from unrestrained admission of prior uncharged acts by requiring that evidence
of these acts be substantially similar to and not too remote in time from the
charged crime.6 Since Congress adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and
numerous state legislatures adopted corresponding state versions of that rule,7
many courts in these jurisdictions have relaxed significantly-if not eliminated-
the evidentiary constraints on the admissibility of this highly prejudicial class of
evidence.8
* The title originates from a colorful remark in a decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit involving the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence: "A drop
of ink cannot be removed from a glass of milk." Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283 (3rd Cir.
1976).
1. The opening quotation is borrowed from the beginning of a law review article on admission
of evidence of a defendant's prior sexual misconduct with children. Hutton, Prior Bad Acts Evidence
in Cases of Sexual Contact with a Child, 34 S.D.L. REv. 604, 604 (1989).
2. See 22 C. WRiGuT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE
§ 5239, at 427 (1978).
3. E. IMWINKELIUED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 1:03 (1984 & Supp. 1991).
4. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (noting that rule 404(b) applies
to both civil and criminal cases).
5. See State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 173-76, 81 S.E.2d 364, 366-68 (1954).
6. See, eg., State v. Boyd, 321 N.C. 574, 577, 364 S.E.2d 118, 119 (1988); State v. Scott, 318
N.C. 237, 248, 347 S.E.2d 414, 420 (1986); State v. Moore, 309 N.C. 102, 106-07, 305 S.E.2d 542,
544-45 (1983); State v. Shane, 304 N.C. 643, 654-56, 285 S.E.2d 813, 820-21 (1982), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1104 (1984). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
7. See, ag., N.C.R. EVID. 404(b) (1986). For North Carolina's version of rule 404(b), see
infra note 43.
8. See Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the
Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1465, 1467-68 (1985). For a discussion of
Congress' adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and the rule's subsequent effects on the
federal courts' approach to uncharged misconduct evidence, see infra notes 83-90 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of state courts' reactions to their legislatures' adoption of a version of rule
404(b), see infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
In State v. Coffey9 the North Carolina Supreme Court followed this trend
and abrogated the traditional procedural safeguards against admission of this
highly prejudicial class of evidence. The court ruled that evidence of the defend-
ant's prior sexual misconduct was admissible to show motive and intent in a trial
for the murder of a ten-year-old girl.'0 In upholding the trial court's admission
of the evidence, the Coffey court announced that a "clear general rule of inclu-
sion" governs the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence under rule
404(b). 1 The court stated that the adoption of rule 404(b) superseded any lan-
guage to the contrary in its previous opinions.' 2 Moreover, the conspicuous
absence of an analysis under the previously applied two-pronged test of similar-
ity and proximity in time 13 intimated that the court interpreted its adoption of
the inclusionary approach as obviating the need to prove either of these previ-
ously required independent safeguards. 14
This Note begins with a brief discussion of the evidence presented at the
trial in Coffey and the court's rationale for upholding its introduction on appeal.
The Note then outlines two lines of state precedent relating to the court's opin-
ion in Coffey: cases delineating the general standard for admissibility of un-
charged misconduct evidence and cases applying this general standard in
situations involving evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct, similar to that in
Coffey. The Note next analyzes two significant aspects of the court's decision.
First, the Note discusses the propriety of the court's express adoption of a rule of
inclusion for uncharged misconduct evidence and contends that the Coffey
court's adoption of this approach is justified by the concomitant intent of the
North Carolina General Assembly. Second, the Note analyzes the court's appli-
cation of this approach to the present case and its apparent abandonment of the
previously applied two-pronged test of similarity and proximity in time. The
Note asserts that the Coffey'court erroneously discarded these important safe-
guards. Specifically, it allowed the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence
for the sole purpose of proving that the defendant was guilty of the charged
offense because he had acted in in accordance with such behavior in the past,
precisely the purpose rule 404(b) prohibits. The Note concludes that only the
North Carolina General Assembly has the authority to restore the common-law
presumption against admission of uncharged misconduct evidence. The Note,
however, recommends that the court restore the previously required two-
pronged test for admission of similar uncharged misconduct evidence.
On July 19, 1979, the beaten and asphyxiated body of ten-year-old Amanda
Ray was found near a lake in Mecklenberg County, North Carolina.' 5 Eight
years later the State indicted the defendant for the first degree murder of the
9. 326 N.C. 268, 389 S.E.2d 48 (1990).
10. Id. at 280-81, 389 S.E.2d at 55-56.
11. Id. at 278, 389 S.E.2d at 54.
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 57-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application of this two-
pronged standard in previous North Carolina cases.
14. See Coffey, 326 N.C. at 278-81, 389 S.E.2d at 54-56.
15. Id. at 274, 389 S.E.2d at 51.
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child. 16 The prosecution based the first degree murder charge on the theory that
the defendant kidnapped the victim with the intent to commit indecent liberties
and subsequently murdered her to avoid exposure. 17
The prosecution's proof at trial relied exclusively on various types of cir-
cumstantial evidence. The State produced numerous eyewitnesses who testified
that they had seen Amanda talking with a man they identified as the defendant
in the two days prior to the discovery of her body.1 8 In addition to eyewitness
identification, the State offered evidence that fibers found on the victim's body
matched fibers found on several items proven to be in the defendant's possession
around the time of the murder.19
Finally, the State offered the testimony of both Janet Ashe and her pastor,
Reverend James Hall.20 Mrs. Ashe testified about an incident involving the de-
fendant and her three-year-old daughter, Angel. Mrs. Ashe stated that in May
1979 she left Angel with the defendant and, after returning home, learned from
the child that the defendant had masturbated in front of her.21 Both Janet Ashe
and her pastor testified that, when confronted, the defendant admitted to mas-
turbating in front of the child.22
Based on this circumstantial evidence, the jury convicted the defendant of
first degree murder and, following the jury's recommendation, the trial court
entered a death sentence.23 On direct appeal to the North Carolina Supreme
Court, the defendant raised numerous assignments of error from both the trial
and sentencing proceedings. 24 The court rejected all of the defendant's objec-
tions arising from the trial and conviction phase, but remanded for a new sen-
tencing proceeding because of prejudicial errors that occurred during that
phase.
25
16. Id. at 274, 389 S.E.2d at 52.
17. Id. at 280, 389 S.E.2d at 55.
18. Id. at 274-75, 389 S.E.2d at 52. More specifically, several eyewitnesses testified that they
saw the victim fishing on a lake with the defendant on July 18, 1979, the day before Amanda's body
was discovered near the same lake. Id. at 275, 389 S.E.2d at 52. Several of the witnesses also saw
the defendant in a white van at both the lake and Amanda's apartment complex. Id. at 274-75, 389
S.E.2d at 52.
19. The State introduced fibers taken from a sofa and van which belonged to the defendant at
the time of the murder. Id. at 276, 389 S.E.2d at 53. Both the defendant and his ex-wife confirmed
that the defendant owned a white and blue van in 1979. Id. at 276-77, 389 S.E.2d at 53. Apparently,
the sofa had not been cleaned in approximately ten years; thus the police were able to obtain hair
fibers from a dog, since deceased but admittedly owned by the defendant. Id. An expert in trace
evidence testified that dog hairs found in the sofa matched those found on the victim's body and in
the defendant's van. Id. The expert also stated that fibers from the carpet in the defendant's van
matched fibers found on Amanda's body. Id.
20, Id. at 277-78, 389 S.E.2d at 54.
21. Id.
22. Id. In a voir dire hearing prior to the admission of this evidence, the court concluded that
the incident involving Angel Ashe was admissible but excluded evidence of two other incidents
where the defendant had taken indecent liberties with other young girls. Id. at 279, 389 S.E.2d at 55.
The court ruled that the cumulative effect of this evidence would be more prejudicial than probative
under Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Id.
23. Id. at 274, 389 S.E.2d at 51.
24. Id.
25. Id. The court reversed the death sentence based on a failure to follow procedures outlined
in § 15A-2000(c)(3) of the North Carolina General Statutes. Id. at 296, 389 S.E.2d at 64.65, This
[Vol. 691606
The court's rationale for upholding the admission of the testimony involv-
ing the incident with Angel Ashe is especially significant. The court rejected the
defendant's contention that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts falls under
a general rule of exclusion, subject only to certain exceptions. 26 Instead, the
court embraced the position that the adoption of North Carolina Rule of Evi-
dence 404(b) manifested a clear legislative intent on the part of the North Caro-
lina General Assembly to codify a general rule of inclusion.27 Under this
standard of inclusion, the court stated, such uncharged misconduct evidence
generally is admitted, "subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion if its
only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposi-
tion to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged." 28 The court
added that its prior decisions have been "markedly liberal" in admitting evi-
dence of prior sex offenses of an "unnatural" character, such as in the present
case.
29
Under this general standard of inclusion, the court ruled that the trial court
properly admitted evidence of the Angel Ashe episode because its admission
satisfied two distinct purposes specifically enumerated in rule 404(b). 30 First,
the court ruled that the incident with Angel Ashe could provide a motive for
Amanda's murder.3 1 In addition, the court held that the lower court properly
admitted this evidence to prove specific intent, a necessary element of the under-
lying felony of kidnapping.32 Finally, the court ruled that in admitting the evi-
dence the trial court did not abuse its discretion under North Carolina Rule of
Evidence 403.33
statute requires that the foreman return a signed writing on behalf of the jury finding that mitigating
circumstances were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating factors before imposing the death pen-
alty. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c)(3) (1988). Because the trial court did not follow this proce-
dure, the supreme court remanded the case for a new sentencing proceeding. Coffey, 326 N.C. at
297, 389 S.E.2d at 65.
26. Coffey, 326 N.C. at 278, 389 S.E.2d at 54.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 278-79, 389 S.E.2d at 54 (emphasis in original).
29. Id. at 279, 389 S.E.2d at 54-55 (quoting 1 H. BRA1NDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE § 92 (3d ed. 1988)).
30. The rule lists as proper purposes proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment, or accident. N.C.R. EViD. 404(b) (1986).
This list is identical to that contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) except for the addition of
the word "entrapment." Id. 404(b) commentary.
31. Coffey, 326 N.C. at 280, 389 S.E.2d at 55. This reasoning reflects the prosecution's theory
that the defendant killed the victim to avoid any exposure similar to that which occurred with Angel
Ashe. Id. Although the prosecution was not required to prove a motive, the court held that motive
is always admissible when the act is in question. Id. Consequently, the court ruled that the trial
court properly admitted the evidence for this purpose. Id.
32. Id. at 280-81, 389 S.E.2d at 55-56. The prosecution theorized that the defendant took the
victim with the intent to commit indecent liberties, thereby committing a kidnapping. Id. at 281,
389 S.E.2d at 55-56. The court agreed that the episode involving Angel Ashe tended to prove the
necessary specific intent and ruled that the evidence was admitted properly on this theory as well.
Id.
33. Id. at 281, 389 S.E.2d at 56. The court stated that under rule 403 the trial judge has wide
discretion to determine if the probative value of the evidence is outweighed substantially by the
danger of undue prejudice to the defendant. See N.C.R. EVID. 403. The court held that the trial
court had remained within the bounds of its discretion on this issue. Coffey, 326 N.C. at 281, 389
S.E.2d at 56.
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In addressing the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence, the
North Carolina Supreme Court confronted a number of its previous decisions,
decided both before and after the enactment of the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence, which took effect on July 1, 1984. 34 The cases decided after the adop-
tion of rule 404(b) retain some of the pre-rule safeguards, but also show a
marked trend toward the admission of "other crimes evidence." 35 This trend
toward admissibility is particularly prominent in the area of prior sexual acts,
especially those of an "unusual" or "unnatural" character. 36
Before the adoption of rule 404(b) and to some extent even after its adop-
tion, the seminal case concerning other crimes evidence in North Carolina was
State v. McClain.37 In McClain, a jury convicted the defendant of prostitution.
The defendant appealed and excepted to the admission of evidence that she sur-
reptitiously stole $135 from her client subsequent to the alleged prostitution. 8
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in admitting
the evidence. The court announced that a general rule of exclusion "subject to
certain well recognized exceptions" governed admission of evidence of un-
charged offenses. 39 Applying this standard, the McClain court excluded evi-
dence relating to the defendant's uncharged larceny because it did not fall within
one of the listed exceptions to the general rule of exclusion.40 Thus, under Mc-
Clain, to admit evidence of other uncharged crimes the state had to prove that
the evidence satisfied one of the finite number of well-recognized exceptions.
The McClain court expounded several strong justifications for the general
rule of exclusion:
"the dangerous tendency and misleading probative force of this class of
evidence require that its admission should be subjected by the courts to
rigid scrutiny. Whether the requisite degree of relevancy exists is a
judicial question to be resolved in the light of the consideration that
the inevitable tendency of such evidence is to raise a legally spurious
presumption of guilt in the minds of the jurors. Hence, if the court
does not clearly perceive the connection between the extraneous crimi-
nal transaction and the crime charged, that is, its logical relevancy, the
accused should be given the benefit of the doubt, and the evidence
should be rejected." '4 1
34. An Act to Simplify and Codify the Rules of Evidence, ch. 701, § 1, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws
666, 668-69 (codified at N.C.R. EVID. 404(b)).
35. Other crimes evidence is a term of art used to refer to proffered evidence relating to an act
that is independent of the charged crime. This is the type of evidence at issue in rule 404(b) cases
such as Coffey.
36. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
37. 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954).
38. Id. at 172-73, 81 S.E.2d at 365.
39. Id. at 174, 81 S.E.2d at 366. The Court then delineated eight exceptions to the exclusionary
rule. Compare id. with N.C.R. EVID. 404(b) (1986) (the exceptions provided in McClain are ex-
tremely similar to those specifically enumerated in rule 404(b)).
40. McClain, 240 N.C. at 177, 81 S.E.2d at 368. The court subsequently held that admission of
such evidence would be prejudicial to the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id.
41. Id. at 177, 81 S.E.2d at 368 (quoting State v. Gregory, 191 S.C. 212, 221, 4 S.E.2d 1, 4
(1939)); see also id. at 173-74, 81 S.E.2d at 356-66 (the court also discusses the reasons for an exclu-
sionary rule); State v. Shane, 304 N.C 643, 654,285 S.E.2d 813, 820 (1982) ("[Flundamental fairness
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On July 1, 1984, the North Carolina Rules of Evidence took effect,42 with
rule 404(b) specifically addressing the admissibility of uncharged misconduct ev-
idence.4 3 Originally, the North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the new
rule to be consistent with prior North Carolina practice.44 Despite this avowed
consistency, North Carolina courts' interpretation of the general standard under
rule 404(b) has been subtly, yet significantly, modified from the pre-rule stan-
dard to one allowing greater admissibility.
For example, in State v. Morgan,45 an early case interpreting the new rule,
the court stated that uncharged misconduct evidence is admissible so long as it is
offered for some purpose other than to show action in conformity. 46 In Morgan
the defendant allegedly came out of his place of business and shot the victim.47
At trial, the State proffered evidence that the defendant had pointed a gun at an
unrelated party three months earlier to disprove his claim of self-defense. 48 The
court held that offering evidence of previous violent behavior to prove that the
defendant was the aggressor in the affray was exactly the type of propensity
evidence excluded by rule 404(b). 49 Thus, under Morgan, the court's announced
standard appears to be more lenient than under McClain because it focuses not
on the exclusion of evidence but instead on the admission of evidence assuming
the prosecution can prove the existence of any proper purpose.5 0 The Morgan
court's application of this standard to the facts of the case, however, retains the
same protections against propensity evidence present in pre-rule cases. 51
In a case decided in the same year as Morgan, the court took an even
broader reading of the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence under
rule 404(b). In State v. Weaver,5 2 the court asserted that under both rule 404(b)
and previously under McClain, "the purposes for which evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible is not limited to those enumerated either in
requires giving defendant the benefit of the doubt and excluding the evidence. [Or, as it is more
descriptively said in the game of baseball, the tie must go to the runner]." (brackets in original)).
42. An Act to Simplify and Codify the Rules of Evidence, ch. 701, § 1, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws
666, 668-69 (codified at N.C.R. EVID. 404(b)).
43. Rule 404(b) reads:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.-Evidene of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not ad-
missible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrap-
ment or accident.
N.C.R. EvID. 404(b).
44. State v. Young, 317 N.C. 396, 412, 346 S.E.2d 626, 635 (1986). In fact, the commentary to
rule 404(b) indicates this same point. See N.C.R. EVID. 404(b) commentary.
45. 315 N.C. 626, 340 S.E.2d 84 (1986).
46. Id. at 636, 340 S.E.2d at 91.
47. Id. at 629, 340 S.E.2d at 86. Apparently this incident evolved from a dispute between the
defendant and the victim over closing down his business. Id.
48. Id. at 637-38, 340 S.E.2d at 91-92.
49. Id. at 638, 340 S.E.2d at 92.
50. Id. at 635-40, 340 S.E.2d at 90-93.
51. See id. at 637-38, 340 S.E.2d at 91-92.
52. 318 N.C. 400, 348 S.E.2d 791 (1986). The State charged the defendant with felonious
breaking and entering and larceny of a chain saw and socket set. Id. at 400, 348 S.E.2d at 792.
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the rule or in McClain.' 53 The court stated, in even broader language, "[i]n
fact, as a careful reading of rule 404(b) clearly shows, evidence of other offenses
is admissible so long as it is relevant to any fact or issue other than the character
of the accused." 54 Under this expansive standard, the court found evidence of
the defendant's prior dealings with a government witness admissible to show a
common plan or scheme.5 5 Thus, in both its language and its application, the
Weaver court significantly relaxed the general admissibility standard for un-
charged misconduct evidence.
In addition to cases delineating the general admissibility standard, numer-
ous North Carolina cases have addressed the admissibility of "other crimes"
evidence in the specific context of sexual misconduct. These cases, also decided
before and after the adoption of rule 404(b), clearly show that the court's ap-
proach to admitting evidence of prior sex acts has been markedly different from
its approach when evaluating cases involving all other crimes. The court stated
in a pre-rule case: "Our Court has been very liberal in admitting evidence of
similar sex crimes in construing the exceptions to the general rule [of exclu-
sion]." '5 6 Even in cases of prior sex acts, however, the court has required that
the evidence meet certain safeguards in order to protect the defendant's right to
a fundamentally fair trial.
In a pre-rule case in this specific context, State v. Shane,5 7 the State
charged a police officer with first degree sexual offense for allegedly using his
position to gain sexual favors from employees of a massage parlor.58 The trial
court admitted testimony from the defendant's former employer about a similar
but independent incident.5 9 Despite the supreme court's finding that a "striking
similarity" existed between the two episodes, it held that the period of time
elapsing between the two events, approximately one year, "substantially negated
the plausibility of the existence of an ongoing and continuous plan to engage
persistently in such deviant activities." 6 Consequently, the court held that the
erroneous and prejudicial admission of such evidence required a new trial.61
53. Id. at 402-03, 348 S.E.2d at 793. This quotation is at variance with the clear holding of
McClain. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
54. Weaver, 318 N.C. at 403, 348 S.E.2d at 794 (citing 1 H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 91 (1982)).
55. Id. at 404, 348 S.E.2d at 793-94. A defense witness testified that he, and not the defendant,
had stolen and sold the tools. Id. at 402, 348 S.E.2d at 793. The court allowed admission of the
defendant's prior dealings with the State's witness to disprove the claim of the defense witness. Id. at
403-04, 348 S.E.2d at 793-94.
56. State v. Greene, 294 N.C. 418, 423, 241 S.E.2d 662, 665 (1978). In Greene, the court ruled
that two cases of assault and rape had been properly consolidated and that testimony of the com-
plaining witness in one case was admitted properly as to the other case under both the identity and
common plan exceptions. Id.
57. 304 N.C. 643, 285 S.E.2d 813, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1104 (1982).
58. Id. at 644-46, 285 S.E.2d at 815.
59. Id. at 652, 285 S.E.2d at 819. This other incident, like the one charged, involved the de.
fendant's use of his position of authority to coerce the victim to engage in oral sex. Id.
60. Id. at 655-56, 285 S.E.2d at 820-21. The State had argued that this evidence should be
admitted under the common plan or scheme purpose. Id. at 653-54, 285 S.E.2d at 820.
61. Id. at 656-57, 285 S.E.2d at 821-22.
[Vol. 691610
Thus, in Shane, the court recognized the first essential requirement in admitting
sexual misconduct evidence-proximity in time to the charged crime.
Another pre-rule case involving admission of uncharged sexual crimes illus-
trates a second requirement for admitting such evidence. In State v. Moore,62
the trial court, during the defendant's trial for first degree sexual offense, admit-
ted the testimony of a victim of a separate uncharged rape, who identified the
defendant as her assailant.63 The trial court admitted the evidence of the previ-
ous sexual offense under the theory that it helped identify the perpetrator of the
charged crime-a recognized exception to the general rule of exclusion." The
Moore court, however, ruled that the testimony relating to the uncharged crime
should have been excluded because of the limited similarities between the two
crimes.65 The court noted that "[t]o allow the admission of evidence of other
crimes without such a showing of similarities would defeat the purpose of the
general rule of exclusion."'66
Thus, prior to the adoption of rule 404(b), the North Carolina Supreme
Court recognized, in separate cases, the existence of two important constraints
on the admissibility of sexual misconduct: proximity in time and similarity.
The court initially reaffirmed the continued existence of these requirements after
the adoption of rule 404(b) in State v. Scott.67 In Scott, a jury convicted the
defendant of a first degree sexual offense perpetrated on his three and four-year-
old nieces. 68 The trial court admitted testimony that eight years previously,
when the defendant was only thirteen, he had forced his sister to have sexual
intercourse with him at knife-point.69
In analyzing the propriety of admitting such evidence, the court recognized
that "no rule exists generally permitting evidence of a defendant's 'unnatural
disposition.' "70 Nevertheless, the court observed that it had made "exceptions
under McClain or Rule 404(b) if the incidents... [were] sufficiently similar and
not too remote in time so as to be more probative than prejudicial under the
Rule 403 balancing test."'71 Applying this standard, the court ruled that the
62. 309 N.C. 102, 305 S.E.2d 542 (1983).
63. Id. at 103, 305 S.E.2d at 542-43.
64. Id. at 106, 305 S.E.2d at 544.
65. Id. at 108, 305 S.E.2d at 545-46. The court found that certain similarities did exist; specifi-
cally, the assailant in both instances had used a knife, both involved oral sex, and both occurred in
Greensboro, North Carolina, within a two month period. Id. at 107, 305 S.E.2d at 545. The court,
however, found that differences between the two-primarily the contrast between the relatively non-
threatening demeanor of the assailant in this case and the violent disposition of the assailant in the
first assault-outweighed any similarities that might have existed. Id. Justice Meyer wrote a scath-
ing dissent asserting that the appellate court should have focused upon the similarities and not the
differences in evaluating the propriety of admitting the testimonial evidence. Id. at 109-10, 305
S.E.2d at 546-47 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 106-107, 305 S.E.2d at 545. The court found the admission of evidence prejudicial
and granted the defendant a new trial. Id. at 109, 305 S.E.2d at 546.
67. 318 N.C. 237, 347 S.E.2d 414 (1986).
68. Id. at 239, 347 S.E.2d at 415.
69. Id. at 244-45, 347 S.E.2d at 418-19. The trial court had allowed testimony regarding the
incident to be elicited during the cross-examination of the defendant and his sister. Id.
70. Id. at 248, 347 S.E.2d at 420.
71. Id.
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incident with defendant's sister eight years ago was too remote in time and dis-
similar from the charged crime to be admitted under any theory recognized by
the court.72
In other cases decided after the adoption of rule 404(b), however, the court
has repeatedly held admissible under this two-pronged standard of proximity in
time and similarity evidence of "unnatural" prior sex acts. The court frequently
admits evidence of uncharged sexual wrongs where a defendant has sexually
abused members of his family on various independent occasions.73 For example,
in State v. DeLeonardo,74 the defendant faced charges of sexually molesting his
sons.75 The trial court, however, admitted evidence that the defendant also had
sexually abused his three-year-old daughter.76 Without reservation, the
supreme court held that the evidence relating to defendant's daughter was ad-
missible to establish a common plan or scheme on the part of the defendant to
sexually abuse his children.77
Thus the court has been more liberal in allowing evidence of uncharged
sexual misconduct than it has been concerning evidence of other uncharged
crimes. The court, however, has placed some restraint on the admissibility of
this type of evidence by employing consistently the two-pronged standard re-
quiring sufficient similarity and proximity in time to the charged act. The deci-
sions of the North Carolina Supreme Court reflect a general adherence to these
procedural safeguards in evaluating evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct.
The court's decision in Coffey is significant for two distinct but related rea-
sons. First, the Coffey court expressly adopted the inclusionary approach to
72. Id. The court granted the defendant a new trial as a result of the erroneous and prejudicial
admission of this evidence. Id.
73. See, eg., State v. Miller, 321 N.C. 445, 454, 364 S.E.2d 387, 392 (1988); State v. Boyd, 321
N.C. 574, 577-78, 364 S.E.2d 118, 120 (1988); State v. DeLeonardo, 315 N.C. 762, 771-72, 340
S.E.2d 350, 357 (1986).
74. 315 N.C. 762, 340 S.E.2d 350 (1986).
75. Id. at 763, 340 S.E.2d at 352.
76. Id. at 767, 340 S.E.2d at 354-55.
77. Id. at 770-71, 340 S.E.2d at 356-57. In a similar case, the court affirmed the admission of
evidence, pursuant to the same common-plan exception, that the defendant had sexually abused the
victim, his son, the day after the charged incident. State v. Miller, 321 N.C. 445, 454, 364 S.E.2d
387, 392 (1988).
On the same day as the Miller decision, the court handed down another case approving the
admission of evidence of uncharged sex crimes with another member of the defendant's family. State
v. Boyd, 321 N.C. 574, 364 S.E.2d 118 (1988). In Boyd, the defendant was convicted of the rape of
his thirteen-year-old step-daughter. Id. at 575-76, 364 S.E.2d at 118-19. The trial court admitted
testimony that within a year of the charged rape, the defendant's wife had discovered the defendant
in the step-daughter's bed with an eight-year-old female cousin. Id. at 576, 364 S.E.2d at 119. Ap-
plying the two-pronged standard announced in Scott, the Boyd court found the incident "sufficiently
similar to the act charged and not too remote in time" so as to be properly admitted. Id. at 578, 364
S.E.2d at 120.
In a case decided a few months after Boyd, the court again applied this standard to uphold the
admission of similar evidence in State v. Rosier, 322 N.C. 826, 370 S.E.2d 359 (1988). In Rosier, the
defendant faced charges of first degree sexual offense for forcing an unrelated seven-year-old to have
anal intercourse. Id. at 827, 370 S.E.2d at 360. The court held that testimony regarding the defend-
ant's prior conviction for fondling other young children only three months prior to the charged
offense was similar and not too remote in time, Id. at 828-29, 370 S.E.2d at 360-61. Accordingly,
the court ruled that the evidence was properly admitted because it established a common scheme or
plan. Id.
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uncharged misconduct evidence under rule 404(b). Although the court at-
tempted to de-emphasize the importance of this decision by stating that it was
merely announcing a principle recognized by its former cases, in fact the court's
adoption of a general inclusionary approach is an important transformation of
court policy.78 Second, the Coffey decision is significant because the court inex-
plicably abandoned the two-pronged test it previously employed to determine
the admissibility of uncharged sexual misconduct evidence.
The exclusionary approach to uncharged misconduct generally prohibits
the admission of evidence of other crimes subject only to a finite number of well-
recognized exceptions. 7 9 Under this traditional doctrine, evidence that does not
fit within one of the previously acknowledged "pigeonhole[s]" is automatically
excluded.80 In contrast, the inclusionary approach allows the admission of
other crimes evidence unless its only probative value is to show the accused's
propensity to commit the charged crime. In other words, admissibility of such
evidence is not limited to one of the specifically enumerated exceptions, but can
be introduced if it satisfies any valid purpose other than to illustrate the defend-
ant's propensity to commit crimes.8 1
To evaluate the Coffey court's express adoption of the inclusionary ap-
proach and equally explicit rejection of the exclusionary approach, two in-
dependent factors must be examined: the original intent of the North Carolina
78. For a discussion of the propriety of the Coffey court's depiction of its precedent as unques-
tionably establishing a rule of inclusion under rule 404(b), see infra note 123 and accompanying text.
79. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidenced in Federal Criminal
Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. Rv. 713, 713 (1981) [hereinafter Reed, Trial by Propensity].
80. Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1468. The exclusionary approach is founded on nothing less
than the nature of the Anglo-American accusatorial system, as opposed to the European inquisitorial
system. Reed, Trial by Propensity, supra note 79, at 713. In an accusatorial system, the state has the
burden of proving that a criminal defendant committed some act prohibited by law. In juxtaposi-
tion, the inquisitorial system assumes the accused committed a crime and requires him to prove his
innocence. Id. More specifically, the emergence of the propensity rule can be linked to a seven-
teenth-century reaction against the use of the Star Chamber during the Tudor and Stuart Regimes.
The Star Chamber was a royal court designed to eliminate political and religious rivals of the monar-
chy through treason trials. Id. at 716-17.
The exclusionary approach was the traditional view in American jurisdictions, with a majority
of the states subscribing to it in the early twentieth century. Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar
Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REv. 988, 1036 n.221 (1938). The North Carolina Supreme
Court traditionally followed this approach, as indicated by the court's decision in State v. McClain,
240 N.C. 171, 173, 81 S.E.2d 364, 365 (1954). For a discussion of the McClain decision, see supra
notes 37-41 and accompanying text. The exclusionary approach remained in force in a majority of
states at the time of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Reed, The Development of the
Propensity Rule in Federal Criminal Causes 1840-1975, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 299, 303-04 (1982) [here-
inafter Reed, Federal Causes].
81. Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1468. This approach originated in Dean Wigmore's charac-
ter rule. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 216 (1904); see Reed, Trial by Propensity, supra note 79, at 736-
37. Dean Wigmore asserted that evidence of an accused's character was highly probative and that
courts were too cautious in excluding this evidence to protect a criminal defendant. As a result of
this view, Wigmore proposed instead that character evidence should be excluded only when it was
offered solely to establish an accused's propensity to criminal activity--essentially the modem inclu-
sionary rule. J. WIGMORE, § 216; see also Reed, Trial by Propensity, supra note 79, at 736-37 (ex-
plaining Dean Wigmore's views on the subject).
This inclusionary approach prevailed in a minority of federal jurisdictions before the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Reed, Federal Causes, supra note 80, at 303-04; Reed, Admis-
sion of Other Criminal Act Evidence After Adoption of The Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 U. CIN. L.
REv. 113, 113-14 (1984) [hereinafter Reed, After Adoption].
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General Assembly in adopting rule 404(b) and, conversely, the justifications typ-
ically given by many state courts for retaining the exclusionary rule. Because
North Carolina rule 404(b) is modeled after its counterpart in the federal
rules,8 2 determining congressional intent is a useful starting point for any at-
tempt to determine the intent of the North Carolina General Assembly in enact-
ing its corresponding state version. The congressional history of the House 83
and Senate, 84 as well as the explanations set forth in the advisory committee's
note85 to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), indicate that Congress intended to
place more emphasis on the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence. As
a result, many commentators concluded that Congress intended to adopt an in-
clusionary approach in enacting federal rule 404(b). 86
82. See N.C.R. EvID. 404(b) commentary (1986).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONo. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7081;
The second sentence of Rule 404(b) as submitted to the Congress began with the words
"This subdivision does not exclude the evidence when offered." The Committee amended
this language to read "It may, however, be admissible", the words used in the 1971 Advi-
sory Committee draft, on the ground that this formulation properly placed greater emphasis
on admissibility than did the final Court version.
Id. (emphasis added).
84. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7071;
[Rule 404(b)] provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove character but may be admissible for other specified purposes such as proof of
motive.
Although your committee sees no necessity in amending the rule itself, it anticipates
that the use of the discretionary word "may" with respect to the admissibility of evidence
of crimes, wrongs, or acts is not intended to confer any arbitrary discretion on the trial
judge. Rather, it is anticipated that with respect to permissible uses for such evidence, the
trial judge may exclude it only on the basis of those considerations set forth in Rule 403, i.e.
prejudice, confusion or waste of time.
Id. (emphasis added).
85. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee note:
Subdivision (b) deals with a specialized but important application of the general rule
excluding circumstantial use of character evidence. Consistently [sic] with that rule, evi-
dence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove character as a basis for
suggesting the inference that conduct on a particular occasion was in conformity with it.
However, the evidence may be offered for another purpose, such as proof of motive, oppor-
tunity, and so on, which does not fall within the prohibition. In this situation the rule does
not require that the evidence be excluded. No mechanical solution is offered. The determi-
nation must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value
of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of proof and other factors appro-
priate for making decisions of this kind under Rule 403.
Id.
86. See Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1484; Reed, AfterAdoption, supra note 81, at 156,
Professor Imwinkelried conducted an extensive survey of the available legislative history sur-
rounding the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Specifically, he questioned whether rule
404(b) retained the common-law allocation of burden to the proponent of evidence or, alternatively,
whether the rule switched the burden to the defendant by incorporating the rule 403 balancing test.
Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1479-80. The rule 403 balancing test places the burden of excluding
evidence on the defendant by requiring that relevant evidence should be admitted unless the danger
of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. FED. R. EVMD. 403. Professor Im-
winkelried concluded that Congress intended to incorporate the rule 403 balancing test, which in
effect adopts an inclusionary approach by allocating the burden of excluding evidence to the defend-
ant. See Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1479-80. His conclusion was based on three main argu-
ments.
First, he asserted that rule 403 was incorporated into all rules contained within the federal rules
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Although the United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
issue,87 the overwhelming majority of federal circuits have interpreted rule
404(b) as adopting an inclusionary approach.88 These courts stressed the signifi-
cance of the placement of the words "such as" preceding the list of exceptions,
that did not expressly preclude its application. Because rule 404(b) does not exclude the rule 403
balancing test, he deduced that the test is included. Id. at 1480.
Second, Imwinkelried rejected the partial incorporation theory, which maintains that rule
404(b) allows a judge to consider the rule 403 factors but preserves the common-law burden. Id. at
1481. Although conceding that this theory is consistent with the literal language of the advisory
committee note, he rejected this notion as contrary to the congressional intent to broaden admissibil-
ity for uncharged misconduct evidence. Id. at 1481-82.
Finally, he rejected the argument that Congress would have made such a sweeping change
explicit in the rule if such a change was truly intended. Id. at 1483. Imwinkelried asserted that
Congress interpreted the language of rule 402, permitting admission of relevant evidence unless
otherwise excluded, as precluding the need for an express repudiation of the common law standard.
Id. at 1483-84.
87. The Supreme Court, however, has addressed the related issue of whether a trial court must
make a preliminary finding that the uncharged misconduct occurred before admitting rule 404(b)
evidence. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988). The Court held that the
proponent of 404(b) evidence is not required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the act
occurred. Id. at 687-89.
Although not directly addressing the issue of which approach Congress intended to adopt in
rule 404(b), the Supreme Court, in two distinct portions of its opinion in Huddleston, gave conflict-
ing indications of its interpretation of this matter. The Court stated: "Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) ... generally prohibits the introduction of evidence of extrinsic acts that might adversely
reflect on the actor's character, unless that evidence bears upon a relevant issue in the case such as
motive, opportunity, or knowledge." Id. at 685 (emphasis added). Although not conclusive, this
language intimates a general rule of exclusion.
In contrast, at the conclusion of its opinion, the Court implied that rule 404(b) incorporates an
inclusionary approach. To allay the fears of the petitioner, the Court observed that even without a
preliminary finding requirement the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence would not be un-
restrained because other protective measures bar introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence. Id. at
691-92. In dicta the Court stated that one such measure is the incorporation of the rule 403 balanc-
ing test into rule 404(b). Id. at 691. This interpretation of rule 404(b), if accepted as binding, would
effectively reverse the common-law presumption of exclusion. See Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at
1484.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Ayers, 924 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1991) ("We have construed
Rule 404(b) as being 'a rule of inclusion.' ") (quoting Heath v. Cast, 813 F.2d 254, 259 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987)); Berkovich v. Hicks, 922 F.2d 1018, 1022 (2d Cir. 1991) ("But
such evidence may be admitted for any other relevant purpose under our 'inclusionary' approach.")
(quoting United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 589 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1022
(1989)); United States v. Yerks, 918 F.2d 1371, 1373 (8th Cir. 1990) ("We view Rule 404(b) as a rule
of inclusion .. "); Virgin Islands v. Edwards, 903 F.2d 267, 270 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Rule 404(b) is a
rule of inclusion, not exclusion .... "); United States v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 770, 776 (1 lth Cir. 1989)
("The rule [404(b)] is one of inclusion .... "); United States v. Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d 945, 948
(6th Cir.) ("Thus, we have explained that Rule 404(b) 'is actually a rule of inclusion rather than
exclusion .... ') (quoting United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1985)), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 255 (1989); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 944 (4th Cir. 1988) ("This Court
has held Rule 404(b) to be an 'inclusionary rule .......") (quoting United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d
83, 85 (4th Cir. 1980)); United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1988) ("It is well
settled that the rule [404(b)] is one of inclusion .... ); United States v. Moore, 732 F.2d 983, 987 &
n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding congressional intent in enacting rule 404(b) to adopt an inclusionary
approach); United States v. Jordan, 722 F.2d 353, 356 (7th Cir. 1983) (" 'The draftsmen of Rule
404(b) intended it to be construed as one of inclusion, and not exclusion.' ") (quoting United States
v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 766 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978)); United States v. Ackal, 706
F.2d 523, 531 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (" 'This test [adopted by the circuit] takes an inclusionary
and not an exclusionary approach.' ") (quoting United States v. King, 703 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 711 F.2d 1054 (1983)). But see United States v. Rodriguez-Cardona, 924 F.2d 1148,
1153 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Rule 404(b) is a rule of exclusion.").
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and concluded that the list of exceptions is only illustrative, not exhaustive.8 9
Consequently, these courts have held that the federal version of rule 404(b)
adopts an inclusionary approach, rather than one characterized by a general rule
of exclusion with a limited number of enumerated exceptions.9"
The accepted interpretation of the federal rule is important because the
North Carolina General Assembly apparently intended to follow the federal
model. The most authoritative support for this interpretation, besides the al-
most identical language of the two rules, is the commentary following the North
Carolina rule. This commentary repeats verbatim the language contained in the
federal advisory committee's note.9 1 If this was not itself a sufficient indication
of an intent to follow the federal rule, the North Carolina commentary appends
an illuminating sentence: "The list in the last sentence of subdivision (b) is
nonexclusive and the fact that evidence cannot be brought within a category
does not mean that the evidence is inadmissible."192 Thus it appears that, like
Congress, the North Carolina General Assembly's intent in enacting its version
of rule 404(b) was to adopt an inclusionary approach.
Although the legislative intent is relatively clear, there are other important
policy concerns that warrant discussion in analyzing the Coffey court's holding.
State courts have repeatedly expressed these policies in retaining the exclusion-
ary approach despite the adoption of rule 404(b) in their respective jurisdictions.
For example, in the seminal pre-rule case on "other crimes" evidence in North
Carolina, State v. McClain,93 the supreme court delineated several of these im-
portant policy concerns.
First, the McClain court observed that logically the commission of an in-
dependent offense did not, in itself, prove the commission of the charged of-
fense.94 Second, the admission of evidence that the defendant has been guilty of
another heinous crime falsely leads the jury to a belief that he is guilty of the
charged crime and, therefore, effectively strips him of the presumption of inno-
89. Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1468; see, eg., Cohen, 888 F.2d at 776 ("The list provided by
the rule is not exhaustive. .. ."); Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d at 948 (" '[Tihe list of permissible uses of
evidence of other crimes or acts set forth in Rule 404(b) is neither exhaustive nor conclusive.' ")
(quoting United States v. Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922
(1987)); Moore, 732 F.2d at 987 n.31 ("The uses specified in the rule [404(b)] are not meant to be
exhaustive, but merely illustrative."); Jordan, 722 F.2d at 356 ("The rule [404(b)] does not exhaust
the purposes for which evidence of other wrongs or acts may be admitted."); United States v. John-
son, 634 F.2d 735, 737 (4th Cir. 1980) ("The Rule's [404(b)] list is merely illustrative, not exclu-
sive."), cert denied, 451 U.S. 907 (1981).
90. Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1468.
91. See N.C.R. EvID. 404(b) commentary (1986). For the text ofthe federal advisory commit-
tee's note, see supra note 85.
92. N.C.R. EvID. 404(b) commentary. The sentence following this one, however, seems con-
tradictory: "Subdivision (b) is consistent with North Carolina practice." Standing alone and inter-
preted in light of North Carolina practice up until the adoption of rule 404(b), this sentence might be
interpreted as intending the application of an exclusionary approach, or so the literal language sug-
gests. In light of various other statements to the contrary in the commentary, however, this sentence
is probably best viewed as an anomaly or legislative misunderstanding of the current state of the law
in North Carolina prior to adoption.
93. 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954). For a discussion of the historical significance of Mc-
Clain, see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
94. McClain, 240 N.C. at 173-74, 81 S.E.2d at 365.
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cence.95 Finally, introduction of this type of evidence unnecessarily diverts the
attention of the jury away from the point in issue and compels the defendant to
meet accusations for which he was not charged.96
Numerous empirical studies reinforce the underlying purposes of the exclu-
sionary rule by confirming that admission of uncharged misconduct evidence
has a significant impact on juries. For example, the Chicago Jury Project9 7 de-
termined that after the proponent disclosed uncharged misconduct evidence, ju-
ries employed a "different... calculus of probabilities" when determining the
guilt or innocence of an accused. 98 Specifically, the study documented that con-
viction rates were significantly greater after such disclosure.99 Furthermore, in a
study conducted on behalf of the National Law and Social Science Founda-
tion,1°° researchers concluded that potential jurors were in substantial agree-
ment in ranking any immoral acts by the defendant as one of the most
prejudicial types of evidence. 10 1 The significance of this finding is augmented
because the potential jurors exhibited virtually no common evaluations regard-
ing the degree of prejudice for other types of evidence. 102
The inclusionary approach adopted by the Coffey court, however, discards
these important arguments against relaxed admissibility of other crimes
evidence. A survey of state court decisions on this issue decided under statutes
similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) discloses a striking disparity of inter-
pretation when compared to the rulings of the federal courts. 10 3 To date, thirty-
four states have enacted an uncharged misconduct rule modeled after Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b).104 Thirty of these states have adopted statutes that are
either verbatim copies of the federal rule or reflect only minor technical
changes.105 Of these states, sixteen have retained the exclusionary approach,10 6
95. Id. at 174, 81 S.E.2d at 366.
96. Id.
97. This title refers to an extensive, exhaustive study of the American jury system conducted at
the University of Chicago Law School. This project attempted to combine the research of attorneys
and social scientists in studying various aspects of the jury system. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY at v (1966).
98. Id. at 179.
99. Id. at 178-79.
100. This study focused on the effects that different aspects of the legal system have on modeling
jury behavior. Professors from the Psychology Department and the School of Law at the University
of New Mexico analyzed the aspect of the study dealing with the prejudicial effect of certain evi-
dence. Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere & Johnson, Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can
Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 WIs. L. REV. 1147, 1147.
101. Id. at 1162.
102. Id. at 1163.
103. For a discussion of the federal circuit courts' almost unanimous interpretation of the federal
version of rule 404(b) as a rule of inclusion, see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
104. See 1 G. JOSEPH & S. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE
STATES ch. 14: Rule 404, at 11-24 (1987 & Supp. 1990) (listing the state statutes).
The states adopting a rule modeled after the federal rule include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 1-24.
105. See id. Of the states listed in note 104 supra, all except Florida, Louisiana, Maine, and
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six have expressly adopted the inclusionary approach, 10 7 and eight states either
have not addressed the issue or have reached inconclusive results. 10 8
The discrepancy between federal and state court interpretations of rule
404(b) stems primarily from most state courts' refusal to disregard the policies
underlying the exclusionary rule. These state courts looked primarily to the
purposes underlying the exclusionary rule as a basis for their retention of it.109
Consequently, they implicitly have chosen to disregard the apparent intent of
the legislators to adopt an inclusionary rule 10 in favor of the policies behind the
exclusionary rule.
The Coffey court could have followed these state courts and chosen to ig-
nore the intent of the North Carolina General Assembly in favor of the policies
governing its case law prior to adoption of rule 404(b). A judicial decision fol-
lowing this route, however, arguably presents a serious danger to the whole
structure of the rules of evidence because it ignores the intent of the legislature
in favor of judge-made rules. 1" Rule 402 allows admission of evidence unless it
is expressly prohibited by another rule, the United States or North Carolina
Constitutions, or other legislative acts. 112 Rule 402's fundamental premise-all
Tennessee have adopted a rule which essentially codifies Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) in their
respective states. See id.
106. See, eg., Burke v. State, 624 P.2d 1240, 1247-48 (Alaska 1980); Soper v. State, 731 P.2d
587, 589-90 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); State v. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212, 216-18, 700 P.2d 1312, 1316.18
(1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985); State v. Bainbridge, 108 Idaho 273, 278, 698 P.2d 335,
340 (1985); People v. Devine, 168 Mich. App. 56, 58, 423 N.W.2d 594, 596 (1988); Elmore v. State,
510 So. 2d 127, 130 (Miss. 1987); State v. Fitzgerald, 238 Mont. 261, 265, 776 P.2d 1222, 1225
(1989); Daly v. State, 99 Nev. 564, 567, 665 P.2d 798, 801 (1983); State v. Ferguson, 391 N.W.2d
172, 174-75 (N.D. 1986); State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St. 3d 277, 281-82, 533 N.E.2d 682, 689-90
(1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075 (1989); Little v. State, 725 P.2d 606, 607 (Olda. Crim. App.
1986); State v. Houghton, 272 N.W.2d 788, 790-91 (S.D. 1978) (en bane), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Willis, 370 N.W.2d 193 (S.D. 1985); Turner v. State, 754 S.W.2d 668, 671-72 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1988); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988); State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. 366,
380-82, 534 A.2d 184, 193 (1987); State v. Dolin, 347 S.E.2d 208, 212 (W. Va. 1986), overruled on
other grounds, State v. Edward, 398 S.E.2d 123 (W. Va. 1990); Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972, 974
(Wyo. 1989).
107. See eg., Sullivan v. State, 289 Ark. 323, 328, 711 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1986); Getz v. State,
538 A.2d 726, 730-31 (Del. 1988); State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226, 228-29 (Iowa 1988); State v.
Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 532, 503 A.2d 809, 813 (1985); Coffey, 326 N.C. at 278-79, 389 S.E.2d at 54;
State v. Johns, 301 Or. 535, 544, 725 P.2d 312, 317-18 (1986).
In addition, two other states with substantially modified versions of rule 404(b) have also
adopted an inclusionary approach. See Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 358 (Fla. 1988); State v.
DeLong, 505 A.2d 803, 805-06 (Me. 1986).
108. These states include Colorado, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
109. See, ag., Houghton, 272 N.W.2d at 790 (South Dakota); Turner, 754 S.W.2d at 671-72
(Texas).
110. Because these decisions are from states with statutes almost identical to the federal rule, it is
logical that the intent of the adopters from these states was to follow Congress' intent to adopt an
inclusionary rule. For a discussion of congressional intent in enacting rule 404(b), see supra notes
83-86 and accompanying text.
111. Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1491-95.
112. The North Carolina version of Rule 402 reads: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by the Constitution of North Caro-
lina, by an Act of Congress, by an Act of the General Assembly, or by these rules. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible." N.C.R. EvID. 402 (1986).
The commentary following the rule adds: "This rule is identical to Fed. R. Evid. 402 except that
the phrases 'by the Constitution of North Carolina' and 'by Act of the General Assembly' were
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relevant evidence should be admitted unless expressly excluded by legislative
act-is the basis of the federal rules and is designed to eliminate the existence of
judge-made rules of evidence. 113 Interpreting rule 404(b) as exclusionary, con-
trary to its clear language, is in essence a judicial decision which subverts the
comprehensive codification effort of the rules. 114 Therefore, ignoring legislative
intent and preferring the common-law purposes behind the exclusionary ap-
proach could precipitate continuous undermining of the foundational principle
behind the rules of evidence. 115
Thus, although strong support exists in both empirical studies and state
case law for the continued application of the exclusionary approach to un-
charged misconduct evidence, following these policy concerns could have detri-
mental effects on the integrity of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. The
North Carolina General Assembly expressed a relatively clear intent to adopt an
inclusionary approach when it enacted North Carolina Rule of Evidence
404(b). 116 Given the intent of the General Assembly and the limited role of the
courts, the Coffey court's adoption of an inclusionary approach is wholly justi-
fied. Furthermore, because subverting the intent of the General Assembly could
have potentially pernicious effects on the integrity and success of the entire
structure of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, the Coffey court cannot be
faulted for adopting an inclusionary approach, despite the strong policies sup-
porting the exclusionary rule. 117
A second significant aspect of the Coffey decision is more dubious, however.
The North Carolina Supreme Court consistently has held, both before and after
the adoption of rule 404(b), that evidence of prior sexual misconduct must sat-
isfy a two-pronged test of substantial similarity and proximity in time to the
charged crime.' 18 For example, in State v. Boyd'1 9 the court cited the broad
admissibility standard enunciated in post-rule cases that relate to sexual miscon-
duct evidence.1 20 In the next sentence, however, the court stated: "Neverthe-
less, the ultimate test for determining whether such [uncharged misconduct]
evidence is admissible is whether the incidents are sufficiently similar and not so
remote in time as to be more probative than prejudicial under the balancing test
of ... Rule 403. '"121 Thus, as Boyd illustrates, the court previously did not
added and the phrase 'by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory author-
ity' was deleted." Id. 402 commentary.
113. 22 C. WRIGlrr & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5199, at 220-23.
114. See Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1493-94.
115. See id. at 1494-95. Professor Imwinkelried discusses other instances where courts have
ignored the framers' intent in adopting a rule and its deleterious effect on the corresponding eviden-
tiary code. Id. at 1494-96.
116. N.C.R. EvID. 404(b) commentary.
117. For a discussion of the appropriate legislative response in light of this empirical support for
the exclusionary rule, see infra text accompanying notes 141-43.
118. See, eg., State v. Rosier, 322 N.C. 826, 828-29, 370 S.E.2d 359, 360-61 (1988); State v.
Boyd, 321 N.C. 574, 577, 364 S.E.2d 118, 119 (1988); State v. Scott, 318 N.C. 237, 248, 347 S.E.2d
414, 420 (1986). For a discussion of North Carolina cases applying this rule, see supra notes 57-77
and accompanying text.
119. 321 N.C. 574, 364 S.E.2d 118 (1988). For a discussion of Boyd, see supra note 77.
120. Boyd, 321 N.C. at 577, 364 S.E.2d at 119.
121. Id.
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interpret the adoption of a broad admissibility standard as superseding the appli-
cation of this independent two-pronged test.122
Furthermore, the Boyd court expressly acknowledged the grave risks inher-
ent in the adoption of a broad admissibility standard for uncharged misconduct
evidence. The court stated: "We are not unmindful of the danger of allowing
Rule 404(b) exceptions to become so pervasive that they swallow the rule, a
danger vigorously argued in defendant's brief. We, however, do not find that its
application to the facts of this case encourages that danger."123
This express concern for the untrammeled admission of other crime evi-
dence is entirely lacking from the court's decision in Coffey. In fact, an analysis
under the two-pronged test is conspicuously absent from the court's opinion.124
The court mentioned the defendant's contention that the incident with Angel
Ash e was not similar to the charged murder.125 It did not, however, employ the
two-pronged test of similarity and proximity in time to reject this argument;
instead, the court implied that the broad admissibility standard under rule
404(b) disposed of the defendant's contention. 126 The court's analysis intimates
that it believed the adoption of a broad inclusionary approach under rule 404(b)
supersedes any previously recognized requirements that the proponent of the
other crimes evidence prove its similarity and timeliness. 127 This reasoning is a
dramatic departure from the analysis employed by the court just two years pre-
viously in Boyd.128
It is possible that the Coffey court implicitly considered the two-pronged
standard in making its analysis. The court concluded that evidence of the Angel
Ashe episode satisfied both the motive and specific intent purposes under rule
404(b). 29 The court found this evidence relevant to prove the intent and motive
for the underlying felony of kidnapping for the purpose of committing indecent
liberties. 130 Presumably, the court implicitly concluded that the incident involv-
ing Angel Ashe was similar to the State's contention that the defendant had
taken indecent liberties with the victim.
The fallacy of this argument, however, is patent: the State had no extrinsic
122. In fact, the Boyd court explicitly found that evidence of the defendant's prior acts with a
related victim fell squarely within this two-pronged test. Id. at 578, 364 S.E.2d at 120.
123. Id. This quotation also calls into question the Coffey court's depiction of its post.rule cases
as effectively adopting an inclusionary approach. This language suggests that the court is still fol-
lowing a general standard of exclusion. The reference to "exceptions swallowing up the rule" is
more consistent with an exclusionary than an inclusionary approach. The standard announced in
State v. Weaver, two years prior to Boyd, however, supports the court's view. See State v. Weaver,
318 N.C. 400, 402-03, 348 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1986). Thus, it is probably most accurate to describe the
court's approach to rule 404(b) prior to Coffey as inconclusive or perhaps inconsistent. This incon-
sistency only reinforces the view that the Coffey court's express adoption of the inclusionary rule is
an extremely significant ruling, not the mere reaffirmance of prior case law, as the court asserts. See
Coffey, 326 N.C. at 278-79, 389 S.E.2d at 54.
124. See Coffey, 326 N.C. at 278-81, 389 S.E.2d at 54-56.
125. Id. at 278, 389 S.E.2d at 54.
126. See id. at 278-79, 389 S.E.2d at 54-55.
127. See id.
128. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
129. Coffey, 326 N.C. at 280-81, 389 S.E.2d at 55-56.
'130. Id.
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evidence that Coffey took any indecent liberties with Amanda Ray. The only
connection between the completely unrelated Angel Ashe incident and the pres-
ent case was the prosecutor's naked theory. 131 In other words, the court upheld
the defendant's conviction of kidnapping with the intent to commit indecent
liberties132 based solely on the testimony that he committed similar acts in the
past in an entirely unrelated incident. Application of this reasoning is tanta-
mount to trying the defendant based on his propensity to commit such acts. As
the court stated in State v. Morgan,133 the inference that the defendant acted a
certain way in the past and thus acted the same way in the present case is "pre-
cisely what is prohibited by Rule 404(b)."' 134 In previous cases, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court consistently required independent extrinsic evidence to
establish that the charged sexual crime occurred before it would admit evidence
of defendant's prior sexual wrongs. 135
Thus, the Coffey court not only abandoned the two-pronged test requiring
evidence of uncharged misconduct to be substantially similar to and not too
remote in time from the charged act, 136 but also failed to require that there be
any independent extrinsic evidence that such a similar act actually occurred in
the present case. The Coffey court disregarded its own post-rule precedents rec-
ognizing these requirements as important protections against the admission of
marginally relevant but extremely prejudicial evidence. 137 By abandoning these
important procedural prerequisites, the court has unleashed a "prosecutor's de-
light," 38 where the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence is unanchored
131. The State conceded that the Angel Ashe incident was its only evidence of the underlying
felony of kidnapping with the intent to commit indecent liberties. Brief for Respondent at 35,
Coffey, (No. 613A87). As counsel for petitioner noted, without such extrinsic evidence, "the jury is
afloat in a sea of speculation." Brief for Petitioner at 49, Coffey, (No. 613A87).
132. This conviction supported the felony-murder charge, which in turn resulted in a conviction
of first degree murder and a sentence of death. Coffey, 326 N.C. at 277, 389 S.E.2d at 53.
133. 315 N.C 626, 340 S.E.2d 84 (1986). For a discussion of Morgan, see supra notes 45-51 and
accompanying text.
134. Id. at 638, 340 S.E.2d at 92 (emphasis added).
135. See, eg., State v. Rosier, 322 N.C. 826, 827, 370 S.E.2d 359, 360 (1988) (victim's testimony
that defendant forced her to engage in anal intercourse); State v. Boyd, 321 N.C. 574, 577, 364
S.E.2d 118, 120 (1988) (victim testified that stepfather sexually assaulted her on four occasions);
State v. DeLeonardo, 315 N.C. 762, 768, 340 S.E.2d 350, 355 (1986) (testimony of son that father
sexually abused him, his brother, and his sister).
Although the victim's testimony is obviously unavailable in Coffey, there are many other forms
of evidence which could have been used to prove that the victim had been sexually abused, such as
presence of semen or abnormalities in the victim's sexual organs.
136. Once the pretext of the unsupported underlying felony is sheared away, it is apparent that
the court has no firm basis on which to admit such evidence, besides propensity-masturbation in
front of a young girl has no similarity to murder. Furthermore, numerous North Carolina cases
excluded other crimes evidence with less tenuous similarities than those offered in Coffey. See, eg.,
State v. Scott, 318 N.C. 237, 248, 347 S.E.2d 414, 420 (1986) (acts of cunnilingus on three and four-
year-old nieces ruled not similar to forced intercourse with sister, the mother of the girls); State v.
Moore, 309 N.C. 102, 107-08, 305 S.E.2d 542, 545-46 (1983) (two attacks both involving the use of a
knife to force the victim to engage in oral sex occurring within Greensboro within a two month
period of each other ruled not sufficiently similar).
137. See, eg., State v. Boyd, 321 N.C. 574, 577, 364 S.E.2d 118, 119 (1988); State v. Scott, 318
N.C. 237, 244, 248, 349 S.E.2d 414, 418, 420 (1986).
138. This term comes from the characterization of uncharged misconduct evidence in a student-
written law review article. Comment, Evidence of Prior AcquittaL. An Attack on the "Prosecutors
Delight," 21 UCLA L. REv. 892, 896 (1974).
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by any protective safeguards to a defendant's right to a fair trial.
Moreover, the language of the opinion is alarmingly general and does not
appear to be limited to the particular facts in Coffey or even just to evidence of
prior sexual acts. 139 Thus, the ruling potentially could be applied to all types of
cases involving the introduction of uncharged misconduct evidence. Without
the two-pronged requirements, the State may freely admit evidence of prior mis-
conduct that is dissimilar and distant in time from the charged act, so long as
the prosecutor can conceive of any possible theory under which it may be rele-
vant. Furthermore, without a requirement that there be some extrinsic evidence
of the charged crime, a prosecutor desiring to introduce evidence of a defend-
ant's uncharged behavior could merely add a plausible, related charge to the
indictment and thereby gain admittance of evidence that is damaging and highly
prejudicial to the defendant.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's ruling in Coffey is significant in sev-
eral important respects. First, the court expressly adopted an inclusionary ap-
proach to rule 404(b) and rejected the traditional exclusionary approach
followed at common law. Second, the court's ruling implies that the adoption of
this broad approach to admissibility of other crimes evidence precludes the ap-
plication of the previously recognized two-pronged test which served to protect
the defendant against introduction of unrelated and unduly prejudicial evidence.
Finally, the general language of the court's opinion intimates that this holding is
not limited to the particular facts of Coffey, but could apply to all cases adjudi-
cating the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence.
Strong empirical data and other states' case law support the continued ap-
plication of the exclusionary approach to uncharged misconduct evidence. 14 °
The Coffey court is bound jurisprudentially, however, to follow the North Caro-
lina General Assembly's intent to adopt an inclusionary approach in enacting
rule 404(b). Given the limited role of the courts, a better alternative to court
renunciation of legislative intent would be for the general assembly to amend
rule 404(b).141 The amendment could take into account the strong empirical
support indicating the highly prejudicial effect of uncharged misconduct evi-
dence as well as the decisions of other state courts retaining the exclusionary
approach without jeopardizing the integrity of either the North Carolina Rules
of Evidence or the North Carolina court system.
This Note recommends adoption of the following amendment, proposed by
a distinguished commentator on rule 404(b) evidence:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in con-
formity therewith. It may however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Before the judge ad-
mits evidence for such a purpose, the proponent of the evidence must
139. See Coffey, 326 N.C. at 278-79, 389 S.E.2d at 54-55.
140. See supra notes 97-102 & 103-10 and accompanying texts.
141. Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1497.
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persuade the judge that the probative value of the evidence outweighs
the danger of unfair prejudice. 142
This amendment would restore the common-law burden of proving that the
evidence should be admitted to the proponent of uncharged misconduct evi-
dence. 143 Consequently, this reformulation of rule 404(b) would recognize the
important policies behind the original adoption of the exclusionary rule by re-
establishing the presumption against admittance of this often unduly prejudicial
type of evidence.
In addition, the court should reaffirm its commitment to the requirements
of substantial similarity and proximity in time as prerequisites to admission of
uncharged misconduct evidence. These requirements serve a useful and neces-
sary purpose by guarding against untrammeled admission of propensity evi-
dence. Without these important safeguards, as the ruling in Coffey indicates,
there exists a substantial danger that the prosecutor will misuse uncharged mis-
conduct evidence essentially to put a defendant on trial for prior bad acts and
not for those crimes properly contained in the indictment.
Coffey was not a sympathetic defendant and it is difficult to be outraged by
the procedural error which occurred in this particular case. Nevertheless, this
rationale does not justify the Coffey court's ruling establishing a potentially per-
nicious precedent in this important area of evidence law. The Coffey court al-
lows the State to introduce evidence of a defendant's unrelated prior sexual acts
without any supporting extrinsic evidence that a similar act occurred in connec-
tion with the actions for which the defendant is specifically charged. This ap-
proach is contrary not only to all North Carolina precedent on the subject, but
also, and more importantly, to the fundamental postulate of the American accu-





144. Cf. Reed, Trial by Propensity, supra note 79, at 713 (asserting that the exclusionary rule
originated in the accusatorial system, which requires the State to prove the defendant is guilty of a
particular crime and not merely past uncharged misconduct).
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State v. Strickland: Evening the Odds in Rape Trials! North
Carolina Allows Expert Testimony on Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder to Disprove Victim Consent
Rape trials traditionally have stood alone among criminal proceedings as
examinations not of the defendant's actions, but of the victim's conduct, life-
style, and personal history.1 As a result, rape consistently has been the most
difficult violent crime to prove.2 Within the last twenty years, however, a con-
certed, albeit scattered, effort has begun to sweep away some of the archaic bar-
riers facing prosecutors at trial.3 Recently one of the largest of these barriers,
the difficulty of disproving consent,4 has come under fire as prosecutors seek to
use expert testimony concerning post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)5 to ex-
1. N. GAGER & C. SCHURR, SEXUAL ASSAULT: CONFRONTING RAPE IN AMERICA 129-30
(1976) (pointing to the patriarchal nature of society and its ramifications on rape trials, which focus
on any possible "seduction, lying, mistaken identification, or 'wanton' behavior" by the victim). For
further examinations on the tendency of rape trials to investigate the victim, see S. BESSMER, THE
LAWS OF RAPE (1984); A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, RAPE: CRISIS AND RECOVERY (1979); T.
MCCAHILL, L. MEYER & A. FISCHMAN, THE AFTERMATH OF RAPE (1979); C. WARNER, RAPE
AND SEXUAL ASSAULT (1980); J. WILLIAMS & K. HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT: RAPE AND
PUBLIC ATITrUDES (1981).
2. Sir Mathew Hale's often-quoted statement on rape prosecution symbolizes the enormous
barriers standing before rape victims:
It is true rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely and impartially to be
punished with death; but it must be remembered, that it is an accusation easily to be made
and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so
innocent.
1 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (1847).
Wigmore carried this fear of a false complaint and the resulting caution toward victims' claims
into modem times. "One form taken by these complexes is that of contriving false charges of sexual
offenses by men. The unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds incidental but direct expression in the
narration of imaginary sex incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or the victim." 3A J.
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 924a, at 736 (Chadboum rev. 1970).
3. Note, Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates. The Admissibility of Expert Testi-
mony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings, 70 VA. L. REv. 1657, 1662-63 (1984).
4. Gager and Schurr described the uniqueness of the legal system's focus on consent in rape
trials, a focus not found in other criminal trials, and the difficulty this focus creates for victims:
The evolution of our legal process has thrust the consent issue into the center of the storm
about rape. The legal obverse of consent is resistance, resistance sufficient to prove lack of
consent. However, resistance, or nonconsent, is largely a subjective matter, and hundreds,
if not thousands, of rapists have been allowed to go free by police, juries, and judges who
have decided arbitrarily that the victim did not resist "enough."
N. GAGER & C. SCHURR, supra note 1, at 139-40.
5. Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) involves the development of a series of characteristic
symptoms (physical and psychological) after an individual undergoes a particularly stressful situa-
tion. In the context of rape, psychologists describe a subcategory of PTSD as "the acute phase and
long-term reorganization process that occurs as a result of forcible rape or attempted rape." Burgess
& Hunter, Rape Trauma Syndrome, in THE RAPE VICTIM 121 (D. Nass ed. 1977). When rape is the
cause of this process commentators sometimes refer to the resulting PTSD syndrome as "rape
trauma syndrome" (RTS). Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 981, 982 (1974) [hereinafter Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome]; Burgess & Holm-
strom, Rape Trauma Syndrome and Post Traumatic Stress Response, in RAPE AND SEXUAL
ASSAULT: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 49 (A. Burgess ed. 1985) [hereinafter Burgess & Holmstrom,
RT and PTSD]; Wilson, Smith & Johnson, A Comparative Analysis of PTSD Among Various Survi.
vor Groups, in TRAUMA AND ITS WAKE: THE STUDY AND TREATMENT OF POST-TRAUMATIC
plain the victim's suffering and defeat the defense's contention that the victim
consented.
Four years after the issue first came before North Carolina courts, 6 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled in State v. Strickland7 that expert testi-
mony on PTSD is relevant and admissible to disprove consent in rape trials." In
Strickland the trial court admitted, over the defendant's objections, expert testi-
mony that the victim suffered from PTSD.9 The appellate court held that such
testimony is relevant in rape cases and affirmed the ruling, but failed to address
directly whether PTSD evidence is universally admissible or remains limited to
cases similar to Strickland.10
This Note examines the Strickland decision in light of the controversial
history of PTSD expert testimony and the resulting split among the states re-
garding its admissibility. After exploring the arguments proffered against al-
lowing PTSD testimony, this Note concludes that both the relevance and
reliability of the technique justify the court's decision to allow such testimony in
limited situations. Finally, this Note discusses the failure of the Strickland
court to discuss the boundaries of PTSD testimony's admissibility, as well as the
implications of the appellate court's vague holding and the North Carolina
Supreme Court's refusal to review the decision.11
Strickland centered on the abduction of a woman as she left a mall in Ra-
leigh, North Carolina. The defendant, Wendell Wade Strickland, forced the vic-
STRESS DISORDER 142, 167 (C. Figley ed. 1985). For a discussion of the specific nature of PTSD
and RTS, see infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
Whether one refers to this syndrome as PTSD or RTS, the basic symptoms remain the same,
but within this general PTSD framework rape victims display certain peculiar behavior patterns,
such as a tendency to delay reporting the incident, memory failure immediately following the rape, a
desire to change daily living patterns, and a fear of men. People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 281, 552
N.E.2d 131, 135, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 887 (1990) (noting the likelihood that RTS sufferers will exhibit
a heightened fear of men); Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, supra, at 983-84
(describing the desire of many rape victims to move in order to overcome their fear that the rapist
will find them again); Veronen, Kilpatrick & Resick, Treating Fear and Anxiety in Rape Victims:
Implications for the Criminal Justice System, in PERSPECTIVES ON VICTIMOLOGY 148, 151 (W. Par-
sonage ed. 1979) (immediately after a rape occurs many rape victims suffer from short-term memory
loss); S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VIariM: A SYNTHE Is OP RESEARCH
FINDINGS, 188-90 (1979) (citing several studies indicating that a large percentage of women delay in
reporting the rape and noting that women who know their assailants wait even longer before filing a
police report).
6. State v. Stafford, 317 N.C. 568, 575, 346 S.E.2d 463, 468 (1986) (The court stated "we do
not deem it necessary to reach on this record the question whether in a proper case testimony about
rape trauma syndrome will be admissible in the courts of this state."), abrogation recognized by State
v. Strickland, 96 N.C. App. 642, 387 S.E.2d 62 (1990).
7. 96 N.C. App. 642, 387 S.E.2d 62, disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 486, 392 S.E.2d 100 (1990).
8. Id. at 648, 387 S.E.2d at 66.
9. Id. at 646, 387 S.E.2d at 65.
10. Id. at 648, 387 S.E.2d at 66.
11. A recent appellate court case has clarified, somewhat, the boundaries of PTSD testimony in
sexual abuse cases. State v. Hall, 98 N.C. App. 1, 390 S.E.2d 169, disc. rev. allowed, 327 N.C. 486,
397 S.E.2d 228 (1990). In Hall the court upheld the trial court's admission of expert testimony to
help the jury determine if a rape had in fact occurred. Id. at 8, 390 S.E.2d at 172-73. This holding
answered one question that remained after Strickland, but failed to address a number of other con-
cerns stemming from the Strickland decision. See infra text accompanying notes 163-73.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Hall and one hopes it will estab-
lish a clear framework for the proper usage of PTSD and RTS testimony.
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tim into her car, demanded that she drive to a deserted road, and then raped
her. 12 Following this incident Strickland took her to his home, where the two
spent the night in his bedroom.1 3 The next morning he took the victim to an-
other location in Raleigh and released her. 14
At trial Strickland's roommate, who was present during the night in ques-
tion, testified that he heard lovemaking sounds coming from Strickland's bed-
room.
1 5 He also stated that he followed Strickland and the victim on the
following morning and witnessed the victim kissing Strickland good-bye as he
got out of her car.' 6 The State called four witnesses to contradict this testi-
mony, 17 including Dr. Susan Roth, a clinical psychologist, who testified that the
victim's symptoms were consistent with PTSD.18 The defense objected, but the
court allowed her testimony,19 and the jury later convicted Strickland of second
degree rape.20
On appeal the defense argued that Dr. Roth was not qualified to offer testi-
mony on PTSD and, further, that testimony regarding PTSD is inadmissible in
rape trials.21 In a perfunctory opinion the appellate court disagreed. The court
first found Dr. Roth qualified 22 and then followed a line of cases from various
states that held PTSD testimony admissible in rape trials by affirming the allow-
ance of Dr. Roth's testimony. 23 The court also found support for its decision in
a dissenting opinion from Judge Martin in an earlier case, in which he argued
that PTSD is relevant in rape cases,24 and in the recent case of State v. Clem-
Mons, 25 which implied that PTSD is now admissible in rape cases.2 6 The North




16. Id. at 644, 387 S.E.2d at 63.
17. Three of these witnesses testified that the defendant had urged his roommate to exaggerate
and lie to the police about the incident, and that the roommate initially gave more "exaggerated"
and deceptive responses to police questions. Id. at 644, 387 S.E.2d at 64.
18. Id. at 645, 387 S.E.2d at 64. She also testified as to the nature of PTSD and its appearance
in rape victims. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 644, 387 S.E.2d at 63.
21. Id. at 645-46, 387 S.E.2d at 64-65.
22. Id. at 646, 387 S.E.2d at 65. The court noted Dr. Roth's position as an associate professor
at Duke University and her extensive research in the areas of sexual trauma, sexual aggression,
stress, coping, and helplessness. Id.
23. Id. at 646-48, 387 S.E.2d at 65-66. The court recognized, but rejected, another line of cases
holding PTSD or RTS inadmissible and also mentioned that the American Psychiatric Association
recognizes PTSD. Id. (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIArNosTIc AND STATIST-
CAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 236 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM III]).
24. Specifically, Judge Martin asserted that PTSD is relevant "'to assist jurors in understand-
ing the evidence and in drawing appropriate conclusions therefrom.'" Id. at 648, 387 S.E.2d at 66
(quoting State v. Stafford, 77 N.C. App. 13, 24, 334 S.E.2d 799, 803 (1985) (Martin, J., dissenting),
aff'd, 317 N.C. 568, 346 S.E.2d 463 (1986)).
25. 319 N.C. 192, 353 S.E.2d 209 (1987). In concluding that admission of testimony regarding
the defendant's prior sexual misconduct was improper but harmless error, the court pointed to
PTSD testimony as a deciding factor supporting the defendant's conviction.
Considering the general consistency between the victim's testimony and her pre-trial state-
ments and conduct, the evidence that the victim's house was in disarray following what the
defendant contended was a consensual sexual union, and particularly the medical evidence
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Carolina Supreme Court subsequently denied discretionary review. 27
Traditionally in rape cases the victims have undergone two ordeals-the
initial rape and the equally traumatic trial procedure. 28 Ironically, society's fear
and loathing of this crime helped shift attention to the victim rather than her
attacker. 29 Virtually the entire inquiry has centered on the victim's behavior,
appearance, and past conduct.30 This skewed focus resulted from a number of
popular misconceptions regarding rape and its victims. 31 First and foremost,
society and the courts have viewed rape as a sexual crime rather than as one of
violence. 32 Thus, the investigation often hinged on the impact the victim's be-
havior and appearance had upon her assailant. If she expressed, in any manner,
a desire for his affections, the attacker could seize upon a ready-made defense to
his crime.33 Similarly, the fear of false accusations of rape and the perception
that "'it is more probable that an unchaste woman would assent ... than a
of the victim's severe post-traumatic stress disorder for a lengthy period immediately fol-
lowing the incident, we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would
not have convicted defendant even if the evidence in question had not been admitted for
any purpose.
Id. at 199-200, 353 S.E.2d at 213.
26. Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 648, 387 S.E.2d at 66 (citing Clemmons, 319 N.C. at 199, 353
S.E.2d at 213).
27. State v. Strickland, 326 N.C. 486, 392 S.E.2d 100 (1990).
28. See N. GAGER & C. SCHURR, supra note 1, at 129-30; Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribu-
lation. Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1977); Bohmer, Judicial Atti-
tudes Toward Rape Victims, 57 JUDICATURE 303, 303 (1974). Bohmer stated that "[v]ictims
frequently report that their encounters with the police, district attorneys and courtroom personnel
were more traumatic than the rape incident itself." Bohmer, supra, at 303.
29. One author explains the tendency to concentrate on the victim rather than the actual crime
observed:
"[IThe mention of rape makes us all uneasy-for different reasons depending on who we
are.... [Tihe thoughtful normal man, after hearing the details of a forcible rape, finds it
difficult to believe.... He knows that all thoughts of sex-which he equates with fun,
romance, and mutual admiration-would leave him if the woman were really struggling to
get free .... He does not realize that, to the rapist, the act is not 'love,' nor ardor, and
usually not even passion; it is a way of debasing and degrading a woman.... This gives
rise to the commonly held view that: 'There is no such thing as rape.'. . . To most women,
[rape] is almost as unreal as it is to most men because they themselves have not experienced
it, and few people who have done so are in the habit of talking about it....
At the same time, an occasional newspaper story about a particularly brutal rape-
murder makes all women shudder. They wonder if it could possibly happen to them, and if
it did, how would they react....
One way of coping ... is to imagine, and then believe, that women to whom rape
happens are in some way vastly different from oneself. Deciding that they must have been
taller, shorter, fatter, thinner, older, or younger will not work since rape victims come in all
variations of these attributes. It is far easier to settle on some impalpable quality which is
not so easily measured with ruler or scale. This accounts for the overwhelming number of
women who believe that most claims of being raped are either outright lies, or that the
rapes were brought on by the victim herself .. "
Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its
Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REv. 395, 399 n.27 (1985) (quoting C.
HURSCH, THE TROU3LE WITH RAPE 5-7 (1977)).
30. Berger, supra note 28, at 12-15; Note, supra note 3, at 1661-62.
31. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
32. See Note, supra note 3, at 1657.
33. See supra note 1.
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virtuous woman' -34 led to a system that put the victim on trial along with her
attacker.
Consequently, the issue of consent is central in most rape trials. The North
Carolina rape statute provides: "A person is guilty of rape in the first degree if
the person engages in vaginal intercourse... [w]ith another person by force and
against the will of the other person. .... -35 Hence, any evidence implying that
the victim assented to the accused's sexual advances becomes relevant to
whether a rape occurred. Traditionally courts allowed any testimony tending to
show victim consent or a failure to resist physically, 36 including evidence of the
victim's prior sexual history.37 This practice caused rape trials to revolve
around the victim's behavior and personal history.33
In response to growing pressures for a solution to the imbalances in rape
trials39 virtually all states have enacted rape shield statutes, which limit explora-
tion into the victim's past.40 North Carolina passed a rape shield statute in 1977
strictly confining explorations into the victim's past sexual behavior.4 ' On sev-
eral occasions the North Carolina courts have upheld the constitutionality of
this statute and" '[rejected] the notion that all sexual behavior, however proved,
has some intrinsic relevance in a sexual assault proceeding, and [required] a
34. Berger, supra note 28, at 15 (quoting People v. Collins, 25 Ill. 2d 605, 611, 186 N.E.2d 30,
33 (1962)). In fact, while the F.B.I. reported that on a national average 15% of all rape reports were
'unfounded' and research based on police statistics turned up even higher percentages, studies per-
formed by medical and social workers yield much lower figures (from 1 to 7%). These differences
were explained by the fact that the police statistics included cases not investigated because the of-
ficers believed that the victim was lying. S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, supra note 5, at 208-14.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a) (1986). For a similar description of second-degree rape, see
i. § 14-27.3 (a)(1) (requiring force against the will of another person).
36. State v. Dill, 184 N.C. 645, 652, 113 S.E. 609, 613 (1922) (allowing testimony that the
victim failed to cry out and subsequently failed to report the rape for three days as relevant to her
credibility and the issue of consent).
37. See, eg., State v. Banks, 295 N.C. 399, 409, 245 S.E.2d 743, 750 (1978); State v. Goss, 293
N.C. 147, 153, 235 S.E.2d 845, 849 (1977); State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177, 191-92, 111 S.E.2d 1,
11-12 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 917 (1960).
38. This focus upon the victim is a major reason for the massive underreporting of rapes. In
1978 only eight percent of the total number of rapes and attempted rape incidents were reported to
the police. Russell, The Prevalence and Incidence of Forcible Rape and Attempted Rape of Females,
7 VicriMoLoGy: AN INT'L J. 81, 81 (1982).
39. The pressure to reform has come from all angles, including the feminist movement, social
commentators, and changing public attitudes toward rape. Note, supra note 3, at 1657 n.1.
40. See Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the
Second Decade, 70 MIN. L. REv. 763, 765 n.3 (1986) (noting that 48 jurisdictions have rejected the
notion that sexual acts of victims are per se admissible).
41. N.C.R. EVID. 412. This statute provides:
The sexual behavior of the complainant is irrelevant to any issue in the prosecution unless
such behavior:
(1) Was between the complaint [sic] and the defendant; or
(2) Is evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior offered for the purpose of
showing that the act or acts charged were not committed by the defendant; or
(3) Is evidence of a pattern of sexual behavior so distinctive and so closely resem-
bling the defendant's version of the alleged encounter.., as to tend to prove that com-
plainant consented to the act... or behaved in such a manner as to lead the defendant
reasonably to believe that the complainant consented; or
(4) Is evidence of sexual behavior offered as the basis of expert psychological or
psychiatric opinion that the complainant fantasized or invented the act or acts charged.
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more specific showing of relevance before such behavior can be proved.' "42
These decisions reflect a concerted effort by the courts to protect rape victims
from defense counsel's arguably prejudicial 43 attempts at uncovering prior sex-
ual exploits.
At the same time that the state legislatures began to enact rape shield stat-
utes, two researchers published a report on an acute stress reaction observed in
rape victims following the event.44 Labelling this condition rape trauma syn-
drome (RTS), 45 Burgess and Holmstrom divided the stress reaction into two
phases. In the initial "acute phase" the victim experiences both physical and
emotional reactions. The physical effects include shock, muscle tension, and
gastrointestinal irritability, while the emotional effects range from fear, anger,
humiliation, and a desire for revenge to an outwardly calm presence that masks
inner torment.46 During this phase the victim most acutely feels the impact of
the rape, although her expressions can range a wide gamut.47 In the subsequent
reorganization phase the victim undergoes a long-term process of redefine-
ment.48 The symptoms of this phase include change in lifestyle and residence,
nightmares, and phobic reactions.4 9 Although these symptoms vary in degree
and sequence, few victims report an absence of any symptoms. 50
A number of researchers questioned the methodology of the Burgess and
Holmstrom study and other, similar studies that followed it.51 Specifically, they
criticized the lack of a control group, the selective nature of the sample group,
and the lack of long-term assessment of the subjects.52 Furthermore, several
42. State v. Fortney, 301 N.C. 31, 37, 269 S.E.2d 110, 113 (1980) (quoting DETAILED COM-
MENTS ON DRAFT LAW, LEGISLATIvE RESEARCH COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY
OF NORTH CAROLINA: SEXUAL ASSAULTS 92 (1977)); accord State v. Herring, 322 N.C. 733, 743-
44, 370 S.E.2d 363, 370 (1988).
43. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249-57 (1966). But see Tanford &
Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544, 544 (1980).
Tanford and Bocchino argue that the rape shield laws are ineffective in reducing jury prejudice and
violate the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to introduce evidence when the probative value
outweighs prejudicial effects. Tanford & Bocchino, supra at 545, 572-78.
44. Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, supra note 5. The researchers conducted
a one-year study of 92 adult victims of forcible rape. These victims were selected from 146 patients
admitted to the emergency ward of Boston City Hospital. Id. at 981.
45. Id. at 981. DSM III recognizes a finite number of other psychologically traumatic events as
causes of PTSD, including military combat, natural disasters, accidental disasters (such as severe car
accidents or airplane disasters), fires, collapsed buildings, and deliberately caused traumas (such as
torture, death camps, and bombing). Common experiences such as loss of loved ones, illnesses,
business losses, and marital conflict do not cause PTSD. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 247-48 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [here-
inafter DSM III-R].
46. Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, supra note 5, at 982.
47. Id. at 982-83.
48. Id. at 983-84.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 983.
51. See Ruch & Leon, Type of SexualAssault Trauma: A Multidimensional Analysis of a Short-
term Panel, 8 VICTIMOLOGY: AN INT'L J. 237, 238-39 (1983); S. KATz & M. MAzUR, supra note 5,
at 20-27.
52. See, eg., Ruch & Leon, supra note 51, at 238-39; Note, supra note 3, at 1670-75; Note,
Expert Testimony On Rape Trauma Syndrome: An Argument For Limited Admissibility-State v.
Black, 63 WASH. L. REv. 1063, 1065 n.9 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Expert Testimony].
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researchers argued that the studies failed to identify any reactions specific to
rape.5 3
In response to these criticisms researchers recently have performed a
number of studies designed to correct the methodological flaws of the Burgess
and Holmstrom research.5 4 Most of these studies have used control groups of
non-rape victims, a battery of standardized psychological tests, and a wider sam-
pling of subjects.55 The results of these more scientific tests did not contradict
Burgess and Holmstrom's findings.5 6 On the contrary, they reinforced and ex-
tended the conclusion that rape victims consistently suffer higher levels of fear,
anxiety, depression, and anger than nonvictims.57 As a result of the original and
subsequent studies confirming the trauma associated with rape, the American
Psychiatric Association, in the 1980 edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM III), recognized rape as one of a small
number of causes of PTSD.5 8 RTS represents one of several sub-categories of
PTSD, which a number of especially traumatic stressors can cause.5 9 PTSD
generally causes the sufferer to re-experience the traumatic event,6° feel es-
tranged from others, 61 exhibit fear and avoidance of the stimuli associated with
the event,62 and display and feel a wide range of emotions.63 Not only have the
recent studies confirmed rape victims' symptoms that correspond with PTSD,64
but at least one researcher has contended that rape victims as a group exhibit
53. In fact, the original study by Burgess and Holmstrom found similar reactions among rape
and attempted rape victims. Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, supra note 5, at 982.
Another study concluded that RTS reactions could result from any stressful sexual situation.
Notman & Nadelson, The Rape Victim: Psychodynamic Considerations, 133 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY
408, 408 (1976). Some courts later cited these studies as evidence that PTSD or RTS represented a
therapeutic technique and could not be used as a fact-finding tool. See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d
236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 460 (1984).
Even more disturbing were results compiled by Symonds, which indicated that similar trauma
could result from any violent crime. Specifically, Symonds compared rape and robbery victims and
found similar victim responses. Symonds, The Rape Victim: Psychological Patterns of Response, 36
Am. J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 27 (1976).
54. See, eg., Becker, Skinner & Able, Sequelae of Sexual Assault: The Survivor's Perspective, in
THE SEXUAL AGGRESSOR: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON TREATMENT 240 (1983); Ellis, A Review
of Empirical Rape Research: Victim Reactions and Response to Treatment, 3 CLINICAL PSYCHOL-
OGY REV. 473 (1983); Veronen, Kilpatrick & Resick, supra note 5.
55. See eg., studies cited supra note 54.
56. Id.
57. See, eg., Becker, Skinner & Abel, supra note 54, at 249, 253; Ellis, supra note 54, at 477.
58. DSM III, supra note 23, at 236. The revised third edition of the DSM III continues to
recognize rape as a cause of PTSD. DSM III-R, supra note 45, at 247.
59. See supra note 45.
60. DSM III-R, supra note 45, at 247.
61. Id. at 248.
62. Id. This avoidance of anything associated with the event can result in partial amnesia with
respect to the rape, a sudden change in lifestyle to avoid reminders of the incident (such as a change
in residence if the rape took place in the victim's home), and even a decreased response to all stimuli
known as "psychic numbing." Id. at 248-49.
63. Id. at 247-49. As shown in the original Burgess and Holmstrom study, see Burgess &
Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, supra note 5, these emotional symptoms can range from open
displays of terror, depression, and anger to a stoic exterior that hides the inner torment of the victim.
DSM III-R, supra note 45, at 247-49.
64. See Burgess & Holmstrom, RTS and PTSD, supra note 5, at 46; Martin, Warfield & Braen,
Physician's Management of the Psychological Aspects of Rape, 249 J. A.M.A. 501 (1983).
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symptoms more severe than those shown by almost any other group of PTSD
sufferers.65
As the documentation of PTSD (and its sub-category RTS) emerged in sup-
port of Burgess and Holmstrom's original conclusions,66 the specter of its possi-
ble use in rape trials began to loom largely. Properly. classified as scientific
testimony, PTSD evidence must meet both the general requirements of rele-
vance6 7 and the test for admitting expert testimony.6 8 This testimony may "em-
brace an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact," 69 but it cannot invade
the province of the jury by simply telling the jury how to decide an issue.70 In
addition, evidence of PTSD must meet the jurisdiction's admissibility test for
novel scientific theories. Many states apply the so-called Frye test,71 which re-
quires that the scientific community "generally accept" the theory before courts
may sanction its use.72 This standard represents a strict and unyielding ap-
proach towards novel scientific theories, and many argue it goes too far by bar-
ring highly reliable and relevant testimony. 73 Not only must the PTSD evidence
cross the Frye barrier, but it must also withstand the skepticism surrounding
psychological testimony in general. 74
Many states, however, have rejected the Frye test for novel scientific tech-
niques and instead admit such techniques if they are reliable.75 North Carolina
courts, in particular, use this "reliability standard." 76 Although the technique
65. Wilson, Smith & Johnson, supra note 5, at 157 (determining that only PTSD caused by
combat in Vietnam surpasses the suffering rape victims endure).
66. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
67. Relevancy consists of evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." N.C.R. EVID. 401.
68. Because PTSD evidence relies on an expert's diagnosis and testimony, it must meet the
requirements of rule 702. Thus, the witness must qualify as an expert and his or her testimony must
assist the trier of fact in making its conclusions. N.C.R. EVID. 702.
69. N.C.R. EvID. 704.
70. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee notes (The Federal Rule is identical to the North
Carolina version of 704.). In the context of PTSD, this means that the expert may explain PTSD
and, depending on the jurisdiction, testify that the victim suffers from PTSD. Neither the expert nor
the court, however, may order the jury to connect the PTSD to the rape or even to accept the
expert's opinion.
71. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
72. Id. at 1014. General acceptance among the scientific community can be shown through use
of the theory in other cases, and discussion in law review articles and other scholarly or authoritative
materials. Massaro, supra note 29, at 434-35.
73. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-
Century Later, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 1197, 1223-24 (1980).
74. The fear surrounding psychological testimony is that it relies too much on theory, cannot
be validated, and draws impermissible conclusions for the trier of fact. Morse, Crazy Behavior,
Morals, and Science" An Analysis Of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 527, 618 (1978).
Contra, Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The
Case For Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. RIv. 427, 463-66 (1980) (arguing that any shortcomings
in the psychological testimony may be countered by cross-examination and limiting instructions and,
furthermore, that psychological testimony is highly relevant and accurate).
75. Massaro, supra note 29, at 435. Of course, general acceptance can bolster a claim for relia-
bility. Id.
76. See State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 147, 322 S.E.2d 370, 380 (1984); State v. Temple, 302
N.C. 1, 12, 273 S.E.2d 273, 280 (1981) (citing State v. Powell, 264 N.C. 73, 74, 140 S.E.2d 705,706
(1965)).
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must be established and recognized, the North Carolina Supreme Court in State
v. Bullard specifically rejected the Frye test as the exclusive standard for admissi-
bility, and recognized reliability as the chief test.77
The increasing presence of PTSD as an established and documented tech-
nique and North Carolina's "reliability standard" for novel scientific techniques
set the stage for an attempt to use evidence of the syndrome in a North Carolina
rape trial. In 1986 the inevitable occurred in State v. Stafford,78 when the State
attempted to offer testimony showing the complainant suffered from RTS.79
The victim in Stafford was a thirteen year-old girl who accused her uncle of
raping her.80 At trial the pediatrician who examined the victim, when asked if
the victim suffered from RTS, testified that "I can't make any conclusions
whether or not this means she was raped. I can just say she fulfills some of the
criteria for the syndrome that has been defined, and that's all I can say."8 1 After
the jury convicted the defendant, he appealed, arguing that RTS testimony is
inadmissible under rule 702.82 The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however,
avoided the broad issue of whether expert testimony on RTS (or PTSD) is ad-
missible in rape trials, and determined instead that this particular testimony was
inadmissible as hearsay under rule 802.83 The supreme court affirmed on the
hearsay grounds and reiterated, "we do not deem it necessary to reach on this
record the question whether in a proper case testimony about rape trauma syn-
drome will be admissible in the courts of this state."'84 Although the majority on
both the court of appeals and the supreme court dodged the RTS issue, dissent-
ers in both cases argued that RTS testimony "as to the symptoms of the syn-
drome and its existence, is admissible to assist jurors in understanding the
evidence and in drawing appropriate conclusions therefrom." 8 5 The majority's
position, in contrast, remained a mystery.8 6
While North Carolina danced around the PTSD admissibility question,
77. Bullard, 312 N.C. at 147, 322 S.E.2d at 380 (holding that, while the general acceptance of a
scientific technique does strengthen the likelihood of its admission into evidence, "[p]lainly, our
Court does not adhere exclusively to the Frye formula").
78. 317 N.C. 568, 346 S.E.2d 463 (1986). At the time Stafford came before the court, at least
four other states already had faced the PTSD question. See infra note 87.
79. Stafford, 317 N.C. at 571, 346 S.E.2d at 465.
80. Id. at 569, 346 S.E.2d at 464.
81. Id. at 571, 346 S.E.2d at 465-66. The doctor subsequently testified on the nature of RTS
and its causes. Id. at 571-72, 387 S.E.2d at 466.
82. See State v. Stafford, 77 N.C. App. 19, 20, 334 S.E.2d 799, 800 (1985), aff'd, 317 N.C. 568,
346 S.E.2d 463 (1986).
83. Id. at 21, 334 S.E.2d at 800. The court ruled that the statements given to the doctor by the
victim constituted inadmissible hearsay and did not fall under the exception to hearsay in North
Carolina Rules of Evidence 803(4), which renders admissible statements made for the purpose of
medical diagnosis or treatment. Id. at 21, 331 S.E.2d at 801. For an argument that the court misap-
plied the hearsay rules to avoid the PTSD question, see Note, State v. Stafford: Rape Trauma Syn-
drome and the Admissibility of Statements Made by Rape Victims, 64 N.C.L. REv. 1364, 1370
(1986).
84. Stafford, 317 N.C. at 575, 346 S.E.2d at 468.
85. Stafford, 77 N.C. App. at 26, 334 S.E.2d at 803 (Martin, J., dissenting); Stafford, 317 N.C.
at 576, 346 S.E.2d at 468 (Martin, J., dissenting). Judge Becton, in contrast, concurred in the court
of appeals decision and argued that RTS had not gained sufficient scientific reliability to be admissi-
ble. Stafford, 77 N.C. App. at 22, 334 S.E.2d at 801 (Becton, J., concurring).
86. Later, in State v. Goodwin, the court again avoided the PTSD controversy by holding that
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other states squarely confronted it. At the time of Stafford four other state
supreme courts had ruled directly on the use of PTSD in rape trials.87 Of these,
three either severely limited or completely excluded the evidence.88 These
courts, and those that later followed their decisions,89 relied on three major ar-
guments to justify their holdings: reliability concerns, lack of helpfulness to the
jury, and the danger of prejudice.
First, these courts concluded that PTSD was not sufficient to meet the stan-
dards required for the admissibility of scientific expert testimony. In addition to
the methodological shortcomings of the early studies, which cast "grave doubt"
on the reliability of PTSD (and RTS),90 the courts rejecting PTSD testimony
contended that PTSD was devised to assist victims in overcoming their trauma
rather than to test the accuracy of the victims' contentions. 91 One court con-
cluded that "[r]ape trauma syndrome is not a fact-finding tool, but a therapeutic
tool useful in counseling."92 In effect, this argument did not dispute the general
acceptance of PTSD as a counseling technique, but viewed PTSD as an inappro-
priate fact-finding method. Furthermore, some courts decided that the difficulty
of determining the cause of the syndrome makes evidence of RTS or PTSD in-
herently unreliable.93 Because other stressors might represent the real cause of
PTSD, reliability problems present a serious danger.94
The second major reason some courts rejected PTSD and RTS testimony
was doubt as to whether its introduction assists the jury enough to merit its
admissibility.95 Essentially this contention rests on the notion that the jury's
the expert offering the PTSD testimony was not qualified to testify as an expert. 320 N.C. 147, 151,
357 S.E.2d 639, 641 (1987).
87. See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 460
(1984) (rejecting testimony of a rape counselor that indicated a rape had occurred); State v. Marks,
231 Kan. 645, 653, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982) (admitting RTS testimony to show nonconsent to
intercourse); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Minn. 1982) (rejecting RTS testimony where it
alleged the victim was a victim of rape and had not fantasized the event); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d
235, 241-42 (Mo. 1984) (en bane) (rejecting RTS testimony offered on the issue of consent).
88. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460; Saldana, 324 N.W.2d
at 232; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 241-42.
89. See, eg., People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 289-90, 552 N.E.2d 131, 136-38, 552 N.Y.S.2d
883, 888-89 (1990); Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 519 Pa. 291, 297, 547 A.2d 355, 358-59 (1988);
State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 347-50 745 P.2d 12, 18-19 (1987).
90. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 345, 745 P.2d at 17; see supra text accompanying notes 51-53. For a
description of later studies that purported to correct the methodological shortcomings, see supra text
accompanying notes 54-65.
91. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460. The court stated:
We emphasize that our conclusion in this regard is not intended to suggest that rape
trauma syndrome is not generally recognized or used in the general scientific community
[from] which it arose, but only that it is not relied on in that community for the purpose for
which the prosecution sought to use it in this case, namely, to prove that a rape occurred.
Id.
92. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230.
93. See id. at 229; State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); Black, 109 Wash.
2d at 344, 745 P.2d at 16-17. "Rape trauma syndrome is not the type of scientific test that accu-
rately and reliably determines whether a rape has occurred. The characteristic symptoms may fol-
low any psychologically traumatic event." Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229. For the contrary view that
only a finite number of traumatic events may cause PTSD, see supra note 45.
94. See Note, supra note 3, at 1699.
95. See, eg., Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 238.
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common sense suffices to determine whether a rape occurred. 96 Due to what
they perceived as the questionable validity of the technique and the inherent
dangers of psychological testimony, 97 these courts found a decision based on the
facts alone more desirable.98
A concern troubling the courts that is related to this second line of reason-
ing was that admitting PTSD might result in a satellite "battle of the experts."
One court argued that "[tjo allow such [PTSD] testimony would inevitably lead
to a battle of experts that would invade the jury's province of fact-finding and
add confusion rather than clarity." 99 The courts feared that instead of assisting
the jury, PTSD testimony would waste valuable time and only cloud the is-
sue.100 An even larger problem introduced by a "battle of the experts" is the
potential to reawaken the traditional focus on the victim.' 0 ' Logically, if the
prosecution introduces evidence of PTSD, the defendant should maintain the
ability to cross-examine the witness regarding all possible causes of the victim's
trauma.'02 Thus, any sexually stressful or otherwise painful event becomes rele-
vant as a possible alternative to rape as the cause of the PTSD. Similarly, the
defendant could argue that the court should allow his expert not only to testify
regarding PTSD's reliability, but also to examine the victim to determine if, in
the expert's estimation, rape or some other trauma caused the victim's symp-
toms. 10 3 This "battle of the experts" could cost the legal system time, confuse
the jury, and focus the jury's attention once again upon the victim.
Lurking behind both the reliability concerns and the contention that PTSD
will not assist the jury is the third overriding concern of courts that have re-
jected PTSD and RTS: the fear of undue prejudice.1°4 The first courts to ad-
dress the admissibility of PTSD testimony believed that the danger of undue
prejudice far outweighs the evidence's marginal reliability and only slightly as-
96. In refusing to admit RTS testimony the Taylor court held that expert testimony "'should
never be admitted unless it is clear that the jurors themselves are not capable, for want of experience
or knowledge of the subject, to draw correct conclusions from the facts proved.'" Taylor, 663
S.W.2d at 239 (quoting Sampson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 560 S.W.2d 573, 586 (Mo. 1978) (en banc)).
97. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
98. See Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230; Taylor, 663 N.W.2d at 238-39; State v. Black, 109 Wash.
2d 336, 350, 745 P.2d 12, 19 (1987).
99. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230.
100. Frazier & Borgida, Juror Common Understanding and the Admissibility of Rape Trauma
Syndrome Evidence in Court, 12 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 101, 116-17 (1988).
101. See Note, supra note 3, at 1703-04. The sixth amendment guarantees the defendant the
right to probe the victim's psychological or sexual history if she offers PTSD evidence. Id. at 1704.
102. See, eg., State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 109, 517 A.2d 741,751 (1986); State v. Liddell, 211
Mont. 180, 188, 685 P.2d 918, 923 (1984).
103. One court noted:
Cross-examination can include not only cross-examining the expert about PTSD in gen-
eral, but also cross-examining the expert and the prosecutrix about possible causes of the
disorder other than the assault charged in the criminal case. In addition, we can foresee
cases where the defendant will seek to counter the State's PTSD evidence with his own
expert testimony. That can, in turn, lead to issues concerning compulsory psychiatric ex-
amination of the complainant by an expert for the defense.
Allewalt, 308 Md. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751.
104. See, eg., State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230-31 (Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663
S.W.2d 235, 238 (Mo. 1984) (en bane); State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 348, 745 P.2d 12, 18
(1987).
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sists the jury.10 5 Although in many later decisions the courts' focus shifted
away from reliability concerns, 10 6 the courts still restricted or prohibited PTSD
and RTS testimony on the basis that the prejudicial effects of the testimony
outweigh its probative value. 10 7 At the core of this view is the belief that expert
testimony that the victim suffers from PTSD automatically surrounds the vic-
tim's story with an impenetrable shield of credibility.10 8 This shield protects the
victim regardless of whether the expert actually comments on the credibility of
the victim,10 9 because, as commentators have suggested, the jury attaches
"mythic infallibility" to the expert. 110 Moreover, at least one court has argued
that allowing the expert to indicate, either expressly or implicitly, that the victim
suffers from PTSD invades the jury's fact-finding province, thereby relieving it
from deciding whether a rape actually occurred. 1 The majority of the early
decisions, therefore, either banned PTSD testimony outright or severely limited
its scope.
As more state courts tackled the PTSD issue, however, this early majority
position gradually became a minority viewpoint. 1 2 State v. Marks113 was the
105. "ITihe danger of unfair prejudice outweighs any probative value [of RTS testimony.]" Sal-
dana, 324 N.W.2d at 230. See, ag., People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203
Cal. Rptr. 450, 460 (1984); Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 238.
106. At least one court that completely precluded PTSD or RTS testimony in rape trials, how-
ever, focused on the earlier concerns of the technique's inherent unreliability as a fact-finding device.
See Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 345-46, 745 P.2d at 17.
107. Courts recently deciding this issue have viewed the danger of prejudice as greatly increased
when the prosecution uses PTSD or RTS testimony with respect to the issue of consent or to bolster
the victim's credibility, as opposed to offering it merely to educate the jury on the trauma associated
with rape. See, eg., People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 293, 552 N.E.2d 131, 139, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883,
891 (1990) (The court rejected the use of RTS testimony introduced to prove a rape occurred be-
cause "where it is introduced to prove the crime took place, its helpfulness is outweighed by the
possibility of undue prejudice."); Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 519 Pa. 291, 297, 547 A.2d 355, 358-
59 (1988) (reversing the appellate court's ruling that RTS testimony was admissible when offered to
bolster the credibility of the victim's identification of the rapist). These courts recognized PTSD and
RTS testimony as valid and reliable scientific tools and did not bar such testimony given to explain
the victim's behavior, but ruled that the prejudice associated with the expert's validating the victim's
claim that a rape occurred outweighed any probative value of expert testimony on the issue of con-
sent. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d at 293, 552 N.E.2d at 138-39, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
The argument over the prejudicial effects of RTS and PTSD testimony forms the center of the
continuing controversy surrounding PTSD testimony. Most modem courts recognize the reliability
of the technique, but split when this testimony appears on the issue of consent. One court facing the
PTSD question has remarked that
[the admission of PTSD or RTS testimony] is an almost unanimous uniform rule when the
expert neither uses the term "rape trauma syndrome" nor offers an opinion on whether the
victim had been raped. However, if the expert testifies on these two matters, the courts are
approximately evenly split on the admissibility of such evidence.
State v. Gettier, 438 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Iowa 1989). Even courts that admit PTSD or RTS testimony on
the consent issue remain sensitive to the dangers of prejudice and attempt to neutralize them. See
infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
108. The Saldana court contended that the expert testimony "'gave a stamp of scientific legiti-
macy to the truth of the complaining witness's factual testimony.'" Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 231
(quoting People v. Izzo, 90 Mich. App. 727, 730, 282 N.W.2d 10, 11 (1979)).
109. Of course, if the expert comments that the victim is not fantasizing the rape and her story is
credible, the danger of undue prejudice becomes far more imminent. Id.
110. See Note, supra note 3, at 1702.
111. See, eg., State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 348, 745 P.2d 12, 18 (1987).
112. For a list of the states admitting PTSD or RTS to show the victim's behavior was similar to
other PTSD sufferers, see Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 647, 387 S.E.2d at 65.
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first case to uphold the admissibility of RTS or PTSD. 114 Contrary to the deci-
sions that questioned the technique's validity, 115 the Kansas Supreme Court
firmly rooted its decision in the belief that PTSD is a reliable diagnostic tech-
nique.1 16 Other courts admitting PTSD testimony also accepted it as reliable
and accurate, 117 regardless of its therapeutic origins. 11 8
Courts admitting PTSD evidence responded to the fear that the syndrome
can appear as a result of a number of other stressors 19 by pointing to the nar-
row range of stressors that can cause PTSD 120 and arguing that cross-examina-
tion offers the defendant an opportunity to suggest any other possible cause.12 1
Of course this contention raises fears that defendants will cross-examine to cir-
cumvent rape shield laws that limit inquiry into the victim's past. 122 In State v.
McQuillen the Kansas Supreme Court encountered this argument, but dismissed
it stating "[s]afeguards are still contained within the statute to protect the vic-
tim. A showing of relevancy is still necessary before the complaining witness'
prior sexual conduct may be admitted into evidence on behalf of the defend-
ant."123 Thus, since only possible causes of PTSD are relevant to the causation
issue, the court can still prevent attempts to examine recklessly every facet of the
victim's life.
Additionally, evidence of trauma recently has been allowed in cases involv-
ing battered children,124 battered women, 125 and insanity defenses. 12 6 Hence,
113. 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982).
114. Id. at 653, 647 P.2d at 1299.
115. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
116. Marks, 231 Kan. at 654, 647 P.2d at 1299. Most commentators, in light of later studies
validating the syndrome, agree with this perspective. One study shows that the scientific community
overwhelmingly accepts the reliability of the PTSD concept and supports its use in court. See Fra-
zier & Borgida, supra note 100, at 111; see also supra text accompanying notes 54-65 (examining
studies that have documented the intense emotional reactions consistently suffered by rape victims).
117. See, eg., Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Allewalt,
308 Md. 89, 107, 517 A.2d 741, 751 (1986) (quoting Marks, 231 Kan. at 654, 647 P.2d at 1299);
State v. Liddell, 211 Mont. 180, 188, 685 P.2d 918, 923 (1984).
118. While some courts have held that the therapeutic origins of PTSD and RTS severely dimin-
ished their value as scientifically reliable techniques, recent commentators have argued instead that
the bases of PTSD and RTS have no effect on their reliability and accuracy as evidentiary tools. See,
e-g., Note, Expert Testimony, supra note 52, at 1075-76.
119. See supra note 93.
120. Only a narrow range of abnormal traumatic events can cause PTSD. See supra note 45.
Absent a showing of one of these events, the victim's past is irrelevant.
121. See, eg.,Allewalt, 308 Md. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751; Liddell, 211 Mont. at 188-89, 685 P.2d
at 923.
122. In State v. McQuillen, the defense argued that admitting RTS testimony "provides a legal
method by which the defendant can evade [the rape shield statute.]" 236 Kan. 161, 172, 689 P.2d
822, 830 (1984). For an explanation of the protections offered by rape shield statutes, see supra notes
40-43 and accompanying text.
123. McQuillen, 236 Kan. at 172, 689 P.2d at 830.
124. In People v. Bledsoe the court recognized the admissibility of "battered child syndrome,"
which indicates that a child with severe injuries has not sustained these injuries by accidental means.
36 Cal. 3d 236, 249, 681 P.2d 291, 299-300, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 458-59 (1984). However, the court
went on to distinguish battered child syndrome as medical testimony on the cause of a particular
physical injury, whereas RTS represented an opinion about the psychological state of the victim. Id.
125. A number of courts have recently allowed testimony on battered woman syndrome. See
Note, State v. Norman: Self-Defense Unavailable to Battered Women who Kill Passive Abusers, 68
N.C.L. REv. 1159, 1165 n.44 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Norman]; Note, A Trend Emerges: A State
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courts have admitted PTSD to maintain consistency with their approach to
other psychological traumas. 127
Courts that allow PTSD testimony view the evidence as potentially very
helpful in explaining to the jury the victim's reactions to rape.'12 Specifically,
they have pointed to documented misconceptions jurors often hold regarding
rape and its victims. 129 Thus, PTSD evidence, for example, may explain effec-
tively the victim's reluctance to report the crime or other behavior following the
rape.130
Some courts also view PTSD as relevant to whether the victim actually
consented. 13 1 To meet the criteria for relevance, evidence must tend to make a
fact at issue more or less probable than it would be otherwise. 132 On this partic-
ular subject, Professor Massaro has commented:
That definition makes psychological "bruises" as relevant as physical
bruises in a consent-rape trial. Both certainly may result from many
causes. Neither the physician who testifies that a woman has physical
bruises nor a psychologist who testifies that a woman suffers from RTS
can state unequivocally that the condition was caused by a specific in-
cident of non-consensual intercourse, yet the evidence of a victim's
physical injuries is deemed clearly relevant in a rape case and admissi-
bility of this is beyond doubt.' 33
PTSD evidence, then, makes it more probable that a rape did in fact occur,
Survey on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning the Battered Woman Syndrome, 25 J.
FAM. L. 373 (1986). Battered woman syndrome results from the interaction of a series of abusive
actions. As a result the woman becomes unable to leave the relationship, notify the authorities, or
solicit help from friends or family. See L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55-70 (1979) (ex-
plaining battered woman syndrome as a cycle of violence consisting of three stages: tension building,
acute battering, and contrition); Note, Norman, supra, at 1165-68.
126. In comparing RTS to insanity defense cases, one court held that "experts have traditionally
been allowed to testify on numerous issues ultimately to be decided by the jury." Kruse v. State, 483
So. 2d 1383, 1387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
127. Some commentators argue, however, that insanity and battered women syndrome expert
testimony is completely different from RTS testimony because only the defendant may initiate it.
Thus, the defendant's control over the admission of this testimony serves as some protection,
whereas no similar protection for the defendant exists in regard to RTS. Courts therefore should not
analogize between the admissibility of RTS or PTSD and other admissible syndromes. See Note,
supra note 3, at 1693-95.
128. Because of its helpfulness to the jury the testimony fulfills the evidentiary requirements for
admissibility. N.C.R. EvID. 702.
129. See, eg., People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 247-48, 681 P.2d 291, 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450,
457 (1984) (reserving the possibility that RTS could be used to educate the jurors on the subject of
rape and its victims, even though RTS was not allowed on the issue of consent). In a study of
average citizens' understanding of rape based upon a fourteen-question quiz, "the scores showed
that, in general, most people knew very little about the facts regarding rape. The average score of
the respondents on the fourteen-item test was less than four items correct." H. FEILD & L. BIENEN,
JURORS AND RAPE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAw 89 (1980).
130. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460; People v. Taylor, 75
N.Y.2d 277, 286, 552 N.E.2d 131, 138-39, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 891 (1990); Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d
1036, 1039 (Wyo. 1987).
131. See, eg., State v. McQuiilen, 236 Kan. 161, 172, 689 P.2d 822, 829 (1984); State v. Al-
lewalt, 308 Md. 89, 109, 517 A.2d 741, 751 (1986); State v. Liddell, 211 Mont. 180, 188, 685 P.2d
918, 923 (1984).
132. N.C.R. EVID. 401.
133. Massaro, supra note 29, at 440-41 (footnote omitted).
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according to courts that accept its reliability as a diagnostic tool.' 34
Despite its use as a diagnostic tool, most courts have decided to admit
PTSD testimony because "although the admission of evidence of this nature has
a prejudicial impact on the defendant's claim of innocence, the probative value
of this testimony clearly outweighs the prejudicial value." 13 5 Central to this view
is the notion that juries do not rely on experts as "mythically infallible," but
weigh expert testimony just as they would any other evidence. 136 Moreover,
these courts have reasoned that expert testimony on RTS or PTSD does not
invade the province of the jury, but only assists the jury in deciding the ultimate
issues. 137 Cross-examination allows the defense to point out any inherent defi-
ciencies in the testimony and protect against any danger of undue prejudice. 138
In recognition of the inherent prejudicial dangers of per se admissibility of
PTSD testimony, 139 few courts that admit PTSD testimony do so uncondition-
ally. 14 Some courts require specific jury instructions stressing to the jury that
the expert testimony is not a legal conclusion and carries only the same weight
as other evidence. 14 1 Many courts allow the expert to explain the symptoms of
PTSD and to state that the victim exhibits similar symptoms, but do not allow
the expert to address the credibility of the victim. 142 Still other courts allow
PTSD testimony only to explain the victim's post-rape behavior, which the jury
might find nonsensical or unusual (such as failing to report the rape immedi-
ately).'43 Finally, a few courts continue to forbid completely PTSD testimony
in rape trials.144
As the battle over PTSD and RTS admissibility continued in other state
courts, North Carolina courts increasingly began to indicate that they would
134. See Allewalt, 308 Md. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751.
135. State v. Whitman, 16 Ohio App. 3d 246, 247, 475 N.E.2d 486, 488 (1984) (allowing RTS
evidence to explain a child victim's behavior). For a holding that the probative value outweighs
possible prejudice when RTS evidence alleges lack of consent, see State v. Huey, 145 Ariz. 59, 63,
699 P.2d 1290, 1294 (1985).
136. Allewalt, 308 Md. at 102, 517 A.2d at 748.
137. See, eg., Huey, 145 Ariz. at 63, 699 P.2d at 1294; State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 654, 647
P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982).
138. See Allewalt, 308 Md. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751; State v. Liddell, 211 Mont. 180, 188, 685
P.2d 918, 923 (1984).
139. See Huey, 145 Aria, at 63, 699 P.2d at 1294.
140. The list of states that allow per se admissibility is fairly short. See, e.g., id.; People v.
Douglas, 183 I11. App. 3d 241, 256-57, 538 N.E.2d 1335, 1344 (1989), cert. denied, 127 111. 2d 625,
546 N.E.2d 1141 (1989); Marks, 231 Kan. at 654, 647 P.2d at 1299; Liddell, 211 Mont. at 188, 685
P.2d at 923.
141. "[B]y proper jury instructions... the trial court can prevent any impression that the psy-
chiatric opinion is like a chemical reaction." Allewalt, 308 Md. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751.
142. See, eg., Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1387-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Simmons v.
State, 504 N.E.2d 575, 579 (Ind. 1987); Allewalt, 308 Md. at 108-09, 517 A.2d at 751; State v.
McCoy, 366 S.E.2d 731, 736-37 (W. Va. 1988).
143. See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 460
(1984) (refusing to allow RTS testimony to disprove consent, but expressly reserving the possibility
that RTS is admissible to dispel the juror's misconceptions on rape victims); People v. Taylor, 75
N.Y.2d 277, 293, 552 N.E.2d 131, 138-39, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 891 (1990) (same); Scadden v. State,
732 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Wyo. 1987) (expert testimony allowed to explain the victim's delay in reporting
the rape).
144. See, ag., State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d
235, 241 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 349, 745 P.2d 12, 19 (1987).
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allow such testimony. State v. Clemmons, decided in 1987, involved a rape oc-
curring in the victim's home. 145 On appeal of his conviction, the defendant con-
tended that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his prior misconduct
towards another female. 146 Although recognizing the trial court's error in ad-
mitting this evidence, the supreme court refused to overturn the decision be-
cause of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant. 147 The court relied
"particularly [on] the medical evidence of the victim's severe post-traumatic
stress disorder for a lengthy period immediately following the incident."' 148
While the PTSD evidence was not at issue in Clemmons, the court's reliance on
it indicated its willingness to accept such testimony, at least in some capacity, as
evidence in rape trials.
State v. Teeter149 followed on the heels of the Clemmons ruling and in-
volved expert testimony that the victim suffered from symptoms consistent with
those found in other rape victims. 150 Although the expert who testified on be-
half of the State never expressly used the term PTSD or RTS, the symptoms he
described closely mirrored PTSD evidence. 151 The court, rejecting the defend-
ant's characterization of the testimony as going to the credibility of the victim's
story,152 allowed the testimony. The court stated that "Dr. Short never testified
that the sexual acts related by [the victim] were committed by any particular
person, nor did he purport to express an opinion as to defendant's guilt or inno-
cence."' 153 Again this decision, and others like it,154 indicated the court's will-
ingness to admit testimony similar to PTSD evidence. 155
In Strickland the North Carolina Court of Appeals took the decisions in
Clemmons and Teeter to a new level by expressly allowing an expert to testify
that the victim suffered from PTSD.156 The court firmly rooted its decision in
the widespread acceptance of PTSD. 157 Not only is PTSD a reliable scientific
145. State v. Clemmons, 319 N.C. 192, 194, 353 S.E.2d 209, 210-11 (1987).
146. In an attempt to impeach the defendant's credibility the prosecution cross-examined the
defendant about a prior incident. Allegedly the defendant had entered a woman's apartment, made
advances towards her, thrown her on a bed, got on top of her, and stopped only when the woman
managed to kick a ringing phone off the hook. Id. at 196-97, 353 S.E.2d at 212.
147. Id. at 199-200, 353 S.E.2d at 213-14.
148. Id. at 199, 353 S.E.2d at 213.
149. 85 N.C. App. 624, 355 S.E.2d 804, disc rev. denied, 320 N.C. 175, 358 S.E.2d 67 (1987).
150. The expert, Dr. Short, testified that the victim's behavior following the rape resembled that
of other rape victims in that she suffered nightmares, appeared nervous, and expressed fear of her




154. See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 31-32, 357 S.E.2d 359, 366-67 (1987) (expert
testified that the victim's symptoms were characteristic of those exhibited by children who have
experienced sexual abuse); State v. Bailey, 89 N.C. App. 212, 220-22, 365 S.E.2d 651, 656-57 (1988)
(expert testified about the victim's behavior during his examination).
155. In its brief to the court of appeals, the State contended, with regard to Teeter and other
similar cases, that "[b]oth this court and the North Carolina Supreme Court have held that an expert
witness may testify to general symptoms and characteristics of victims of sexual abuse and to state
an opinion that the behavior exhibited by the victim is consistent with ... other victims of sexual
abuse." Brief for the State at 20, Strickland (No. 8910SC41 1).
156. Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 648-49, 387 S.E.2d at 66.
157. Id. at 646-47, 387 S.E.2d at 65.
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method, but it also is generally accepted among the medical community,15 8
among legal commentators,15 9 and by a majority of the state courts.' 60 This
broader acceptance of PTSD testimony prevents the inconsistency that would
result if courts allowed experts to testify that a victim exhibited symptoms simi-
lar to those of other rape victims, but refused to allow the expert to mention the
medical symptoms suffered by rape victims. The mere label "PTSD" or "RTS"
should not invoke different admissibility rules. 16 1 Further, admission of PTSD
testimony serves to educate the jury concerning the popular misconceptions sur-
rounding rape and its victims.' 62
Using PTSD testimony to educate the jury is, however, a far cry from using
it to disprove consent, as the Strickland court allowed.' 63 The level of prejudice
rises dramatically when the expert discusses whether the sexual relations were
voluntary or forced, as opposed to merely explaining the victim's behavior or
commenting on the general severity of rape. 164  Surprisingly, the court in
Strickland made no mention of the possible prejudices surrounding use of PTSD
testimony for this purpose. Virtually every other court ruling on PTSD or RTS
has considered the impact the testimony might have on the defendant and has
provided some means to limit these dangers, or at least to explain how the rele-
vance of PTSD outweighs the prejudicial effects. 165 Judge Lewis' brief opinion
in Strickland, in contrast, does not raise, let alone address, these concerns.166
The court simply cited a number of cases as supporting the admissibility of
158. Frazier & Borgida, supra note 100, at I11.
159. See Massaro, supra note 29, at 460-70; Note, Expert Testimony, supra note 52, at 1074-86.
160. See Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 647, 387 S.E.2d at 65 (listing the state decisions allowing
PTSD and RTS testimony).
161. See Brief for the State at 20.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291,
203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984). The Bledsoe court stated, "We hasten to add that nothing in this opinion
is intended to imply that evidence of the emotional and psychological trauma that a complaining
witness suffers after an alleged rape is inadmissible in a rape prosecution." Id. at 251, 681 P.2d at
301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460. The Strickland court recognized Judge Martin's dissent in State v. Staf-
ford, which pointed out PTSD testimony's ability to assist the jury in understanding the plight of
rape victims:
"There is recognized scientific authority for the medical conclusion that there exists a com-
plex and unique number of physical and emotional symptoms exhibited by victims of rape,
which are similar, but not identical, to other post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms. An
understanding of those symptoms, the unique reactions of victims of rape, is not within the
common knowledge or experience of most persons called upon to serve as jurors. There-
fore, expert testimony as to the symptoms of the syndrome and its existence, is admissible
to assist jurors in understanding the evidence and in drawing appropriate conclusions
therefrom."
Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 648, 387 S.E.2d at 66 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Stafford,
77 N.C. App. 19, 26, 334 S.E.2d 799, 803 (1985), aff'd 317 N.C. 568, 346 S.E.2d 463 (1986)).
163. See Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 645-46, 387 S.E.2d at 65.
164. When the expert offers his opinion that the victim did not consent or that a rape occurred,
the danger of the jury blindly accepting the victim's story is much greater than when the expert
merely talks about the nature of PTSD to educate the jury. See supra notes 104-11 and accompany-
ing text. In fact, some courts draw a sharp line between PTSD testimony on the issue of consent and
testimony to dispel the jury's misconceptions or explain the victim's behavior. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal.
3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460; People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 293, 552 N.E.2d
131, 138-39, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 890-91 (1990); Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1047 (WVyo. 1987),
165. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
166. See Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 644-49, 387 S.E.2d at 63-66.
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PTSD or RTS,167 failing to acknowledge that these decisions comprised a wide
variety of specific restrictions on the testimony itself and the context in which
the testimony was used. 168 The Strickland opinion left open the question
whether PTSD and RTS testimony is per se admissible or whether its admissibil-
ity is limited to situations similar to the facts of Strickland. In Strickland the
State's expert testimony that the victim displayed symptoms consistent with
PTSD was offered to refute the defendant's contention that the victim con-
sented. 169 The expert neither explicitly addressed the victim's credibility nor
stated that she thought a rape had occurred;' 70 therefore, the court did not dis-
cuss whether an expert could testify directly on the credibility issue. Language
in the opinion, however, suggests that the court will confine expert testimony to
a more general realm. 17 1 The court, when citing the many state decisions al-
lowing PTSD, stated "[m]ost jurisdictions allow such testimony on PTSD, or on
rape trauma syndrome, or expert testimony regarding reactions or behavior con-
sistent with other victims of sexual assault."' 172 This comment indicates that the
court recognized the problems associated with PTSD testimony and might ad-
mit it only to show that the victim displayed symptoms consistent with PTSD.
This view represents the best approach to PTSD, because it lessens the possibil-
ity that the jury might abdicate its fact-finding duties by simply accepting the
expert's opinion that a rape did occur, and greatly reduces the likelihood of
undue prejudice resulting from PTSD testimony. The court's opinion in Strick-
land never expressly discussed any boundaries to PTSD testimony, and its ap-
proach to the prejudice issue remains a mystery with few clues.
An equally disturbing aspect of the Strickland opinion is the court's failure
to consider the scope of a defendant's cross-examination after the introduction
of PTSD testimony.' 73 The court never discussed whether a defendant will be
able to pry indiscriminately into the victim's past for an alternative cause of the
PTSD. Other courts have maintained that the defendant cannot escape rape
shield laws once PTSD testimony enters the case.1 74 By placing boundaries on
just what the defendant can explore as he tries to discredit the notion that rape,
rather than some other trauma, caused the victim's PTSD, these courts attempt
to prevent a return to a trial that focuses on the victim. Of course the court
must honor the defendant's constitutional right to confront his accusers,' 75 so
167. See id. at 647, 387 S.E.2d at 65.
168. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text. In fact, one of the decisions cited by the
Strickland court was later overturned by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Gal-
lagher, 519 Pa. 291, 297, 547 A.2d 355, 359 (1988). In its haste the Strickland court mistakenly
cited the appellate decision that admitted RTS testimony. Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 647, 387
S.E.2d at 65 (citing Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 353 Pa. Super. 426, 510 A.2d 735 (1986), rev'd,
519 Pa. 291, 547 A.2d 355 (1988)).
169. Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 645-46, 387 S.E.2d at 64-65.
170. Id. at 646, 387 S.E.2d at 65.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 644-49, 387 S.E.2d at 63-66.
174. See State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 172, 689 P.2d 822, 830 (1984); supra text accompa-
nying notes 122-23.
175. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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the right to cross-examine cannot be overly circumscribed. The court, however,
can limit the defendant's inquiry to relevant events without infringing on the
defendant's constitutional rights. 176
Closely related to the danger of a defendant using cross examination to
uncover skeletons from the victim's past is the question of mandatory psycho-
logical examination of the victim. 177 This question could arise in two situa-
tions.178 First, the defendant might seek psychological examination evidence in
response to the prosecution's PTSD or RTS evidence. Should the defendant
have access to the medical records of the expert, or can the defendant demand to
have his own expert examine the victim?1 79 At present, North Carolina courts
do not allow mandatory psychological exams,180 but commentators have argued
that if PTSD is available to disprove consent, the accused should have an equal
opportunity to have his own expert examine the victim.181 More dangerous is
the second possibility, that the defendant might someday attempt to use PTSD
to prove consent. For example, the defendant might demand an expert examina-
tion of the victim, and if she exhibits no PTSD symptoms he might then contend
that no rape occurred. Thus, PTSD could become a subterranean essential ele-
ment of rape, putting the onus on the victim to prove she suffered from PTSD or
face the contention that the absence of PTSD symptoms proves her consent to
sexual intercourse. To avoid these potential problems, courts must refuse the
defendant access to medical records unless the victim plans to introduce PTSD
evidence and must prevent defendants from initiating discussion of PTSD.1 82
The victim would maintain control over the PTSD issue, thereby preventing
PTSD from becoming a weapon of the defense.183 The North Carolina Court of
176. One court has taken this approach already as a means to limit the defendant's inquiry into
the victim's past. McQuillen, 236 Kan. at 172, 689 P.2d at 830 (1984).
177. See State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 109-10, 517 A.2d 741, 751 (1986).
178. The Allewalt court foresaw both possibilities:
When a trial judge admits PTSD evidence.., the ruling necessarily carries certain baggage
with it.... [W]e can foresee cases where the defendant will seek to counter the State's
PTSD evidence with his own expert testimony. That can, in turn, lead to issues concerning
compulsory psychiatric examination of the complainant by an expert for the defense,
Lurking in the background is the nice question of whether the absence of PTSD is provable
by the accused in defense of a rape charge, as tending to prove that there was consent.
Id.
179. This issue recently came before the Ohio Court of Appeals when a defendant contended
that his counsel provided him an inadequate defense by failing to produce an expert witness to testify
that the victim did not suffer from RTS and, therefore, had consented to the defendant's sexual
advances. State v. Rose, No. 57573 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 4, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
Although the court refused to grant the defendant's motion for retrial because the decision not to
call an expert was a non-reviewable tactical decision, it recognized the possibility of defendants using
RTS testimony to prove consent. Id.
180. State v. Clontz, 305 N.C. 116, 123-24, 286 S.E.2d 793, 797 (1982) (holding that a trial judge
does not have the discretionary power to compel an unwilling witness to submit to a psychiatric
examination).
181. See Massaro, supra note 29, at 453-60; Comment, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syn-
drome" Admissibility and Effective Use in Criminal Rape Prosecution, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 417, 459-60
(1984).
182. Massaro, supra note 29, at 453-60.
183. This would create a situation similar to the use of the battered woman syndrome and the
insanity defense, where the defendant controls the evidence's admissibility. See Note, supra note 3,
at 1694-95.
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Appeals failed to consider these questions in its Strickland ruling, but assuredly
it will be forced to face them in future cases.
The failure of the court of appeals to address or provide for the major
problems associated with PTSD testimony, and the subsequent supreme court
decision to deny review, leaves uncertain the exact limits surrounding PTSD
testimony. 184 Boundaries must be placed on the use of PTSD, either now or in
subsequent cases. Rather than articulating these limits on a case-by-case basis,
efficiency mandates forming a blueprint for handling future difficulties. Virtu-
ally every court faced with the PTSD dilemma has recognized its inherent dan-
gers and established concrete limitations or, at least, discussed why the benefits
outweigh the risks of this form of testimony.18 5 Strickland offered the perfect
opportunity to form an effective PTSD strategy, but neither court seized it.
Thus, the difficult problems surrounding this issue will continue to appear until
the court establishes a consistent approach to PTSD and RTS testimony.186
Although the court made the correct preliminary decision to admit PTSD testi-
mony, it failed to lay the proper groundwork for consistent and fair admission of
the evidence by the trial courts.
Louis A. TROSCH, JR.
184. State v. Strickland, 326 N.C. 486, 392 S.E.2d 100 (1990).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 139-44.
186. State v. Hall presents the perfect chance for the court to establish this consistent approach,
but the supreme court must go further than the lower courts, which declared only that PTSD is
admissible to prove consent. 98 N.C. App. 1, 8, 390 S.E.2d 169, 172-73, disc. rev. allowed, 327 N.C.
486, 397 S.E.2d 228 (1990). For a full discussion of Hall, see supra note 11.
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Duke University v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.:
The Court of Appeals Brings Ambiguity to the Interpretation of
"Professional Services"
The extraordinary development of insurance, and its necessary adapta-
tion to the varying and complicated business relations of a progressive
age tax the utmost ability of the courts.... While we should protect
the companies against all unjust claims and enforce all reasonable reg-
ulations necessary for their protection, we must not forget that the pri-
mary object of all insurance is to insure. . . . We can not permit
insurance companies by unreasonable stipulations to evade the pay-
ment of such indemnity when justly due, and thus defeat the very ob-
ject of their existence.'
Over ninety years ago, the North Carolina Supreme Court, revealing more
than a hint of consternation about the increasing complexity of insurance con-
tracts, joined other American jurisdictions in concluding that ambiguous clauses
in contracts of insurance should be interpreted in favor of the insured. This
canon of construction, which since has proved inherently flexible in both appli-
cation and outcome, 2 has become a favorite of modem jurists dealing in the
complex and technical language of insurance contracts. 3
Most recently, the North Carolina Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of
strict construction in Duke University v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.4
to give narrow interpretation to a "professional services" exclusion in the gen-
eral liability insurance policy of a North Carolina hospital.5 This ruling places
North Carolina among a growing number of states giving narrow construction
to "professional services" exclusions. 6 This Note analyzes the court's holding in
Duke University and concludes that while the strict construction of professional
services exclusions is consistent with North Carolina courts' long term deference
to policyholders, the court's rationale creates a confusing area of overlap be-
tween general liability insurance policies and professional service insurance poli-
cies. The Note suggests that the court could have minimized this overlap by
1. Grabbs v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 125 N.C. 389, 399, 34 S.E. 503, 506 (1899).
2. See infra notes 41-61 and accompanying text.
3. 2 M. RHODES, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 15:74, at 334, 341 (rev. 2d ed.
1984). "The words, 'the contract is to be construed against the insurer' comprise the most familiar
expression in the reports of insurance cases." Id. at 334. For a list of cases applying the rule that
ambiguous language is to be construed against the insurer, see id. at 341 n.10.
4. 96 N.C. App. 635, 386 S.E.2d 762, disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 595, 393 S.E.2d 876 (1990).
5. Id. at 641, 386 S.E.2d at 766.
6. See, eg., Gulf Ins. Co. v. Gold Cross Ambulance Serv. Co., 327 F. Supp. 149, 154-55 (W.D.
Okla. 1971); Keepes v. Doctors Convalescent Center, Inc., 89 I1. App. 2d 36, 40, 231 N.E.2d 274,
276 (1967); American Casualty Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 479 So. 2d 577, 579 (La. App. 1985);
D'Antoni v. Sara Mayo Hosp., 144 So. 2d 643, 646-47 (La. App. 1962); Lady Beautiful, Inc. v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 16 Ohio Misc. 169, 172, 240 N.E.2d 894, 896 (1968). But see Ocean Accident &
Guarantee Corp. v. Herzberg's Inc., 100 F.2d 171, 173 (8th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 645
(1939); Antles v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 221 Cal. App. 2d 438, 443, 34 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511
(1963); Brockbank v. Travelers Ins. Co., 12 A.D.2d 691, 691, 207 N.Y.S.2d 723, 724 (1960), appeal
denied, 9 N.Y.2d 609, 172 N.E.2d 293, 210 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1961); Harris v. Fireman's Fund Indem.
Co., 42 Wash. 2d 655, 660-61, 257 P.2d 221, 227 (1953).
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considering the intent of the contracting parties and the economic considera-
tions driving insurance contracts. In particular, the Note submits that a proper
analysis would have considered that insurance policies are designed to classify
insureds according to commonality of risk, and that these classifications, when
successfully applied, serve the important public policy goal of placing the burden
of insuring a particular type of risk on those persons most able to protect against
it.
At issue in Duke University was a general liability insurance policy insuring
Duke University and Duke University Medical Center against claims of injury
arising from accidents on their premises.7 The policy specifically excluded
"claims arising out of the providing or failure to provide professional services"
in hospital operations.8 In June of 1986, an elderly patient at the Medical
Center's outpatient dialysis center was injured when attendants failed to stabilize
her dialysis chair as she attempted to rise after treatment.9 The patient later
died from injuries sustained in the fall and a wrongful death action ensued. 10 St.
Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, the underwriter of the university's
general liability policy, refused to defend the wrongful death action on grounds
that the claim was within the policy's professional services exclusion. 11 Follow-
ing settlement of the parent action, the university brought suit against the in-
surer to recover its costs. 12 The trial court ordered summary judgment for the
university and the insurer appealed. 13 The court of appeals unanimously
affirmed. 14
The interpretation of professional services exclusions in insurance policies
was an issue of first impression for North Carolina appellate courts. 15 The court
of appeals thus began its analysis of the exclusion clause by briefly reviewing
North Carolina's well-settled rules of construction for contracts of insurance.
Specifically, the court noted that "[p]rovisions which exclude liability coverage
are not favored ... and any ambiguities must be construed against the insurer
and in favor of the insured." 16
After quickly concluding that the claim at issue could not be excluded on
causal grounds alone,17 the court turned to the task of construing the term "pro-
7. Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 636, 386 S.E.2d at 763; see Record at 21, Duke University
(No. 8914SC33).
8. Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 637, 386 S.E.2d at 764; Record at 29.
9. Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 638, 386 S.E.2d at 764.
10. Id. at 636, 638, 386 S.E.2d at 763, 764; see Record at 4.
11. Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 636, 386 S.E.2d at 763.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 641, 386 S.E.2d. at 766.
15. Id. at 638, 386 S.E.2d at 764.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 638-39, 386 S.E.2d at 764. The exclusion clause provided that claims "arising out
of" professional services should be excluded. Id. at 638, 386 S.E.2d at 764. The court noted that the
"arising out of language" must be construed narrowly "to require that the excluded cause be the sole
proximate cause of the injury." Id. at 638-39, 386 S.E.2d at 764 (citing State Capital Ins. Co. v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 318 N.C. 534, 547, 350 S.E.2d 66, 74 (1986)). Thus the court held:
"[C]overage [in this case] is excluded only if any negligence with respect to assisting decedent out of
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fessional services." Two principles guided its inquiry. First, the court noted
that "a 'professional service' generally is defined as one arising out of a vocation
or occupation involving specialized knowledge or skills, and the skills are mental
as opposed to manual."18 Second, the court observed, acts or omissions should
be classified as professional services on the basis of the nature of the acts or
omissions themselves, rather than the "position of the person responsible for the
act or omission." 19 Applying these postulates and the rule that courts should
construe ambiguous policy exclusions in favor of the insured, the court con-
cluded that the actions at issue in Duke University could not be classified as
professional services for policy exclusion purposes.20 Professional service policy
exclusions, the court held, apply "only [to] those services for which professional
training is a prerequisite to performance. '2 1 Stabilizing the dialysis chair and
assisting the injured party required no special skill or training and thus could
not be viewed as falling within the professional services exclusion.22
The court was not persuaded by authorities from other jurisdictions that
had given professional service exclusions broader sweep. 23 Jurisdictions that
had so ruled, the court noted, "did not employ the strict rule of construction
against the insurer that we must follow in this case."'24 Further, the court held
that while its interpretation of the exclusion language implied that the same
claim might be insured under both professional malpractice policies and general
liability policies with professional service exclusions, this potential for overlap-
ping coverage would not affect its decision.25
The notion that insurance policy exclusions should be disfavored and nar-
rowly construed against the insurer is but one element in a group of construc-
tional principles North Carolina courts apply when interpreting contracts of
the chair was a providing [sic] or failure to provide professional services. In order to resolve this
issue, we must construe the term 'professional services.' " Id. at 639, 386 S.E.2d at 764.
18. Id. at 639, 386 S.E.2d at 765 (citing Smith v. Keator, 21 N.C. App. 102, 105-06, 203 SE.2d
411, 415, aff'd, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203, appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1043 (1974)); see infra
notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
19. Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 639, 386 S.E.2d at 765 (citing Gulf Ins. Co. v. Gold Cross
Ambulance Serv. Co., 327 F. Supp. 149, 152 (W.D. Okla. 1971)); see infra notes 88-89 and accompa-
nying text.
20. Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 641, 386 S.E.2d at 766.
21. Id.
22. Id. Further, the court concluded that:
"[a]lthough the dialysis chair was a specialized piece of equipment, the injury was not
related to any special function of the chair but merely resulted from the presence of casters
on the chair which enable it to be easily moved.... [N]o special training is required for a
person to know that a chair with casters may move when someone attempts to rise from
it."
Id.
23. See supra note 6.
24. Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 640, 386 S.E.2d at 765. Presumably the court was refer-
ring to the rule that "provisions which exclude liability coverage are not favored," id. at 638, 386
S.E.2d at 764, since virtually all jurisdictions employ the general rule of construction against the
insurer. See supra note 3. Even the rule disfavoring exclusions may not distinguish adequately many
of the holdings in jurisdictions that give broader interpretation to the exclusion language. See infra
note 37.




insurance. The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Maddox v. Colonial Life &
Accident Insurance Co., summed up these constructional rules:26
In interpreting the relevant provisions of [insurance policies], we
are guided by the general rule that in the construction of insurance
contracts, any ambiguity in the meaning of a particular provision will
be resolved in favor of the insured and against the insurance company.
Exclusions from and exceptions to undertakings by the company are
not favored, and are to be strictly construed to provide the coverage
which would otherwise be afforded by the policy. The various clauses
are to be harmoniously construed if possible, and every provision
given effect. An ambiguity exists where, in the opinion of the court,
the language of the policy is fairly and reasonably susceptible to either
of the constructions asserted by the parties.27
Three principles underlie this aggregated rule of construction. First, in constru-
ing ambiguous policy provisions, courts must favor the insured. 28 Second, ab-
sent ambiguity, courts must construe an insurance policy in accordance with its
express terms.29 Finally, ambiguous terms must be construed in harmony with
the express provisions of the policy. 30
Although frequently applied mechanically by modem courts, 3 1 there are
important theoretical underpinnings for the rule that insurance policies should
be construed in favor of the insured. As the quotation that opens this Note
suggests, North Carolina courts struggling with the rapid development of new
forms of insurance during the early twentieth century sought to protect rela-
tively unschooled laypersons ill-equipped to analyze and interpret their poli-
cies. 32 Although this rule is similar to the admonition contra proferentem,33 it
has independent policy justifications. As one court has pointed out, "[insurance
policies] are unipartite.... In general, the insured never sees the policy until
after he contracts and pays his premium, and he then most frequently receives it
from a distance, when it is too late for him to obtain explanations or
26. 303 N.C. 648, 280 S.E.2d 907 (1981) (six of seven justices concurring in the result but not in
the opinion), quoted with approval in Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 68 N.C. App. 184, 188,
314 S.E.2d 552, 554-55, disc. rev. denied, 311 N.C. 761, 321 S.E.2d 142 (1984).
27. Maddox, 303 N.C. at 650, 280 S.E.2d at 908 (citations omitted).
28. See infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 41-61 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
31. See e.g., State Capital Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 318 N.C. 534, 541, 547, 350
S.E.2d 66, 70, 73-74 (1986); Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 693-94, 340
S.E.2d 374, 378-79 (1986); Maddox v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 303 N.C. 648, 653-54, 280
S.E.2d 907, 910 (1981).
32. See, e.g., Roberts v. American Alliance Ins. Co., 212 N.C. 1, 4, 192 S.E. 873, 875 (1937);
East Carolina Ry. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 145 N.C. 114, 117, 58 S.E. 906, 907 (1907) (quoting
Bray v. Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 139 N.C. 390, 393, 51 S.E. 922, 923 (1905)).
33. See 2 M. RHODES, supra note 3, § 15:74, at 334, 341. The constructional principle ofcontra
proferentem suggests that "if language supplied by one party is reasonably susceptible to two inter-
pretations, one of which favors each party, the one that is less favorable to the party that supplied
the language is preferred." E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.11, at 518 (2d ed. 1990). The rule
frequently is applied in the construction of standard contracts and "often operates against a party
that is at a distinct advantage in bargaining." Id.
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modifications." '34
In contrast to the clearly articulated considerations supporting the general
rule of construction in favor of insureds, North Carolina courts adopted the
principle that exclusions are disfavored and thus strictly construed against the
insurer with virtually no independent explanation. The exclusion rule first was
applied in North Carolina in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Shelby Mutual Insurance
Co. 35 in 1967. Justice Lake, who wrote frequently for the court regarding insur-
ance matters, stated simply that "[e]xclusions from and exceptions to undertak-
ings by the company are not favored." 3 6 Presumably, the court considered this
unexplained statement an obvious corollary to the general rule that courts
should construe ambiguities in policies of insurance in favor of the insured.
Since exclusions by their very nature must diminish coverage, and hence disfa-
vor the insured, any ambiguity in such clauses necessarily would cause a court to
construe the limiting language narrowly.37 Additionally, the Allstate court may
well have concluded that policyholders unfamiliar with the structure and termi-
nology of insurance documents might overlook or misunderstand exclusion
clauses, and that disfavoring these exclusions would protect unsuspecting insur-
ance purchasers.38 Whatever rationale prompted the rule, it has found wide
34. Roberts, 212 N.C. at 4, 192 S.E. at 875.
35. 269 N.C. 341, 152 S.E.2d 436 (1967).
36. Id. at 346, 152 S.E.2d at 440. Nor do the authorities cited for the proposition explain why
exclusions should be disfavored beyond any other language purporting to define the nature and
extent of coverage. See Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 430, 435,
146 S.E.2d 410, 414 (1966); Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 309, 312, 145 S.E.2d 845, 848
(1966).
Whatever the reasons for disfavoring exclusions, courts have held that the burden of proving
facts within an exclusion rests with the insurer. See, ag., Brevard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
262 N.C. 458, 461, 137 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1964) ("In an action to recover under an insurance policy,
the burden is on the plaintiff to allege and prove coverage. On the other hand, the burden of show-
ing an exclusion from coverage in [sic] on the insurer."); Barclays American/Leasing, Inc. v. North
Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 99 N.C. App. 290, 294, 392 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1990); Reliance Ins. Co. v.
Morrison, 59 N.C. App. 524, 525, 297 S.E.2d 187, 188 (1982).
37. 2 M. RHODES, supra note 3, states simply: "In accord with general principles, policy excep-
tions are strictly construed and do not reduce the coverage beyond their express terms.... [A]ny
ambiguity in an exception clause is construed in favor of the insured." 2 M. RHODES, supra note 3,
§ 44A:3, at 7.
If this is the only theoretical justification for North Carolina courts' disfavoring of exclusions,
then it would seem there is really no reason to disfavor such clauses more than any other limitation
in coverage. If so, the Duke University court's attempt to distinguish jurisdictions that have con-
strued exclusions more broadly is seriously flawed. See Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 639.40,
386 S.E.2d at 765; supra note 24 and accompanying text. Each of the conflicting jurisdictions cited
by the court has well-developed rules requiring strict construction of ambiguous policy limitations.
See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hollender, 38 Cal. 2d 73, 81, 237 P.2d 510, 514 (1951); Tonkin v.
California Ins. Co., 294 N.Y. 326, 328-29, 62 N.E.2d 215, 216 (1945); Jack v. Standard Marine Ins.
Co., 33 Wash. 2d 265, 271, 205 P.2d 351, 354 (1949) (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. Continental
Life Ins. Co., 159 Wash. 683, 688, 294 P. 585, 587 (1930)).
38. This supposition is supported by rather colorful language used by Justice Lake in James-
town Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 430, 146 S.E.2d 410 (1966):
When an insurance company, in drafting its policy of insurance, uses a "slippery"
word to mark out and designate those who are insured by the policy, it is not the function
of the court to sprinkle sand upon the ice by strict construction of the term. All who may,
by any reasonable construction of the word, be included within the coverage afforded by
the policy should be given its protection. If, in the application of this principle of construc-
tion, the limits of coverage slide across the slippery area and the company falls into a
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application in recent North Carolina insurance holdings.3 9 Like the general
principle of strict construction, however, North Carolina courts employ the doc-
trine quite mechanically, with little if any consideration for its theoretical
basis.40
Before a court is permitted to apply any of the rules of strict construction
outlined above, it first must find a provision ambiguous.4 ' The presence of am-
biguity is a determination for the court.42 In cases involving exclusion clauses,
courts have found ambiguity in policy provisions that are substantially contra-
dictory,43 as well as in provisions that are susceptible to more than one interpre-
tation.44 In the case of contradictory provisions, courts generally have denied
effect to exclusionary language. 45 Clauses susceptible to multiple interpreta-
tions, however, have presented a host of difficult cases in which courts have
acted largely on the equities of particular situations. In York Industrial Center,
Inc. v. Michigan Mutual Liability Co.,46 for example, the court held that an
insurance policy that specifically exempted intentional destruction covered lia-
bility in trespass incurred by a developer who cleared erroneously surveyed
property.47 The court concluded that although trespass, by definition, requires
coverage somewhat more extensive than it contemplated, the fault lies in its own selection
of the words by which it chose to be bound.
Id. at 437, 146 S.E.2d at 416.
39. Eg., State Capital Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 318 N.C. 534, 542-43, 350 S.E.2d
66, 71 (1986); Maddox v. Colonial Life and Accident Ins. Co., 303 N.C. 648, 650, 280 S.E.2d 907,
908 (1981); Wilkins v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 97 N.C. App. 266, 270, 388 S.E.2d 191, 193
(1990); W & J Rives, Inc. v. Kemper Ins. Group, 92 N.C. App. 313, 317, 374 S.E.2d 430,433 (1988),
disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 342, 378 S.E.2d 809 (1989); Western World Ins. Co. v. Carrington, 90
N.C. App. 520, 523, 369 S.E.2d 128, 129 (1988); Graham v. James F. Jackson Assocs., Inc., 84 N.C.
App. 427, 430, 352 S.E.2d 878, 881, disc. rev. granted, 319 N.C. 458, 356 S.E.2d 4, disc. rev. with-
drawn, 321 N.C. 295, 362 S.E.2d 277 (1987).
40. See supra note 39.
41. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d
518, 522 (1970). If there is no ambiguity, "the court must enforce the contract as the parties have
made it and may not, under the guise of interpreting an ambiguous provision, remake the contract
and impose liability upon the company which it did not assume and for which the policyholder did
not pay." Id. For two recent cases that follow this rule, see Wilkins, 97 N.C. App. at 272, 388
S.E.2d at 195 and Mastrom, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 78 N.C. App. 483, 484, 337 S.E.2d
162, 163 (1985).
42. Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 694, 340 S.E.2d 374, 379
(1986). "No ambiguity... exists unless, in the opinion of the court, the language of the policy is
fairly and reasonably susceptible to either of the constructions for which the parties contend." Id.
(quoting Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d
518, 522 (1970)).
43. See, eg., Graham, 84 N.C. App. at 430-31, 352 S.E.2d at 881 (insurer liable for coverage
when policy insured against injury resulting from assault but excluded claims arising out of any
criminal act); Southeast Airmotive Corp. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 78 N.C. App. 418, 418-20,
337 S.E.2d 167, 168-69 (1985) (insurer liable for coverage when policy covered damage to property
arising from use of aircraft but excluded damage to property carried on an aircraft), disc. rev. denied,
316 N.C. 196, 341 S.E.2d 583 (1986); Stanback v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 68 N.C. App. 107, 111-
15, 314 S.E.2d 775, 778-80 (1984) (insurer liable for coverage when policy covered personal injury,
including false arrest and false imprisonment, but excluded acts "committed... with intent to cause
personal injury").
44. See infra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 43.
46. 271 N.C. 158, 155 S.E.2d 501 (1967).
47. Id. at 159-61, 163, 155 S.E.2d at 503-04.
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an intentional act, the clearing of adjacent property did not constitute inten-
tional destruction for the purposes of the policy exemption. 48 Similarly, the
court in W & J Rives, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance Group49 construed ambiguous
policy language in favor of the insured. In that case, Rives, a manufacturer of
sportswear, had contracted with Aetna Casualty and Insurance Company for an
excess umbrella policy.50 The Aetna policy contained an exemption for prop-
erty damage "to the extent that the insured has agreed to provide [other] insur-
ance therefor."''s When a shipment of Rives' goods was stolen in 1984, the
company claimed against Aetna for the value of loss in excess of that covered by
its primary insurer, Kemper Insurance Group.5 2 Aetna denied coverage, assert-
ing that since Rives had reached an agreement with Kemper to insure the ship-
ment, Aetna's policy did not apply.5 3 The court, noting that Aetna's agent had
issued the policy pursuant to Rives' request for excess coverage for precisely the
type of shipments involved, ruled that Rives' policy with Aetna covered the un-
insured losses. 54 The exemption clause, the court held, applied only to agree-
ments with third parties such as purchasers of Rives' goods, and not to
agreements with other insurance companies."5
North Carolina courts, however, have by no means accepted assertions of
ambiguity in insurance policies whenever parties have so pleaded. Accordingly,
in Western World Insurance Co. v. Carrington,56 the court rejected arguments by
a waterproofing contractor that his general liability policy covered damages in a
suit for the costs of remediating faulty workmanship.5 7 The court held that the
policy's exclusion for "property damage to work performed by ... the named
insured arising out of the work"5 8 effectively excused the insurer, since the claim
consisted "solely for bringing the quality of the insured's work up to the stan-
dard bargained for."'5 9 Similarly, the court of appeals in Wilkins v. American
Motorists Insurance Co. 6 held that claims of failure to warn or properly instruct
persons leasing an aircraft from the insured fell within a homeowner's policy
exclusion for injuries "arising out of the ownership, maintenance [or] use.., of
... an aircraft."'6
1
As these cases suggest, the ability to determine whether ambiguity exists
has afforded courts considerable flexibility in determining the precise extent to
48. Id. at 163, 155 S.E.2d at 505-06.
49. 92 N.C. App. 313, 374 S.E.2d 430 (1988), disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 342, 378 S.E.2d 809
(1989).
50. Id. at 315, 374 S.E.2d at 432.
51. Id. at 316, 374 S.E.2d at 432.
52. Id. at 315, 374 S.E.2d at 432.
53. Id. at 315-16, 374 S.E.2d at 432.
54. Id. at 316-17, 374 S.E.2d at 433.
55. Id. at 317, 374 S.E.2d at 433.
56. 90 N.C. App. 520, 369 S.E.2d 128 (1988).
57. Id. at 521, 524, 369 S.E.2d at 128-29.
58. Id. at 522, 369 S.E.2d at 129.
59. Id. at 525, 369 S.E.2d at 131,
60. 97 N.C. App. 266, 388 S.E.2d 191 (1990). The opinion was handed down after Duke
University.
61. Id. at 268, 272, 388 S.E.2d at 193, 195.
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which policies of insurance protect policyholders. This flexibility, however, is
limited by the principle that even ambiguous terms must be construed in har-
mony with the express provisions of the policy and the intent of the parties. 62
Most frequently, this maxim is expressed as a refusal, "under the guise of inter-
preting an ambiguous provision, [to] remake the contract and impose liability
upon the company which it did not assume and for which the policyholder did
not pay." 63 Occasionally, however, North Carolina courts have articulated this
principle in terms of the intent of the parties as discernable through the contract.
As one court wrote: "[T]he objective of construction of terms in an insurance
policy is to arrive at the insurance coverage intended by the parties when the
policy was issued." 64
The best illustration of this intent-oriented reasoning is the North Carolina
Supreme Court's holding in Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Insurance Co. 65
In that case, a private trash collection company accused of depositing refuse
containing hazardous materials in a local landfill sought to compel its insurers to
defend the action.66 The insurers argued that a policy exclusion for pollution
damage exempted the underlying suit,67 which involved deposits over a six-year
62. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354-55, 172 S.E.2d
518, 522 (1970).
63. Eg., Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co, 315 N.C. 688, 694, 340 S.E.2d 374, 379
(1986) (quoting Wachovia, 276 N.C. at 354, 172 S.E.2d at 522).
64. Wachovia, 276 N.C. at 354, 172 S.E.2d at 522. The Wachovia court went on to enumerate a
series of rules of construction to be used in gleaning the intent of the parties from the language of the
insurance contract:
When the policy contains a definition of a term used in it, this is the meaning which must
be given to that term wherever it appears in the policy, unless the context clearly requires
otherwise. In the absence of such definition, nontechnical words are to be given a meaning
consistent with the sense in which they are used in ordinary speech, unless the context
clearly requires otherwise....
Where the immediate context in which words are used is not clearly indicative of the
meaning intended, resort may be had to other portions of the policy and all clauses of it are
to be construed, if possible, so as to bring them into harmony. Each word is deemed to
have been put into the policy for a purpose and will be given effect, if that can be done by
any reasonable construction in accordance with the foregoing principles.
Id. at 354-55, 172 S.E.2d at 522 (citations omitted).
Interestingly, the clearest expression of the importance of intent is found in the opinions of
courts that originally struggled with the theoretical justification of construing a policy against the
insurer. In Bray v. Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 139 N.C. 390, 51 S.E. 922 (1905), for example,
the court wrote:
If the clause in question is ambiguously worded, so that there is any uncertainty as to its
right interpretation, or if for any reason there is doubt in our minds concerning its true
meaning, we should construe it rather against the [insurer] ... giving, ofcours legal effect
to the intention, if it can be ascertained, although it may have been imperfectly or obscurely
expressed.
Id. at 393, 51 S.E. at 923 (emphasis added).
65. 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986).
66. Id. at 689-90, 340 S.E.2d at 376-77.
67. Id. at 690, 340 S.E.2d at 376-77. The exact language of the policy was as follows:
This insurance does not apply ... to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of... toxic chemicals ... waste materials or other
... contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or
body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or
escape is sudden and accidental.
Id. at 693-94, 340 S.E.2d at 379.
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period, unless such damage resulted from a "sudden and accidental" release of
harmful materials.68 In holding that the exclusion applied, the court looked not
only to the language of the insurance contract, but also to the underlying policy
reasons for the pollution exclusion.69 In particular, the court noted that, from
the insured's perspective, coverage for pollution damage would result in a temp-
tation to "diminish ... precautions and relax ... vigilance."' 70 Conversely,
wrote the court, by "putting the financial responsibility for pollution that may
occur over the course of time upon the insured [, the policy] places the responsi-
bility to guard against such occurrences upon the party with the most control
over the circumstances most likely to cause the pollution. '7 1 The court also
noted in a footnote that at the time the policyholder purchased the insurance in
question, separate policies for "environmental impairment" were available to
supplement general liability coverage. 72 The existence of pollution coverage, the
court opined, was "enlightening concerning the underwriters' understanding of
the scope of coverage in the [general] liability policy."'73 These types of policy-
based observations, though relatively rare in North Carolina insurance jurispru-
dence, indicate the court's willingness to look beyond the mechanical application
of traditional rules of construction to more subtle indications regarding the in-
tent of parties and the meaning of policy language.
Compared to the large amount of North Carolina case law addressing con-
struction of insurance policies, authority regarding the nature of the term "pro-
fessional services" is quite limited.74 Indeed, the court in Duke University found
68. See id. at 690, 696-700, 340 S.E.2d at 376, 380-83. The insurers also argued that the routine
dumping of waste materials alleged in the underlying suit was not an "occurrence" for the purposes
of the policies involved. Id. at 695-96, 340 S.E.2d at 379-80. The court disagreed. Id. at 696, 340
S.E.2d at 380.
69. See id. at 697-98, 340 S.E.2d at 381.
70. Id. at 698, 340 S.E.2d at 381.
71. Id. The full language of the court's observation is as follows:
The policy reasons for the pollution exclusion are obvious: if an insured kmows that liabil-
ity incurred by all manner of negligence or careless spills and releases is covered by his
liability policy, he is tempted to diminish his precautions and relax his vigilance. Relaxed
vigilance is even more likely where the insured knows that the intentional deposit of toxic
material in his dumpsters, so long as it is unexpected, affords him coverage. In this case, it
pays the insured to keep his head in the sand.
From the insurer's perspective, the practical reasons for the pollution exclusion are
likewise clear: the lessons of Love Canal and sites like it have revealed the yawning extent
of potential liability arising from the gradual or repeated discharge of hazardous substances
into the environment. In addition, putting the financial responsibility for pollution that
may occur over the course of time upon the insured places the responsibility to guard
against such occurrences upon the party with the most control over the circumstances
most likely to cause the pollution.
Id. at 697-98, 340 S.E.2d at 381.
72. Id. at 698 n.5, 340 S.E.2d at 381 n.5.
73. Id.
74. Although a number of North Carolina statutes use the term "professional service," few
have resulted in litigation specifically addressing the term. The few cases that have addressed the
term provide little guidance for the purposes of this analysis. Two courts have refused to find the
term unconstitutionally vague. In State v. Covington, 34 N.C. App. 457, 238 S.E.2d 794 (1977),
disc rev. denied, 294 N.C. 184, 241 S.E.2d 519 (1978), the court concluded that a statute defining the
"practice of professional engineering" as "any professional service ... requiring engineering educ-
tion... and the application of special knowledge of the mathematical, physical and engineering
sciences," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89-2(6) (1965) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT, § 89C-3(6)
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its definitional authority for the term in Smith v. Keator,75 a case wholly unre-
lated to insurance law. In Smith a group of masseurs operating in Fayetteville
sought to avoid local licensing requirements by arguing that state law gave the
North Carolina Commissioner of Revenue sole authority to license practitioners
of any "professional art of healing." 76 The court held that masseurs could not
be classified as professionals.77 A professional service, it wrote, "'is one arising
out of a vocation, calling, occupation, or employment involving specialized
knowledge, labor, or skill, and the labor of [sic] skill involved is predominantly
mental or intellectual, rather than physical or manual.' "178 This definition is
substantially identical to that reported by Appleman,79 who notes further that
"[m]ere employment, even though on a compensated basis, does not of itself
render the person employed a 'professional' in that particular field." 80
North Carolina law has been the basis for two holdings regarding the na-
ture of professional services for the purposes of malpractice insurance. In Mas-
trom, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., s1 an accounting firm that had
recommended investment in one of its financially troubled clients sought cover-
age for its liability in fraud.8 2 The court held that investment advising could not
be brought within the firm's coverage for "damages... arising out of the per-
(1989)), was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to an engineer accused of practicing engineering
without registering as required by statute. Covington, 34 N.C. App. at 460-61, 238 S.E.2d at 797. In
Roberts v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 56 N.C. App. 533, 289 S.E.2d 875 (1982), aff'd per
curiam, 307 N.C. 465, 298 S.E.2d 384 (1983), a statute establishing a period of limitations for "mal-
practice arising out of the performance of or failure to perform professional services," N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983), was held not to be unconstitutionally vague as applied to a doctor who failed
to remove an intravenous catheter after rendering care. Roberts, 56 N.C. App. at 538-41, 289 S.E.2d
at 878-80.
Two cases involving North Carolina's unfair and deceptive trade practice statute, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988), have interpreted a professional services exemption in that law rather broadly.
In Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., Inc., 58 N.C. App. 414, 293 S.E.2d 901, disc rev.
denied, 307 N.C. 127, 297 S.E.2d 399 (1982), the court held that the statute's exemption for "profes-
sional services rendered by a member of a learned profession," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b), ex-
empted doctors who, as members of a hospital administrative board, voted to deny staff privileges to
a podiatrist. Cameron, 58 N.C. App. at 446-47, 293 S.E.2d at 920-21. The court concluded that
"the nature of this consideration of whom to grant hospital staff privileges is a necessary assurance of
good health care; certainly, this is the rendering of 'professional services.'" Id. at 447, 293 S.E.2d at
921. Similarly, the court held in Abram v. Charter Medical Corp., 100 N.C. App. 718, 398 S.E.2d
331 (1990), that a drug rehabilitation services provider who requested a review of a competitor's
certificate-of-need application was acting as a responsible provider of professional services and thus
outside the scope of the statute. Id. at 722, 398 S.E.2d at 334. But cf Winston Realty Co. v.
G.H.G., Inc., 70 N.C. App. 374, 375-76, 382, 320 S.E.2d 286, 287-88, 291 (1984) (employment agent
who recommended convicted embezzler for accounting position was not rendering professional serv-
ices for purposes of professional services exemption in unfair and deceptive trade practices statute),
aff'd, 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985).
75. 21 N.C. App. 102, 203 S.E.2d 411, aff'd, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203, appeal dismissed,
419 U.S. 1043 (1974).
76. Id. at 103, 105, 203 S.E.2d at 413, 415; see N.C. GEM. STAT. § 105-41(a) (1989) (amended
1990).
77. Smith, 21 N.C. App. at 105-06, 203 S.E.2d at 415.
78. Id. (quoting Marx v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 183 Neb. 12, 14, 157 N.W.2d 870,
872 (1968)).
79. 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4504.01, at 309-10 (W. Berdal ed.
1979).
80. Id. § 4501.12 at 282-83.
81. 78 N.C. App. 483, 337 S.E.2d 162 (1985).
82. Id. at 483-84, 337 S.E.2d at 163.
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formance of professional services... as an accountant. '8 3 Similarly, in Smith v.
Travelers Indemnity Co.,8 4 a federal district court found that an attorney's pro-
fessional malpractice policy did not cover his failure to return $15,000 given to
him for investment.85 Noting that no attorney-client relationship had been es-
tablished at the time the lawyer received the money, the court concluded that
the plaintiff had not employed the attorney "for the purposes of obtaining any
legal assistance."'8 6 The transaction, therefore, was outside the coverage of the
malpractice policy.8
7
The second element of the Duke University court's definition of professional
services-the rule that the nature of the act rather than the title or character of
the actor should determine the presence of such services-is new to North Caro-
lina law. While at least three other jurisdictions have applied this rule,88 each
has done so in a largely mechanical fashion, with no discussion of underlying
rationale or purpose.8 9
Fundamental to an understanding of the holding in Duke University is a
careful analysis of the types of activities that the term "professional services"
may encompass. Relevant activities can be grouped into two categories. First
are services that even the narrowest definition of the term will embrace. These
are acts informed by special knowledge.90 Examples include a surgeon's selec-
tion of an incision site, a lawyer's drafting of a will, and an accountant's classifi-
cation of expenses for bookkeeping purposes. The second, much broader,
category of services consists of those actions that, though not arising directly
from some specially informed judgment, are associated so closely with the per-
83. Id. at 484-85, 337 S.E.2d at 163. The court concluded: "Nowhere do we find any definition
of 'accountant' broad enough to include the sale of securities, nor any definition of 'accountant' as
one who offers a general range of financial services." Id. at 485, 337 S.E.2d at 164.
84. 343 F. Supp. 605 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
85. Id. at 605-06, 610.
86. Id. at 609.
87. Id. at 609-10. The terms of the professional malpractice at issue involved provided for
insurance for claims "arising out of the performance of professional services for others in the in-
sured's capacity as a lawyer." Id. at 608.
88. See Mason v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 370 F.2d 925, 926 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (court
applying Louisiana law held that claim by infirmary patient for injuries received from hypodermic
injection administered by student nurse was within professional services exclusion of general liability
policy); Danks v. Maher, 177 So. 2d 412, 417-18 (La. App. 1965) (claim by patient injured when
hospital nurse failed to count accurately laparotomy sponges removed from patient undergoing ab-
dominal surgery was not within professional services exclusion of hospital's general liability policy);
D'Antoni v. Sara Mayo Hosp., 144 So. 2d 643, 646-47 (La. App. 1962) (claim by patient injured in
fall from bed after hospital attendants failed to raise bed rails was not within professional services
exclusion of hospital's general liability policy); Marx v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 183 Neb.
12, 14, 157 N.W.2d 870, 872 (1968) (when fire resulted from laboratory technician's refilling steam
sterilizer with benzene, court concluded that damages were not excluded by a general liability policy
exclusion for the rendering of professional services); Multnomah County v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co.,
256 Or. 24, 28-29, 470 P.2d 147, 150 (1970) (inmate's claim of failure to provide necessary medical
treatment against county jailer within professional services exclusion of general liability policy).
89. See supra note 88. Appleman reports the rule without comment. 7A J. APPLEMAN, supra
note 79, § 4504.01, at 310 ("[I]n determining whether a particular act is a 'professional service' the
court must look not to the title or character of the party performing the act, but to the act itself.").
90. See Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 639, 386 S.E.2d at 765. Although the definition of
professional services used in the principal case is more complex and precise, see id., this Note uses




formance of informed services that they are arguably professional in character.
Activities within this second category can be ordered according to the strength
of their association with acts in the first category. For example, when a surgeon
fails to remove an instrument from a patient before closure, the mechanical act
of inventorying instruments or recognizing that one has been left in the patient
requires no special skill or knowledge, yet it seems likely that even the most
conservative of courts would classify such an action as a failure to render a
professional service. On the opposite end of the spectrum are actions that are
only loosely associated with the furnishing of a service requiring special skill or
knowledge. Maintenance of a doctor's office premises, for example, may well
constitute an action so remote from the application of specialized knowledge as
to render meaningless any assertion that it is professional in character.
In interpreting professional service exclusion clauses, there is a temptation
to assert that only those activities classified within the first category above-
actions informed by some special skill or knowledge-should be deemed to fall
within the exclusion language. Indeed, this is one possible interpretation of the
holding in Duke University. Specifically, the court observed that stabilizing the
dialysis chair and assisting the patient did "not require any special skills or
training."91 In its strictest sense, this statement would exclude almost any act
not informed by some special knowledge or skill.
Most likely, however, the Duke University court concluded only that the
acts and omissions at issue in the case could not be classified without ambiguity.
This determination, in turn, required a decision in favor of the insured, since the
applicable rules of construction demand that any ambiguity be resolved against
the insurer. This interpretation of the holding is supported by the court's obser-
vation that "the claim in this case could come within [a professional liability
policy] and yet not fall within a professional services exclusion." 92 Indeed, this
notion that a single claim may be susceptible to coverage under both general and
professional liability policies suggests that the court tacitly recognized that cer-
tain professional services may be classified along a spectrum according to the
strength of their association with actions which are truly informed by special
skill and knowledge.
While both the above modes of analysis achieve results commensurate with
North Carolina insurance jurisprudence, there is little to recommend either. If
professional services are restricted exclusively to actions informed by special
knowledge, general liability insurance will cover a whole range of activities
closely associated with informed actions, but not themselves requiring special
knowledge, regardless of the applicable policy's exclusionary language. While
the opinion in Duke University does not require this result, its largely mechanical
analysis does little to dissuade future courts from this interpretation.
The second interpretation of the court's holding also presents important
difficulties. By its express terms, the opinion institutionalizes an overlap be-
tween general liability policies, the exclusionary clauses of which must be con-
91. Id. at 641, 386 S.E.2d at 766.
92. Id. at 640, 386 S.E.2d at 765.
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strued narrowly, and professional services liability policies, which must be
construed broadly.93 This overlap is likely to encourage litigation between com-
peting insurers as they attempt to apportion liability with regard to actions that
are covered under two policies. Policyholders, in contrast, will be encouraged to
use any overlap in experience-rated policies to file claims under less expensive
general liability policies, thus shifting the cost of insuring the particular activity
away from populations most able to limit the risk involved. Finally, the overlap
will hamper efforts by insurance providers to classify activities according to the
nature of the risk involved and to set premiums accordingly.
The court in Duke University could have reduced the potential overlap be-
tween general liability and professional services policies by broadening its analy-
sis to consider the intent of the parties and the underlying theory of the policy
provisions at issue as a means of reducing ambiguity in the term "professional
services." In particular, the court failed to note that most insurance companies
attempt to maximize profitability by grouping policyholders into categories that
share common risks.94 Classification allows insurers to measure accurately the
costs of insuring risks and to price policies, copayments, and deductibles in a
manner that maximizes both risk avoidance and risk protection. 95 Furthermore,
accurate classification serves important societal interests by placing the burden
of insuring a risk on those persons most able to protect against it.96
As suggested earlier, judicial consideration of these principles of risk alloca-
tion and insurance economics is not without precedent. In Waste Management,
Inc. v. Peerless Insurance Co. 97 the North Carolina Supreme Court, looking to
what it termed "policy reasons,"9 8 gave considerable weight to the fact that the
pollution exclusion at issue encouraged policyholders to "guard against" the
pollution risk. 99 The Waste Management court noted that the exclusion was
entirely consistent with the insurer's perception of the "yawning extent" of the
potential liability involvedi ° ° and the availability of special forms of insurance to
93. See id.
94. K. ABRAHAM, DISRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
15 (1986).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 138. Of course, insurance may serve a distributional function as well. The whole
point of insurance is to enable a single individual to avoid the entire risk for a particular activity. See
id. at 18. In virtually all cases, insurers' inability to predict risk for particular individuals perfectly,
combined with the cost of information gathering, prevents classification of insureds into groups so
small that the distributive benefit of insurance is lost. Id. at 15.
Some commentators have suggested that an appropriate function of insurance law is to assure
that risk classification by insurers does not inappropriately limit the socially desirable goal of risk
distribution. See id. at 18-31. A discussion of the appropriateness of judicial interpretation of pri-
vate contracts of insurance for risk distribution purposes is beyond the scope of this Note. It should
be noted, however, that the court in Duke University made no express or implied reference to this
objective. Further, while the ever increasing cost of health care insurance may provide an argument
that broader risk distribution is appropriate for professional services in the field of health care, the
policy adopted by the court in Duke University would appear to apply to all forms of professional
service, inside and outside the health care arena. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
97. 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986).
98. Id. at 697, 340 S.E.2d at 381.
99. Id. at 697-98, 340 S.E.2d at 381.
100. Id. at 698, 340 S.E.2d at 381.
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cover the specific risk. 10 1
Similar arguments can be made regarding professional services coverage.
Specifically, when a particular action is related closely to some action informed
by special skill or knowledge, the risks associated with the action are likely to be
peculiarly within the control of the actor in his capacity as a professional.
Under the theory that the costs of insuring risks should be borne by those most
able to control the risk, such actions should be insured under professional serv-
ices insurance policies rather than under contracts of general liability insurance.
Alternatively, when a particular action is only loosely associated with the ren-
dering of some specially informed service or skill, the risks associated with the
action are more likely to be within the control of the actor as a member of
society in general. In other words, the risks associated with the action are not
disproportionately within the actor's control in his capacity as a professional.
Such acts are, therefore, most appropriately insured under general liability
coverage.
Notably, this mode of analysis is consistent with the rule that the nature of
an act and not the title or position of the actor is determinative with respect to
the presence of professional services. Looking to the title of an actor gives no
indication of whether the particular action at issue is peculiarly within her con-
trol as a professional. To build on an example already suggested, a doctor's
liability for failure to maintain safe premises is not closely related to the medical
profession, but rises from a duty common to owners of business premises as a
whole. The risk and liability are not closely related to the doctor's skill or learn-
ing, nor disproportionately within her control as a professional.
Applying the suggested analysis to the facts in Duke University, it is clear
that the court, though failing to recognize the intent of the parties as a factor in
construing the policy at issue, ultimately arrived at a result consistent with such
an analysis. As the court intuitively concluded, the failure to fix the casters on
the patient's dialysis chair was not an omission uniquely or disproportionately
associated with the providing of skilled health care. The court suggested in its
closing analysis:
Although the dialysis chair was a specialized piece of equipment, the
injury was not related to any special function of the chair but merely
resulted from the presence of casters on the chair which enable it to be
easily moved. The injury may have been avoided by simply locking the
casters or holding the chair.102
As this statement suggests, much the same risk is found in the failure of any
business operator to safely use and maintain equipment on his premises. In this
light, the failure to lock the casters was not an action informed by special knowl-
edge, nor so closely related to the employment of specially informed judgment as
to be disproportionately associated with the provision of health care.
Finally, although Duke University presents the problem of analyzing profes-
sional liability exclusions in terms of the health care profession, the question is
101. Id. at 698 n.5, 340 S.E.2d at 381 n.5.
102. Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 641, 386 S.E.2d at 766.
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by no means unique to that field. Cases in other jurisdictions have addressed the
problem in the context of engineering firms,103 barbers and beauticians, 1t 4 and
hotel operations.10 5 One innovative insurer has even suggested that a profes-
sional services exclusion apply to babysitting in the home.10 6 Indeed, the prob-
lem is likely to arise in any professional area in which insurance companies offer
or limit protection for professional liability.
Although the mode of analysis suggested by this Note may be applied to
any of these fields, the classification scheme it proposes certainly is not without
ambiguity. Close cases will continue to pose difficult choices. But consideration
of the economic and risk allocation objectives of policy exclusions, and in partic-
ular the need to place the cost of insurance on those most able to prevent the
injury insured, would provide a useful guidepost for jurists. Further, such con-
siderations would serve as an appropriate balance to the well-established goal of
protecting the insured against unfair and ambiguous policy language.
North Carolina has joined other jurisdictions in holding that courts should
resolve ambiguities in contracts of insurance in favor of the insured. 10 7 This
canon of construction, which opinions of early courts grounded solidly in the
need to protect policyholders from the "slippery" wording of complex and tech-
nical contracts, is now a fixture of modem insurance jurisprudence. Yet, in
many respects, contemporary application of the rule has become largely
mechanical. Such was the case in Duke University, where the North Carolina
Court of Appeals narrowly construed a general liability policy exclusion for pro-
fessional services. While the Duke University court's result arguably is correct,
the opinion fails to articulate a rationale that will guide future courts in resolv-
ing similar disputes over the status of professional services exclusion claims.
Further, by openly acknowledging that current rules of construction create an
area of overlap between general liability and professional services coverages, the
103. See ag., First Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 466 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1972) (engineer-
ing drawings requiring earthen fill which damaged oil pipeline constituted failure of professional
services for purposes of contractor's general liability policy exclusion); Womack v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 251 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 1971) (engineering firm's failure to confirm drawings showing location
of gas pipeline was professional malpractice within general liability policy exclusion); Atlantic Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Continental Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 123 N.J. Super. 241, 302 A.2d 177 (1973) (failure of
engineering firm to properly oversee trench fortification was failure to render professional services
excluded by general liability policy).
104. See, eg., Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Herzberg's Inc., 100 F.2d 171 (8th Cir.)
(beautician's negligent use of electrical depilator was failure of professional services for purposes of
exclusion in department store's general liability policy), cert denied, 306 U.S. 645 (1939); Ruotolo v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 56 Misc. 2d 45, 287 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1968) (barber who hit customer in
eye with whisk broom not rendering tonsorial services for purposes of exclusion in general liability
policy); Lady Beautiful, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 16 Ohio Misc. 169, 240 N.E.2d 894 (1968) (beauty
parlor patron's injuries from faulty hair dryer not a result of acts or omissions excluded by profes-
sional services clause of general liability policy).
105. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Crazy Water Co., 160 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942)
(hotel patron's injuries in bath prescribed by hotel physician and attended by hotel "tubber" (one
who draws the bathwater, checks the water temperature, and otherwise assists a bather) not ex-
cluded by professional services clause of general liability policy).
106. See Gulf Ins. Co. v. Tilley, 280 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Ind. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 393 F.2d
119 (7th Cir. 1968).
107. See Grabbs v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 125 N.C. 389, 34 S.E. 503 (1899); supra text
accompanying note 1.
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opinion encourages future litigation and impedes insurers' abilities to classify
and price insurance policies covering risks related to professional services accu-
rately. These difficulties will continue until North Carolina courts begin to con-
sider systematically the underlying nature of insurance contracts and the
importance of accurate risk allocation in interpreting and coordinating the in-
surance of professional services.
SAMUEL M. TAYLOR
Brown v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.: When Does
Exhaustion of Policy Limits Terminate an
Insurer's Duty to Defend?
A liability insurance policy imposes two duties on an insurer with respect to
the insured: the duty to indemnify and the duty to defend.1 In the past, when
an insurer believed liability would exceed policy limits, it argued that the latter
duty is dependent on the former, and that therefore exhaustion of policy limits
terminated the duty to defend. Although there is general consensus today that
the duty to defend is independent of and broader than the duty to indemnify, 2
most courts have held that some forms of exhaustion can extinguish the duty to
defend. 3 Courts following this rule, however, have not agreed on the forms of
exhaustion that suffice.4
In Brown v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,5 the North Carolina
Supreme Court addressed this problem, one of first impression in the state. The
court held that when a policy reads, "'Our duty to settle or defend ends when
our limit of liability for this coverage has been exhausted,' "6 the insurer's duty
to defend continues until exhaustion of coverage occurs either through settle-
ment of a claim against the insured or through a judgment against the insured.7
This Note examines the language changes insurers have made in their poli-
cies in an attempt to terminate the duty to defend on exhaustion of liability
coverage. It discusses the split in opinion between courts that have held exhaus-
tion ends the duty to defend, and those that have held it does not. The Note
then addresses the disagreement among courts in the former group over the
form of exhaustion that suffices to end the duty. It analyzes the Brown court's
reasoning and looks at the policy implications of the decision. The Note con-
cludes that the decision is correct as a matter of policy, but that the court should
have rested its holding on less vulnerable grounds.
In Brown defendant Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company (LMCC) sold
plaintiffs Doyle and Coleen Brown a $25,000 automobile insurance policy that
contained the following duty-to-defend provision:
We will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for
1. There is no North Carolina statutory requirement that an insurer provide its insured with a
defense. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (1989). A company, however, may provide this by
contract. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 326 N.C. 387, 391, 390 S.E.2d 150, 152 (1990).
2. Eg., Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 691, 340
S.E.2d 374, 377, reh'g denied, 316 N.C. 386, 346 S.E.2d 134 (1986); see A. WINDT, INSURANCE
CLAIMS AND DIsPUTES 201 n.262 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990) (listing cases holding that the duty to
defend is independent of the duty to pay); Zulkey & Pollard, The Duty to Defend After Exhaustion of
Policy Limits, FOR THE DEF., June 1985, at 21, 21 ("It is a well-recognized legal principle that an
insurer's duty to defend is broader than the insurer's duty to indemnify the insured.").
3. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. For examples of forms of exhaustion that may
extinguish the duty to defend, see infra text accompanying note 94.
4. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
5. 326 N.C. 387, 390 S.E.2d 150 (1990).
6. Id. at 389, 390 S.E.2d at 151 (quoting policy).
7. Id. at 394, 390 S.E.2d at 154.
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which any covered person becomes legally responsible because of an
auto accident. We will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate,
any claim or suit asking for these damages. In addition to our limit of
liability, we will pay all defense costs we incur. Our duty to settle or
defend ends when our limit of liability for this coverage has been
exhausted.8
When Joan Hinson brought a tort action against the Browns as a result of a
car accident, LMCC hired a law firm to represent the Browns.9 In response to
Hinson's complaint, the firm filed an answer denying any negligence by the
Browns.10 In an affidavit, however, the law firm gave its opinion that the court
probably would find the Browns liable, and it predicted a verdict between
$50,000 and $75,000.11 Against the Browns' wishes but at the direction of
LMCC, the firm offered Hinson a $25,000 settlement.' 2 When Hinson refused
the offer, LMCC paid her this amount in exchange for a release of its obligation;
Hinson did not release the Browns. 13 LMCC terminated the Browns' defense
and discharged the law firm. 14 The court later entered a $45,000 judgment
against the Browns, crediting to them the $25,000 payment by LMCC.15
The Browns sued LMCC, claiming that it was obligated to defend them
even after paying the policy limit. LMCC argued that by paying Hinson the full
coverage, it discharged its duty to defend the Browns. The trial court entered
summary judgment for LMCC.16
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the duty-to-
defend provision was ambiguous.' 7 The North Carolina Supreme Court af-
firmed in a four-three decision.18 It agreed with the court of appeals that the
duty-to-defend provision was ambiguous because it did not specify what form of
exhaustion terminated the duty to defend. 19 Proof of ambiguity lay in the par-
ties' conflicting interpretations: the Browns argued that only a settlement or
judgment could exhaust the policy limits, but LMCC maintained that any man-
8. Id. at 389, 390 S.E.2d at 151.
9. Id. at 390, 390 S.E.2d at 151.
10. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 90 N.C. App. 464, 466, 369 S.E.2d 367, 368
(1988), aff'd in part, 326 N.C. 387, 390 S.E.2d 150 (1990).
11. Brown, 326 N.C. at 390, 390 S.E.2d at 151.
12. Id. at 390, 390 S.E.2d at 151-52.
13. Id. at 390, 390 S.E.2d at 152. LMCC paid Hinson pursuant to North Carolina General
Statutes § 1-540.3, which allows advance payments to an injured person by a party or the party's
insurer. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-540.3(a) (1983)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 391, 390 S.E.2d at 152.
17. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 90 N.C. App. 464, 477, 369 S.E.2d 367, 374
(1988), aff'd in part, 326 N.C. 387, 390 S.E.2d 150 (1990). The supreme court did not review the
decision of the court of appeals that an insured cannot hold her insurer vicariously liable for the
negligence of an attorney it has hired, because the attorney is an independent contractor. For an
analysis of this decision of the court of appeals, see Note, Brown v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Co- The Rock, the Hard Place, and the Insurance Defense Attorney, 67 N.C.L. REv. 1424 (1989).
18. Brown, 326 N.C. at 397, 390 S.E.2d at 156. Chief Justice Exum wrote the majority opinion,
which was joined by Justices Frye, Martin, and Mitchell. Justice Whichard wrote the dissent, which
was joined by Justices Meyer and Webb.
19. Id. at 393-94, 390 S.E.2d at 153-54.
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ner of payment would suffice.20 The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals
decision to interpret the provision against LMCC, and concluded that LMCC's
duty to defend the Browns did not end until there was a settlement or judg-
ment.2 1 In his opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Exum relied in part on
supporting opinions from courts in three states and one federal district that have
interpreted identical language. 22
Justice Whichard dissented, arguing that there was no ambiguity. 23 Ac-
cording to the dissent's examination of language changes in duty-to-defend pro-
visions over the past twenty-five years, the majority's interpretation amended the
disputed provision by including words that LMCC patently omitted. 24 Justice
Whichard also claimed that the majority's interpretation of the provision
"render[ed] it [the provision] meaningless surplusage," because the duty to de-
fend, if it does not end earlier, always terminates on settlement or judgment. 25
The dissent went on to distinguish the cases the majority claimed to follow, 26
and then argued that the majority's interpretation ran counter to the public pol-
icy of the state because it discouraged payments to claimants before judgment or
full settlement. 27
Because Brown decided an issue of first impression in North Carolina, it is
helpful to examine other courts' analyses of the problem. It is important, how-
ever, to distinguish cases interpreting different policy language, for the insurance
industry has changed the wording of the standard liability policy several times.
Before 1955 the defense coverage clause was separate from the liability coverage
clause, and the policy limited the insurer's duty to defend only by prefacing the
defense provision. The preface stated that the insurer would defend only suits
"'[a]s respects the insurance afforded by the other terms of this policy under
coverages A [bodily injury liability] and B [property damage liability].' "28 In
1955 the insurance industry changed the preliminary language slightly, to read:
"'With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy for bodily injury
liability and for property damage liability.' "29 The defense coverage clause and
the liability coverage clause remained separate. 30 In 1956 the drafters merged
the defense coverage clause into the liability coverage clause and changed the
20. Id. at 394, 390 S.E.2d at 154.
21. Id. Courts resolve contractual ambiguity against the drafter, in this case the insurer.
Woods v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 295 N.C. 500, 506, 246 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1978).
22. Brown, 326 N.C. at 394-96, 390 S.E.2d at 154-55 (citing Stanley v. Cobb, 624 F. Supp. 536,
537 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Samply v. Integrity Ins. Co., 476 So. 2d 79, 83 (Ala. 1985); Anderson v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 177 Ga. App. 520, 521, 339 S.E.2d 660, 661 (1986); Pareti v.
Sentry Indem. Co., 536 So. 2d 417, 420-21 (La. 1988)).
23. Id. at 397-98, 390 S.E.2d at 156 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 399, 390 S.E.2d at 157 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 400, 390 S.E.2d at 157 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 400-01, 390 S.E.2d at 158 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 402-03, 390 S.E.2d at 158-59 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
28. Van Vugt, Termination of the Insurer's Duty to Defend by Exhaustion of Policy Limits, 44
INS. CouNs. J. 254, 256 (1977) (quoting N. RiSJARD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE CASES, STANDARD PROVISIONS AND APPENDIX 2 (1964)).
29. Id. (quoting N. RISJARD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES, STAN-




language limiting the duty to defend. The revised policy provided that the in-
surer would defend only suits "'seeking damages which are payable under the
terms of this policy.' "31 In 1966 the drafters again changed the language limit-
ing the duty to defend: "'[T]he company shall not be obligated to pay any claim
or judgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the company's
liability has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.' "32 The
insurance industry effected these changes to make clear that the insurer's duty to
defend extends only as far as its duty to indemnify, and that therefore an insurer
terminates its duty to defend by paying the policy limits in any manner. 33 None-
theless, courts have been far from unanimous in rendering such an
interpretation.
The decisions construing the pre-1955 policy language are split. Some cases
focus on the restrictiveness of the preliminary language and hold that the duty to
defend is dependent on the duty to indemnify; therefore, payment of the policy
limit terminates the duty to defend.34 At least one court also based its opinion
on the anomaly of requiring an insurer with no financial interest in the outcome
of the case to defend an insured. 35 Cases holding that the duty to defend is
independent of the duty to pay, and that therefore exhaustion of coverage limits
does not terminate the duty to defend, focus on the policy language providing
that "the company shall defend any suit" and the separateness of the defense
coverage clause and the liability coverage clause.36
There is also a split in opinions interpreting the 1955 policy language.
Cases holding that exhaustion of policy limits ends the duty to defend focus on
the changed language, construing "such insurance as is afforded by this policy"
to refer to the amount of liability coverage afforded. 37 They also point out that
the limiting phrase immediately precedes the defense agreement. 38 Courts that
have interpreted the 1955 policy against the insurer have held that the duty to
31. Id. at 257 (quoting N. RISJARD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES,
STANDARD PROVISIONS AND APPENDIX 34 (1964)).
32. Id. (quoting N. RSJARD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES, STAN-
DARD PROVISIONS AND APPENDix 265 app. (1964)).
33. Id. at 256.
34. Eg., General Casualty Co. v. Whipple, 328 F.2d 353, 357 (7th Cir. 1964) (applying Illinois
law); Denham v. La Salle-Madison Hotel Co., 168 F.2d 576, 584 (7th Cir.) (same), cerL denied, 335
U.S. 871 (1948); see supra text accompanying note 28.
35. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. McCarthy, 90 N.H. 320, 323, 8 A.2d 750, 752 (1939).
36. E-g., American Casualty Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322, 326 (4th Cir. 1951) (applying South
Carolina law); Anchor Casualty Co. v. McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1949) (applying Texas
law); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 150 Mont. 182, 187-88, 433 P.2d 795, 798
(1967); American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 205 Misc. 1066, 1073-74,
131 N.Y.S.2d 393, 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954), appeal withdrawn, 1 A.D.2d 1008, 154 N.Y.S.2d 835
(N.Y. App. Div. 1956); see supra text accompanying note 28.
37. Eg., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Montgomery Trucking Co., 328 F. Supp. 415, 416-17 (N.D. Ga.
1971); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 866 (S.D. Ind. 1964); Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Mead Corp., 219 Ga. 6, 9, 131 S.E.2d 534, 535-36 (1963); Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 44
Ill. App. 2d 235, 255-56, 194 N.E.2d 489, 500 (1963); Sutton Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rolph, 109 N.H. 142,
144, 244 A.2d 186, 188 (1968); see supra text accompanying note 29.
38. E-g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co., 597 F. Supp. 946, 950-51 (D.D.C. 1984), vacated on
other grounds, 631 F. Supp. 34 (D.D.C. 1985) (issues rendered moot by settlement pending appeal).
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defend is independent of and broader than the duty to indemnify.3 9 At least one
case holds that the duty to defend continues after judgment or settlement;40 the
court supported its opinion by declaring the policy language ambiguous and by
turning to the state's public policy of protecting insureds. 4 1
Only one case interprets the 1956 policy. In Simmons v. Jeffords42 the
court construed the language as obligating the insurer to defend the insured until
final settlement or judgment.43 The court rejected the insurer's attempt to
tender the policy limits into court before settlement or judgment.44
The only court interpreting the post-1966 policy reached the same conclu-
sion. In Conway v. Country Casualty Insurance Co.,4 5 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the duty to defend does not end when the insurer pays the policy
limits to the claimant and that the payment does not result in a release of the
insured.46 The court underscored the unambiguous language of the policy,
which referred to "judgments or settlements;" since neither had occurred, the
insurer could not claim relief of its duty to defend.47 In a case decided five years
later by the same court, the court relieved the insurer of its duty to defend when
it paid the policy limits through judgments and settlements.48
The language variations described above are different forms of the standard
liability policy. Other cases have interpreted policies that, like the Brown policy,
do not fall into one of these categories. The policy in Gross v. Lloyds of London
Insurance Co.49 provided that exhaustion would occur by payment of judgments
or settlements "or after such limit of the Company's liability has been tendered
for settlements."' 50 The Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted the added lan-
guage as contemplating payment before judgment or settlement; the insurer
therefore could terminate its duty to defend by tendering the insured's policy
limits into court.5 1 In National Union Insurance Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 5 2
the court released the insurer from its duty to defend after it deposited the
39. Eg., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 56 Cal. App.
3d 791, 804, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47, 55 (1976) (primary insurer's duty to defend continued, but court
ordered excess carriers to reimburse primary insurer for costs beyond the policy limits); Travelers
Indem. Co. v. East, 240 So. 2d 277, 279 (Miss. 1970) ("The defense clause... is... a contractual
right of the insured, for which he is paid a premium.... ."); Prince v. Universal Underwriters Ins.
Co., 143 N.W.2d 708, 717 (N.D. 1966) ("The defendant... had a duty to defend all actions against
the plaintiff regardless of the amount involved.").
40. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 553 F. Supp. 425, 431 (E.D. Pa.
1981).
41. Id. at 429, 431.
42. 260 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
43. Id. at 642.
44. Id. at 641; see supra text accompanying note 31.
45. 92 Ill. 2d 388, 442 N.E.2d 245 (1982).
46. Id. at 395, 442 N.E.2d at 247.
47. Id. at 396, 442 N.E.2d at 248; see supra text accompanying note 32.
48. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., 118 Ill. 2d 23, 56, 514 N.E.2d 150, 165 (1987).
49. 121 Wis. 2d 78, 358 N.W.2d 266 (1984).
50. Id. at 83, 358 N.W.2d at 269.
51. Id. at 89, 358 N.W.2d at 272. The insurer could not terminate its duty to defend on this
occasion, however, because it had not highlighted the added wording in the policy or otherwise given
clear notice to the insured of the substantial change in the language. Id. at 88, 358 N.W.2d at 271.
52. 301 A.2d 222 (D.C. 1973).
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amount of the policy limit with the court because the policy stated that the duty
ended when the insurer "paid or tendered or deposited in court such part of such
judgment as does not exceed the limit of the company's liability."'5 3 The Dela-
ney v. Vardine Paratransit, Inc.54 court held that use of the language "[o]ur
payment of liability insurance limit ends our duty to defend or settle" did not
release the insurer of its duty to defend when it paid the policy limits directly to
the claimant who had sued the insured. 55 In Batdorf v. Transamerica Title In-
surance Co.,56 the court released the insurer from its duty to defend after it paid
its insureds the policy limits. The Batdorf policy contained perhaps the most
explicit language interpreted by a court so far:
The Company shall have the right to... defend the insured...
reserving however, the option at any time of settling the claim or pay-
ing the amount of this policy in full.
The Company may at any time pay this policy in full, whereupon
all liability of the Company shall terminate .... The liability of the
Company shall in no case exceed the actual loss of the insured and
costs which the Company is obligated to pay.57
All courts interpreting the Brown wording, which is the post-1966 language
without the last six words, "by payments of judgments or settlements," have
reached the conclusion the Brown court did: only exhaustion of policy limits by
way of judgment or settlement extinguishes the insurer's duty to defend. The
Stanley v. Cobb s5 court read the "[w]e will settle or defend" language as provid-
ing the only two options for exhaustion. 59 The courts in Stanley, Samply v.
Integrity Insurance Co.6t and Anderson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.61 rejected the claim that an insurer's duty to defend ends when it pays the
policy limits into court. The court in Pareti v. Sentry Indemnity Co.62 released
the insurer from its duty to defend because a good-faith settlement had ex-
hausted the policy limits. 63
This overview of cases shows that the issue in Brown concerns not one but
two questions. First, does exhaustion of liability limits terminate the duty to
defend? If not, the insurer is obligated to defend the insured until the very
end-that is, until resolution of all claimants' actions and conclusion of all ap-
peals. Very few courts have reached this conclusion; those that have were inter-
53. Id. at 224-25. Another court reached the same conclusion when an insurer using almost
identical policy language tendered its policy limits into court in an interpleader action. See Com-
mercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 866 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
54. 132 Misc. 2d 397, 504 N.Y.S.2d 70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
55. Id. at 398, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
56. 41 Wash. App. 254, 702 P.2d 1211 (1985).
57. Id. at 256-57, 702 P.2d at 1212-13.
58. 624 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
59. Id. at 537.
60. 476 So. 2d 79, 83-84 (Ala. 1985).
61. 177 Ga. App. 520, 522, 339 S.E.2d 660, 661 (1986).
62. 536 So. 2d 417 (La. 1988).
63. Id. at 424.
1991] 1665
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
preting pre-1966 policy language.64 Second, if exhaustion does terminate the
duty to defend, what form of exhaustion suffices? The Brown court, following
the majority trend, held that only exhaustion through settlement or judgment
suffices. 65 Other courts have approved exhaustion by way of the insurer's
tendering the policy limits into court or to the insured.66 Notably, no court has
held that LMCC's method of exhaustion, tendering the coverage limits to the
claimant, terminates the duty to defend.67
Against this backdrop it is easier to understand the ambiguity dispute in
Brown. The majority and dissent agreed on the answer to the first question: the
Brown policy language explicitly declares that exhaustion of liability limits ter-
minates the duty to defend. All the justices conceded that the insurer is not
obligated to pay for an appeal.68 They disagreed, however, on the second ques-
64. Eg., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 553 F. Supp. 425, 430-31
(E.D. Pa. 1981); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 56 Cal.
App. 3d 791, 804, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47, 55 (1976); Travelers Indem. Co. v. East, 240 So. 2d 277, 280
(Miss. 1970); American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 205 Misc. 1066, 1073,
131 N.Y.S.2d 393, 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954), appeal withdrawn, 1 A.D.2d 1008, 154 N.Y.S.2d 835
(N.Y. App. Div. 1956).
65. Although LMCC did not make the argument, an insurer might label payment to a plaintiff
in partial satisfaction of his claim against the insured a "partial settlement" and contend that it has
met the Brown requirement that exhaustion occur through judgment or settlement. A commentator
from the insurance industry rejects this proposition:
The better reasoning would seem to support the view that an agreement whereby the
insurer tenders its policy limits to a single claimant in exchange for a partial release of his
claim against the insured is not in fact a "settlement" but merely establishes a credit
against the insured's ultimate liability, and therefore a payment of policy limits pursuant to
such an agreement would not terminate the duty to defend.
Van Vugt, supra note 28, at 264 (the author bases his position on a reading of the post-1966
standard liability policy, not the Brown policy).
66. E.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 866 (S.D. Ind. 1964) (in-
surer's duty to defend ended when it tendered policy limits unconditionally into court in an inter-
pleader action); National Union Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 301 A.2d 222, 225 (D.C. 1973)
(duty to defend ended when insurer paid amount of policy limits into court); Batdorf v. Transamer-
ica Title Ins. Co., 41 Wash. App. 254, 258, 702 P.2d 1211, 1213 (1985) (court relieved insurer of
duty to defend when it paid insureds the amount of liability coverage).
67. At least two courts have rejected this form of exhaustion. In Conway v. Country Casualty
Insurance Co., the insurer paid the claimant with the insured's consent, but she released neither the
insurer nor the insured. 92 Ill. 2d 388, 395, 442 N.E.2d 245, 247 (1982). In rejecting the insurer's
claim that payment of the policy limit terminated its duty to defend the insured, the Illinois Supreme
Court relied on state law holding that the duty to defend is not dependent on the duty to indemnify,
but instead arises from the insurance contract. Id. at 394, 442 N.E.2d at 247. Because the policy
expressly provided that the insurer could terminate its duty to defend by paying the policy limits in
"any judgments or settlements," and there was neither a judgment nor a settlement, the court held
that the insurer did not terminate its duty to defend. Id. at 396, 442 N.E.2d at 248; see supra notes
45-47 and accompanying text.
In Delaney v. Vardine Paratransit, Inc-, the insurer "unilaterally, paid its policy limit of $5,000
to plaintiffs without regard to settlement of the litigation or any further exposure of its insured." 132
Misc. 2d 397, 398, 504 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986). The New York Supreme Court,
holding that the insurer had not terminated its duty to defend, relied on a state regulation that
mandates certain provisions for automobile liability insurance policies. The regulation states: "The
amounts so incurred under this subdivision, except settlement of claims and suits, shall be payable by
the company in addition to the applicable policy limits." N.Y. COMP. CODas R. & REuS. tit. 11,
§ 60.1(b) (1985). The court held that the regulation "clearly anticipates that the insurer may not
unilaterally avoid payment of defense costs and related expenses by the ex parte payment of the
limits of its policy." Delaney, 132 Misc. 2d at 398, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 71; see supra note 54 and
accompanying text.
68. Because the issue was not before the court, it is not clear how many justices would find that
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tion. The majority found the Brown language ambiguous because it is unclear
what form of exhaustion terminates the duty to defend.69 The dissent claimed
that there is no ambiguity: "[T]he only reasonable interpretation is that by pay-
ing its full policy limits to the party injured by its insured, defendant 'exhausted'
its limit of liability and ended its duty to settle or defend."'70
The North Carolina Supreme Court is the first court to base its interpreta-
tion of the Brown policy language on a finding of ambiguity. Four other courts
interpreting the same language have reached holdings consistent with Brown,
but none found ambiguity. The Stanley7 1 and Anderson 72 courts held that the
language is not ambiguous: it clearly requires exhaustion through settlement or
judgment. The Samply court did not mention the ambiguity issue.73 The Pareti
court held that an insurer may terminate its defense obligations under the ex-
press terms of the policy by entering into a good-faith settlement for the policy
limits. 74 The Pareti court found no ambiguity because there was a settlement,
but had there been a tender of policy limits the same language arguably would
have been ambiguous. 75
The vulnerability of the ambiguity argument is indicated to some extent by
the justices' votes: although there was only one dissenter among all the judges
deciding Samply, Stanley, Pareti, and Anderson, Brown is a four-three decision.
Ambiguity is a vulnerable basis because it is largely a question of fact, not of
law. For example, the majority cited several cases holding that a difference in
the parties' interpretations is a factor going toward a finding of ambiguity,
although such a conflict is not dispositive.76 "A difference of judicial opinion
regarding proper construction of policy language" is also some evidence that the
provision is ambiguous. 77 Arguably the potential for judges changing their
minds is higher with such a fact-based inquiry than it is with a more law-based
analysis.
the duty to defend ends when there is a judgment or settlement with only one of several claimants.
Nor is it possible to know how many justices would find that the insurer has a continuing duty to
defend the insured in a codefendant's suit for contribution or indemnification. At least one commen-
tator declares it "well settled" that the duty to defend does not continue in these two situations. Van
Vugt, supra note 28, at 263.
69. Brown, 326 N.C. at 394, 390 S.E.2d at 154.
70. Id. at 398, 390 S.E.2d at 156 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
71. Stanley v. Cobb, 624 F. Supp. 536, 537 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
72. Anderson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 177 Ga. App. 520, 521, 339 S.E.2d 660,
661 (1986).
73. Samply v. Integrity Ins. Co., 476 So. 2d 79, 81-83 (Ala. 1985).
74. Pareti v. Sentry Indem. Co., 536 So. 2d 417,423 (La. 1988). The court went on to state that
the insurer must "make every effort to avoid prejudicing the insured by the timing of its withdrawal
from litigation," and "make allowances for the time that the insured will need to retain new counsel,
and should continue to represent the insured after the settlement, if necessary, until new counsel can
be retained." Id.
75. Id. at 421 n.3.
76. Brown, 326 N.C. at 392, 390 S.E.2d at 153 (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Freeman-White Assoc., 322 N.C. 77, 83, 366 S.E.2d 480, 484 (1988); Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins.
Co., 311 N.C. 621, 630, 319 S.E.2d 217, 223 (1984); Trust Co. v. Insurance Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354,
172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970)).
77. Id. (citing Maddox v. Insurance Co., 303 N.C. 648, 654, 280 S.E.2d 907, 910 (1981); Elec-
tric Co. v. Insurance Co., 229 N.C. 518, 521, 50 S.E.2d 295, 297 (1948); Annotation, Insurance-
Ambiguity-Split Court Opinions, 4 A.L.R.4TH 1253, 1255 (1981)).
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The decision would have had the same effect, yet stood on firmer ground,
had the court based it on the reasonable interpretation that "[o]ur duty to settle
or defend" unambiguously defines the only two methods of exhaustion.78 This
also would have given the North Carolina insurance industry clearer guidelines
for changing the policy language. Such a holding would have told insurers that
they need to erase "to settle or defend" from their policies. As the decision
stands, it tells insurers only that the Brown policy language is ambiguous; it does
not tell them how to remove the ambiguity to attain the effects they seek.
Although the dissent criticized the majority's claim of ambiguity, its attack
is weak in that it relies on Pareti, Stanley, and Anderson, cases whose holdings
are consistent with Brown. The dissent flip-flopped by turning to these cases to
support the argument that the policy language is unambiguous, 79 and then dis-
tinguishing their holdings by claiming a significant factual difference.80
The dissenters argued that an insurer necessarily exhausts policy limits by
tendering the amount to a claimant, as in Brown, because it will not get the
money back.81 In contrast, by tendering the amount into court, as in Anderson,
Samply, and Stanley, the insurer will recover the sum if it makes the tender
conditional on the insured being found liable and the insured is then found not
liable.8 2 The weakness of this argument is that it considers only the claimant
and ignores the insured, to whom, after all, the defense is of value. Professor
Appleman asserts:
[T]he insurer's duty is both to defend actions and to pay judgment
against the insured. Otherwise, where the damages exceed the policy
coverage, the insurer could walk into court, toss the amount of the
policy on the table, and blithely inform the insured that the rest was up
to him. This would obviously constitute a breach of the insurer's con-
tract to defend actions against the insured, for which premiums had
been paid, and should not be tolerated by the courts.8 3
Although it was an insurer's attempt to tender policy limits into court that
prompted the Simmons court to declare that "a most significant protection af-
forded by the policy-that of defense-is rendered a near nullity,"'84 the same
concern applies when the insurer pays the amount directly to the claimant.
To distinguish further the tendering of policy limits into court and to the
claimant, the dissent argued that Brown runs counter to the North Carolina
78. This was the basis for the decisions in Stanley and Anderson. Stanley v. Cobb, 624 F. Supp.
536, 537 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Anderson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 177 Ga. App. 520, 521,
339 S.E.2d 660, 661 (1986). Nonetheless, the majority's finding of ambiguity is defensible. For a
recitation of the court's chief argument that the method of exhaustion is ambiguous, see infra text
accompanying note 94 (listing various methods LMCC may have intended).
79. Brown, 326 N.C. at 397-98, 390 S.E.2d at 156 (whichard, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 400-01, 390 S.E.2d at 158 (Whichard, J., dissenting). Opinions from other courts
seem to indicate that the factual distinction does not support the dissent's argument, but cuts against
it. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
81. Brown, 326 N.C. at 401, 390 S.E.2d at 158 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Whichard, J., dissenting).
83. 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRAcriCE § 4685, at 21-22 (1942).
84. Simmons v. Jeffords, 260 F. Supp. 641, 642 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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public policy that encourages insurers to make advance partial payments to
claimants before final settlements.85 Although Brown does not further en-
courage partial payments to claimants, neither does it discourage such pay-
ments, as the dissent contends. Section 1-540.3(a) still encourages insurers to
make partial payments by declaring that the payments do not constitute an ad-
mission of liability by either the insured or the insurer;86 Brown's only effect is
that the payments will not relieve the insurer of its duty to defend the insured.
Moreover, the dissent's policy argument ignores the state's countervailing public
policy, which is to give effect to all parts of a contract, 7 including the " 'signifi-
cant protection... of defense.' s88
Another argument of the dissent is that the majority's interpretation
amends the disputed provision to include words that LMCC patently omitted.8 9
The Brown policy lacks language that the post-1966 policy contained: "ITihe
company shall not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to defend any
suit after the applicable limit of the company's liability has been exhausted by
payment of judgments or settlements." 90 Because "[t]he language specifying
means of exhaustion of policy limits is patently absent in the contract at issue
here," Justice Whichard argued that the court should have given effect to the
drafters' clear intent to leave limitless the forms of exhaustion that end the in-
surer's duty to defend.9 1 Although the argument is attractive in theory, it does
not defeat the majority's finding of ambiguity. That is, whether or not the omis-
sion of "by payments of judgments or settlements" is purposeful, the court must
resolve the ambiguous result against the drafter.
Even without a finding of ambiguity, the dissent's argument is unpersuasive
because the language leaves the insured unwarned. 92 It is unlikely that there are
many insureds who, on reading the Brown proviso, contemplate the multiple
avenues of escape open to the insurer:9 3 paying the policy limits into court and
85. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-540.3(a) (1983) (allowing for partial payments before settlement).
86. Id.
87. Brown, 326 N.C. at 393, 390 S.E.2d at 153 (citing Bolton Corp. v. T.A. Loving Co., 317
N.C. 623, 628, 347 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1986)).
88. Id. at 396-97, 390 S.E.2d at 155 (quoting Simmons v. Jeffords, 260 F. Supp. 641, 642 (E.D.
Pa. 1966)).
89. Id. at 399, 390 S.E.2d at 157 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
90. Van Vugt, supra note 28, at 257 (emphasis added) (quoting N. RISJARD & J. AUSTIN,
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES, STANDARD PROVISIONS AND APPENDIX 265 app.
(1964)).
91. Brown, 326 N.C. at 399, 390 S.E.2d at 157 (Whichard, J., dissenting). The dissent also
argued that the majority's interpretation of the disputed language renders it "meaningless surplus-
age," because the duty to defend, if it does not end earlier, always terminates on settlement or
judgment. Id. at 400, 390 S.E.2d at 157 (Whichard, J., dissenting). The argument fails, however, for
the provision tells the insured that the insurer will not pay to appeal the case once there is a judg-
ment. Although the Brown court did not decide the issue, the provision may also inform the insured
that the duty to defend stops on judgment or settlement in other situations in which the insured
continues to need a defense. See supra note 68.
92. See Kosce v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 159 N.J. Super. 340, 345-46, 387 A.2d 1259, 1262
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) ("When construing language covering an obligation such as the duty to
defend the insured, the court must look to the reasonable expectations of the insured.").
93. See id. at 346, 387 A.2d at 1262 ("We are dealing with language in a long, detailed insur-
ance policy which an insured would find difficult to understand even after painstaking study.").
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interpleading conflicting claimants, paying the limits to one of several claimants
in exchange for a settlement of that one claim against the insured, paying the
limits in full or partial satisfaction of a judgment against the insured, advancing
the amount to the insured without investigating available defenses, or paying the
limits to the claimant in return for a release of the insurer but not the insured.94
When courts have approved termination of the duty to defend on unilateral
tender of policy limits, they have had before them much more explicit policy
language. Unlike the Brown policy, the policies in Gross,95 National Union,96
Batdorf,97 and Commercial Union 98 did not leave the term "exhausted" unde-
fined. Although by specifying the means of exhaustion an insurer may be faced
with a form of exhaustion it did not contemplate, this route is the only fair one
for insureds. To leave the forms of exhaustion limitless is to take advantage of
the insured, who is not alerted to the issue without some affirmative language in
the contract defining "exhaustion." Moreover, the insurer is the party in the
best position to raise and clarify the issue.
Even assuming that an insured reading the policy language used in Brown
understands that the insurer readily can escape the duty to defend, such a con-
tract may be void as against public policy. Even those in the insurance industry
concede that "an insurer cannot unilaterally pay money and walk away." 99 One
industry article states:
[E]ven in jurisdictions that have.., held that an insurer can terminate
its defense obligation by paying the maximum amount of coverage
specified by the policy, it has been widely accepted that the insurer
cannot avoid its obligation to defend against an insured's contingent
liability by early payment of the policy limits without effectuating a
settlement or without obtaining the permission of the insured. 100
Professor Long agrees. He writes that the duty to defend should not end on
exhaustion of the policy limit when the result would prejudice the insured.'01
He argues that an insurer should not be allowed to pay the policy limit to its
insured and thereby leave the insured to fend for himself, because this is an
unjustified attempt by the insurer to free itself from its contractual duty to
defend. 102
The duty-to-defend provision is a way to prevent an insurer from aban-
doning its insured by paying its policy limits into court or to the claimant, leav-
94. Brown, 326 N.C. at 394, 390 S.E.2d at 154. Of course, these options are not available to the
insurer if a court declares them against public policy or if the insurer discharges them in bad faith.
95. Gross v. Lloyds of London Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 78, 83, 358 N.W.2d 266, 269 (1984).
96. National Union Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 301 A.2d 222, 224-25 (D.C. 1973).
97. Batdorfv. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 41 Wash. App. 254, 256-57, 702 P.2d 1211, 1212-13
(1985).
98. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 865 (S.D. Ind. 1964); see supra
note 53.
99. Zulkey, When Can and How Does an Insurer Properly Exhaust Its Limits?, 56 DEF. COUNS.
J. 202, 205 (1989).
100. Zulkey & Pollard, supra note 2, at 23.
101. R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 5-25, at 5-179 (1990).
102. Id. § 5.26, at 5-184.
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ing the insured with litigation and possible appeals.'10 3 If an insurer can do this
by specifically declaring in the policy its right to this option, the insurer is
merely putting the insured on notice that he is obtaining a valueless contractual
right. 1 4
If an insurer wishes to escape its duty to defend when it believes liability
will exceed the policy limit, it should make the contract language unequivocal.
The following suggestion puts the insured on notice by spelling out the forms of
exhaustion without limiting them:
Our duty to settle or defend ends when our liability for this cover-
age has been exhausted. Coverage may be exhausted in any manner,
including but not limited to the following methods of payment by the
Company: to the insured if she consents; to a claimant or claimants in
full or partial satisfaction of a settlement of the claimant's or claim-
ants' actions against the insured; to a claimant or claimants in full or
partial satisfaction of a judgment against the insured; to a claimant or
claimants in return for a release of the Company, whether or not the
insured is also released; to the court when there are conflicting claim-
ants and the Company wishes to interplead.
Unlike the Brown policy, this language is not ambiguous. Moreover, it noti-
fies the insured that the duty to defend can terminate quickly. Although this
Note argues that such a provision is void as against public policy, only the
courts can make such a decision.10 5 Certainly an insurer can defend its contract
more forcefully when it has used explicit language and can argue that it has
acted in good faith 10 6 by making every effort to avoid prejudicing the rights of
its insured. Because the LMCC'policy language was not explicit, leaving the
Browns without warning that LMCC's duty to defend them could end so
quickly, the Brown court correctly decided to construe the ambiguous language
against the defendant. The only mistake the court made was resting its opinion
on so vulnerable a basis as ambiguity.
CHRISTINE J. WICHERS
103. 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 83, § 4682, at 36 (1979).
104. It was not the intent of the drafters of the 1966 and earlier policies to give the insured a
valueless right. According to several representatives of the insurance industry, the purpose of the
1966 addition of"by payments ofjudgments or settlements" was merely to clarify the defense cover-
age clause, not to change its substance. Van Vugt, supra note 28, at 263. Therefore, "it could be
persuasively argued that under all forms of the standard liability policy exhaustion of policy limits
can occur only by payment of judgments or settlements." Id. If this is indeed the intent of the
drafters, then they always have meant for the insured to obtain something of value. Of course, the
argument on the other side is what the dissent in Brown asserted: that the drafters of the Brown
policy, which omits the language added in 1966, did not intend to limit exhaustion to settlement or
judgment. Brown, 326 N.C. at 399, 390 S.E.2d at 157 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
105. Moreover, there is significant support for the position that when the contract makes the
option clear, payment of coverage limits into court is not against public policy. Several courts have
upheld this form of exhaustion. Eg., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 866
(S.D. Ind. 1964); National Union Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 301 A.2d 222,225 (D.C. 1973);
Batdorf v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 41 Wash. App. 254, 702 P.2d 1211, 1213 (1985).
106. For an argument that insurers can exhaust policy limits in all cases with multiple claimants
by interpleading, so long as they do so in good faith, see Zulkey, supra note 99, at 204-05.
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Divorcing Public Policy from Economic Reality: The Fourth
Circuit's Copyright Misuse Doctrine in Lasercomb
America, Inc. v. Reynolds
For much of this century the United States Supreme Court has considered
the grant of a patent1 to be a public benefit that its owner may not misuse.
Doing so deprives the patentee of the right to enforce an infringement claim. 2 A
debate exists among lower federal courts and commentators, however, regarding
the type of conduct sufficiently abusive to constitute misuse. Must the patentee
use the patent to violate the antitrust laws? 3 Or must the patentee merely extend
the scope of the patent beyond the statute's permissible bounds, an act the courts
consider contrary to public policy?4 In like fashion, lower courts and commen-
1. A patent is a statutory grant that offers the patentee the exclusive right to make, use, or sell
his invention for 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). Under the Patent Act, the law considers the
patent to be personal property. Id. § 261. The grant of a patent primarily benefits society: by
offering the patentee a limited monopoly in exchange for an early disclosure of his invention, society
gains the benefit of knowledge that might otherwise be shrouded from view as a trade secret. See
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981); 8 E. LIPSCOMB, LIPSCOMB's
WALKER ON PATENTS § 28:2 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter WALKER ON PATENis]. For further con-
sideration of the patent law's procompetitive policy, see infra note 149.
Inventors seeking to patent their inventions must meet several statutory requirements. The
threshold requirement is that the invention be useful. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The patent laws also
require "novelty"-the inventor must be the first to invent or discover the device. Id. § 102(g). The
law charges the inventor with constructive knowledge of all prior references to relevant technologi-
cal developments. Id. § 102(a). If another discovery "anticipated" the invention, no patent will
issue. Thus, to be patentable the invention must be sufficiently new and different from what came
before it; or in the argot of the Patent Act, the invention must be "nonobvious." Id. § 103. The
Patent Office requires an applicant to demonstrate that her invention meets all requirements and
carefully scrutinizes each invention before issuing a patent. The Patent Act also establishes proce-
dures for the mediation of competing claims. See id. §§ 131-35, 141-46. For the statutory require-
ments for a valid copyright see infra note 6.
2. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488,494(1942); Carbice Corp. v. Amedcan
Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,
243 U.S. 502, 518-19 (1917).
3. See USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Since the
antitrust laws as currently interpreted reach every practice that could impair competition substan-
tially, it is not easy to define a separate role for a doctrine also designed to prevent an anticompetitive
practice-the abuse of a patent monopoly."); G.S. Suppiger Co. v. Morton Salt Co., 117 F.2d 968,
970 (7th Cir. 1941) ("[A] patentee is not handicapped in his commercial transactions because he
owns a patent. What he could lawfully do before he acquired the patent, he may lawfully do after
acquirement."), rev'd, 314 U.S. 488 (1942); see also 4 D. CHisUM, PATENTS § 19.04[2] (1990)
("mhe misuse doctrine presents greater analytical problems than antitrust analysis ... [which]
involves a balancing of patent interests and the impact or likely impact of a practice on competition.
The misuse doctrine compounds the difficulty of balancing by substituting for competitive injury the
vague notion of 'extension.' ").
The Patent Act recognizes patent misuse, but only a narrow field of patentee conduct rises to
the level of an antitrust violation to constitute misuse. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1988), quoted
infra at note 76. In the converse situation, where a patentee is charged with violating the antitrust
laws, the Patent Act states that nothing in the patent laws "shall be deemed to convey to any person
immunity from civil or criminal liability, or to create any defenses to actions, under any antitrust
law." Id. § 211.
4. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494; Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d
225, 231 (7th Cir. 1972) ("The policy underlying the misuse doctrine is designed to prevent a paten-
tee from projecting the economic effect of his admittedly valid grant beyond the limits of his legal
monopoly."); see Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REv. 175, 178-
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tators5 have differed over whether these same principles should apply to another
limited monopoly, the copyright.6 The Supreme Court has implied that copy-
right misuse might be a valid defense,7 but it has not suggested what types of
misbehavior will bar an infringement claim.
In Lasercomb America, Ina v. Reynolds8 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit became the first appellate court expressly to sanc-
tion copyright misuse as an infringement defense and to hold that such misuse
barred the plaintiff's action.9 The Fourth Circuit refused to import antitrust
requirements into the misuse doctrine; instead, the copyright holder's anticom-
petitive behavior towards a third party was deemed sufficiently contrary to pub-
92 (1988). One North Carolina jurist conjured up this colorful simile to describe patent misuse:
"Like Aesop's dog, he seeks to take in too much, and must lose what he already had." Dubuit v.
Harwell Enters., 336 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (McMillan, J.).
5. See, eg., Fine, Misuse and Antitrust Defenses to Copyright Infringement Actions, 17 HAS-
TINGS LJ. 315, 330-36 (1965); Gibbs, Copyright Misuse: Thirty Years Waiting for the Other Shoe, 23
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 31, 37-57 (1977); Note, Redefining Copyright Misuse, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 1291, 1310-14 (1981).
6. Like patents, copyrights offer rewards to individuals as an inducement to generate an in-
creased number of unique expressions that benefit the general public. Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 431-32 (1984). Despite the theoretical similarities, however, copyrights differ
in practical ways from patents.
A copyright is a limited monopoly granted to a work satisfying two criteria: The work must be
"original" in that it is the independent effort of the author seeking the copyright, and the work must
be fixed in a tangible medium. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). For works created on or after January 1,
1978 the copyright endures for the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death. Id.
§ 302(a). The copyright grants certain exclusive rights in the protected work, including the right to
reproduce the work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies to the public (by sale, rental, lease,
or lending), and perform or display the work publicly. Id. § 106. Protection from unauthorized
copying extends only to the particular expressions originating with the author; it does not protect the
ideas that are part of the copyrighted work. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b).
There are two significant exceptions to a copyright grantee's claim of exclusivity. Unlike pat-
ents, the grantee need not be the first to create the unique expression. The alleged infringer's in-
dependent creation of an identical work is a defense to an infringement action. Mazer, 347 U.S. at
218. In addition, the Copyright Act provides that the unauthorized copying done pursuant to a "fair
use," typically for nonprofit educational purposes, is not an infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
No analogous provision exists in patent law.
Finally, the standards for securing a copyright are far less severe than are patent standards, and
copyrights are not subject to rigorous evaluations. For a useful comparison of the levels of protec-
tion afforded by patents and copyrights, see Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d
99, 100-04 (2d Cir. 1951). See supra note 1 for a discussion of the practical and theoretical underpin-
nings of a patent.
7. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 6 & n.9 (1979). For a
discussion of CBS see infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
8. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). Lasercomb chose not to petition for certiorari because it felt
the added cost of litigation was not justified because "Interact," Lasercomb's copyrighted software
program, had become obsolete and because Lasercomb "purged" its misuse by discontinuing the use
of the noncompete clause in its standard licensing agreement. Telephone interview with Lee Brom-
berg, counsel for Lasercomb America, Inc. (Jan. 21, 1991). For a discussion of how a grantee may
purge its misuse see infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
9. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979. In 1948 one district court did deny the plaintiff-copyright
holder's action to enjoin infringement on the grounds that the plaintiff used its copyright to gain
monopolistic domination over musical compositions and therefore exceeded the privileges protected
under the copyright laws. M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 849-50 (D. Minn. 1948),
appeal dismissed sub nom. M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir.
1949). For a discussion of Jensen see infra notes 84-93 & 166-69 and accompanying texts.
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lic policy to deny relief.' 0
This Note traces the development of equitable defenses in the field of lim-
ited monopolies, from the origin of the "unclean hands" doctrine through the
parallel evolutions of patent and copyright misuse. It explores the underlying
policy justifications for granting limited monopolies and compares the varying
amounts of protection afforded to grantees. The Note examines the role that
antitrust principles have played in the misuse doctrine and concludes that the
Fourth Circuit incorrectly rejected those principles as a foundation for copyright
misuse. The Note maintains that the Fourth Circuit's embrace of the "public
policy" rationale creates a standard too ambiguous to guide those who seek to
exploit their property rights without losing the protection of the law.
Lasercomb America, Inc. created a computer software program called "In-
teract," which companies use to design and manufacture steel rule dies for the
paper box and carton industries.'1 Lasercomb also manufactures steel rule dies,
as did its competitor, Holiday Steel Rule Die Corporation. 12 In 1983, before it
was ready to put its software on the market, Lasercomb licensed four prerelease
copies of Interact to Holiday Steel under an oral agreement. 13 Each Interact
copy contained a "chronoguard," an antitheft device that allowed Interact to
work only on those machines to which it was attached. 14 Larry Holliday, Holi-
day Steel's president and sole shareholder, ordered his computer programmer,
Job Reynolds, to remove the chronoguards and to make three copies of Inter-
act. 15 Holiday Steel then began marketing a CAD/CAM program called PDS-
1000, which essentially was Interact under a new name. 16
Once Lasercomb discovered what Holiday Steel had done, it registered the
copyright 17 for Interact and sued for copyright infringement. 18 Defendants
10. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979. For a discussion of violations of the antitrust laws, see infra
note 113.
11. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 971. Companies use Interact for CAD/CAM (computer assisted
design and computer assisted manufacture). Id. at n.2. Interact permits a box designer to create a
"box blank"-a flat paperboard sheet that is cut so that it may be folded into a box, An Interact-
controlled computer stores information about the prototype box blank, and a die maker can use that
information to control the manufacture of a steel rule die. The die then stamps out quantities of box
blanks. Opening Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Lasercomb (No. 89-3245).
12. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 971.
13. Although Lasercomb had asked Holiday Steel to sign its standard licensing agreement,
Holiday Steel never signed, and Lasercomb never demanded compliance. Id. at 973. Later, how-
ever, Holiday admitted in a letter that an oral agreement with Lasercomb bound Holiday Steel. Id.
at 973 n.7. Lasercomb charged Holiday Steel $35,000 for the first copy, $17,500 for the next two,
and $2,000 for the fourth copy. Id. at 971.
14. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 14, Lasercomb (No. 89-3245).
15. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 971.
16. Id.
17. Registering the work with the Copyright Office is a prerequisite for filing an infringement
action. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1988). For works published before March 1, 1989 the author has five years
from the date of publication to register the work to preserve the copyright. Id. § 405(a). The
Copyright Act protects computer software as a "literary work," defined as "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."
Id. § 101. The Act limits the grantee's exclusive rights by permitting certain noninfringing uses.
For example, the owner of a copy of a computer program may make another copy freely, if the new
copy "is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine" or "is for archival purposes only." Id. § 117.
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Holiday Steel, Holiday, and Reynolds claimed that Lasercomb misused its
copyright because of anticompetitive clauses in Lasercomb's standard licensing
contract, clauses that restricted a licensee from creating its own computer-as-
sisted die-making software. 19 The district court rejected the copyright misuse
defense for three reasons. First, although another Interact licensee was bound
by the anticompetitive clauses, the defendants had not explicitly agreed to them,
and therefore had not suffered from the misuse.20 Second, the clause was " 'rea-
sonable in light of the delicate and sensitive area of computer software.' ",21 Fi-
nally, the court doubted whether such a defense existed as a matter of law.2 2
The trial court found the three defendants jointly and severally liable for actual
damages on both the copyright infringement and fraud claims, awarded punitive
damages against Holliday and Reynolds on the fraud claim, and permanently
enjoined all defendants from making or selling PDS-1000. 2 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
injunction and the damage award for copyright infringement, 24 affirmed the trial
court's finding of fraud,25 and remanded the case to the district court for recal-
culation of the damages.26 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that
18. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 972. Lasercomb also claimed breach of contract and fraud. Id.
The trial court dismissed Lasercomb's claims for misappropriation of trade secret, false designation
of origin, and unfair competition because the Copyright Act preempted them. Id.
19. Id. The clauses at issue in the Lasercomb licensing agreement read:
D. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement that it will not permit or suffer its
directors, officers and employees, directly or indirectly, to write, develop, produce or
sell computer assisted die making software.
E. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement and for one (1) year after the termi-
nation of this Agreement, that it will not write, develop, produce or sell or assist others
in the writing, developing, producing or selling computer assisted die making software,
directly or indirectly without Lasercomb's prior written consent. Any such activity
undertaken without Lasercomb's written consent shall nullify any warranties or agree-
ments of Lasercomb set forth herein.
Id. at 973. The term of the licensing agreement was for 99 years. Id.
20. Id. Holiday Steel never signed the standard licensing agreement but was bound under an
oral contract. See supra note 13.
21. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973 (quoting the trial court's findings).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 972. The trial court found that "'the evidence at trial clearly disclosed not only
defendants' liability as copyright infringers, it also indicated their culpability... [as] malicious in-
fringers who acted with full knowledge of and gross disregard to plaintiff's right.'" Brief of Plain-
tiff-Appellee at 5-6 (quoting trial court's findings) (emphasis in Brief). Following the judgment
against it, Holiday Steel went bankrupt and the bankrupt estate stipulated it would not appeal. Id.
at 3 n.2.
24. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979.
25. Id. at 980.
26. Id. The trial court found that Lasercomb had suffered damages of $105,000 from the in-
fringement and another $105,000 from the fraud. The damages arose, however, from lost sales of the
same copies of Interact; Lasercomb, therefore, could not recover twice. Id. at 972 n.3. The court
based the $105,000 damages amount on Interact's sale price of $35,000 to first-time buyers, multi-
plied by three---the number of unauthorized copies defendants made of Interact. Id. at 980. The
Fourth Circuit, in contrast, noted that it could only measure damages by lost sales to Holiday Steel,
which was receiving a discount for additional purchases of Interact. Id. at 981. It was up to the
district court on remand to decide whether the defendants' fraudulent activities induced Lasercomb
to discount its price. Id.
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the copyright misuse defense was far from being a settled area of the law,27 but
considered the defense to be "inherent in the law of copyright." 28
The touchstone of the court's analysis was the body of patent law that pro-
duced the patent misuse defense and the parallel public policies behind patent
and copyright law. After discussing the seventeenth century English Crown's
practice of granting limited monopolies, 29 the court found that the Federal Con-
stitution's grouping of patent and copyright into the same clause reflected "a
unitary purpose-to promote progress."'30 The court then examined a seminal
patent misuse case, Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 31 and found that its
"phraseology adapts easily to the copyright context."' 32 The result of that easy
adaptation is that public policy excludes from protection all that is not embraced
by the copyright and forbids the use of a copyright to secure rights not granted
by the Copyright Office.
33
The Lasercomb panel next considered whether copyright misuse depends
on antitrust principles. The trial court deemed Lasercomb's noncompete clause
to be "reasonable," a notion that the Fourth Circuit assumed was derived from
the antitrust concept of the "rule of reason."' 34 While stating that an antitrust
27. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's discomfort with the apparent lack of certainty
surrounding the copyright misuse doctrine, see infra note 144.
28. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973.
29. Id. at 974.
30. Id. at 975. The Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power... [t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, c. 8.
The Supreme Court has noted the "historic kinship between patent law and copyright law," but
also has warned that "[t]he two areas of the law, naturally, are not identical twins, and we exercise
the caution which we have expressed in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one area to the
other." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 & n.19. (1984). Despite that
warning, however, the Court in Sony Corp. readily applied the doctrine of contributory infringement
to copyrights. The Court noted that the Patent Act expressly defines this concept but the Copyright
Act does not. Id. at 434-35. Such a doctrine, the Court concluded, was necessary to provide "effec-
tive ... protection of the statutory monopoly" when a defendant sells copying equipment that is
capable only of substantial infringing uses. Id. at 442. The Court found that, although the general
public was using video recorders sold by Sony to tape the plaintiffs' copyrighted motion pictures,
Sony was not liable for contributory infringement because its video recorders were also capable of
substantial noninfringing uses. Id. at 456.
31. 314 U.S. 488 (1942). The Fourth Circuit noted that although Morton Salt was not the first
Supreme Court case to recognize the patent misuse defense, it is generally considered the "founda-
tional" case. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976. For a discussion of Morton Salt, see infra notes 49-68 and
accompanying text.
32. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977. The Fourth Circuit quoted a passage from Morton Salt and
replaced patent terms and phrases with those applicable to copyright. The Fourth Circuit thus
found:
"The grant to the [author] of the special privilege of a [copyright] carries out a public
policy adopted by the Constitution and laws of the United States, 'to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to [Authors]... the exclusive
Right.. . ' to their ["original" works]. United States Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, [17
U.S.C.A. § 102]. But the public policy which includes [original works] within the granted
monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the [original expression]. It equally
forbids the use of the [copyright] to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not
granted by the [Copyright] Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant."
Id. (quoting Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492) (bracketed material added by the Lasercomb court).
33. Id. See supra note 6 for a discussion of the rights protected under the copyright laws.
34. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977. Although the Sherman Act forbids "every contract ... in
restraint of trade," 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), courts interpret this language to mean that only those
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violation would trigger the copyright misuse defense, the Fourth Circuit held
that an antitrust violation is not a prerequisite to barring an infringement action.
Instead, any attempt to use a copyright "to control competition in an area
outside the copyright, Le. the idea of computer-assisted die manufacture," would
give rise to misuse "regardless of whether such conduct amounts to an antitrust
violation."135 The Fourth Circuit reached its conclusion because Morton Salt did
not require an antitrust violation to apply the patent misuse defense.36 In re-
jecting the copyright misuse defense, the district court had emphasized that the
defendants had not explicitly agreed to the noncompete clause, and therefore
could not claim injury from the alleged misuse in order to bar the infringement
action against them.37 The Fourth Circuit, however, relied on the venerable
Morton Salt decision to conclude that the copyright misuse defense is applicable
even though the infringing parties did not themselves suffer injuries from the
misuse.38
Copyright misuse cases such as Lasercomb are the culmination of complex,
intertwined conceptions of unclean hands, rights under the patent and copyright
laws, and antitrust principles. Some cases rest the copyright misuse defense
solely on antitrust principles,39 while others deny that an antitrust violation can
provide an affirmative defense to infringement. 4° Still others, like Lasercomb,
find that an antitrust violation, while not a prerequisite, may trigger a misuse
contracts that unreasonably restain trade are illegal. W. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ANTrrRUST LAW § 5.01[2] (1990). See infra note 113 for a discussion of the antitrust rule of reason.
For a discussion of the noncompete clause's purported reasonableness, see infra note 175.
35. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979. The Lasercomb panel described the noncompete clause as
containing language that was "extremely broad," and found it to be "at least as egregious" as similar
language in a patent licensing agreement that the Fourth Circuit had declared to be a patent misuse.
Id. at 978-79 (citing Compton v. Metal Prod., Inc., 453 F.2d 38,45 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 968 (1972)). For a discussion of Compton and other cases involving noncompete clauses, see
infra note 175.
Although the Fourth Circuit found that the noncompete clause constituted copyright misuse, it
rejected the defendants' claim that Lasercomb created an illegal "tying" arrangement by discounting
Interact's price for those licensees who also purchased steel rule dies from Lasercomb. Lasercomb,
911 F.2d at 972 n.6. Because Lasercomb did not require a buyer to purchase Interact or steel rule
dies when buying the other product, or require its customers to agree not to purchase goods from
other sellers, the court found no tie-in. Id. A tying arrangement is one in which a seller requires
that a purchaser buy one item (the tied product) to buy another (the tying product). See Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 & n.4 (1958).
36. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978. For a discussion of the unified economic theory behind patent
and antitrust law, see infra note 149.
37. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979.
38. Id.
39. Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987);
see also Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 1951) (balancing the
equities between harm caused by copyright owner's alleged antitrust violation and infringer's
culpability).
40. See, eg., BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing,
Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (denying antitrust defense to copyright infringement
but recognizing misuse defense when there is an attempt to extend the limited monopoly beyond the
protected work); Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 220 (D. Kan.
1987); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F_ Supp. 672, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Grant's Cabin, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 633, 634-45 (E.D. Mo. 1979); M. Witmark &
Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470, 480 (E.D.S.C.), aff'd mem., 2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir.
1924).
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defense.4 1
The animating principle behind denying relief from infringement is equita-
ble in nature; a court will not render assistance to a party coming into court with
unclean hands.42 The unclean hands doctrine bars legal or equitable relief to a
plaintiff who has harmed the defendant in a way that bears directly on the mat-
ter in controversy.4 3 In Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.44 the
Supreme Court denied relief in a patent infringement case because the patentee,
in an earlier case, had suppressed evidence that would have shown his patent to
be invalid.45 The Court stated that for the doctrine to apply there must be an
immediate and necessary relationship between the plaintiff's unconscionable act
and the relief sought.46 Courts have also applied the unclean hands doctrine in
copyright infringement actions. One early court, for example, applied the doc-
trine when the copyright holder's advertisements were false and misleading,
thereby causing a public injury egregious enough to bar relief.47 Subsequent
copyright cases disavowed this broad application and confined the equitable de-
fense to "misuses that frustrate the particular purposes of the copyright...
statute."
'48
In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co. the Supreme Court modified the
unclean hands doctrine, permitting a patent infringer to assert the patent misuse
defense even though the patentee's misuse did not harm the infringer. 49 The
Court previously had recognized the patent misuse defense only when the in-
fringing party suffered injury by the patentee's attempt to enlarge the scope of
41. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978; Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 487, 488 (D. Del. 1978); M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 850 (D. Minn.
1948) ("One who unlawfully exceeds his copyright monopoly and violates anti-trust laws is not
outside the pale of the law, but where the Court's aid is requested ... it should be denied."), appeal
dismissed sub nom. M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949).
42. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814
(1945); Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theatre, 604 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1979);
Jensen, 80 F. Supp. at 850.
43. MitchellBros., 604 F.2d at 863; see also Tempo Music, Inc. v. Myers, 407 F.2d 503, 507 n.8
(4th Cir. 1969) (equitable estoppel barring plaintiff the right to plead copyright infringement applica-
ble both in law and equity); F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 506 F. Supp. 1127, 1137
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (unclean hands applies in equity suits as well as in actions for damages), rev'd on
other grounds, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (7th Cir. 1982).
44. 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
45. Id. at 246-47.
46. Id. at 245.
47. Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 F. 837, 841-43 (5th Cir. 1915).
48. See, eg., Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 864 (5th Cir.
1979). The Fifth Circuit, largely repudiating its earlier decision in Stone & McCarrick, refused to
permit the defendant to assert a "public injury" defense based on the claim that the infringed work
was obscene. Id. at 865. In limiting Stone & McCarrick, the Fifth Circuit contrasted that case with
Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942), finding that Morton Salt properly required
clean hands when the patentee subverted the public policy behind the patent statute. Id. at 864.
It is interesting to note, however, that Morton Salt itself relied on Stone & McCarrick to deny
the patentee's infringement claim. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494. Seemingly unconcerned about the
prior requirement that there be an "immediate and necessary" relationship, the Court in Morton Salt
justified barring the patentee's claim, even though the infringer had not suffered from the patent
misuse, because of "the adverse effect upon the public interest." Id. (emphasis added). For a discus-
sion of the Supreme Court's departure from traditional equitable doctrine when confronted with
enforcing patent claims, see infra note 56 and accompanying text.
49. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494.
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the patent privileges. 50 In Morton Salt the plaintiff owned the patent for a can-
ning industry device that inserted measured amounts of salt in tablet form into
canned goods.5 1 The plaintiff leased its machines but required that licensees
purchase salt tablets exclusively from the plaintiff's subsidiary. 52 The Court de-
nied injunctive relief from the defendant's patent infringement on the grounds
that the patentee was using its patent to restrain competition in the market for
salt tablets, an unpatented item, and that continued restraint would permit the
patentee to create a limited monopoly not within the scope of the patent grant.53
Although the infringer also competed with the patentee in the salt tablet
market,5 4 the Court considered injury to the public to be of primary impor-
tance.55 The Court recognized that the unclean hands doctrine typically bal-
ances the relative misconduct of the parties to the suit, but found that
"additional considerations must be taken into account where maintenance of the
suit concerns the public interest as well as the private interests of suitors."15 6
Because the patentee derives privileges from a statutory grant enacted to further
a public policy, the Court would not protect a patent being used to subvert that
policy.57 The policy has two components: protecting inventions included in the
patent while excluding from the patent all that is not embraced by the inven-
tion,5 8 and forbidding a patentee from using its patent to secure an exclusive
privilege that the Patent Office did not grant.5 9 To the Court, a successful in-
fringement claim would adversely affect the public interest. 6° That adverse im-
pact, in combination with the misuse, disqualified the patentee from protection
regardless of whether the infringer suffered from the patent misuse.6 1
However harsh the patent misuse doctrine may appear, the Court noted
that the misuse could be "purged" by abandoning the improper conduct and
dissipating the harmful consequences of the misuse.62 The patent misuse doc-
50. See Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31-35 (1931) (plaintiff-
patentee denied relief against supplier who sold dry ice to plaintiff's licensees with the knowledge
that the license required dry ice to be purchased only from patentee); Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518-19 (1917) (owner of a patented film projector barred
from enforcing license restriction against film distributors when patent license required that only
films rented from the patentee's licensee could be used with the patented projector).
51. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 489.
52. Id. at 490-91.
53. Id. at 491.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 493.
56. Id. The Supreme Court later rationalized this change from the traditional unclean hands
doctrine through the fiction of joining the public as a party to the suit. Precision Instrument Mfg.
Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945). Because of the "far-reaching
social and economic consequences of a patent," the public has a "paramount interest in seeing that
patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that
such monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope." Id.
57. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494.
58. Id. at 492.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 494.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 493. See generally 4 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 19.04[4] (discussion of purging
and dissipating'patent misuse).
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trine therefore does not invalidate a patent; the patentee may bring an action for
an infringement occurring after the misuse is satisfactorily purged. 63 In fact, a
patentee may purge the misuse even after commencing the infringement claim. 64
In reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
the Morton Salt Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the patentee's
tying arrangement65 violated antitrust laws under the Clayton Act.66 In the
Seventh Circuit's view, acquiring a patent does not impose a higher standard of
commercial behavior on patentees because the antitrust laws were not designed
to "discriminate between patentees and others when it comes to use or sale of
unpatented articles." 67 The Supreme Court, however, found that an inquiry
into whether the patentee substantially decreased competition or tended to cre-
ate a monopoly missed the point. Although the patent misuse doctrine is con-
cerned with a patentee's anticompetitive conduct, the proper analysis must be
grounded in the patent laws and the public policy behind them.6 8
Morton Salt did not predicate patent misuse on antitrust principles; instead,
the Court intimated that antitrust violations may serve as the basis for patent
misuse.69 Subsequently, however, the Court and commentators70 have muddied
the distinction by linking the two concepts. In Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co. 7 1 the Court opined that "[t]he legality of any attempt
63. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 419-20 (1945); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Bulldog Elec. Prod. Co., 179 F.2d 139, 145 (4th Cir. 1950); see also WALKER ON PATENTS,
supra note 1, § 28:35 ("[I]mproper use does not invest an infringer with a license for the life of the
patent, for if a patent owner purges himself of the improper business practices, he may then enforce
his patent and recover damages for infringement occurring thereafter.").
64. See Westinghouse Elea, 179 F.2d at 145 ("Since plaintiff here has abandoned any illegal
conduct, it is entitled to the protection of the courts and there is no reason why relief should not be
afforded in the presently pending litigation.").
65. See supra note 35 for a definition of a tying arrangement. For a discussion of congressional
reform of patent misuse based on tying clauses, see infra note 76.
66. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494. Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides that:
lit shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce... to lease or make a sale or
contract for sale of goods... whether patented or unpatented ... or fix a price charged
therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods... or
other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect
... may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988) (emphasis added).
67. G.S. Suppiger Co. v. Morton Salt Co., 117 F.2d 968, 970 (7th Cir. 1941), rev'd, 314 U.S.
458 (1942).
68. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490.
69. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945) ('iSlo long as the
patent owner is using his patent in violation of the antitrust laws, he cannot restrain infringement of
it by others."). Indeed, Judge Posner has repeatedly argued that an antitrust violation must be the
basis for patent or copyright misuse. See Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816
F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987) (copyright misuse); USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d
505, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1982) (patent misuse). See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text for a
discussion of antitrust and nonantitrust violations constituting patent misuse.
70. See, e.g., 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.09[A] (1989)
(describing patent cases like Morton Salt and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator
Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944), as holding that "a patentee who uses his patent privilege contrary to the
public interest by violating the antitrust laws will be denied the relief of a court of equity in a patent
infringement action.").
71. 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
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to bring unpatented goods within the protection of the patent is measured by the
anti-trust laws not by the patent law.... [T]he effort here made to control
competition in this unpatented device plainly violates the anti-trust laws." '72
This holding may be interpreted as requiring an antitrust violation as a predicate
for patent misuse, but it may be viewed also as a call to permit a patent misuse to
be a per se violation of the antitrust laws, without requiring an inquiry into the
patentee's market power.73 Although the Supreme Court implicitly has rejected
this concept 74 and reaffirmed its allegiance to Morton Salt's patent misuse doc-
trine,75 Congress has recently circumscribed the limits of the patent misuse de-
fense by explicitly requiring courts to employ antitrust principles when the
claimed misconduct involves tying arrangements and package licensing.7 6 The
interplay and tension between limited monopolies and antitrust doctrines is re-
72. Id. at 684. In a companion case, the Court again noted that "the anti-trust acts or other
laws not the patent statutes define the public policy." Mercoid Corp., 320 U.S. at 666.
73. Calkins, supra note 4, at 184-85. Market power is a critical component of an antitrust
inquiry. If the purported anticompetitive conduct involves a tying arrangement, the court must
evaluate whether the defendant-seller
has the power, within the market for the tying product, to raise prices or to require pur-
chasers to accept burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a completely competitive
market. In short, the question is whether the seller has some advantage not shared by his
competitors in the market for the tying product.
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (citation omitted).
74. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969) ("lit does not
necessarily follow that the [patent] misuse embodies the ingredients of a violation of either § 1 or § 2
of the Sherman Act, or that a violation threatened Zenith so as to entitle it to an injunction under
§ 16 of the Clayton Act.").
75. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221 (1980) (Without importing
antitrust principles into patent doctrine, the Court noted that "Et]he policy of free competition runs
deep in our law. It underlies both the doctrine of patent misuse and the general principle that the
boundary of a patent monopoly is to be limited by the literal scope of the patent claims.").
76. Package licensing may or may not constitute misuse. Two types of package licenses are
permissible. One type is when patents "block" each other so that the patents may not be exploited
without each infringing the other. A second type is when the patents are "complementary"-i.e.,
each patent protects a discreet unit within a larger device, making it inefficient, if not impossible, to
produce the device without the complementary patents. W. HOLMES, supra note 34, at § 22.02.
Package licensing may become an illegal tying arrangement when a patentee requires the licensee to
take a license on one patent as a condition for the grant of a license on another. See Automatic
Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 830-31 (1952). The 1988 Patent Misuse
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 100-73, tit. II, § 201, 102 Stat. 4676 (1988), amended 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) to
read:
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringe-
ment of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the
patent right by reason of having done one or more of the following: ... (5) conditioned the
license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a
license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the
circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or
patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
Although the Lasercomb panel remarked on this change in patent misuse doctrine, Lasercomb,
911 F.2d at 976 & n.15, the court failed to take notice of the strong congressional effort to predicate
patent misuse doctrine entirely on antitrust principles in accordance with the view espoused by
Judge Posner. See Calkins, supra note 4, at 192-200. Although Congress ultimately did not adopt
such a radical departure from existing patent misuse doctrine, Senate leaders gave notice that Con-
gress intends to make more extensive changes in the future. Id. at 197-200. Under existing federal
trademark law, the trademark owner's present or past use of the trademark to violate the antitrust
laws is a defense to an infringement action. 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (1988).
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flected by the broad scope of what may constitute patent misuse,77 including
agreements not to deal in competing goods,78 royalties based on total sales,79
price fixing,80 tying arrangements, 81 package licensing, 82 and field-of-use
restrictions.8 3
The admixture of antitrust standards and policy-based misuse doctrine fre-
quently spills over into the area of copyright law. The Supreme Court has never
expressly declared the copyright misuse defense to be legitimate. This failure
may explain why the lower courts, with one exception prior to Lasercomb, have
not rushed to transplant Morton Salt's misuse defense into copyright doctrine.
In M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen 84 a Federal district court, relying on Mor-
ton Salt, denied injunctive relief because of the copyright owners' anticompeti-
tive conduct.85 The Jensen plaintiffs owned copyrighted musical works and
belonged to the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (AS-
CAP).8 6 Through ASCAP the plaintiffs licensed to motion picture producers
"synchronization rights"-the right to record plaintiffs' musical compositions
onto the soundtracks of certain motion pictures.87 The plaintiffs' licensing
agreement did not include the right to perform publicly the compositions. The
plaintiffs claimed that defendant motion picture theater operators infringed by
showing films containing the copyrighted musical works without first obtaining
a license to perform the music.8 8 Although theater operators may bargain with
individual copyright owners for a performance license, for practical reasons they
have no real choice but to take a "blanket license" through a performance soci-
77. See Calkins, supra note 4, at 187 n.38 (for a discussion of various patent misuses). See
generally 4 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 19.04[3][a]-1] (comprehensive discussion of various patent
misuses).
78. Compton v. Metal Prod., Inc., 453 F.2d 38, 44-45 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 968
(1972), cited in Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979; Berlenbach v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d
782, 784-85 (9th Cir. 1964); National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255, 256
(3d Cir. 1943). Courts uniformly have found noncompete clauses in patent licenses to be a per se
misuse of the patent. See 4 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, at § 19.04[3][b] (citing cases). For a discussion
of noncompete clauses as the measure for misuse, see infra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
79. Although coercing a licensee to pay royalties based on total sales constitutes misuse, Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 138 (1969), the patentee and its licensee may
agree to the arrangement if it is convenient for the parties to collect royalties in such a way. Auto.
matic Radio, 339 U.S. at 834.
80. United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 378 (1952); United States v. Line Mate-
rial Co., 333 U.S. 287, 306 (1948).
81. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). Under the 1988 Patent Reform
Act, tying arrangements must be analyzed under antitrust standards to constitute patent misuse. See
supra note 76 for the language of the statute.
82. Automatic Radio, 339 U.S. at 830-31; see supra note 76 for a definition of package licensing.
83. A patentee may restrict a licensee to make or use the patent only in a particular field.
WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 1, § 28:17. It is patent misuse, however, to demand such a re-
striction after the first sale. General Talking Picture Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181-
82, aff'd on rehearing, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
84. 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed sub nom. M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger
Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949).
85. Id. at 850. Later, the Fourth Circuit cited Jensen as the only "case which has actually
applied copyright misuse to bar an action for infringement." Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976.





ety like ASCAP. 89
The Jensen court agreed with defendants that the consequence of ASCAP's
licensing practices created the economic power to coerce theater owners into
taking blanket performance licenses, giving the plaintiffs advantages far greater
than those enjoyed by a single copyright owner.90 Although the court found that
the copyright owners violated the antitrust laws,9 1 it was more concerned with
the practice of using a copyright to expand illegitimately the rights granted
under the copyright laws to the detriment of the public interest. 92 The court
concluded that it was unnecessary to decide whether antitrust violations alone
would constitute copyright misuse barring the plaintiffs' infringement claim.
93
The law of antitrust-based copyright misuse is much more developed,
although highly fractured. 94 Due to mixed signals from the Supreme Court, two
mutually exclusive doctrines have evolved. One doctrine permits an antitrust-
based copyright misuse defense as a result of the Court's linking antitrust viola-
tions to the improper enlargement of the copyright monopoly. 95 The other for-
bids that type of copyright misuse defense because of the Court's prohibition
against "collateral" antitrust defenses. 96
In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc 97 the Supreme Court implicitly
recognized the copyright misuse defense and hinted that antitrust analysis ought
to play a role in considering whether a grantee has misused its copyright. The
Court found that defendant motion picture distributors' practice of "block-
booking"9 8 violated the antitrust laws.99 In citing Morton Salt, however, the
court also remarked that the practice improperly enlarged what the copyright
89. Rather than deal with multitudes of copyright owners, the blanket licensee pays an annual
fee to ASCAP and in exchange receives the right to perform all the musical works authorized to
ASCAP, regardless of whether the licensee needs or desires all the works in the ASCAP catalogue.
Id. at 845. When the performance licensee pays ASCAP, that association distributes the royalties to
ASCAP members based upon a formula it has devised. Id. at 846.
90. Id. at 847. The court noted that the licensing scheme gave ASCAP members a monopoly of
"80% of all of the music recorded in motion picture films." Id.
91. Id. at 850.
92. Id.
93. Id. A more recent case, however, cites Jensen as supporting a copyright misuse defense
due to practices violating the antitrust laws. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 487, 488 (D. Del. 1978).
94. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment Servs., 746 F. Supp. 320,
328 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (describing copyright misuse defense as "ill-received" by lower courts, typically
either rejected out of hand, or if recognized, finding misuse defense inapplicable on the facts).
95. See infira notes 97-123 and accompanying text.
96. An antitrust violation may be collateral when the contract in restraint of trade is not the
subject matter of the suit. Defendants have asserted, without much success, that the courts should
not permit a plaintiff in violation of the antitrust laws to enforce a claim for breach of contract, even
though the disputed contract did not form the basis for the antitrust violation. See, eg., Kelly v.
Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 518-21 (1959). For a discussion of the judicial treatment given to collateral
antitrust defenses, see infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
97. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
98. Block-booking is a motion picture tying arrangement in which distributors license films "on
condition that the exhibitor will also license another feature or group of features released by the
distributors during a given period." Id. at 156.
99. Id. at 159.
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granted.100
In United States v. Loew's, Inc. 101 the Supreme Court again addressed the
practice of block-booking films, but this time to television stations rather than
movie theaters. The Court found that the practice violated section 1 of the Sher-
man Act,10 2 and that for tying arrangements the law requires that the seller have
"'sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably
restrain free competition in the market for the tied product.' "103 The Court
rejected defendants' attempt to distinguish Paramount Pictures on the grounds
that, because television stations rely on films only for a small fraction of their
programming, the defendants lacked sufficient economic power. 104 The Court
responded that when the tying product is patented or copyrighted the "requisite
economic power is presumed." 105 Therefore, the court held that compelling a
licensee to take unwanted films as a condition for the desired license is illegal,
and the copyright monopoly must be strictly confined by the antitrust laws. 10 6
Because the case involved a government suit brought under the antitrust laws,
rather than a claim for copyright infringement, the Court did not need to decide
whether a copyright misuse defense existed. The Court's specific reference to
the patent misuse defense, however, in conjunction with its uniform application
of the antitrust laws to both patents and copyrights, 10 7 suggests that the Loew's
Court tacitly approved of a copyright misuse defense. 10 8
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System 1o9 the Supreme
Court gave the lower courts further reason to believe that antitrust violations
can trigger the copyright misuse defense. Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)
100. Id. at 157. By forcing a licensee to take an inferior copyrighted work as a condition to
receiving a superior one, the licensor "strengthens its monopoly" beyond what the copyright in-
tended and reaps disproportionate rewards. Id. at 158.
101. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
102. Id. at 39. The Sherman Act provides in part: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Although the statute prohibits
"every contract," courts construe this language narrowly by forbidding only those contracts that
unreasonably restrain trade. W. HOLMES, supra note 34, § 5.0112]. For a discussion of the various
judicial modes of antitrust analysis, see infra note 113.
103. Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958)).
104. Id. at 47-48.
105. Id. at 48. Prior to the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act, see supra note 76, several appellate
courts rejected, either expressly or implicitly, the presumptive economic power of patented or copy-
righted works used in tying arrangements. The courts instead inquired into the grantee's actual
market power in the patented or copyrighted product. See Nobel Scientific Indus., Inc. v. Beelman
Instruments, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1313, 1328 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd, 831 F.2d 537 (4th Cir. 1987)
(patents); A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1987) (case in-
volving copyrighted computer software in which Sixth Circuit observed that " '[m]ore often than not
... a patent or copyright provides little, if any, market power.' " (quoting Note, The Presumption of
Economic Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
1140, 1156 (1985))).
106. Loew's, 371 U.S. at 49.
107. Id. at 46-49. The Loew's Court noted that "[a]ccommodation between the statutorily dis-
pensed monopoly in the combination of contents in the patented or copyrighted product and the
statutory principles of free competition demands that extension of the patent or copyright monopoly
by the use of tying agreements be strictly confined." Id. at 49.
108. 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 70, § 13.09[A].
109. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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sued Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and ASCAP claiming that the performance
societies' blanket licensing of copyrighted musical works amounted to price fix-
ing and was per se illegal under the antitrust laws. 10 CBS also asked for a
declaratory judgment that BMI and ASCAP were misusing their copyright. 11'
The Court reversed both the Second Circuit's finding that the blanket li-
censing was illegal per se under the antitrust laws and the copyright misuse
judgment that the trial court had predicated on an antitrust violation.' 12 The
Court remanded to the lower court for an assessment of the claim under the
antitrust rule of reason.' 13 Writing for the Court, Justice White stated:
Although the copyright laws confer no rights on copyright owners to
fix prices among themselves or otherwise to violate the antitrust laws,
we would not expect that any market arrangements reasonably neces-
sary to effectuate the rights that are granted would be deemed a per se
violation of the Sherman Act. 14
The implication, therefore, is quite strong that the Court not only recog-
nized that the copyright misuse defense exists, but that the antitrust laws are the
proper measurement of copyright misuse. 1 5 This implied approval, in both
110. Id. at 6.
111. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. American Soc'y of Composers, 400 F. Supp. 737, 771
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
112. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24.
113. Id. at 24-25. Under the rule of reason an agreement unreasonably restrains trade if, under
all the facts and circumstances, its anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive effects. See
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); J. VAN CISE, W.
LIFLAND & L. SORKIN, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 35 (9th ed. 1986). This factual
inquiry has its limits in that "the Rule does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in
favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly
on the challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions." Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at
688.
Agreements that are illegal per se are those "whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality." Id. at
692. The law has deemed certain practices facially anticompetitive: price fixing, tying arrange-
ments, agreements between competitors to divide markets, boycotts, pooling profits, and bans on
competitive bidding. . VAN CiSE, W. LIFLAND & L. SORKIN, supra, at 116. Before courts will find
that the challenged trade practice is presumptively illegal, the courts require proof that the practice
creates adverse economic effects in light of judicial experience that "the practice is of a type that will
'always or almost always tend to restrict competition.'" W. HOLMES, supra note 34, § 5.01[2]
(quoting Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-20).
A defendant may rebut the presumption of illegality by two methods: (1) Showing that the
restraint is essential to allow the product to become available; if so, then the restraint is scrutinized
under the rule of reason and will be upheld if the restraint's potential for anticompetitive effects is
never realized and the purpose for the restraint is lawful; (2) If the restraint does not involve price,
the restraining party does not have market power, and the restraint is "reasonably ancillary to effi-
ciency in competition." 3. VAN CisE, W. LIFLAND & L. SORKIN, supra, at 118-19.
114. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19 (emphasis in original).
115. Several commentators support this view. See, eg., W. HOLMES, supra note 34, § 4.09;
Comment, Copyright Misuse and Cable Television: Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 35
FED. COMM. L.J. 347, 360 (1980) ("Tlhe Court agreed that the limits of the copyright grant are
defined by the antitrust laws."); Note, supra note 5, at 1305; Note, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc.: The Copyright Misuse Doctrine, 15 NEW. ENG. L.J. 683, 693 (1980)
("[Tlhe Court appears to be endorsing a copyright misuse doctrine which is analogous to the patent
misuse doctrine and requires no analysis of copyright policy.").
This viewpoint is not universally shared. See, eg., Phelan, The Continuing Battle with the Per-
forming Rights Societiev The Per Se Rule, the Rule of Reason Standard and Copyright Misuse, 15
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Broadcast Music and Loew's, has influenced several lower courts in their finding
of copyright misuse predicated on antitrust illegality. 116
The Seventh Circuit, and Judge Posner in particular, has accepted the
Supreme Court's apparent invitation to permit a copyright misuse defense, but
only if predicated exclusively on antitrust violations. In Saturday Evening Post
Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc. 117 the plaintiff-licensor sued its licensee for breach
of the copyright licensing agreement. The agreement contained a clause stating
that the licensee would not dispute the validity of any copyrights the licensor
may have obtained. 118 The licensee argued that the no-contest clause violated
the public policy of the Copyright Act and therefore was unenforceable. 119 The
Seventh Circuit responded that no-contest clauses in copyright licenses are valid
unless they violate the antitrust laws. 120 The court cited a previous Seventh
Circuit patent misuse opinion for its reasoning:
"If misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust principles,
by what principles shall they be tested? Our law is not rich in alterna-
tive concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it is rather late in the day to
try to develop one without in the process subjecting patent holders to
debilitating uncertainty."' 12 1
The court stated that this reasoning was even more persuasive regarding
TEx. TECH. L. REv. 349, 377 (1984) ("Mhe Supreme Court did not expressly rule that a finding of
copyright misuse is always dependent upon an antitrust violation."). Similarly the Lasercomb panel
rejected the idea that Broadcast Music mandates an antitrust-based misuse defense, stating that
viewed "[i]n context ... it is apparent that misuse was linked to antitrust in that case simply as a
matter of litigation strategy. Copyright misuse was not asserted as a defense to an infringement suit,
and the primary claim was an antitrust claim." Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977 n.17.
116. See United Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604, 612 (8th Cir. 1988) (recogniz-
ing the concept of antitrust-based copyright misuse, but finding no antitrust violation in this case);
Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding
that a no-contest clause in a copyright licensing agreement is valid unless violative of antitrust law);
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment Servs,, 746 F. Supp. 320, 327:28
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (recognizing that an affirmative defense of copyright misuse is cognizable following
a finding that defendant pleaded a colorable monopolization counterclaim); F.E.L. Publications,
Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 506 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (tying arrangement held to be a
per se Sherman Act violation and therefore a misuse of plaintiff's copyright), rev'd, 214 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 409, 413 n.9 (7th Cir. 1982) (reversing the district court's finding of a per se Sherman Act
violation, but noting that copyright misuse is an equitable defense that requires a balancing of equi-
ties); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 357, 364-65 (D. Del. 1980) (denying
plaintiff-copyright holder's motion for summary judgment against allegedly infringing defendant's
copyright misuse defense and antitrust counterclaim on grounds that a factual question existed
whether plaintiff's conduct violated antitrust rule of reason); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v.
Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 280, 287 (W.D. Okla. 1973) (plaintiff's antitrust violations
constituted copyright misuse, rendering copyright unenforceable), rev'd, 497 F.2d 285, 290 (10th
Cir. 1974) (assuming that antitrust violations are copyright misuse, no basis to support finding of
antitrust violations), cerL denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975).
117. 816 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff magazine licensed to the defendant the right to
manufacture porcelain dolls based on Norman Rockwell illustrations. Id. at 1193. Although the
license warranted that the Saturday Evening Post owned the copyright in the Rockwell illustrations,
it bad a copyright only in each of the magazines and not in the illustrations themselves. Id. After
the license terminated the defendant continued making the dolls, precipitating the litigation. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1199.
120. Id. at 1200.




copyright misuse because copyrights present a smaller threat of monopolization
than do patents. 122 The court observed that if a copyright holder seeks to ex-
tend its monopoly power beyond that granted by the statute, the proper avenue
of attack is under the Sherman Act, rather than "a federal common law rule that
would jostle uncomfortably with the Sherman Act." 123
In marked contrast to this strain of legal thought that demands an anti-
trust-based misuse defense is a line of cases that rejects the idea that antitrust
violations can preclude enforcement of a copyright infringement claim. This
judicial hostility borrows from a long-held doctrine that an antitrust violation is
not a defense to a breach of contract. 124 Beginning in the early part of this
century, the Supreme Court distinguished between contracts that are inherently
illegal under the antitrust laws and contracts that are merely collateral to the
alleged illegality. 125 When the plaintiff sought to enforce a contract, the Court
repeatedly ruled that the plaintiff's violation of the antitrust laws is not a defense
if the contract itself is not inherently illegal under the antitrust laws. 12 6
For example, in Bruce's Juices, Ina v. American Can Co. 127 the plaintiff
sought to collect on promissory notes the defendant had signed following
purchases of goods from the plaintiff.128 The defendant asserted that the notes
were uncollectible because the plaintiff's pricing policy for other buyers was iMle-
gally discriminatory under the Robinson-Patman Act. 129 The Court rejected
this antitrust defense because the contract was not inherently illegal' 30 and be-
cause voiding contracts was not among the Act's exclusive remedies. 131
Copyright jurisprudence mirrors this doctrine, flatly denying that a collat-
eral antitrust defense can bar an action to enforce an infringement claim.132 The
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. For a review of the role antitrust violations have played in actions to enforce contracts see
Note, The Defense ofAntitrust Illegality in Contract Actions, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 758, 759-68 (1960);
Note, supra note 5, at 1291-93.
125. Compare Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 547 (1902) (plaintiff's contract
to sell pipe to the defendant unrelated to plaintiff's conspiracy to fix prices) with Continental Wall
Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 262 (1909) (enforcement of requirements
contract denied because it was part of a scheme to violate the antitrust laws).
126. See Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 521 (1959); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co.,
330 U.S. 743, 756-57 (1947).
127. 330 U.S. 743 (1947).
128. Id. at 744.
129. Id. at 744-45. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff's practice of giving discounts to
volume buyers of cans exerted anticompetitive pressures against a small cannery like itself. Id. at
745. The Robinson-Patman Act outlaws price discrimination between purchasers "where the effect
of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly... or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
130. Bruce's Juices, 330 U.S. at 755-56.
131. Id. at 750-51.
132. BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing, 719 F.
Supp. 1551, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (denying antitrust defense to copyright infringement but recogniz-
ing misuse defense when there is an attempt to extend the limited monopoly beyond the protected
work); Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publishing, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 220 (D. Kan. 1987); Orth-O-
Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Grant's Cabin, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 633, 634-45 (E.D. Mo. 1979); United Artists Associated v.
NWL Corp., 198 F. Supp. 953, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (rejecting antitrust defense but denying plain-
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rationale behind this doctrine is twofold. First, the courts will not construe the
Sherman Act to divest a violator of his property rights, including ownership of a
valid copyright. 133 Second, the antitrust laws offer specific remedies that are
exclusive. 134 Both of these reasons are ones the Fourth Circuit expressly has
supported in the past,135 yet the Lasercomb court failed to address these points.
Lasercomb simply gives no indication whether the Fourth Circuit now questions
the continuing vitality of this precedent.
In the copyright-antitrust dynamic, a less clear-cut third choice has
emerged. In Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. 136 the Second Circuit
embroidered upon the collateral antitrust defense by providing that courts must
balance the competing policies of preventing copyright piracy and enforcing the
antitrust laws. 137 The district court in Alfred Bell had rejected the antitrust
defense as a matter of law, s38 recognizing that the Supreme Court's denial of the
collateral antitrust defense in Bruce's Juices had limited the misuse principles
outlined in Morton Salt.139 Although the Second Circuit affirmed, it chose in-
stead to take "into account the comparative innocence or guilt of the parties, the
moral character of their respective acts, the extent of the harm to the public
interest, [and] the penalty inflicted on the plaintiff if we deny it relief."' 140 Under
this balancing test, the Second Circuit found a clear copyright infringement, but
only a marginal antitrust violation, and therefore, held that the defendants "did
not establish the anti-trust 'unclean hands' defense."' 141 Subsequent courts, in-
cluding the Fourth Circuit, have agreed that balancing the equities is the proper
response to a copyright misuse defense.142
Against the backdrop of the last half-century of patent and copyright law,
tiff's motion to strike copyright misuse defense); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187
F. Supp. 334, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Harms, Inc. v. Sansom House Enters., 162 F. Supp. 129, 135
(E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd sub nom. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Lew Tendler Tavern, Inc., 267 F.2d 494 (3d Cir.
1959); M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470, 480 (E.D.S.C.), aff'd mem., 2
F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924).
133. Pastime Amusement, 298 F. at 480 ("The Sherman Act does not make the party to an
interstate monopoly an outlaw.").
134. Id.
135. The Fourth Circuit affirmed Pastime Amusement without comment. M. Witmark & Sons
v. Pastime Amusement Co., 2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924).
136. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
137. Id. at 106.
138. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 973, 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), aff'd,
191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
139. Id. at 978.
140. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 106.
141. Id. at 105.
142. See F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409, 413 n.9 (7th
Cir. 1982) ("Dismissal of a copyright claim for misuse is an equitable defense which requires a
balancing of equities."); Inge v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 143 F. Supp. 294, 298-99
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (employing Alfred Bell's balancing test; finding that the facts did not support an
antitrust defense). In Stein v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472, 480 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 201 (1954),
the defendant asserted a copyright misuse defense to plaintiff's action for infringement on the
grounds that it reproduced the copyrighted work of art for utilitarian purposes. The defendant
presented no unfair competition claims. The Fourth Circuit, citing Morton Salt, stated that it was
"not impressed" by the copyright misuse claim and observed that "the equities ... lie with the




the Lasercomb decision is significant because it marks the first time an appellate
court has used the copyright misuse defense to deny an infringement action. 143
Yet Lasercomb is far from surprising.144 Given the widespread acceptance of
Morton Salt's patent misuse doctrine, it seemed almost inevitable that an identi-
cal doctrine would appear in the law of copyright. Essentially the Lasercomb
court's analysis boils down to a syllogism: Patent and copyright law have paral-
lel constitutional goals of promoting progress. Under Morton Salt a patentee
who misuses his patent by exceeding the scope of the limited monopoly frus-
trates that policy goal and is unworthy of legal protection. Therefore, copyright
law must recognize copyright misuse as a defense to infringement. While this
reasoning has some appeal, it fails to distinguish critically between patent and
copyright theory and application, to comprehend the role copyrights play in
modem economics, or to provide any guideposts for what constitutes copyright
misuse.
By framing copyright policy as one designed to "promote progress," the
Fourth Circuit sidestepped two important points. First, although patents and
copyrights both offer limited monopolies to individuals primarily for the benefit
of the public, there are significant theoretical and practical differences between
them;145 these differences show that patents are more difficult than copyrights to
obtain, but offer more protection from infringement. 14 6 For example, because
patent infringers cannot interpose the defenses of independent creation or fair
use as can copyright infringers, a patent affords substantially greater economic
power than does a copyright.' 47 Thus, the danger to the public interest is
143. At the district court level, only two cases have used the misuse defense to bar the copyright
holder's claim: F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 506 F. Supp. 1127, 1136-37 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on grounds plaintiff misused its copy-
right), rev'd, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409, 413 n.6 (7th Cir. 1982) (recognizing copyright misuse defense
exists, but finding copyright holder did not violate the antitrust laws); M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen,
80 F. Supp. 843, 850 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed sub nom. M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger
Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949).
144. A substantial number of cases have considered the nature of copyright misuse; two of these
cases were from the Fourth Circuit. See supra notes 133-35 & 142 and accompanying texts. Inter-
estingly, the Lasercomb court cited only a single case, Jensen, that directly addressed the copyright
misuse defense. The opinion, however, did note repeatedly that this is an unsettled area of the law
and used such phrases as: "much uncertainty engulfs the 'misuse of copyright defense;"' "there is
little case law;" "the paucity of precedent;" and "uncertainty persists." Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973-
76. Although the Lasercomb panel expressed these concerns partly due to the lack of a definitive
ruling from the Supreme Court, it is unclear whether these statements are the product of disingenu-
ousness or insufficient research. Also, instead of analyzing prior relevant cases, the court expended
its energy scrutinizing the monopoly practices of the British Crown during the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries. Id. at 974-75. Rather than reaching so far afield, perhaps if the court had analyzed
the case law that has developed over the past few decades, the court's opinion would have demon-
strated a firmer grasp of the nuances associated with the misuse doctrine.
145. For a comparison of patents and copyrights, see supra notes 1 & 6; Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 100-04 (1951). Contra Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 890 (1971)
(order denying certiorari) ("No distinction is made in the constitutional language between copy-
rights and patents and I would not create one by judicial gloss.") (Douglas, J., dissenting); Gibbs,
supra note 5, at 74-78 ("It should be concluded that there is no case for applying a distinction in the
availability of the misuse defense between patent infringement and copyright infringement cases.").
146. Stein v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
147. See Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir.
1987). Although a patentee's economic power may be greater, that power is offset by the shorter life
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greater when a patentee seeks to enlarge his monopoly than when a copyright
holder acts similarly.
Second, the "promotion of progress" desired by the authorities is inextrica-
bly bound to an incentive-based scheme that rewards the grantee according to
the amount of copyrighted items sold or licensed.148 As a result of this royalty
scheme, owners of copyrighted works compete with one another to provide the
highest quality and most desirable works at a price the market is willing to pay.
The public policy in need of protection, therefore, is one that ensures that an-
ticompetitive practices do not impede or restrain the public's demand for copy-
righted works. 149
The Lasercomb decision presents three significant problems. Beyond con-
demning noncompete clauses in copyright licenses, it does not delineate the
boundaries of copyright misuse, because the Fourth Circuit opted to ground
misuse on an ill-defined public policy rather than on the antitrust laws. Further-
more, enforcement of a policy-based misuse doctrine announced in Lasercomb
necessarily depends on a morally culpable party. Finally, the opinion, which
states that antitrust-based misuse is acceptable, fails to grapple with the problem
of collateral antitrust defenses.
The Lasercomb panel never clearly articulated the public policy that in-
forms the copyright misuse defense. The court noted that society benefits from
"the efforts of authors to introduce new ideas and knowledge into the public
domain"'150 and that copyright law seeks "to increase the store of human knowl-
span of a patent compared to a copyright. See supra notes 1 & 6 for a comparison of patents and
copyrights.
148. The Supreme Court has observed that
[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in "Science
and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards com-
mensurate with the services rendered.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
149. See Note, supra note 5, at 1307-08. The Supreme Court has acknowledged repeatedly that
the copyright law's rewards to a grantee act as a mechanism to ensure that the public gains access to
new expressions: "'[P]rivate motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts.'" Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.
417, 432 (1984) (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)) (em-
phasis added). In a similar vein, the patent grant also encourages competition:
When a new product appears on the market, it stimulates all concerned in the trade to
improve on it or to develop a competing product. After the Patent Office grants a patent
for the invention, the publication to the world of the specification adds to the fund of public
knowledge. The process continues ad infinitum. In this connection, it appears that a fun-
damental object of the Patent Laws is in effect to encourage the replacement of inferior
goods or processes by superior ones ....
WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 1, § 28:2. At the heart of both patent and antitrust doctrine is the
objective of maximizing consumer wealth by producing desirable goods at the lowest cost. There
may be a diversity of approaches on how to reach this goal, but patent and antitrust law are wedded
in a unitary purpose. W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTrIRuST LAW 1 (1973).
150. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 975. A copyright does not protect ideas, only expressions. Ideas
are in the public domain and may not be copyrighted. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217. For example, in
the literary world there are certain common ideas or themes that all are free to use, such as young
love tragically destroyed by fierce antagonisms between the families of the two lovers. This is an idea
as old as Shakespeare and is not copyrightable what is copyrightable are the expressions that convey
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edge and arts."''1 If that is true, then the goal of copyright policy should be to
encourage authors to meet the demand for such expressions and to remove ob-
stacles that interfere with that demand. Such obstacles then may appropriately
constitute misuse. Rather than explore this aspect of copyright policy, the court
repeated Morton Salt's command that "'[public policy] ... forbids the use of a
patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Pat-
ent Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant.' ",152 The circular
reasoning within that statement is apparent: Public policy forbids what is con-
trary to public policy. The only concrete idea in that tautology is the stricture
against expanding rights beyond what is conferred by the statute. Although
Lasercomb does not analyze why this expansion is against public policy, the
implication is that a copyright holder who extends his limited monopoly earns a
reward greater than what the statute contemplated. The courts, therefore, will
not protect one who receives an unearned property right because of the harm
done to the public interest.
In light of the Fourth Circuit's unwillingness to explore the contours of a
policy-based misuse defense, examining the sources on which the court relied is
instructive to better understand the policy the court invoked. One commentator
the court cited argues that the improper extension of the limited monopoly re-
quires a court to determine whether this conduct has anticompetitive effects,
because "the copyright law necessarily incorporated within it the public policy
of encouraging a competitive economy." 153  Misuse analysis, therefore, is de-
pendent on "an uncodified law of anticompetitive practices"' 54 rather than on
federal antitrust law. This same commentator, however, then argues that courts
"should be less interested in actual anticompetitive effects and more interested in
preserving the limits on monopoly grants"' 55 to prevent the copyright holder
from obtaining a reward greater than the copyright permits. This statement
suggests that the copyright grant is a safe harbor beyond which the grantee dare
not venture for fear of losing the court's protection. Such reasoning offers a
purist's view of the copyright grant as pristine and inviolable. The result is a
formalistic approach to the law. The copyright grant protects conduct it ex-
pressly authorizes, while other conduct may expose the grantee to infringements
that cannot be remedied because the court assumes that such conduct is an-
ticompetitive in a way harmful to the public interest.
Rather than make assumptions about the allegedly anticompetitive effects
generated by conduct outside the copyright grant, courts should look to the es-
tablished body of antitrust law for their misuse analysis. 15 6 Some commentators
the idea-the dialogue, unique plot twists, or clearly delineated characters. For an instructive essay
on the distinction between idea and expression, see Judge Hand's opinion in Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 120-23 (2d Cir. 1930).
151. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976.
152. Id. (quoting Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942)).
153. Gibbs, supra note 5, at 42.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 46-47.
156. See supra note 113 for a discussion of antitrust principles.
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argue that because copyright law predates antitrust law, the latter is unnecessary
to enforce the former. 157 Judge Posner has observed, however, that because the
misuse doctrine evolved before the antitrust laws, its current viability in judging
anticompetitive effects is questionable. Furthermore, he has argued that because
the antitrust laws affect all practices that could impair competition substantially,
establishing a separate doctrine with an identical purpose is difficult.158 Judge
Posner mused that courts would use such a doctrine to condemn "any... licens-
ing practice that is even trivially anticompetitive, at least if it has no socially
beneficial effects." 159
The Lasercomb opinion reflects the tendency for the misuse doctrine to as-
sume harmful anticompetitive effects. In examining the noncompete clause in
Lasercomb's licensing agreement, 16 the court asserted that the licensee is "re-
quired to forego utilization of the creative abilities of all its officers, directors and
employees in the area of CAD/CAM die-making software. Of yet greater con-
cern, these creative abilities are withdrawn from the public." 161 The withdrawal
of one company from the relevant market does not, however, guarantee that the
noncompete clause has harmful consequences; that would depend upon, among
other factors, the relative market strength the licensor already enjoyed. 162 In
Lasercomb's case, its Interact program did not dominate the marketplace, and
was actually one of seven competing systems available on the market. 163 Mar-
ket power, an essential element in antitrust analysis, is thus irrelevant to the
purist's view of copyright law, which the Lasercomb court followed. 164 The in-
consistency in this approach is striking. The Fourth Circuit seeks to condemn
misuse on economic grounds without analyzing its economic effects.
It is interesting to contrast Lasercomb's analysis with the economic inquiry
undertaken by Lasercomb's judicial ancestor, Jensen.165 In Jensen the court
found that the grantees' licensing methods allowed them to capture eighty per-
157. See, eg., Gibbs, supra note 5, at 36 ("Analysis of allegedly anticompetitive conduct from
the standpoint of copyright policy alone is absolutely proper, for federal copyright protection existed
for one hundred years before the Sherman Act became law.").
158. USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982).
159. Id.
160. See supra note 19 for the language of the licensing agreement.
161. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
162. In this respect it may be helpful to analogize the noncompete clause to a merger between
competing companies. Both practices eliminate competition between firms that are, or could be,
rivals. The economic result, however, is not entirely clear-cut. If the two rivals have substantial
market shares, the result may well be monopoly and a restriction of output, with an attendant rise in
prices. If, in contrast, the rivals have insignificant market shares, their combination may either have
a neutral effect or result in economies of scale, improved management, or greater access to capital,
which in turn can produce a more "efficient" system, !e., one that produces goods that consumers
desire. See R. BORK, THE ANTrTRusT PARADoX 105, 219 (1978).
Analogizing between noncompete clauses and mergers, however, is fraught with imprecision.
In the merger situation, the market shares are a quantifiable amount; with the licensee who agrees
not to compete, it is pure speculation what the licensee's market share could have been had it not
agreed to the noncompete clause. For the procompetitive effects that may flow from noncompete or
exclusive dealing arrangements, see infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
163. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 13.
164. See supra note 73 for a definition of market power.
165. M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed sub nom.
M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949).
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cent of the market for music integrated into motion picture soundtracks. 166
Although the Jensen court chose not to predicate copyright misuse on an anti-
trust violation, the court obviously was influenced by the scope of the grantees'
anticompetitive behavior. The Jensen court observed palpable effects flowing
from this conduct, noting that it effectually restrained competition 167 giving the
grantees the power to "sound the death knell of every motion picture theatre in
America."1 68 The court concluded that such power clearly extended beyond
what was granted under the copyright laws; the court therefore would not con-
done using one monopoly to obtain another.169
In contrast, in its Lasercomb opinion the Fourth Circuit could not detail
any tangible effects resulting from Lasercomb's licensing agreement. By the
time of trial Lasercomb had sold approximately forty licenses for Interact, but
the defendants could prove that only one Interact licensee was bound by the
standard licensing agreement that included the noncompete clause. 170 The
court was unimpressed with Lasercomb's assertion that the noncompete clause
was negotiable and had been modified on previous occasions. 17 1 Instead, the
court expressed concern that the noncompete clause was effective for ninety-nine
years, which could last longer than the life of the copyright. 172 But most impor-
tant to the Lasercomb panel was the similarity between the language of this
noncompete clause and the language found in a patent license that the Fourth
Circuit earlier had condemned as patent misuse. Misuse resulted from such a
condition because it" 'unreasonably lessen[ed] the competition which the public
has a right to expect.' "173 The Fourth Circuit, however, did not expound on
what would be a reasonable lessening of competition that would not constitute
misuse. Nor did the court document any actual anticompetitive effects. Instead,
the Fourth Circuit retreated to its purist's view of copyright law: for the
Lasercomb panel, a quantum of harm sufficient to injure the public interest
could be found in "Lasercomb's attempt to use its copyright in ... the Interact
software, to control competition in an area outside the copyright, Le., the idea of
computer-assisted die manufacture."' 174 While the Fourth Circuit asserted that
166. Id. at 847.
167. Id. at 849.
168. Id. at 847.
169. Id. at 850.
170. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973 & n.8. For the language of the disputed noncompete clause, see
supra note 19.
171. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973 n.8.
172. Id. at 978 & n.21. For works created on or after January 1, 1978, the copyright endures
"for the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death." 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988).
173. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979 (quoting Compton v. Metal Prod., Inc. 453 F.2d 38, 45 (4th
Cir. 1971) (emphasis added)). For a discussion of the judicial hostility towards noncompete clauses
in patent licenses, see infra note 175.
174. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979 (emphasis added). Despite its professed allegiance to a pure,
nonantitrust misuse doctrine, the Fourth Circuit seems to be importing the antitrust concept of
attempted monopolization, which is forbidden under the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Judi-
cial analysis of attempted monopolization claims involves three parts: (1) Inquiry into the relevant
market; (2) whether the defendant possessed a specific intent to achieve monopoly power, as opposed
to engaging in mere vigorous competition; (3) whether there is a "dangerous probability" that the
defendant, if left unchecked, would achieve an actual monopoly. W. HOLMES, supra note 34, § 6.05.
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restraints in competition injure the public, in the same breath the court found a
public injury even if a party only attempts to impair competition.175
Lasercomb's assumption of public harm also fails to consider that some
seemingly restrictive clauses actually have procompetitive consequences. 176 For
example, by conditioning a license on the licensee's agreement not to create com-
peting items, the licensor must compensate the licensee for the restriction.1 7 7
Such compensation lowers the price for the license, creating a cost savings that
the licensee can pass to the consumer. Although the licensee effectively takes
itself out of the particular market, the agreement should be enforceable unless it
demonstrably violates the Sherman Act's prohibition against contracts that re-
strain trade in a commercially unreasonable manner.178 The overall effect of
ignoring the well-established body of antitrust law and replacing it with a vague
Proof that the defendant already had a substantial market share may satisfy the "dangerous
probability" inquiry. Id.
By holding a grantee liable for attempts to control competition, the Fourth Circuit thus is trying
to have it both ways. It is holding grantees to a higher standard of commercial behavior than those
who do not possess a copyright, but without engaging in any serious economic analysis.
175. Although the Fourth Circuit did not scrutinize rigorously the nature of noncompete
clauses, given the precedents found in patent law, it likely assumed it did not have to. For nearly
fifty years the federal courts have consistently considered noncompete clauses in patent licenses to be
misuse per se. See Compton v. Metal Prod., Inc., 453 F.2d 38, 45 (4th Cir. 1971); Berlenbach v.
Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1964); McCullough v. Kammerer
Corp., 166 F.2d 759, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1948); National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co.,
137 F.2d 255, 256 (3d Cir. 1943); Park-In Theatres v. Paramount Richards Theatres, 90 F. Supp.
730, 734 (D. Del.), aff'd, 185 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1950). One early case, relying in part on Morton
Salt, observed that "[a] patentee's right does not extend to the use of the patent to purge the market
of competing non-patented goods, except of course, through the process of fair competition." Na-
tional Lockwasher Co., 137 F.2d at 256.
Later courts adhered to this view, finding patent misuse when the patentee did not enforce the
noncompete clause, Berlenbach, 329 F.2d at 785, or despite arguments that the licensee had an
implied duty of good faith, under an exclusive license, to exploit the patent and refrain from using
competing nonpatented items. Park-In Theatres, 90 F. Supp. at 733-34. In Park-In Theatres the
patentee argued that the licensee who enjoyed the exclusive right to exploit the patent could choose
to use another nonpatented good, thereby depriving the patentee of any royalties, an act the patentee
considered to be in bad faith. Id. at 733.
Lasercomb advanced essentially the same argument in its brief, asserting that a licensee owes a
"duty of care not to undertake to create a new work to substitute for the licensed work, even though
a stranger to the agreement is entirely free to undertake to create a substitute work." Brief of Plain-
tiff-Appellee at 21. Such a view is supported by some courts and commentators. See Conan Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 353, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H
Computer Systems, 605 F. Supp. 816, 827-28 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER,
supra note 70, § 10.11[B]. Because Lasercomb provided certain codes that permitted a licensee to
convert Interact for the purpose of making the program compatible with the licensee's hardware,
Lasercomb argued that the noncompete license was essential to protect against a licensee misappro-
priating Interact. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 21. This vulnerability to misappropriation is proba-
bly what the district court referred to when it said that "'such a clause is reasonable in light of the
delicate and sensitive area of computer software.'" Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973 (quoting the trial
court's findings). The Lasercomb panel, however, did not address this issue, finding the noncompete
clause to be misuse per se. Id. at 979.
176. See USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510-11 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner,
J.).
177. Id. at 510.
178. See supra note 102 for the language of the statute. One commentator notes that per se
condemnation of noncompete or exclusive dealing arrangements is unwarranted due to certain
procompetitive effects that they may generate. W. HOLMES, supra note 34, § 21.03. Purchasers may
be benefitted, for example, by an assured supply, protection of the purchaser's capital investment,
and ease in long-term planning. Id.
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policy-based doctrine is to generate the debilitating uncertainty of which Judge
Posner warned.17 9
An antitrust-based misuse doctrine is not without problems. One comnen-
tator, in discussing patent misuse, notes that antitrust-based misuse creates two
possible results: Either the limited monopoly is allowed to extend beyond the
grant because there is no antitrust violation, or, if there is a violation, the grantee
is subject to the stem penalties of the antitrust laws, including treble damages
and attorney's fees.180 A policy-based misuse doctrine, therefore, affords an es-
cape valve from those penalties while it enforces the patent laws.' 8 ' In essence,
because policy-based misuse is available, "[tihe full weight of the antitrust laws
is not required" to enforce patent policy.' 8 2 This position, however, necessarily
depends on a belief that the patent and antitrust laws have distinct, if not antag-
onistic, policy goals-a belief that fails to withstand analysis.183
Another factor militating against antitrust-based misuse is the litigation ex-
penses an infringer must incur when seeking to prove the grantee was in re-
straint of trade. The result of these exorbitant expenses is that infringers may
not prosecute some antitrust actions against grantees in restraint of trade.' 8 4
This scenario is especially true in the case of an infringer asserting a collateral
antitrust defense. If the infringing defendant proves misuse because the grantee
violated the antitrust laws, the defendant escapes infringement liability; because
the defendant is not injured by reason of the antitrust violation, however, neither
treble damages nor attorney's fees will be available.18 5 Thus, there is less incen-
tive to litigate the question, 186 although ways are available to avoid this
dilemma.' 8 7
One of the more troubling aspects of a policy-based misuse doctrine is that
enforcement of the policy lies solely in the hands of a copyright infringer. If a
public policy is so important that it warrants depriving a property owner of the
court's protection against theft, why is a thief's conduct the only vehicle for
179. USM Corp., 694 F.2d at 512. Not only is there less certainty due to the nature of a policy-
based misuse, but copyright holders also wil have to speculate whether each practice condemned
under the patent misuse doctrine is equally vulnerable under copyright misuse. See supra notes 77-
83 and accompanying text for the types of conduct constituting patent misuse. If the Fourth Circuit
finds patent and copyright policy in virtual lockstep, may copyright holders now assume that courts
will engage in a market power inquiry in copyright cases involving tying arrangements and package
licensing, as is required only under the patent laws? See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1988). Although prece-
dent exists for importing statutory requirements under the patent laws into copyright doctrine, see
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 434-42 (1984), Lasercomb leaves copyright
owners with only a guess for whether this might be the case.
180. Calkins, supra note 4, at 187.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the patent and anti-
trust laws reflect parallel procompetitive policies.
184. Calkins, supra note 4, at 187.
185. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
186. Note, supra note 5, at 1312 n.106.
187. One commentator suggests two possible solutions. One alternative is permitting the infring-
ing defendant to join the antitrust victim as a codefendant, thereby covering the litigation costs
should the antitrust counterclaim prevail. A second possibility is requiring that the government
intervene to enforce the antitrust laws, which places the litigation expenses on the government. Id.
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enforcing that policy? The pure copyright misuse theory holds that the public
interest is harmed by improper enlargement of the copyright, but such conduct
need not rise to the level of an antitrust violation. By varying the facts of
Lasercomb, one can imagine a situation in which no party has standing to en-
force this presumably important public policy.188 A public policy that relies so
heavily on happenstance and the willful wrongdoing of a private party to enforce
that policy is not much of a policy at all.189
Significantly, the Fourth Circuit did not attempt to address the issue
whether collateral antitrust violations can trigger the misuse defense. 190 The
court instead straddled the fence and found that misuse results from either anti-
trust or public policy violations. 19 1 Because the Fourth Circuit's holding was
grounded in a policy-based misuse, the court did not contemplate the validity of
prior Fourth Circuit caselaw that bars collateral antitrust defenses to copyright
infringement actions. 192 Had it affirmed this principle, while at the same time
deciding Lasercomb as it did, the court would have placed itself in an untenable
position. In both cases the infringing party would be in a position collateral to
the misuse, yet only the grantee who committed the more egregious offense-the
antitrust violator-would still be allowed to enforce an infringement claim.
A better approach would have been to disavow this precedent and distin-
guish collateral antitrust defenses in cases involving contracts and copyrights.
The former involve state-created rights while the latter involve rights created
188. Assuming the defendants had not broken the chronoguard and stolen the software for
themselves, they would not have been liable for infringement and would never have asserted the
copyright misuse defense; Lasercomb then would never have had the incentive to purge its misuse.
If a court found that the noncompete clause withstood an antitrust attack, the clause would remain
in force. At this point the only way to confine Lasercomb to its limited monopoly and discontinue
the anticompetitive conduct would be to use copyright misuse as an affirmative attack on the copy-
right holder. The Lasercomb panel did not need to contemplate this notion, but one court recently
rejected use of the copyright misuse doctrine as "a vehicle for affirmative relief." Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment Servs., 746 F. Supp. 320, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
A party may seek a declaratory judgment on the question of copyright misuse. See id. at 327;
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. American Soc'y of Composers, 400 F. Supp. 737, 771 (SD.N.Y.
1975), rey'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). Yet an affirmative judgment of misuse would permit a party to
infringe with impunity only until the copyright holder purged the misuse. The result here is the
same: enforcement of copyright policy is entirely dependent on one who willfully violates the copy-
right laws.
Judge Posner has also cast doubt on the importance of the policy that is meant to be protected.
In seeking to explain a patent misuse case arising out of the Fourth Circuit. Judge Posner suggested
that misuse doctrine, "unlike antitrust law, condemns any patent licensing practice that is even
trivially anticompetitive, at least if it has no socially beneficial effects." USM Corp. v. SPS Technol-
ogies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982). If so, one may wonder whether "De minimis non
curat lex"--"the law does not care for trifling matters"--holds true in the Fourth Circuit.
189. In denying an antitrust defense to a breach of contract action, Justice Brennan has observed
that "[i]f the defense of illegality is to be allowed as a collateral method of enforcement of the
antitrust laws,... it must be said that [this] creates a very strange class of private attorneys general."
Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 520 (1959). Given the holding in Lasercomb, the Fourth Circuit is in
effect expanding this "very strange class" for the purpose of enforcing an ill-defined public policy.
190. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
191. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
192. M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470,480 (E.D.S.C.), aff'd mem., 2




under federal law. Any judicial repugnance towards injecting federal policy into
disputes governed by state law, therefore, is not warranted in actions already
concerning federal law.193 Furthermore, the rationale that courts should not
use the Sherman Act to divest a copyright holder of her property rights is un-
availing in light of the temporary effect that misuse doctrine has upon a copy-
right. Once the grantee purges her misuse she regains all rights to her property.
Moreover, while the remedies offered by the antitrust laws are said to be exclu-
sive, no rational basis exists for preventing federal courts from employing a well-
established body of legal analysis as a measuring device that is useful in enforc-
ing equally important federal laws. 194 The result in allowing collateral antitrust
violations to constitute misuse involves a trade-off. This choice requires infring-
ers asserting a misuse defense to satisfy the requirements of the antitrust laws. It
balances the burden of meeting this demand against permitting infringers who
have not suffered antitrust injuries to raise the misuse defense. This in turn
broadens the class of copyright holders who will be unable to pursue an infringe-
ment claim and should act as a deterrent to copyright abuse.
Although it is too early to gauge the impact of the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion, it hardly can be welcome news for copyright holders. 195 It remains an
open question, however, whether courts will construe Lasercomb narrowly or
will give it widespread application in infringement actions involving computer
software as well as in other fields. 196
193. But see Gibbs, supra note 5, at 70.
194. See Note, supra note 5, at 1314.
195. The Lasercomb decision already has attracted criticism outside the legal community. One
commentator in the computer software field suggests that the result in Lasercomb is "ridiculous,"
and the product of a judiciary that fails to comprehend that computer software is unique; software is
neither "like a book or a hammer," but an "entirely new beast." Gruenfeld, Copyrights: You Abuse,
You Lose, INFORMATION WEEK, Mar. 18, 1991, at 52.
196. One recent software infringement action suggests that "shrink wrap" or "box top" licenses
may make the licensor vulnerable to charges of copyright misuse. Shrink wrap licenses are often
used in the marketing of consumer software. The license consists of a form attached to the exterior
of the software packaging, which alerts consumers that opening the package binds the consumer to
the terms of the license. 1 L. KurrEN, COMPUTER S6FrwARE, § 8.03[11 (1991). The form then
lists various provisions that seek to control the way the purchaser uses the software. Id.
In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988), the plaintiff copyright
holder brought an infringement action against another software producer, who purportedly was
bound by the terms of the plaintiff's shrink wrap license. In addition to the infringement action, the
plaintiff asserted a claim that the defendant breached its license agreement by decompiling or disas-
sembling the plaintiff's program in violation of a Louisiana statute. Id. at 258. That statute permit-
ted licensors to restrict licensees from decompiling or disassembling computer programs, as well as
enforcing a complete ban on copying the programs. Id. at 269. The Fifth Circuit found that such
restrictions conflict with the Copyright Act, which permits archival copies and copies made as an
essential step in the use of a computer program. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988). The court then held
that the Copyright Act preempted the Louisiana statute, rendering the license agreement unenforce-
able. Vault, 847 F.2d at 270.
The potential application of Lasercomb's misuse doctrine is clear. When the copyright holder
seeks to usurp rights granted under the Copyright Act, this action ostensibly enlarges the grantee's
copyright beyond what was originally contemplated. If a court were to declare the grantee to have
misused the copyright in a case like Vault, the irony is remarkable: a grantee who has relied on a
state legislative expression of what the public policy should be concerning copyrighted programs
now has no remedy against those who infringe.
In areas outside computer software, Lasercomb's implications are less clear-cut. One could
imagine a film or video producer licensing the reproduction and distribution rights to another, on the
condition that the licensee agree not to enter into the business of film or video production. If the
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Despite the uncertain reach of the Fourth Circuit's decision, the Lasercomb
opinion is troubling in its flat rejection of the idea of defining copyright misuse
according to antitrust doctrine. The Fourth Circuit chose not to inquire into the
contested practice's actual effects. The result is that even though a licensing
agreement may be only marginally anticompetitive, have a neutral effect, or in
practice actually have procompetitive consequences, 197 it still will be harmful to
the public interest if it does not fall squarely within the defined bounds of the
statutory grant. This formalistic approach is out of step with modem economic
analysis and even traditional equitable principles of balancing one party's culpa-
bility against the other's. 198 Moreover, opting for a vaguely defined public pol-
icy rationale rather than antitrust principles likely will generate "debilitating
uncertainty" for copyright holders seeking to license their copyrights. 199
Although Lasercomb may be a landmark holding, its celebrity could well be
short-lived. Given the recent congressional attempt to subsume the patent mis-
use defense under antitrust principles, 2°° it may not be long before the Fourth
Circuit is legislatively preempted, at least far more quickly than the languid ju-
risprudential pace that transformed Morton Salt into Lasercomb.
ScoTT A. MISKIMON
licensee were to create an unauthorized derivative work (for example, a film sequel) in violation of
the noncompete clause, Lasercomb's misuse defense would bar any infringement action.
197. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text for the Second Circuit's balancing approach.
199. See supra note 179.
200. See supra note 76.
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An Update on Contract Damages When the Landlord Breaches
the Implied Warranty of Habitability: Surrat v. Newvton and
Allen v. Simmons
By enacting the Residential Rental Agreements Act in 1977,1 the North
Carolina General Assembly established an implied warranty of habitability in
residential leases.2 The Act, however, does not specify the damages that a ten-
ant may recover if her landlord violates the implied warranty. Ten years after
the enactment of the statute, in Miller v. C. W. Myers Trading Post,3 the North
Carolina Court of Appeals adopted a "benefit of the bargain" formula for com-
puting such damages.4 This measure of damages seeks to put the plaintiff in the
position she would have attained if the defendant had performed his contract
duty.5
In Surratt v. Newton 6 and Allen v. Simmons 7 the court of appeals added
substance to the structure it had established in Miller. Most notably, the court
placed a "rent paid" ceiling on the Miller formula for damages; 8 defined the
contract rights of tenants who ceased paying rent before vacating their rental
units;9 and held that the actions of the breaching landlord may constitute unfair
trade practices, for which the landlord may be liable for treble damages. 10
This Note examines the court's opinions in Surratt and Allen in light of
judicial precedent and the Residential Rental Agreements Act. The Note con-
cludes that the holdings are reasonable, although not clearly expressed. The
Note then offers three principles to guide future holdings, focusing primarily on
reducing the uncertainty surrounding legal liability in this area.
Plaintiff Katherine Surratt rented a house in Winston-Salem, North Caro-
lina from 1974 or 1975 through March 1987.11 Defendant Jerry Newton was
the rental agent and property manager responsible for the house during the last
fourteen months of her tenancy. 12 Plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to re-
spond to her many requests for repairs of defective conditions existing in the
1. Residential Rental Agreements Act, ch. 770, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1006 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-38 to -44 (1984)).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(a) (1984). An implied warranty of habitability requires a land-
lord to deliver and maintain habitable premises. See R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LAND-
LORD AND TENANT § 3:16, at 127 (1980).
3. 85 N.C. App. 362, 355 S.E.2d 189 (1987).
4. Id. at 371, 355 S.E.2d at 194.
5. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACrS § 12.1, at 840 (2d ed. 1990).
6. 99 N.C. App. 396, 393 S.E.2d 554 (1990).
7. 99 N.C. App. 636, 394 S.E.2d 478 (1990).
8. Id. at 642, 394 S.E.2d at 482; Surratt, 99 N.C. App. at 407, 393 S.E.2d at 560.
9. Allen, 99 N.C. App. at 641-42, 394 S.E.2d at 482; Surratt, 99 N.C. App. at 407, 393 S.E.2d
at 560.
10. Allen, 99 N.C. App. at 645, 394 S.E.2d at 484.
11. Surratt, 99 N.C. App. at 399, 393 S.E.2d at 556.
12. Id. at 400, 393 S.E.2d at 556. For Ms. Surratt's entire tenancy before 1986, Paul Jeffrey
Newton, d/b/a Newton Brothers, was the rental agent. He was also a defendant in Surratt's suit,
but the trial court dismissed his appeal based on his failure to file a notice of appeal within ten days
of the judgment. The court of appeals affirmed this dismissal. Id. at 400-03, 393 S.E.2d at 556-58.
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house throughout her occupancy.13 These conditions included "electrical fail-
ures, flooding of sewage and water into the house, rodent infestation, and other
deteriorating conditions throughout the house." 14 Plaintiff ceased paying rent
in November 1986, which precipitated a summary ejectment action by defend-
ant.15 The court entered judgment against plaintiff, and she vacated the prem-
ises at the end of February or the beginning of March of 1987.16
In March 1987 Surratt appealed to the district court for a trial de novo and
filed an answer asserting that she owed no rent because the defendants had failed
to maintain the premises in a safe and habitable condition. 17 In addition to
moving to dismiss the summary ejectment claim, plaintiff counterclaimed for
rent abatement and other consequential and actual damages.' 8 Defendant vol-
untarily dismissed the summary ejectment action and moved for summary judg-
ment on plaintiff's counterclaims, but the court denied the motion and plaintiff
prevailed on the merits of the counterclaims. 19 Defendant then appealed to the
North Carolina Court of Appeals. 20
Newton's appeal raised several issues concerning the nature and extent of
landlord liability under the Residential Rental Agreements Act. 21 Judge Eagles,
writing for the court, first defined the extent of damages that a tenant can receive
in a rent abatement action. The court disagreed with defendant's contention
Ms. Surratt reached a settlement with the owners of the rental house, who were also defendants in
the original action. Id. at 399, 393 S.E.2d at 556.






19. Id. at 400-01, 393 S.E.2d at 556.
20. Id. at 401, 393 S.E.2d at 557.
21. The Residential Rental Agreements Act provides in relevant part:
(a) The landlord shall:
(1) Comply with the current applicable building and housing codes, whether
enacted before or after October 1, 1977, to the extent required by the operation of
such codes;...
(2) Make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises
in a fit and habitable condition;
(3) Keep all common areas of the premises in safe condition; and
(4) Maintain in good and safe working order and promptly repair all electrical,
plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air conditioning, and other facilities and
appliances supplied or required to be supplied by him provided that notification
of needed repairs is made to the landlord in writing by the tenant except in emer-
gency situations.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(a) (1984).
The court also rejected defendant Newton's argument that he was not a proper defendant. Sur-
ratt, 99 N.C. App. at 403-05, 393 S.E.2d at 558-59. The court held that Newton was a "landlord,"
defined for the purposes of the Act as "any owner and any rental management company, rental
agency, or any other person having the actual or apparent authority of an agent to perform the
duties imposed by this Article." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-40(3) (1984). The court distinguished the
case from its earlier holding in Collingwood v. General Elec. Real Estate Equities, 89 N.C. App. 656,
659, 366 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1988), rev'd in part on other grounds, 324 N.C. 63, 376 S.E.2d 425 (1989),
that a property manager is not liable for defects in design and construction. Surralt, 99 N.C. App. at
404-05, 393 S.E.2d at 558-59.
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that he was liable for no more than the amount of his rental commission. 22
Instead, the court based the damages recoverable on the damages formula it had
adopted in Miller:
"[A] tenant may recover damages in the form of a rent abatement cal-
culated as the difference between the fair rental value of the premises if
as warranted (i.e. in full compliance with G.S. 42-42(a)) and the fair
rental value of the premises in their unfit condition for any period of
the tenant's occupancy during which the finder of fact determines the
premises were uninhabitable, plus any special or consequential dam-
ages alleged and proved."' 23
The court qualified this rent abatement formula, however, by declaring that "the
amount of rent paid is a limit on recovery." 24 Thus, the Surratt court employed
a literal reading of Miller, which had found a cause of action "'for recovery of
rent paid.' ",25 Thus, a more precise statement of the rent abatement formula is:
the lesser of (1) fair rental value as warranted less fair rental value "as is," and
(2) the rent paid during the period that the premises were uninhabitable.
In addition, the Surratt court addressed the nature of the tenant's responsi-
bilities in the following three aspects of a rent abatement claim: The require-
ment of notice to the landlord concerning defective conditions; the evidence used
to establish fair rental values; and the consequence of withholding rent. Defend-
ant argued that a tenant cannot recover for defects that fall under section 42-
42(a)(4), which includes "electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air
conditioning, and other facilities and appliances,"'26 if she has failed to provide
the landlord with the written notice required under that subsection. 27 The court
rejected that argument, noting that the jury had found that the orally requested
repairs were needed to put the house in "fit and habitable condition." 28 Because
section 42-42(a)(2), which requires the landlord to "put and keep the premises in
a fit and habitable condition," 29 does not explicitly require written notice from
the tenant, the court held that "where the conditions enumerated in G.S. 42-
42(a)(4) are the same conditions that render the premises unfit and uninhabit-
able no written notice is required under the statute."30
Defendant next argued that the damages awarded were contrary to the evi-
dence of fair market value produced at trial.31 In response, the court noted that
defendant himself had testified that the house had a fair rental value of $600 per
22. Surratt, 99 N.C. App. at 406-07, 393 S.E.2d at 560 ("No lesser measure of damages is
recoverable against a landlord (as defined by G.S. 42-40(3)) merely because he is not the owner but is
an agent.").
23. Id. at 406, 393 S.E.2d at 560 (quoting Miller v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, 85 N.C. App.
362, 371, 355 S.E.2d 189, 194 (1987)).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 407, 393 S.E.2d at 560 (quoting Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 368, 355 S.E.2d at 193).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(a)(4) (1984); see supra note 21.
27. Surratt, 99 N.C. App. at 405, 393 S.E.2d at 559.
28. Id.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(a)(2).
30. Surratt, 99 N.C. App. at 405-06, 393 S.E.2d at 559.
31. Id. at 408, 393 S.E.2d at 561. Specifically, he contended that plaintiff had failed to prove
that the fair rental value of the house was different from the amount of rent charged. Id.
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month and that "it only rented for less because of the nature of the neighbor-
hood." 32 Noting also that the plaintiff testified to an "as is" rental value of
between $100 and $150, the court held the testimony to be sufficient for the jury
to determine damages. 33
Finally, the court agreed with defendant that the jury could not award rent
abatement damages for the period that plaintiff had withheld rent payments,
although it rejected his rationale for this conclusion. 34 Defendant argued that
the Residential Rental Agreements Act's provision that "[t]he tenant may not
unilaterally withhold rent prior to a judicial determination of a right to do so"135
precluded rent abatement during the period of rent withholding. 36 Instead of
accepting this argument, the court simply characterized rent abatement as a re-
fund of all or part of rent actually paid and held, in effect, that one cannot
refund an amount never paid. 37 The court noted, however, that there is "noth-
ing in the Act" to preclude entirely a tenant from collecting damages because
she withholds rent; she just may not collect damages for the period of the
withholding.38
Significantly, the Surratt court split on the fundamental question of exactly
how rent abatement relates to an action for breach of the warranty of habitabil-
ity. Judge Eagles distinguished an action for rent abatement from an action for
breach of the warranty of habitability.39 He stated, "Since the pleadings here
pray for relief in rent abatement and do not seek damages for breach of the
covenant of habitability, we expressly decline to address here the issue of
whether damages for the breach of a covenant of habitability are limited to the
amount of rent paid." 4 Judge Greene, who concurred in the result, took issue
with the court's "suggestion... that an action in rent abatement somehow dif-
fers from an action for breach of warranty for habitability. '4 1 He characterized
rent abatement as only one of the remedies available for a breach of the warranty
of habitability.42
In Allen the court of appeals reviewed a fact pattern similar to that in Sur-
ratt. Defendant Warnell Simmons rented a house from Scott Realty, the agent
for plaintiff Harvey Allen, after Scott Realty allegedly agreed to make specified
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 407, 393 S.E.2d at 560.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-44(c) (1984).
36. Surratt, 99 N.C. App. at 407, 393 S.E.2d at 560.
37. Id.
38. Id. In an opinion concurring in the result, Judge Greene went further in explaining the
position of a tenant who has withheld rent in response to the landlord's failure to provide fit prem-
ises. Judge Greene stated that such a tenant, as a defendant in a summary ejectment action, can seek
an abatement of rent due. Under those circumstances, however, Judge Greene would modify the
court's rent abatement formula by replacing the "as warranted" term with "agreed rent." Id. at 411,
393 S.E.2d at 562 (Greene, J., concurring in result).
39. Id. at 409, 393 S.E.2d at 561.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 411, 393 S.E.2d at 562 (Greene, J., concurring in result).
42. Id. (Greene, J., concurring in result). Judge Greene identified special and consequential
damages as two other remedies for a breach of the warranty. Id. (Greene, J., concurring in result).
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repairs prior to occupancy.4 3 Defendant alleged that Scott Realty failed to make
the repairs before she moved into the house in November 1985 and failed to
correct defects brought to its attention throughout her tenancy.44 Simmons oc-
cupied the house until July 1987, although she ceased paying rent after August
1986.45 Defendant's initial rent withholding occurred concurrently with the
Winston-Salem Housing Services Department's declaration, issued on Septem-
ber 5, 1986, that the house was unfit for human habitation.4
Allen brought a summary ejectment action and prevailed in an April 1987
hearing in magistrate's court.47 Defendant then appealed to the district court
and, in addition, counterclaimed for rent abatement and damages for fraud, in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, and unfair and deceptive trade prac-
tices. 48 The district court entered directed verdicts on all of the counterclaims
against the defendant, and she appealed. 49 The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's directed verdicts on the fraud5° and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress51 counterclaims, but reversed the trial court on the other counts,
finding sufficient evidence to reach the jury on the rent abatement5 2 and unfair
trade practice claims.53
In the majority opinion, Judge Eagles reiterated his Surratt position that,
section 42-44(c) notwithstanding,54 a tenant's withholding of rent does not bar
him from recovering damages, except rent abatement for the period of withhold-
ing.55 His discussion of rent abatement, including the formula for determining
damages, mirrored his Surratt opinion.56 Judge Eagles again distinguished be-
tween an action for rent abatement and an action for breach of the implied war-
43. Allen, 99 N.C. App. at 638, 394 S.E.2d at 480. "The defects included: holes in some of the
walls; a damaged faucet on the kitchen sink, electrical problems, plumbing that leaked in the bath-
room and in the basement; a damaged commode; a damaged hot water heater; fleas; broken glass;
and no furnace." Id.
44. Id. These alleged ongoing problems included pipes bursting from lack of heat, rats entering
through holes in the walls, and a fire caused by defective wires. The defendant testified that a fur-
nace was not installed until the day before she vacated the house. Id. at 638-39, 394 S.E.2d at 480.
45. Id. at 638, 394 S.E.2d at 480.
46. Id. at 639, 394 S.E.2d at 480.
47. Id. at 638, 394 S.E.2d at 480.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 640, 394 S.E.2d at 481.
50. Id. at 643, 394 S.E.2d at 483 (finding "no evidence that at the time of his promise plaintiff
intended not to make the repairs" he promised to make).
51. Id. at 646, 394 S.E.2d at 484 (finding no evidence of serious mental distress or other bodily
harm).
52. Id. at 642, 394 S.E.2d at 482.
53. Id. at 645, 394 S.E.2d at 484. Unfair trade practices are addressed in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-1.1 (1988). Subsection (a) provides: "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." Id. § 75-
1.1(a). The statute defines commerce broadly to include "all business activities," id. § 75-1.1(b),
although it expressly excludes services rendered by someone in a "learned profession" and certain
activities of advertising media. Id. § 75-1.1(b), (c).
54. The Residential Rental Agreements Act provides that the "tenant may not unilaterally
withhold rent." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42.44(c) (1984); see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
55. Allen, 99 N.C. App. at 642, 394 S.E.2d at 482.
56. See id. at 641-42, 394 S.E.2d at 482; supra notes 22-40 and accompanying text.
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ranty of habitability.57 "Tenants may bring an action seeking damages for
breach of the implied warranty of habitability and may also seek rent abatement
for their landlord's breach of the statute," s58 he stated.
The court also found that defendant had presented evidence from which a
jury could find that plaintiff had committed an unfair trade practice under sec-
tion 75-1. 1.9 After determining that Simmons and Allen were proper parties to
such an action, 6° the court noted that Simmons provided evidence that plaintiff
failed to respond to numerous notices concerning the unfit and uninhabitable
condition of the house.6 1 The court placed special significance on the fact that,
"[d]espite the unfit conditions of the house, Scott Realty attempted to collect
rent."' 62 It found that "[Allen's] behavior [could] be considered 'immoral, un-
ethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.' "63
Evidence that Simmons suffered additional expenses because of the unfit condi-
tions was the final element cited by the court in finding that a jury should have
determined the unfair trade practice issueA4
Surratt and Allen are the latest chapters in North Carolina landlord and
tenant law as it has evolved since the enactment of the Residential Rental Agree-
ments Act in 1977. Prior to the Act, the common-law doctrine of caveat emptor
applied to residential leases in North Carolina and absolved landlords of any
duty to maintain and repair the leased premises. 65 Courts in the United States
applied this common-law concept into the 1960s.66 By the late 1970s, approxi-
mately one-third of the states had moved away from caveat emptor by judicial
creation of landlord duties under an implied warranty of habitability.67 Also
during this period, adoption of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act (URLTA),68 which includes an implied warranty of habitability, established
a statutory implied warranty in an equivalent number of states.69 Courts now
57. Allen, 99 N.C. App. at 641, 394 S.E.2d at 482.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 645, 394 S.E.2d at 484.
60. Id. at 644, 394 S.E.2d at 483. Plaintiff was a physician who owned the house rented by
Simmons and retained Scott Realty as rental agent. Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 9, Allen (No.
8921DC1155). Dr. Allen argued that he was not in the business of real estate. Id. Finding Scott
Realty to be in the business of real estate, however, the court used the concept of agency to find
Allen to be a proper deflendant in the unfair trade practice action. See Allen, 99 N.C. App. at 644,
394 S.E.2d at 483.
61. Allen, 99 N.C. App. at 644, 394 S.E.2d at 484.
62. Id. at 644-45, 394 S.E.2d at 484. "[P]laintiff even went to defendant's house in February
1987 in an effort to collect past due rent for the unfit house." Id.
63. Id. at 645, 394 S.E.2d at 484 (quoting Mosley & Mosley Builders, Inc. v. Landin Ltd., 97
N.C. App. 511, 517, 389 S.E.2d 576, 579, disc, rev. denied, 326 N.C. 801, 393 S.E.2d 898 (1990)),
64. Id.
65. Fillette, North Carolina's Residential Rental Agreements Act: New Developments for Con-
tract and Tort Liability in Landlord-Tenant Relations, 56 N.C.L. REv. 785, 785 (1978).
66. See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.38, at
313 (1984).
67. See id. at 314.
68. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT, 7B U.L.A. 427 (1985). The North
Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act is patterned after the Uniform Act. See Residential
Rental Agreements Act, ch. 770, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1006 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 42-38 to -44 (1984)).
69. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 2, § 3:31, at 152.
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recognize an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases in all but a
handful of jurisdictions.70
Generally, when a landlord breaches the implied warranty of habitability,
the tenant is entitled to vacate the premises and terminate the lease. 71 It is not
necessary for a rental unit to be "literally uninhabitable" for a breach to occur.72
Thus, a tenant can seek relief for the landlord's breach while continuing in occu-
pancy of an unfit unit, or she may seek relief after vacating the premises for the
period during which she occupied the premises. 73
Courts have developed at least three different formulas to calculate the
damages suffered by a tenant occupying an unfit rental unit.74 First, courts can
measure the damages as the difference between the fair rental value of the prem-
ises as warranted and the fair rental value of the premises in their unfit condi-
tion, or "as is."'75 This approach seeks to compensate the tenant for the loss of
her bargain.76 Second, courts may compute the damages as the difference be-
tween the agreed rent and the "as is" fair rental value.77 This view effectively
requires that the tenant pay the fair rental value of the defective premises. 78
Third, the damages may be a percentage of the agreed rent representing the
percentage reduction in the tenant's use and enjoyment of the premises resulting
from the breach. 79 In a modified version of the third formula, the court uses the
"as warranted" and "as is" fair market values in computing the percentage to be
applied to the agreed rent in calculating damages.80 When the court computes
damages as a percentage of agreed rent, the resulting reduction in the rent obli-
gation commonly is called a rent abatement.81
In addition to collecting damages for the landlord's breach, the tenant may
assert a breach of the implied warranty of habitability as a defense to an action
for rent.8 2 This defense is a consequence of the tenant's right to terminate the
lease following the landlord's breach,8 3 which precludes the landlord from col-
lecting the full agreed rent during a period when unfit conditions constituting a
70. See id. § 3:16, at 67 n.30 (Supp. 1990) (implied warranty of habitability not recognized by
courts in Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Oregon, and South Carolina).
71. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 66, § 6.41, at 333. This
entitlement derives from the mutuality of landlord and tenant obligations under a lease. Id. Termi-
nation of a lease in this manner is "very similar to a traditional 'constructive eviction' based on the
landlord's failure to perform an express covenant to maintain the premises." Id. at 333 n.3.
72. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 2, § 3:17, at 68 (Supp. 1990).
73. See id.
74. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 66, § 6.42, at 336.
75. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 2, § 3:25, at 141-42.
76. Id. at 141.
77. Id. at 142.
78. Id.
79. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 66, § 6.42, at 337.
80. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 2, § 3:25, at 142-43. It is not obvious that this modified
formula produces a different measure of damages than the formula it modifies.
81. Id. Rent is abated when damages constitute an effective refund of prior rent payments or
when a tenant who has withheld rent is relieved of the obligation to pay all or part of past due rent.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 4 (6th ed. 1990).
82. R. SCHOSHINKSKI, supra note 2, § 3:22, at 136.
83. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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breach exist.84 Indeed, in the landmark implied warranty case of Javins v. First
National Realty Corp. 85 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit went even further and held that a breach-of-implied-warranty
defense could be used not only in an action for nonpayment of rent, but also in
an action for possession. 86
The first recognition of an implied warranty of habitability in North Caro-
lina was judicial.87 In 1974 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that such a
warranty applies to the sale of newly constructed houses. 88 The following year,
however, the court of appeals refused to recognize an implied warranty of habit-
ability in residential leases.89 The North Carolina General Assembly countered
that decision by enacting the Residential Rental Agreements Act in 1977.90 The
Act provides that the tenant's obligations to pay rent and maintain clean prem-
ises and the landlord's obligation to provide fit premises are mutually depen-
dent.91 The landlord's obligation includes specific responsibilities concerning
building and housing code compliance, common-area maintenance, and mainte-
nance of electrical and other facilities, and a general responsibility to "[m]ake all
repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and
habitable condition." 92 The statute does not delineate specific remedies, but
provides that "[a]ny right or obligation declared by this Chapter is enforceable
by civil action, in addition to other remedies of law and in equity.' '93
Because the Act lacks specificity concerning a tenant's remedies for land-
lord violations of the Act, the North Carolina Court of Appeals began filling the
void. The initial cases before the court of appeals were tort actions involving
personal injury and wrongful death. 94 In those cases, the court found landlords
to be in violation of the Act in instances of dimly lit steps in a common area,95
failure to repair steps of the rental unit, 96 and failure to repair a heating flue.97
84. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 2, § 3:21, at 136.
85. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
86. Id. at 1082.
87. Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 62, 209 S.E.2d 776, 783 (1974).
88. Id. (implied warranty that house is free of major structural defects and satisfies worlnan-
like quality standard).
89. Knuckles v. Spaugh, 26 N.C. App. 340, 340, 215 S.E.2d 825, 826, cert. denied, 288 N.C.
241, 217 S.E.2d 665 (1975).
90. Residential Rental Agreements Act, ch. 770, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1006 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-38 to -44 (1984)).
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-41 (1984).
92. Id. § 42-42(a). For a further explanation of § 42-42(a), see supra note 21.
93. N.C. GSEN. STAT. § 42-44(a) (1984). The other two provisions of this section, however,
limit the right to recover for violations of the Act by providing that "[tihe tenant may not unilater-
ally withhold rent prior to ajudicial determination of a right to do so" and that "[a] violation of this
Article shall not constitute negligence per se." Id. § 42-44(c), (d).
94. See Jackson v. Housing Auth., 73 N.C. App. 363, 364, 326 S.E.2d 295, 296 (1985), aff'd,
316 N.C. 259, 341 S.E.2d 523 (1986); Brooks v. Francis, 57 N.C. App. 556, 557, 291 S.E.2d 889, 890
(1982); Allen v. Equity & Investors Mgt. Corp., 56 N.C. App. 706, 706, 289 S.E.2d 623, 624 (1982);
O'Neal v. Kellett, 55 N.C. App. 225, 226, 284 S.E.2d 707, 709 (1981); Lenz v. Ridgewood Assocs.,
55 N.C. App. 115, 116, 284 S.E.2d 702, 703 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 300, 290 S.E2d 702
(1982).
95. O'Neal, 55 N.C. App. at 228, 284 S.E.2d at 710.
96. Brooks, 57 N.C. App. at 559-60, 291 S.E.2d at 891.
97. Jackson, 73 N.C. App. at 369, 326 S.E.2d at 299.
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In Miller,9" decided in 1987, the court of appeals first addressed the issue of
contract remedies under the Residential Rental Agreements Act. The plaintiffs
rented a house from defendant for over six years before bringing suit and sought
recovery of rent paid for premises that defendant allegedly failed to maintain in
a fit and habitable condition as required by the Act. 99 In reversing the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for defendant, the Miller court held that the
Act provides "an affirmative cause of action to a tenant for recovery of rent paid
based on the landlord's noncompliance with [section] 42-42(a)."'10 The court
based its damages formula on two premises. First, the court stated, "[tihe im-
plied warranty of habitability entitles a tenant in possession of leased premises to
the value of the premises as warranted, which may be greater than the rent
agreed upon or paid."10 1 Second, the court ruled that a tenant in possession of
defective housing is "liable only for the reasonable value, if any, of his use of the
property in its defective condition."10 2 The court then declared the formula for
damages "in the form of a rent abatement" to be the difference between the
rental unit's fair rental value as warranted and its fair rental value "as is".1 °3
In another 1987 case, Cotton v. Stanley,1° 4 the court commented further on
the application of the Miller formula for computing damages arising from a
landlord's breach.10 5 The court held that the illegality of renting housing that
violates a housing code does not automatically establish a fair market value of
zero for such housing in possession of a plaintiff tenant.10 6 Dismissing the de-
fendant's contention that plaintiffs must produce direct evidence of the two fair
rental values in the damage formula, however, the court held that "[tihe fair
rental value of property may be determined 'by proof of what the premises
would rent for in the open market, or by evidence of other facts from which the
fair rental value of the premises may be determined.' "107 The court found that
the rent to which the parties agreed was nonbinding evidence of the fair rental
value as warranted, and that the jurors' personal experience with housing to-
gether with descriptions of the premises from plaintiffs and a building inspector
were sufficient for the jury to determine a fair rental value "as is".10 8 Thus,
98. Miller v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, 85 N.C. App. 362, 355 S.E.2d 189 (1987).
99. Id. at 364-65, 355 S.E.2d at 190-91. For the landlord's maintenance obligations under the
Act, see supra note 21.
100. Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 368, 355 S.E.2d at 193. The court stated that "[t]he action for a
rent abatement for breach of an implied warranty is wholly contractual." Id. at 371, 355 S.E.2d at
195.
101. Id. at 370, 355 S.E.2d at 194. The court explicitly held that renting unfit housing at a "fair"
rental value for that property would not free a landlord from obligations under the Residential
Rental Agreement Act. Id.
102. Id. at 370-71, 355 S.E.2d at 194.
103. Id. at 371, 355 S.E.2d at 194; see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
104. 86 N.C. App. 534, 358 S.E.2d 692, disc rev. denied, 321 N.C. 296, 362 S.E.2d 779 (1987).
105. The court of appeals also affirmed the right of a group of tenants to bring a class action for
breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Id. at 539, 358 S.E.2d at 696.
106. Id. at 538, 358 S.E.2d at 695. "The measure of the unit's fair rental value is not the price at
which the owner could lawfully rent the unit to a new tenant in the open market, but the price at
which he could rent it if it were lawful for him to do so." Id.
107. Id. at 539, 358 S.E.2d at 695 (quoting Brewington v. Loughran, 183 N.C. 558, 565, 112 S.E.
257, 260 (1922)) (emphasis added in Cotton).
108. Id.
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Cotton provided broad leeway regarding the evidence that a tenant can intro-
duce for the valuation of damages under the Miller formula.
Any action potentially affecting the damages recoverable in a consumer suit
may also involve a claim of unfair trade practices. 109 The court of appeals has
held that the rental of residential housing is in the nature of "trade or com-
merce" within the meaning of section 75-1.1 of the North Carolina General Stat-
utes, the unfair trade practice statutes. 110 In one case, a state district court
judge found that the defendants committed an unfair trade practice when they
"violated the North Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act and the Ten-
ant Security Deposit Act." '111 The trial judge assessed damages of $240, which
was the amount of the security deposit, and trebled the damages to $720.112
In Surratt and Allen the North Carolina Court of Appeals added a rent-
paid ceiling to its previously stated formula for contract damages arising from a
landlord's violation of the implied warranty of habitability, while addressing for
the first time the effect of rent withholding on the tenant's rights in an implied
warranty action. The Surratt court established the rent paid by the tenant as a
cap on the damages otherwise collectible under the court's "benefit of the bar-
gain" formula. 13 The court determined that it had prescribed such a cap by its
prior characterization of a tenant's action as "'recovery of rent paid.' "114
The Surratt court's imposition of an agreed rent ceiling on the damages
formula might have been influenced by the Miller court's use of the "rent abate-
ment" label in the formula.1 15 Generally, rent abatement and benefit of the bar-
gain measures are distinct implied warranty damage measures.116 One might
view the court's new formula, however, as a merger of the two concepts. In this
merger, the court has chosen to use agreed rent as a variable in the "rent abate-
ment" formula while abandoning the "percentage of rent" damage measure nor-
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988). The court will award treble damages when those dam-
ages result from an unfair trade practice. Id. § 75-16.
110. Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 516, 239 S.E.2d 574, 583 (1977), disc. rev. denied, 294
N.C. 441, 241 S.E.2d 843 (1978). For a discussion of the unfair trade practices statute, see supra
note 53.
111. Borders v. Newton, 68 N.C. App. 768, 769, 315 S.E.2d 731, 731 (1984) (renting a dwelling
that was under a condemnation order). The court of appeals dealt only indirectly with the unfair
trade practice concept, ruling that the plaintiffs could not recover fraud damages because they had
already recovered treble damages for the same conduct under the unfair trade practices statute. The
court thereby implied that a violation of the Residential Rental Agreements Act could constitute an
unfair trade practice. See id. at 770, 315 S.E.2d at 732.
The Tenant Security Deposit Act, ch. 914, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1237, is codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-50 (1984).
112. Borders, 68 N.C. App. at 770, 315 S.E.2d at 731.
113. Surratt, 99 N.C. App. at 406, 393 $.E.2d at 560; see supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
114. Surratt, 99 N.C. App. at 407, 393 $.E.2d at 560 (quoting Miller v. C.W. Myers Trading
Post, 85 N.C. App. 362, 368, 355 S.E.2d 189, 193 (1987)). To at least one commentator, however,
such a conclusion is not inevitable. See Note, Miller v. C.W. Myers Trading Post: North Carolina
Adopts Expansive Tenant Remedies for Violations of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 66 N.C,L.
REv. 1276, 1285 (1988) ("[The actual rent paid is not considered in the damage formula" in
Miller.).
115. Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 366, 355 S.E.2d at 191; see supra text accompanying note 23.
116. See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 2, § 3:25, at 141-43.
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mally associated with rent abatement.11 7 If the "as warranted" rental value
exceeds the agreed rent, the tenant might recover damages in excess of those
awarded under a traditional rent abatement formula, but, as under traditional
rent abatement, damages will not exceed the agreed rent.
Use of an "as warranted" benchmark in computing damages is consistent
with the Miller court's concept that the implied warranty of habitability gives
the tenant a statutory entitlement to habitable premises.1 18 This recognition of
the tenant's legitimate expectation interest119 parallels the Uniform Commercial
Code's basic contract principle that "the aggrieved party [should] be put in as
good a position as if the other party had fully performed." 120 The "as war-
ranted" measure of damages raises the possibility that the damages would ex-
ceed the agreed rent when the landlord and tenant agree to the rental of unfit
housing at a rent significantly below the "as warranted" value. 121 One might
view this result as a reasonable consequence of renting unfit housing or, alterna-
tively, as "the patently absurd result that the landlord would have to pay the
tenant for occupying the unit."1 22 Under similar circumstances, a damage mea-
sure of agreed rent minus fair rental value "as is" would yield zero damages, "at
least where the [unfit] condition of the dwelling unit has not worsened since the
beginning of the tenancy."12 3 This result would appear to be a clear violation of
section 42-42(b), which bars an explicit or implicit waiver of the implied war-
ranty by the tenant.1 24
The court's agreed-rent cap on the damage formula is a compromise be-
tween an unrestricted benefit of the bargain formula and a formula providing
damages only to the extent that the "as is" value falls below the agreed rent.
The court's seemingly flexible evidence requirements for proving fair rental val-
ues in Cotton 125 and Surratt12 6 create for landlords uncertainty concerning
their potential liability, even under the Surratt compromise formula. To reduce
this uncertainty by requiring expert testimony would add to the litigation costs
of tenant-plaintiffs, many of whom have low incomes. 127 The percentage dimi-
nution approach, a rent abatement damage measure based on the percentage
reduction in use and enjoyment resulting from the landlord's breach applied to
the agreed rent, eliminates much of the uncertainty and cost of using fair rental
117. Id. at 142-43.
118. See Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 370, 355 S.E.2d at 194 (the tenant is entitled to the as-war-
ranted value of the leased housing).
119. E. FARNSwoRTH, supra note 5, § 12.1, at 840.
120. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1989).
121. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 66, § 6.42, at 338.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 337.
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(b) (1984) ("The landlord is not released of his obligations under
any part of this section by the tenant's explicit or implicit acceptance of the landlord's failure to
provide premises complying with this section. .. ").
125. See Cotton v. Stanley, 86 N.C. App. 534, 539, 358 S.E.2d 692, 695, disc rev. denied, 321
N.C. 296, 362 S.E.2d 779 (1987); supra text accompanying notes 104-08.
126. See Surratt, 99 N.C. App. at 408, 393 S.E.2d at 561; supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
127. See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 2, § 3:25, at 143.
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values. 128
A broader perspective from which to evaluate damages for breach of the
implied warranty of habitability would be that of public housing policy. One
commentator, for example, has argued against adopting a percentage diminution
approach by asserting that it would not discourage the practice of renting unfit
housing at rents below as-warranted values. 129 From a policy standpoint, the
potential tradeoff resulting from alternative damage formulas rests between a
higher rate of compliance with the implied warranty obligations, obtained by
using a liberal damages formula, and a more ample stock of housing for low
income persons, albeit with a lower warranty compliance rate, obtained through
a damages formula rendering more modest awards. 130 Because the Residential
Rental Agreements Act is only one small piece in the array of federal, state, and
local housing laws and programs, however, the North Carolina courts are better
situated to apply contract law principles in fashioning a damages formula than
to incorporate economic analysis of the housing market into their choice of
remedies. 131
The extent to which the Surratt damages formula fills in the picture con-
cerning tenant remedies for landlord breach is diminished further by Judge Ea-
gles's distinction between rent abatement and damages for breach of implied
warranty. 13 2 Although Judge Greene appropriately criticized this distinction in
his concurring opinion in Surratt,133 Judge Eagles stated the distinction in even
stronger terms in his opinion for the Allen court. 134 Perhaps Judge Eagles sim-
ply was referring to the concluding phrase of the Miller damage formula state-
ment, which allowed, in addition to rent abatement, "any special or
consequential damages alleged and proved." 135 Subsequent opinions have
quoted this provision, 136 but an alternative interpretation of Judge Eagles's
opinion is that the court remains open to alternatives or additions to its rent
abatement formula.
A potential avenue for expanding tenant remedies presents itself when a
landlord's actions in violation of the Residential Rental Agreements Act rise to
the level of an unfair trade practice. In Borders v. Newton 137 the court of ap-
128. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 66, § 6.42, at 338.
129. Note, Property Law-A Fresh Look at Contractual Tenant Remedies Under the North Caro-
lina Residential RentalAgreements Act-Miller v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, Inc., 10 CAMPBELL L.
REv. 167, 191 (1987).
130. See Note, supra note 114, at 1287-89.
131. Government income maintenance programs, such as rent subsidy programs and direct in-
come redistribution programs, also enter into the broader housing policy milieu. See id. at 1289.
132. Surratt, 99 N.C. at 409, 393 S.E.2d at 561 (claim was for "rent abatement and.., not ...
damages for breach of the covenant of habitability"); see supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
133. Surratt, 99 N.C. at 411, 393 S.E.2d at 562 (Greene, J., concurring in result) (rent abatement
is a measure of damages for breach of implied warranty); see supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
134. Allen, 99 N.C. App. at 641, 394 S.E.2d at 482 (raising possibility that a tenant bringing
action for breach of implied warranty "may also seek rent abatement"); see supra text accompanying
notes 57-58.
135. Miller v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, 85 N.C. App. 362, 371, 355 S.E.2d 189, 194 (1987).
136. Allen, 99 N.C. App. at 641, 394 S.E.2d at 482; Surratt, 99 N.C. App. at 406, 393 S.E.2d at
560; Cotton v. Stanley, 86 N.C. App. 534, 537, 358 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1987).
137. 68 N.C. App. 768, 315 S.E.2d 731 (1984); see supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
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peals left undisturbed a district court holding in support of such an action. 138
Similarly, the Allen court found that the tenant had presented evidence from
which a jury could find an unfair trade practice.1 39 The court left unanswered,
however, the question of which damages would be subject to the treble damages
provision of section 75-16.140 The district court in Borders trebled a security
deposit as damages.1 4 1 Arguably, the court-ordered return of a security deposit
is analogous to court-ordered rent abatement. This analogy would support the
court trebling damages calculated by the Miller rent abatement formula when a
landlord's violation of the Residential Rental Agreements Act rises to the level
of an unfair trade practice. By allowing such an award, the court would penal-
ize significantly those landlords who egregiously violate the Act.
The Surratt and Allen cases involved tenants who ceased paying rent and
became defendants in summary eviction actions prior to vacating their rental
units. The court held both times that the tenants' withholding of rent did not
preclude their recovery of damages for the landlords' breaches of the implied
warranty of habitability.1 42 Landlord Allen invoked the Act's prohibition
against unilateral rent withholding prior to judicial action, 14 3 asserting that Sim-
mons "waived her right to bring any action which arose out of her tenancy." 144
Professor Fillette has argued that such a broad interpretation of the prohibition
would "largely negate" the Act's section 42-41, which states that the obligations
of the tenant and the landlord are mutually dependent. 145
The court of appeals qualified its statement of the recovery rights of the
tenant who has withheld rent by noting that a tenant cannot collect rent abate-
ment damages for a period when she did not pay rent.14 6 The court essentially
defined rent abatement as a refund of rent; one obviously cannot get a refund of
something one did not pay. This approach leaves unanswered, however, the
question of the potential liability of the tenant who has withheld rent in response
to his landlord's breach. Judge Greene's view that a tenant can assert the land-
lord's violation of the implied warranty of habitability to seek an abatement of
his overdue rent obligation 14 7 is consistent with general law elsewhere.1 48 It
would be incongruous to hold that a landlord's attempt to collect rent for unfit
138. Borders, 68 N.C. App. at 770, 315 S.E.2d at 732.
139. Allen, 99 N.C. App. at 645, 394 S.E.2d at 484; see supra notes 59-64 and accompanying
text.
140. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1988) (providing for trebling of damages assessed for viola-
tion of unfair trade practice statutes).
141. Borders, 68 N.C. App. at 770, 315 S.E.2d at 731.
142. Allen, 99 N.C. App. at 642, 394 S.E.2d at 482; Surratt, 99 N.C. App. at 407, 393 S.E.2d at
560.
143. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-44(c) (1984).
144. Plaintiff Appellee's Brief at 7, Allen (No. 8921DCI 155).
145. Fillette, supra note 65, at 789; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-41 (1984).
146. Allen, 99 N.C. App. at 642, 394 S.E.2d at 482; Surratt, 99 N.C. App. at 407, 393 S.E.2d at
560.
147. Surratt, 99 N.C. App. at 411, 393 S.E.2d at 562 (Greene, J., concurring in result); see supra
notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
148. See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 2, § 3:22, at 136; UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND
TENANT AcT § 4.105, 7B U.L.A. 485 (1985).
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housing could be an element of an unfair trade practice action, 149 and yet hold a
tenant who has withheld rent liable for more than the fair rental value of sub-
standard housing.
If the tenant withholding rent without judicial approval is not thereby lim-
iting his claim to damages, except for the obvious lack of a claim for a refund of
rent, the prohibition on unilateral rent withholding must be, by process of elimi-
nation, applicable to the tenant's right to possession. One commentator has sug-
gested that the unilateral withholding prohibition complements the requirement
in section 42-25.6 that prohibits landlords from evicting tenants without resort
to a judicial summary ejectment proceeding. 150 Viewed from this perspective,
the two provisions complement each other by denying either party possession
rights if she attempts self-help remedies. North Carolina landlord and tenant
law dealing with retaliatory eviction bars the retaliatory eviction defense to a
summary ejectment claim when the tenant has failed to pay rent.15 1 This ex-
plicit linkage of the tenant's possession right and his duty to pay rent, in spite of
possible wrongdoing by the landlord, lends further support to interpreting the
unilateral withholding prohibition as creating a similar link.
Professor Fillette has argued for a narrower interpretation of the phrase
"unilaterally withhold rent."' 152 He has suggested that, based on the mutuality
of landlord and tenant obligations under section 42-41, a tenant's withholding of
rent cannot be considered unilateral if the landlord previously breached the im-
plied warranty of habitability. 153 Professor Fillette also has stated that "[t]he
terms 'wrongful' and 'unilateral' could be read synonymously in this con-
text." 15 4 This substitution of terms would essentially leave section 42-44(c)
reading, "It is unlawful to withhold rent unlawfully." Thus, either by process of
elimination or by following Professor Fillette's reasoning to its logical conclu-
sion, section 42-44(c), if it has substantive content, denies rights of possession to
the tenant who withholds rent before the landlord has been found by a court to
have breached the implied warranty of habitability.
Although failing to clarify the unilateral rent withholding prohibition, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals, in Surratt and Allen, has presented a formula
for computing the contract damages of a tenant who has occupied unfit rental
housing. The landlord is liable for the period of occupancy for which the court
finds her to have breached the implied warranty of habitability under section 42-
42(a).' 5 5 Damages are the lesser of the rental unit's fair rental value as war-
ranted minus the fair rental value of the rental unit in its defective condition,
and the agreed rent. The court has derived a reasonable measure of damages in
applying a lease-based, agreed-rent ceiling to a "benefit of the bargain" measure
149. Allen, 99 N.C. App. at 645, 394 S.E.2d at 484.
150. Note, supra note 114, at 1281; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-25.6 (1984).
151. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-37.1(c)(1) (1984).
152. Fillette, supra note 65, at 790.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. While the court also acknowledged the possibility of special and consequential damages, it
did not discuss these types of damages.
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of damages. The court was right to assert that withholding rent does not strip a
tenant of the right to bring an action in breach of warranty against the landlord,
but the court should have used the opportunity to clarify its interpretation of the
statutory prohibition on unilateral withholding of rent.
The court of appeals has decided only four cases concerning contract dam-
ages for breach of the implied warranty of habitability in rental housing; none of
these cases has reached the North Carolina Supreme Court. Future holdings
should seek to reduce the remaining uncertainty concerning the legal obligations
and potential liability of landlords and tenants. Holdings adhering to the three
recommended principles that follow would add significantly to the certainty and
equity of landlord and tenant law in North Carolina. First, the as-warranted
fair rental value should be presumed equal to the agreed rent, if the tenant fails
to prove that the premises were unfit when first occupied by the tenant. This
approach would reduce both subjectivity and uncertainty of outcome in resolv-
ing valuation issues. Second, the courts should clarify the actions constituting
unfair trade practices and the scope of damages to be trebled. Treble damages
can be an appropriate and effective punitive remedy only if applied in a consis-
tent manner to egregious circumstances. Third, the prohibition on unilateral
rent withholding should have consequences only for the tenant's right to posses-
sion of the premises.
The North Carolina courts have addressed the issue of contract damages
for which a landlord is liable when in violation of the implied warranty of habit-
ability. If future holdings adhere to the three principles presented above, land-
lords and tenants will operate in a more certain and predictable legal
environment. This element of stability would be of particular value in the fragile
market for low income housing.
DANIEL B. HILL
1991] PROPER TY LAW 1713
A Clear Judicial Day in North Carolina-Johnson v. Ruark
Obstetrics Smooths the Way for Plaintiffs' Claims for Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress
"'[T]here are clear judicial days on which a court can foresee forever,' ",
and in North Carolina, such a day has arrived. In Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics &
Gynecology Associates,2 the North Carolina Supreme Court conclusively rejected
the long-held and widely followed view that a plaintiff could not recover for
negligent infliction of emotional distress absent the showing of some related
physical injury, either as a cause of the distress or as a consequence of it.3 By
way of replacement, the court decreed that "an allegation of ordinary negligence
will suffice, '4 so long as the plaintiff also "allege[s] that severe emotional distress
was the foreseeable and proximate result of such negligence." 5 By rejecting the
imposition of bright-line rules or standards,6 the Johnson decision is the judicial
equivalent of a clean slate.
This Note chronicles the North Carolina courts' treatment of tort claims
for negligent infliction of emotional distress and examines the varying limita-
tions and restrictions imposed by the courts in their attempts to develop worka-
ble rules. It analyzes the Johnson court's selective application of precedent and
questions both the court's disinclination to establish more specific standards re-
garding availability of the claim and the wisdom of dismissing several decades of
contrary case law as "erroneous." The Note then explores the potential effects
of Johnson. The Note concludes that the court should have set forth clearer
standards to better guide the trial courts in determining whether to allow the
1. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 327 N.C. 283, 309, 395 S.E.2d 85, 100
(Meyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 668, 771 P.2d 814, 830, 257 Cal.
Rptr. 865, 881 (1989) ("with apologies to [lyricist] Bernard Witkin")).
2. 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990).
3. The court found it necessary to overrule a number of cases that "require[d] a plaintiff to
show-in addition to mental or emotional injury-a physical impact, physical injury, or a physical
manifestation of emotional distress to succeed on a claim of negligent intliction of emotional dis-
tress." Id. at 301, 395 S.E.2d at 95. The court overruled Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189
N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925), overruled on other grounds in Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial
Hosp., Inc., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980). The court also disapproved Stanback v. Stanback,
297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979), disapproved in Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d
325 (1981); Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960); and Kimberly v. Howland,
143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906), to the extent those cases implicated a physical injury requirement.
In addition, Johnson overruled seven decisions of the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The
overruled decisions were Edwards v. Advo Systems, Inc., 93 N.C. App. 154, 376 S.E.2d 765 (1989);
Ledford v. Martin, 87 N.C. App. 88, 359 S.E.2d 505 (1987), disc. rev. denied, 321 N.C. 473, 365
S.E.2d 1 (1988); Campbell ex rel McMillan v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 84 N.C. App. 314,
352 S.E.2d 904, aff'd on other grounds, 321 N.C. 260, 362 S.E.2d 273 (1987); Woodell v. Pinehurst
Surgical Clinic, P.A., 78 N.C. App. 230, 336 S.E.2d 716 (1985), aff'd, 316 N.C. 550, 342 S.E.2d 523
(1986) (per curiam); Craven v. Chambers, 56 N.C. App. 151, 287 S.E.2d 905 (1982); and Wesley v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 680, 268 S.E.2d 855, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 239, 283
S.E.2d 136 (1980).
4. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 291, 395 S.E.2d at 89. The court explained that "our law includes no arbitrary re-
quirements to be applied mechanically to claims for the negligent infliction of emotional distress."
Id.
claim to go to a jury, and recommends different standards of recovery for di-
rectly injured victims and for bystanders. The Note proposes alternative limita-
tions for each; specifically, the Note argues that in order to state a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, directly injured plaintiffs should be re-
quired to forecast evidence that, if believed, would support an award of punitive
damages.7 This standard emphasizes the nature of the defendant's conduct
rather than the extent of the plaintiff's emotional injury. The Note agrees with
the Johnson court's affirmation of bystanders' ability to recover for negligently
inflicted emotional distress, but suggests that they should be permitted to do so
only in accordance with a modified version of the test recently established by the
California Supreme Court in Thing v. La Chusa.8
From March through October of 1983, expectant parent Barbara Johnson
received prenatal medical care from Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Associ-
ates, P.A.9 Mrs. Johnson's pregnancy progressed normally through the morning
of October 3, 1983;10 later that afternoon, she began experiencing contractions
and was admitted to Wake Medical Center.11 Testing undertaken at the hospi-
tal revealed the absence of any fetal heart tones, and the Johnsons were informed
of the fetal death at approximately 8:00 p.m. 12 Mrs. Johnson remained in labor
and delivered the stillborn fetus in the early hours of October 4, 1983.13
On behalf of the fetus, Glenn Johnson filed a wrongful death action against
defendants. 14 Included in the complaint were claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, brought by both Glenn and Barbara Johnson "in their indi-
vidual capacities as father and mother of the fetus." 15 The complaint alleged, in
sum, that Mrs. Johnson's doctors negligently failed to treat Mrs. Johnson's dia-
betic condition properly, thereby causing the fetus to die of malnutrition. 16
Defendants denied any negligence and moved to dismiss for failure to state
7. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text. A "directly injured plaintiff" is any party
who brings suit to recover for mental injury negligently inflicted upon her by the defendant.
8. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989). See infra notes 173-80 and accom-
panying text. Discussions of "bystander" recovery refer to recovery by a plaintiff who alleges mental
suffering brought about by the plaintiff's concern for a third party who was directly injured by
defendant's negligent conduct.
9. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 286, 395 S.E.2d at 87. Glenn and Barbara Johnson brought suit
against Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Associates, P.A. (formerly The Ruark Clinic), and against
the four individual doctors employed by the defendant who managed Mrs. Johnson's prenatal health
care program.
10. Id. at 286-87, 395 S.E.2d at 87. Mrs. Johnson reported feeling fetal movement during the
evening of October 2, 1983. Id. According to the complaint, defendant Dr. Edgerton reported the
presence of a fetal heart tone at 9:30 a.m. on October 3, 1983, when Mrs. Johnson visited The Ruark
Clinic to report contractions. Plaintiffs' Brief at 5, Johnson (No. 8610SC942).
11. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 286-87, 395 S.E.2d at 87.
12. Id. at 287, 395 S.E.2d at 87.
13. Id.
14. Id. Mr. Johnson was authorized by statute to bring the action as administrator of the fetal
estate. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984).
15. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 287, 395 S.E.2d at 87.
16. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 89 N.C. App. 154, 156, 365 S.E.2d
909, 910 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990). The infant's death
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a claim upon which relief could be granted. 17 Defendants also requested, and
received, summary judgment as to all claims.18 The court of appeals reversed
the trial court's dismissal of both the wrongful death and the negligent infliction
of emotional distress claims.19 In so doing, the court rejected defendants' con-
tention that North Carolina prohibits recovery for mental anguish prompted by
concern for another person.20 The court relied on Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham
Memorial Hospital, Inc.21 to hold that "where some intimate relationships are
affected, there is no longer any absolute prohibition against compensating emo-
tional distress damages arising from injuries to others." 22 The court recognized,
however, that availability of the claim must be tempered by the policy interest in
limiting negligence liability.23
Having determined that the claim was not barred as a matter of law, the
court of appeals considered defendants' argument that plaintiffs still had no
standing to sue, not having suffered any physical injuries themselves. 24 Citing
Williamson v. Bennett,25 the court found that "absent some [physical] impact,
the emotional distress claimant must manifest some resulting physical injury."'2 6
The court held that both Glenn and Barbara Johnson had alleged proper claims
because Barbara Johnson did in fact suffer physical injury and because the court
could not say as a matter of law that Glenn Johnson had not suffered physical
manifestations of his mental distress. 27
certificate listed the cause of death as "placental insufficiency." Plaintiffs' Record on Appeal to the
North Carolina Court of Appeals, Exhibit B at 10, Johnson (No. 8610SC942).
In relevant part, the complaint alleged:
Past, present and future pain and suffering and emotional distress of enduring the labor,
with the knowledge that their unborn child was dead, and the delivery of a dead child.
Past, present and future mental distress and anguish resulting from the dramatic circum-
stances surrounding the stillbirth of their child.
Plaintiffs' Complaint at 7, Johnson (No. 8610SC942).
17. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 287, 395 S.E.2d at 87; see N.C.R. CIv. PRO. 12(b)(6).
18. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 156-57, 365 S.E.2d at 911; see N.C.R. CIv. PRO. 56(e).
19. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 171, 365 S.E.2d at 919.
20. Id. at 163, 365 S.E.2d at 915. The defendants relied on Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C.
498, 508, 112 S.E.2d 48, 55 (1960), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85, and Hin-
nant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E.2d 307 (1925), overruled on other grounds in
Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., Inc., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980), and over-
ruled in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
21. 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980).
22. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 163, 365 S.E.2d at 915.
23. Id. at 164, 365 S.E.2d at 915. The court explained that the policy issues involved generally
relate to questions of remoteness and proximate cause. Id. According to the court, "the definition of
proximate cause necessarily includes ... whether the tort-feasor's liability should as a matter of
public policy extend to [the] injuries." Id.
24. Id. at 162, 365 S.E.2d at 914.
25. 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
In Williamson the North Carolina Supreme Court held that "[it is almost the universal opinion that
recovery may be had for mental or emotional disturbance in ordinary negligence cases where, coinci-
dent in time and place with the occurrence producing the mental stress, some actual physical impact
or genuine physical injury also resulted directly from defendant's negligence." Id. at 503, 112 S.E.2d
at 52.
26. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 165, 365 S.E.2d at 916.
27. Id. Barbara Johnson alleged two physical injuries, the first resulting from the negligent
treatment of her diabetes and the second resulting from the injury to the fetus; the court observed
that since "the fetus is normally attached to the mother's uterine wall, we fail to see how a physical
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The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' reinstate-
ment of the Johnsons' claims, albeit on very different grounds.28 Writing for the
majority, Justice Mitchell described the physical injury requirement as a miscat-
egorization of North Carolina law and acknowledged that "varying and at times
inconsistent analyses used by our courts have apparently buttressed such mis-
conceptions." 2 9 Overruling or disapproving a number of North Carolina cases
that had included such a requirement, 30 the court held that "neither a physical
impact, a physical injury, nor a subsequent physical manifestation of emotional
distress is an element of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. '31
In its review of the tort's "long and winding history in every state," 32 in-
cluding North Carolina, the court considered the theories at work in other juris-
dictions. The court resolved, however, to base any final conclusions exclusively
on North Carolina law.33 To state a valid claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, the court concluded that "a plaintiff must allege that (1) the de-
fendant negligently engaged in conduct, (2) it was reasonably foreseeable 34 that
such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress (often referred
to as mental anguish), and (3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe
emotional distress."'35 Thus, the North Carolina courts' treatment of such tradi-
tional concepts as foreseeability and proximate cause drew much of the Johnson
court's attention. The application of these concepts, the court said, "must be
determined under all the facts presented, and should be resolved on a case-by-
case basis by the trial court and, where appropriate, by a jury."'36
The court drew a distinction between mere "fright," which by itself is not
compensable, 37 and "severe emotional distress," for which a plaintiff might re-
impact or injury to the fetus would not normally be an injury or impact to the mother." Id. at 167,
365 S.E.2d at 917.
Regarding Glenn Johnson's claim, the court concluded that the pleadings revealed no facts that
would necessarily "prohibit him from later more specifically forecasting or introducing evidence that
his alleged mental distress resulted in the necessary physical injury." Id. at 168-69, 365 S.E.2d at
918.
28. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 286, 395 S.E.2d at 86-87.
29. Id. at 291, 395 S.E.2d at 89.
30. See cases cited supra note 3.
31. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
32. Id. at 288, 395 S.E.2d at 88.
33. The dissent characterized as error the majority's reluctance to "[seek] guidance from the
experience of other jurisdictions with less expansive doctrines of recovery." Id. at 308, 395 S.E.2d at
99 (Meyer, J., dissenting). For a survey of several other jurisdictions' attempts to define the required
elements of the tort, see cases cited infra note 59.
34. The differing interpretations of "foreseeability" and its usefulness as a restrictive aspect of
the claim are discussed thoroughly by the court and debated vigorously in Justice Meyer's dissent.
For a summary of Justice Meyer's concerns, see infra notes 43-62 and accompanying text. For a
collection of foreseeability standards applied by other jurisdictions, see infra note 59.
35. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
36. Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98 (citing Kanoy v. Hinshaw, 273 N.C. 418, 160 S.E.2d 296
(1968); Toone v. Adams, 262 N.C. 403, 137 S.E.2d 132 (1964)).
37. Id. at 303.04, 395 S.E.2d at 97. This restriction is consistent with the court's prior hold-
ings, reviewed in detail by the majority. Id. at 294, 395 S.E.2d at 91-92. For example, in Kimberly
v. Howland, 143 N.C. 399, 403, 55 S.E. 778, 780 (1906), the court observed that "[a]ll the courts
agree that mere fright, unaccompanied by or followed by physical injury, cannot be considered as an
element of damage." Although the Kimberly statement was dictum because the plaintiff had suf-
fered contemporaneous physical injury, later cases often cited it. See, e.g., Williamson v. Bennett,
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cover. 38 The court recognized that severe emotional distress could encompass a
wide range of disorders so long as the condition alleged by the plaintiff was of a
sort generally recognized as a genuine disorder by trained medical personnel. 39
The Johnson court rejected any requirement of heightened negligence. 4°
The court also established identical standards for the plaintiff who brings an
action based upon a mental or emotional injury infficted directly upon him by
the defendant, and for the "bystander" plaintiff who alleges mental suffering
brought about by the plaintiff's concern for another party injured by the defend-
ant's negligent conduct.4 1 Applying these standards, the court concluded that
the Johnsons' allegations of emotional distress were sufficient to support their
cause of action.42
The Johnson decision was accompanied by a vigorous dissent,43 which
characterized the Johnsons' alleged injuries as the understandable distress occa-
sioned by the loss of a child rather than as anguish caused by any specific acts of
negligence on the part of the defendants.44 Condemning the rule adopted by the
251 N.C. 498, 503-04, 112 S.E.2d 48, 52 (1960) ("mere fright caused by ordinary negligence does not
give a cause of action and may not be considered an element of damages"), disapproved in Johnson,
327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85; Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 812, 188 S.E. 625,
627 (1936) ("fright alone is not actionable," but allegations of ensuing "nervous disorders of serious
proportions" will preclude dismissal or nonsuit); Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 438, 439, 73 S.E. 211,
212 (1911) ("mere fright is not actionable"); see Byrd, Recovery for Mental Anguish in North Caro-
lina, 58 N.C.L. Rav. 435, 437-45 (1980).
For a discussion of the North Carolina courts' treatment of fright as an element of a claim for
the negligent infliction of emotional distress, see infra notes 81-85 & 87 and accompanying texts.
38. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 303-04, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
39. Id. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. Specifically, the court spoke to "any emotional or mental
disorder, such as, for example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of
severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diag-
nosed by professionals trained to do so." Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. Recovery for emotional injury to directly injured victims is qualitatively different from
recovery for emotional injury to bystanders. Standards of recovery should reflect that difference.
See infra notes 166 & 172-80 and accompanying texts.
42. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. In the instant case, both Glenn and Barbara
Johnson were within the generally recognized definition of "bystanders" insofar as their claim was
related to the injury to their child (a third party). Alternatively, Mrs. Johnson's claim could have
been based upon mental and emotional injuries that she herself endured while undergoing labor. See
Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 89 N.C. App. 154, 166-67, 365 S.E.2d 909, 916-
17 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990).
43. Justice Meyer authored a lengthy dissent that included a survey of standards applied by
other jurisdictions and a critical examination of the court's definition of foreseeability. See infra
notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
Justice Webb dissented separately on grounds that the case represented a marked departure
from precedent, as evidenced by the number of cases overruled, and that the cases overruled were in
fact accurate interpretations of valid law. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 318, 395 S.E.2d at 106 (Webb, J.,
dissenting). Despite the admittedly "arbitrary" nature of the physical injury requirement, Justice
Webb argued that the rule served valid policy purposes by providing a needed limitation on liability.
Id. (Webb, J., dissenting). Justice Webb would hold that the plaintiffs did not state claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. (Webb, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 307, 395 S.E.2d at 99 (Meyer, J., dissenting). For an interesting early discussion of
the need to distinguish between these two sources of injury, see Young v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
107 N.C. 370, 382, 11 S.E. 1044, 1048 (1890). See aiso Hancock v. Western Union Tel. Co., 137
N.C. 498, 501, 49 S.E. 952, 953 (1905) (expressing concern that jurors "may possibly confound the
mental anguish naturally arising from the loss of a near relative with that which grows from the
defendant's negligence"); Cashion v. Western Union Tel. Co., 123 N.C. 267, 274, 31 S.E. 493, 494
(1898) (same).
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court as "overbroad," 45 Justice Meyer criticized the majority for "go[ing] be-
yond even Dillon's 6 broad approach" 47 without adequate justification and for
failing to provide practical standards or workable restrictions to the lower
courts. 48 Specifically, Justice Meyer expressed strong reservations concerning
the court's treatment of the concepts of duty 4 9 foreseeability, 50 and proximate
cause.5 1
The dissent interpreted the majority's opinion as holding that "a defendant
has a duty not to cause serious emotional distress in any person who might
foreseeably suffer such distress from proximate negligence. This duty, is limited
only by the foreseeability that such harm may occur."'5 2 Justice Meyer argued
that this theory presumes the existence of a duty without first providing any
analysis of the duty's foundation, 3 In particular, Justice Meyer questioned
whether defendants' alleged negligent failure to treat, thereby causing the death
of the fetus, created any duty not to cause serious emotional distress flowing
from the defendants to the Johnsons.54
Further, Justice Meyer observed that without more specific restrictions on
the standards of recovery the Johnson decision "stands for the proposition that
no risk of serious emotional distress is acceptable."55 This premise, he con-
tended, would be contrary to such well-established axioms of tort law as Judge
Learned Hand's famous cost-benefit equation 56 and would have detrimental ef-
fects on the availability and price of social necessities, including medical care
45. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 313, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
46. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (en banc). For a
description of the Dillon test, see infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
47. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 308, 395 S.E.2d at 99 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 312-13, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Meyer criticized the court
for failing to establish "any limitations whatsoever on this duty not to negligently inflict foreseeable
serious emotional distress," because "[i]n adopting a rule, it should not be so vague that it provides
no guidance to the judges and juries that must implement it." Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
49. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
51. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 309-14, 395 S.E.2d at 100-03 (Meyer, J., dissenting). For Justice
Meyer's discussion of the majority's treatment of proximate cause, see infra notes 55-62 and accom-
panying text.
52. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 309, 395 S.E.2d at 100 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
53. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 312, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting). Judge Hand suggested an equation that evaluates the sensibility
of taking certain risks in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
[Judge] Hand described the duty of an actor to protect against the resulting injuries as
being a function of three variables: (1) the probability (P) of injury occurring, (2) the
gravity (L) of resulting injury, and (3) the burden (B) of adequate precautions. Hand
described this relationship algebraically as an inquiry as to whether B < PL.
Johnson, 327 N.C. at 312 n.3, 395 S.E.2d at 102 n.3 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (construing Carroll
Towing, 159 F.2d at 173).
Justice Meyer observed that "[v]irtually all conduct is risk creating" and argued that the John-
son court failed to differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable risks. Id. at 312, 395 S.E.2d at
102 (Meyer, J., dissenting). He concluded: "Today's decision, drawing no such distinction, stands
for the proposition that no risk of serious emotional distress is acceptable." Id. (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
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and insurance. 57
Stating that "the universe of plaintiffs contemplated by the majority's rule is
infinite indeed,"' 58 the dissent also called for more circumscribed definitions of
foreseeability and proximate cause based upon "the relationship of the plaintiff,
the proximity of perception, and the severity of the injury that would give rise to
a bystander's cause of action for serious emotional distress."' 59 These standards
resemble the factors enumerated in Dillon v. Legg, an oft-cited California case
which established the threshold requirements for recovery for negligently in-
flicted emotional distress later imposed by several jurisdictions. 6° Justice Meyer
57. Justice Meyer said:
mhe impact of this rule on the availability of medical care, particularly that of obstetrics,
will be to further discourage qualified physicians from practicing. The risk of liability and
the escalated premium for insurance to cover the liability are already seriously affecting the
delivery of obstetrical care to this state, particularly to the rural areas and to the poor....
I cannot think that our state will benefit from a rule that discourages such risk-taking
activity without regard to the costs society might pay or the benefits society might derive
therefrom.
Johnson, 327 N.C. at 312, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 311, 395 S.E.2d at 101 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Meyer concluded that
"[l]iability without limitation adversely affects three distinct groups: tort-feasors, the physically in-
jured primary and secondary victims, and society as a whole." Id. at 311, 395 S.E.2d at 101-02
(Meyer, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 313, 395 S.E.2d at 102-03 (Meyer, J., dissenting). For the requirement that the by-
stander plaintiff have a specific relationship to the victim, see, eg., Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d
644, 667-68, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 880 (1989) (mother of victim is "closely
related"); Elden v. Shelden, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 273, 758 P.2d 582, 586-87, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254, 258
(1988) (unmarried cohabitant denied recovery); James v. Leib, 221 Neb. 47, 55, 375 N.W.2d 109,
117 (1985) (child who witnessed death of sibling could recover; court placed greatest weight on
relationship between victim and bystander and required marital or close familial relation); Gates v.
Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 199 (Wyo. 1986) (limiting recovery to spouses, children, parents, and
siblings for social policy purposes).
For limitations based on the proximity of perception or the plaintiff's location in the "zone of
danger," see, e.g., La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d at 669, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881 (denied
recovery to victim's mother, who was neither present at scene nor aware son was being injured);
Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. 204,209, 532 P.2d 673, 676 (1975) (physical proxim-
ity to scene of tort is determinative of liability); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Ill. 2d 546, 555,
457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1983) (child who witnessed serious injury to brother on escalator required to prove
that he too was in zone of danger); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 553, 555 (Minn. 1980) (parents
witnessed severe injury to their child but denied recovery because not within zone of danger); Wilder
v. City of Keene, 131 N.H. 599, 604, 557 A.2d 636, 639 (1989) (no recovery for plaintiff who did not
show geographic and temporal proximity to accident). But cf Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 733,
441 P.2d 912, 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75 (1968) (en banc) (relief should not be conditioned on plain-
tiff's location within a matter of yards of accident; case "exposes the hopeless artificiality of the
zone-of-danger rule"). ,
For the requirement that the bystander plaintiff witness a severe injury to the victim, see, e.g.,
Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 100-01, 417 A.2d 521, 527-28 (1980) (severe mental distress not a usual
result when bystander perceives only less serious harm); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 199
(Wyo. 1986) (injury to victim must be objectively severe; court reasoned that "people recover from
serious shock quickly if it turns out to be a false alarm").
For the requirement that the bystander plaintiff himself suffer severe emotional distress as a
result of the injury to the victim, see, eg., La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d at 668, 771 P.2d at 829-30, 257 Cal.
Rptr. at 880-81 (requiring "serious emotional distress"); Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d
559, 570 (La. 1990) (mental distress must be severe and debilitating). The Johnson court required
the plaintiff's mental distress to be "severe." Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
60.' The Johnson factors are comparable to the factors enumerated in Dillon, discussed infra in
text accompanying note 145. Dillon itself was restricted recently by the California Supreme Court in
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dismissed the Johnson court's requirements as "low hurdles" 6 1 and called for
"limits on the class of bystander plaintiff[s]." 62
The Johnson court devoted a great deal of its attention to an extensive re-
view of North Carolina's treatment of claims alleging negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. The effects of conflicting policy goals and varying fact patterns
turned what was originally a fairly clear doctrine into a confusing hybrid charac-
terized, the court observed, by "erroneous" and "unfortunate" misstatements of
law.6 3 Because a sequential presentation of the cases would serve only as a lit-
eral illustration of this confusion, this Note orders the discussion of the cases
according to their thematic rather than chronological development." 4
The North Carolipa Supreme Court first confronted the question whether a
plaintiff could recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress at all in
Young v. Western Union Telegraph Company.65 This case and others like it
66
Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989). The La Chusa court
concluded that Dillon was unworkable; see infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
For scholarly measurements of the success of the Dillon test, see generally Diamond, Dillon v.
Legg Revisited: Towards a Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible
Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 504 (1984) (criticizing Dillon for "using foreseeability to limit com-
pensation in the first instance"); see also Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted
Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 490-501
(1982) (characterizing Dillon as at least as arbitrary and unsatisfactory as the zone-of-danger rule, if
not more so); Comment, Negligent Infliction ofMental Distress: A Jurisdictional Survey of Existing
Limitation Devices and Proposal Based on an Analysis of Objective Versus Subjective Indices of Dis-
tress, 33 VILL. L. REv. 781, 803-17 (1988) (detailed discussion of many jurisdictions' treatments of
Dillon); Note, Bystander Recovery: A Policy Oriented Approach, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rav. 877, 888-98
(1987) (discussing difficulties encountered by California courts interpreting Dillon).
61. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 310, 395 S.E.2d at 101 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Meyer said the
court's implication that psychiatric testimony might be required to substantiate or verify that the
plaintiff suffered severe mental distress was a "totally ineffective barrier" because diagnosable re-
sponses to traumatic events are common, and possibly even a statistical likelihood. Id. (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
For a listing of the various elements often cited in support of medical diagnoses of severe mental
distress, see DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 236-38 (3d rev. ed.
1987) [hereinafter DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL]. See infra note 119 for a short listing
of elements.
62. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 311, 395 S.E.2d at 101 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 294-95, 395 S.E.2d at 91-92. (The "Kimberly opinion was the first opinion of this
Court to characterize, unfortunately, emotional injury as a type of physical injury .... Such mis-
characterizations of emotional distress [are now recognized to be] unnecessary and erroneous
terminology.").
64. First, the Note discusses the North Carolina Supreme Court's initial recognition of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress claims when the claims were coupled with other causes of action.
See infra notes 65-79. The Note then addresses the development of the physical injury requirement
and attempts to clarify the often overlooked distinctions between mere fright and genuine mental
anguish, and the differing standards applicable to each. See infra notes 80-92. The Note also ana-
lyzes the cases pertaining to the collateral issue of bystander recovery. See infra notes 93-108.
65. 107 N.C. 370, 11 S.E. 1044 (1890). The Young court noted that the issue was one of "first
impression in this State." Id. at 383, 11 S.E. at 1048.
The Young decision was also the first of many "negligent delivery of a telegram" cases in which
the court routinely allowed recovery for mental distress occasioned by a late or missing message. In
this context, the court stated in Hancock v. Western Union Tel. Co., 137 N.C. 498, 500-01, 49 S.E.
952, 953 (1905), that "[the right to recover damages for purely mental anguish, not connected with
or growing out of a physical injury, is the settled law of this State, and it is too late now to question
it."
66. The cases that first established the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress in North
Carolina generally date to the period between 1800 and 1920. For a comprehensive survey of the
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focused not only on the injuries for which a plaintiff could recover, but also on
the nature of the cause of action itself. Plaintiffs generally brought claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress in conjunction with other claims,67 in
tort or in contract. In Young, for example, plaintiff alleged that he had "suffered
great pain, mental anguish, and distress by reason of the [defendant's] gross neg-
ligence and delay in transmitting... [a] telegram" 68 that, if delivered, would
have given plaintiff notice of his wife's impending death and afforded him the
opportunity to be with her and to attend her funeral. 69 Confirming that these
mental injuries were indeed compensable, the court cited Cicero's Eleventh Phil-
lippic against Anthony as instructive: "For, as the power of the mind is greater
than that of the body, in the same way the sufferings of the mind are more severe
than the pains of the body."70
The Young court also emphasized the importance of defendant's status as a
public servant and of the duties it owed to the public as a result of that relation-
ship.7 1 Though plaintiff's cause of action was based in contract, the court also
recognized that the claim was "in reality in the nature of tort for the negligence,
and that.., the plaintiff is entitled to recover... for the actual damages done
him, and that mental anguish is actual damage."'72
In other early cases alleging mental anguish, the court also routinely recog-
nized a right to recover for mental distress occasioned by negligent transporta-
tion or mishandling of dead bodies where the plaintiff was a close relative of the
deceased person. 73 In allowing these plaintiffs to recover, the court frequently
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress and its development in North Carolina, see Byrd,
supra note 37.
67. For example, plaintiffs sought recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress in con.
nection with missing or late telegraphs, negligent actions by common carriers, negligent mishandling
of dead relatives' bodies, and the negligent termination of telephone services. Byrd, supra note 37, at
452-55 & n.17.
68. Young, 107 N.C. at 371, 11 S.E. at 1044.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 385, 11 S.E. at 1048-49. Cicero, the court observed, "certainly may be quoted as an
authority among lawyers." Id. at 385, 11 S.E. at 1048.
The severity of mental injuries and their genuine ability to incapacitate has been recognized
consistently by the North Carolina courts. See, eg., Hargis v. Knoxville Power Co., 175 N.C. 31,
34, 94 S.E. 702, 703 (1917) ("As all pain is mental and centers in the brain, it follows that as an
element of damage for personal injury the injured party is allowed to recover for actual suffering of
mind and body"); Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 404, 55 S.E. 778, 780 (1906) ("[Tihe general
principles of the law of torts support a right of action for physical injuries resulting from negligence
... none the less strongly because the physical injury consists of a wrecked nervous system instead of
lacerated limbs."), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85; Hunter v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 135 N.C. 458, 467, 47 S.E. 745, 748 (1904) (Clark, C.J., concurring) ("[m]ental suffering is
as real as physical").
71. Young, 107 N.C. at 383, 11 S.E. at 1048. The court explained that
[i]n failing to promptly deliver [a] telegram the telegraph company negligently fails to per-
form a duty which it owes to the sender of [the] telegram, and should be held liable for
whatever injury follows as the proximate result of its negligent conduct. It is not a mere
breach of contract, but a failure to perform a duty which rests upon it as a servant of the
public.
Id. at 377, 11 S.E. at 1046.
72. Id. at 385, 11 S.E. at 1048.
73. Parker v. Quinn-McGowen Co., 262 N.C. 560, 138 S.E.2d 214 (1964) (denying recovery but
recognizing a quasi-property right in the body); Stephenson v. Duke Univ., 202 N.C. 624, 163 S.E.
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relied on the "rationale that the cause of action [was] based on a quasi-property
right in the body."'74
In 1916, the court held in Bailey v. Long 75 that a plaintiff-husband could
recover not only the medical expenses he incurred as a result of the defendant-
doctor's negligent breach of a contract to provide skillful medical care for plain-
tiff's wife, but also could recover damages for the mental anguish he sustained
when she died as a result of the doctor's negligence.76 Bailey suggested that the
underlying contract claim might not be crucial to plaintiff's cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress; in short, it suggested that the tort claim
could stand alone. The court reasoned that "if the husband can recover dam-
ages from a telegraph company for mental anguish for delay in delivering a tele-
gram informing him of his wife's illness, he should.., recover for the mental
anguish occasioned by witnessing her suffering and death against the alleged
author of such suffering and death."'77
A number of decisions that emphasized the related or underlying claims
present in the successful early negligent infliction of emotional distress cases,
however, quickly curtailed Bailey's suggestion that a negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress claim might be valid even without an underlying claim based in
contract or on a breach of public duty. After holding that the basis for liability
in Bailey was a contractual duty owed to plaintiff by defendant, 78 the North
Carolina Supreme Court began to scale back the availability of the negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim by returning to its earlier emphasis on the
presence of separate underlying tort or contract claims.79
The physical injury requirement itself was first identified as a valid underly-
ing cause of action in Kimberly v. Howland.8 0 In Kimberly, plaintiff brought an
action for negligently inflicted emotional distress to recover for the fright she
sustained when defendants negligently conducted blasting operations near her
home, causing a large rock to come crashing through the roof.8 1 The North
Carolina Supreme Court observed: "All the courts agree that mere fright, unac-
698 (1932) (recovery limited to next-of-kin); Floyd v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 167 N.C. 55, 83
S.E. 12 (1914) (same); see Byrd, supra note 37, at 454-55 & nn.120-27.
74. Byrd, supra note 37, at 455.
75. 172 N.C. 661, 90 S.E. 809 (1916).
76. Id. at 661-62, 90 S.E. at 809. For further discussion of the Bailey facts and its significance
in the context of bystander recovery, see infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
77. Bailey, 172 N.C. at 663, 90 S.E. at 810. For a discussion of the many cases allowing recov-
ery for negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by a late or missing telegraph, see Byrd, supra
note 37, at 452-54.
78. "The foundation of liability in Bailey's Case was the contractual relation existing between
the plaintiff and the defendant; the action was not prosecuted by a stranger or a third party." Hin-
nant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 125, 126 S.E. 307, 310 (1925), overruled on other
grounds in Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., Inc., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980),
and overruled in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85. The Johnson court characterized this inter-
pretation of Bailey as "erroneous" and "simply... wrong." Johnson, 327 N.C. at 297, 395 S.E.2d at
93.
79. See Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960), disapproved in Johnson, 327
N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85; Hinnant, 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307.
80. 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
81. Id. at 401-02, 55 S.E. at 779.
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companied by physical injury, cannot be considered as an element of damage."82
When the fright became manifested physically, however, the plaintiff could re-
cover for the physical injury; the court held that "the general principles of the
law of torts support a right of action for physical injuries resulting from negli-
gence, whether wilful or otherwise, none the less strongly because the physical
injury consists of a wrecked nervous system instead of lacerated limbs."'83
The Kimberly decision precipitated much of the later confusion regarding a
"requirement" of physical injury either occurring contemporaneously with the
event causing the emotional distress or appearing as a later physical manifesta-
tion of the distress before a plaintiff could recover for its negligent infliction.
The Kimberly court faced only a claim based on fright, not emotional distress,
and allowed recovery for fright only upon a showing that the fright resulted in
some physical injury.84 In dictum, the court went on to discuss mental upsets
generally, which may have sparked the application of a physical injury require-
ment to cases for severe mental distress as well as those for fright. Kimberly also
recast the claim by characterizing the mental upset itself as a distinct type of
physical injury, rather than as an emotional injury and an additional, separate
physical injury.8 5 The decision presumably would allow recovery for pure
mental anguish, absent any actual physical injury caused directly by defendant's
negligence, so long as that anguish was manifested in such a way as to prove its
authenticity. 86
In contrast, a plaintiff could recover for distress arising from negligent in-
fliction of fright only if the plaintiff could show a literal physical injury either
occurring contemporaneously with, or as a direct result of, the negligent act.
The differences between mere fright and mental distress gradually became
blurred,8 7 however, and the requirement of an accompanying physical injury in
claims that arose out of negligently inspired fright was attributed to mental
82. Id. at 403, 55 S.E. at 780. The court went on to note that "where the fright occasions
physical injury, not contemporaneous with it, but directly traceable to it, the courts are hopelessly
divided." Id.
83. Id. at 404, 55 S.E. at 780.
84. The Kimberly court confirmed that although fright and nervousness could not themselves
be considered an injury within the court's usage of the term, any detrimental health effects brought
about "naturally and directly" by the fright or nervousness would be compensable. Id. (quoting
unreported opinion of court below). -
85. Id. at 403.04, 55 S.E. at 780. For example, the Kimberly court held that a physical injury
may consist of a "wrecked nervous system." Id. Professor Byrd notes that
[p]hysical injury, as incorporated in the rule, is not used in the sense of an injury to a
specific part of the body, such as a cut, broken bones, or damage to an internal organ....
Impairment of health, loss of bodily power, or sickness, without proof of any specific
injury, has been held to constitute a physical injury.
Byrd, supra note 37, at 458.
86. The physical injury requirement originally served as a "vehicle used by the court to distin-
guish harm of [great] magnitude from less serious interferences which, if a multitude of suits are to
be avoided, everyone must be left to absorb to some degree." Byrd, supra note 37, at 458.
87. See, e.g., Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 507, 112 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1960) (court charac-
terized case as belonging to "category [of] cases of fright, anxiety, and other emotional distress,
unaccompanied by physical injury"), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
Even when claims for mental anguish are distinguished from those for fright, the mental
anguish claims often receive generalized treatment. "There is a tendency in the decisions to treat all
mental anguish claims alike, and as a result distinctions are seldom made between intentional con-
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anguish claims as well. 88 Eventually, the courts came to apply a "physical in-
jury requirement" 89 to almost all cases involving some form of unquantifiable
emotional distress.90
By this time, a crucial distinction had been lost. Though the courts later
returned to Bailey's early suggestion that negligently inflicted emotional distress
warranted compensation even when unaccompanied by an underlying claim,
they retained the physical injury requirement. Claims prompted by the negli-
gent frightening of a plaintiff could not succeed without a contemporaneous or
resultant physical injury, the claim itself being founded upon the physical injury.
Although claims for negligently inflicted emotional distress once had been con-
sidered qualitatively different from claims prompted by "mere fright," the sepa-
ration between the two faded away. In Williamson v. Bennett,91 the court held
that "it is almost the universal opinion that recovery may be had for mental or
emotional disturbance in ordinary negligence cases where, coincident in time
and place with the occurrence producing the mental stress, some actual physical
injury also resulted directly from the defendant's negligence." '92
Other cases addressed the collateral issue of bystander recovery, as differen-
tiated from a mental or emotional injury inflicted by the tortfeasor directly upon
the victim.93 In Bailey v. Long9 4 the court allowed plaintiff-husband to recover
for the "great pain and mental anguish ... to his feelings and sympathies"
95
induced by "witnessing the agony and suffering of his said wife,"' 96 when his wife
duct and negligence, or between the determination of the extent of liability and the decision ifa cause
of action exists at all." Byrd, supra note 37, at 442.
88. See, eg., Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 198-99, 254 S.E.2d 611, 623 (1979) ("clear
that plaintiff must show some physical injury resulting from the emotional disturbance caused by
defendant's alleged conduct"), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85; King v. Hig-
gins, 272 N.C. 267, 269, 158 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1967) (citing Williamson, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48,
and disallowing recovery absent evidence of "any disfiguring injury"); Williamson, 251 N.C. at 503,
112 S.E.2d at 52 (recovery for mental or emotional distress allowed when accompanied by simulta-
neous physical impact or injury), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85; Woodell v.
Pinehurst Surgical Clinic, P.A., 78 N.C. App. 230, 232, 336 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1985) (explaining that
"non-permanent discomfort (physical pain and suffering, mental anguish and emotional distress)
with no physical injury [is not compensable]"), aff'd, 316 N.C. 550, 342 S.E.2d 523 (1986) (per
curiam), overruled in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85; Wesley v. Greyhound Lines, 47 N.C.
App. 680, 690, 268 S.E.2d 855, 862 (1980) (requiring physical impact or injury in conjunction with
mental trauma or emotional disturbance); McDowell v. Davis, 33 N.C. App. 529, 537, 235 S.E.2d
896, 901 (applying Williamson standard), disc rev. denied, 293 N.C. 360, 237 S.E.2d 848 (1977),
overruled in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
89. See Williamson, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48, disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395
S.E.2d 85; Wyatt v. Gilmore, 57 N.C. App. 57, 290 S.E.2d 790 (1982).
90. See, eg., cases cited supra note 3.
91. 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
92. Id. at 503, 112 S.E.2d at 52.
93. For a discussion of cases involving relational interests or "bystander recoveries," see Byrd,
supra note 37, at 448-452. See also cases cited supra note 59 (listing the major restrictions and
standards applicable to bystander recovery in other jurisdictions).
94. 172 N.C. 661, 90 S.E. 809 (1916). The Bailey decision may be read as bridging the gap
between permitting recovery for limited factual situations in which plaintiff's claim arose from a
contractual relationship with defendant, and more liberal reasoning that focuses more specifically on
the nature of the injury itself, instead of its source. For a discussion of the contractual relationship
in Bailey, see supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
95. Bailey, 172 N.C. at 662, 90 S.E. at 809.
96. Id. at 663, 90 S.E. at 810.
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died from illnesses traceable to defendant-doctor's negligent failure to provide a
habitable room for her.97 The court held that plaintiff could recover not only
the sums he expended on her medical services but also for his own mental
distress.98
The Bailey decision was followed by Hipp v. EL Dupont de Nemours &
Co.,99 in which the court reviewed Bailey and confirmed that a spouse could
recover for her own personal mental injuries caused by a third party's negligent
physical injury to the other spouse.l10 The court limited availability of the claim
to spouses and placed it in the context of damages relating to loss of consortium;
"children or other dependent relatives" could not have access to the claim be-
cause "[t]he wife's cause of action [arose] from the nature of the relationship
created by the contract of marriage." 10'
The court sharply abridged this apparent ability of a bystander to recover
for his own mental injuries, albeit occasioned by a more direct injury to another
person, in Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co. 10 2 In Hinnant the North Carolina
Supreme Court addressed both the general standards for recovery for negligently
inflicted emotional distress and the availability of the claim to a third-party by-
stander. The court held that plaintiff-wife could not recover for the mental dis-
tress and "serious nervous shock" she experienced after seeing her husband in a
"broken [and] mashed" condition after a train collision caused by the defend-
ant's negligence.103 The husband died of his injuries, causing plaintiff's nervous
system to be "permanently impair[ed] and weaken[ed]."' 1 4 The Hinnant court
conclusively denied the availability of bystander damages, holding that
[i]n the law mental anguish is restricted, as a rule, to such mental pain
and suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself,
as distinguished from that form of mental suffering which is the ac-
companiment of sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering, or which
97. Id. at 661-62, 90 S.E. at 809.
98. Id. at 663, 90 S.E.2d at 810. The plaintiff in Bailey was a "bystander" in the sense that the
physical injury negligently and directly inflicted upon his wife caused his mental distress.
99. 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921).
100. Id. at 19, 108 S.E. at 322-23. The plaintiff-wife's husband became permanently incapaci-
tated while working for defendant. Plaintiff alleged that due to her increasing indebtedness and the
despair she felt while watching her husband suffer, "her own nerves and health [were] seriously and
permanently shocked, weakened, and impaired; and that by reason of the physical and mental condi-
tion of her husband she still continue[d] to suffer in mind and body." Id. at 11, 108 S.E. at 319.
101. Id. at 19, 108 S.E. at 323.
102. 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925), overruled on other grounds in Nicholson v. Hugh Chat-
ham Memorial Hosp., Inc., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980), and overruled in Johnson, 327 N.C.
283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
103. Id. at 120, 126 S.E. at 308. The majority of the court's later decisions refused to allow such
recovery. See Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 824, 32 S.E.2d 611, 613 (1945) (Mar-
ried Women's Act of 1913 eliminated right of either spouse to recover for injury to the other; with-
out a cause of action for loss of consortium, "there is none for mental anguish"), overruled in
Nicholson, 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818; Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n v. Neal, 194
N.C. 401, 403, 139 S.E. 841, 841-42 (1927) (mother could not recover for her mental anguish occa-
sioned by injuries to her son because damages "too remote").
104. Hinnant, 189 N.C. at 120, 126 S.E. at 308. The claim can be read as alleging a physical
injury, but the court apparently did not find the allegation sufficient.
[Vol. 691726
arises from the contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of
another.105
As a general rule, the court said, "mental suffering, unrelated to any other cause
of action, is not alone a sufficient basis for the recovery of substantial dam-
ages." 106 More recently, in Williamson v. Bennett,107 the North Carolina
Supreme Court refused to allow a plaintiff to recover for mental distress brought
on by her fright and fear that she had driven over a child, noting that "this
Court has held that there can be no recovery for fright and anxiety, and resul-
tant neurosis, which arises for the safety and well-being of another."' 08
In Johnson the North Carolina Supreme Court took stock of all the confu-
sion and conflict in this area of law and chose to define a plaintiff's ability to
recover by principles and standards of foreseeability and proximate cause with-
out additional limitation.10 9 The holding is arguably in accord with prior North
Carolina case law, insofar as the earliest cases are concerned; however, by dis-
counting several decades of subsequent case law as erroneous or unfounded, the
court adopted a markedly revisionist approach to precedent.110 The court
105. Id. at 129, 126 S.E. at 312.
106. Id. The Hinnant court went on to list a number of exceptions to this rule under which
plaintiffs could bring claims for mental or emotional damages without an underlying or supporting
cause of action; among these exceptions were claims for a breach of a promise to marry, and the
negligent delivery of a telegram. Id.
107. 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
108. Id. at 508, 112 S.E.2d at 55. The Williamson court denied recovery to the plaintiff because
the mental injury was not proximately caused by any negligent act of the defendant. While the
defendant did negligently collide with plaintiff's car, the injury itself was caused by plaintiff's un-
founded fear that she had injured a child; "[iln short, she was not frightened by what actually hap-
pened but by what might have happened," and the defendant was under no duty to guard against
such an unlikely reaction. Id.
109. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. The application of these standards, without
more, has been criticized extensively by numerous courts and scholars. See, eg., Thing v. La Chusa,
48 Cal. 3d 644, 662, 771 P.2d 814, 826, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 877 (1989) (foreseeability "not a realistic
indicator of potential liability and does not afford a rational limitation on recovery"); see also Dia-
mond, supra note 60, at 493 ("It is apparent that the use of a foreseeability standard to assess non-
physical damages often is inconsistent with the kinds of injuries that courts, and society, are pre-
pared to compensate.... [The courts are] not willing to 'open the floodgates' by compelling com-
pensation for all foreseeable mental distress.").
110. Interview with Robert G. Byrd, Professor of Law, University of N. C. School of Law, in
Chapel Hill, N.C. (Oct. 5, 1990). In its attempt to mold its prior decisions into a more cogent and
logical progression, the court adopted what could be termed a "historical revisionist" view, accord-
ing to Professor Byrd.
For example, the court explained the physical injury requirement enunciated in Stanback v.
Stanback as follows:
While we said in Stanback that a showing of "physical injury" was required, we also
relied upon our earlier statement in Kimberly, indicating that emotional distress is one type
of physical injury, and held that the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim must be
reversed. Thus, the statement in Stanback is, to some extent at least, at odds with its
holding. Further, the awkward two-step analysis of Stanback and Kimberly - by which
we implied that physical injury was required, but then defined emotional distress as a type
of physical injury for which a plaintiff could recover - was entirely unnecessary in light of
the analyses contained in our prior cases which reached the same result in a more straight-
forward and less cumbersome fashion.... [O]ur earlier cases did not require any physical
impact or injury in addition to the mental or emotional injury itself; instead, our earlier
cases simply treated emotional distress as any other type of injury - compensable if the
plaintiff shows that the injury was foreseeably and proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence.
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aligned Johnson with North Carolina's earliest cases on the issue, III and accu-
rately "reinstated" the original principles applied by the first courts allowing
recovery. 1 12
The court contended, in essence, that Johnson is not new law. "While ad-
mittedly some of our opinions have suggested contrary results," the court ob-
served, "the overwhelming weight of this Court's opinions for the past one
hundred years leads us to the conclusion that neither a physical impact, a physi-
cal injury, nor a subsequent physical manifestation of emotional distress is an
element of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress."' 113 The implica-
tions of this view are far reaching. A practicing North Carolina attorney
observed:
Since Ruark held that this holding has been the law in North Car-
olina since the Hancock decision in 1905, it must be understood that
the holding and reasoning was that this had been our law for quite
some time, despite court decisions to the contrary. Accordingly, every
lawyer handling tort claims must now look into the past to determine
how many emotional distress claims have had life breathed into them
through the decision in Ruark.... My opinion is that there are emo-
tional distress claims which have been revived by Ruark which are
now buried in our "retired" files.
This raises issues of legal malpractice.... If our clients have had
new claims occur because of Ruark, or have had an old claim that we
did not prosecute revived, it is our ethical obligation to review our old
files to the extent necessary and to determine which of our clients have
emotional distress claims which now ethically must be prosecuted. 114
Insurance companies are likely to feel keenly the problems occasioned by dor-
mant claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress if the companies believe
they had addressed and settled the claims of minors or, indeed, any party for
whom the applicable statute of limitations has not yet run. 15
Johnson, 327 N.C. at 302, 395 S.E.2d at 96 (discussing Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 198-99,
254 S.E.2d 611, 623 (1979), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (citations and
footnote omitted).
I 11. See cases cited supra note 65.
112. See cases cited supra note 70.
113. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. The court suggested:
Such misstatements have led some to believe that an action for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress may not be maintained absent some physical impact, physical injury or sub-
sequent physical manifestation of the emotional distress, and also that recovery may not be
had for emotional distress caused by a plaintiff's concern for another person.
Id. at 290-91, 395 S.E.2d at 89. This observation probably is understated; see McCain, Johnson v.
Ruark Obstetrics: Land Mine For The Unwary, 9 LML TODAY, Nov. 1990, at 2, 2.
114. McCain, supra note 113, at 2.
115. Id. The statute of limitations for actions based on personal injury is three years, commenc-
ing on the date on which the claim accrues. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (1983). When a minor is
involved, the statute does not begin to run until the minor reaches the age of 18. Id. § 1-17(a)(1)
(Supp. 1990).
McCain warned that Johnson "also raises a spectre as to whether these insurance companies
will look to their defense counsel for failure to obtain releases of all claims," when the insurance
companies believed they had "bought their peace in previous settlements." McCain, supra note 113,
at 2.
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Read literally, Johnson appears to invite a flood of litigation, 116 if the physi-
cal injury requirement in fact operated to exclude many cases in the first
place. 117 Johnson held, however, that plaintiffs must allege severe mental dis-
tress of the sort generally recognized by professionals trained in the diagnosis
and treatment of mental disorders. 118 Given that such diagnoses in all
probability would depend on the presence of the physical ailments that com-
monly accompany severe mental distress, 119 the rejection of a physical injury
requirement may have only limited effect.120
Johnson's most significant impact probably will be in the area of bystander
recovery.1 2 1 The Johnson court held both that "the relationship between the
plaintiff and the other person for whose welfare the plaintiff is concerned" 122 is
relevant to the question of foreseeability and that the plaintiff may "recover for
his or her severe emotional distress arising due to concern for another person, if
the plaintiff can prove that he or she has suffered such severe emotional distress
as a proximate and foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence.", 123 Ques-
116. The Johnson decision sparked a great deal of public interest, to say the least. Johnson was
interpreted as "a ruling likely to increase the liability woes of doctors and enable plaintiffs to win
damages for mental anguish in a variety of cases." Raleigh News & Observer, Aug. 30, 1990, at B1,
col. 2. An attorney for the North Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys suggested: "'What
they may have done is open a Pandora's box for all sorts of tort actions, not just medical malpractice
actions.'" Id. at B2, col. 3.
The criticism of Johnson took on partisan tones as November elections approached; in the run-
ning for Supreme Court judgeships were incumbent Justices Exum, Webb, and Whichard. Republi-
can Governor James G. Martin "criticized Democratic judges for being too eager to rewrite state law
and to make it too easy for plaintiffs to win large civil verdicts." Id., Oct. 17, 1990, at B1, col. 2.
News reports observed that "Mr. Martin also has singled out specific decisions [Johnson and a death
penalty case] by the Democratic incumbents and has complained that the court has a liberal, activist
approach to the law." Id., Oct. 18, 1990, at B3, col. 1.
117. Plaintiffs have satisfied the physical injury requirement by alleging, for example, general
"[i]mpairment of health, loss of bodily power, or sickness, without proof of any specific injury."
Byrd, supra note 37, at 458 (citing Sparks v. Tennessee Mineral Prods. Corp., 212 N.C. 211, 212, 193
S.E. 31, 32 (1937) (plaintiff suffered from loss of weight, nervousness, and other ailments); Kimberly
v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 403, 55 S.E. 778, 780 (1906) (plaintiff affected with shocked nervous
system), dissapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. at 295, 302, 395 S.E.2d at 92, 96)); see also Arthur v.
Henry, 157 N.C. 438, 439, 73 S.E. 211, 212 (1911) (plaintiff "suffered in body and mind" and was
"made sick"); Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co., 131 N.C. 536, 538, 42 S.E. 983, 984 (1902) (plaintiff
became "almost helpless" and "could not go about her daily duties"). But cf Woodell v. Pinehurst
Surgical Clinic, P.A., 78 N.C. App. 230, 232, 336 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1985) (neither nonpermanent
discomfort nor physical pain satisfies physical injury requirement), aff'd, 316 N.C. 550, 342 S.E.2d
523 (1986) (per curiam), overruled in Johnson, 327 N.C. at 301, 395 S.E.2d at 95.
Professor Byrd observed that "[u]nder these holdings it is probable that a 'physical' injury can
be shown in any case in which significant mental or emotional harm has occurred." Byrd, supra
note 37, at 458.
118. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
119. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL, supra note 61, at 235-39. Post traumatic
stress disorders may be manifested by such things as nightmares, hyperalertness, difficulty in concen-
trating, sleep disorders, and diminished responsiveness to external stimuli. Id. at 248.
120. Interestingly, the language of Johnson suggests that although expert psychiatric testimony
is not required in order to substantiate a claim, its use might well become the accepted standard.
Thus, plaintiffs could be obligated to incur the additional expenses of psychiatric examination and
testimony, which might also serve to curb any potential increase in fraudulent claims.
121. The dissent contended that Johnson represented the "addition of [a] new layer of liability to
bystanders." Johnson, 327 N.C. at 312, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98.
123. Id. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
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tions of foreseeability traditionally are reserved to the trier of fact; thus, unless a
claim is so unsound on its face as to warrant dismissal by the trial judge, the case
is potentially assured of reaching a jury.1 24 Prior to Johnson, the "physical in-
jury requirement" served as a clearly defined, if merely arbitrary, screening
device.1 25
Given the widespread perception that Johnson opened new doors to more
extensive liability, 126 the decision may prompt an increased effort to recover for
negligent infliction of emotional distress and, naturally, a corresponding increase
in litigation. 12 7 Because claims must be examined on their facts, plaintiffs must
overcome few preliminary obstacles.128 Plaintiffs need allege only that a defend-
ant acted negligently, that the foreseeable result was severe emotional distress or
mental anguish on the part of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff did suffer severe
emotional distress as a result.12 9
Characterizing Johnson as exemplary of the "[new] policy of this jurisdic-
tion to extend an infinite responsibility to everyone who has suffered," 130 Justice
Meyer noted in dissent that an increase in litigation and a heightened awareness
of liability on the part of service providers, and insurance companies in particu-
lar, could impose severe societal costs. 13 1 The danger of escalating insurance
premiums and decreasing availability of obstetric care are valid concerns. In
addition, the risk of an excessive recovery by plaintiffs is real.132 Damages for
emotional distress are regularly compensated in wrongful death actions, even if
not specifically requested as an element of damages and despite instructions to
124. The court held that "[q]uestions of foreseeability and proximate cause must be determined
under all the facts presented, and should be resolved on a case-by-case basis by the trial court and,
where appropriate, by the jury." Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98. As a result of Johnson, plaintiffs who
bring negligent infliction of emotional distress claims may have enhanced bargaining power during
settlement negotiations.
125. As one commentator noted:
[The] so-called "physical manifestation" requirement served two major purposes. First, it
served to limit the potential liability of defendants since a cause of action was only available
in those cases where physical injury could be established. Second, it operated as an ele-
ment of proof that the plaintiff suffered actual mental distress, and thus that the suit was
not trivial or fraudulent.
Comment, supra note 60, at 795.
126. The North Carolina legal community's reaction to Johnson was dominated by concerns that
the case ushered in unlimited liability on the part of defendants. The decision became a popular
topic for various political campaigns underway in October and November of 1990; critics frequently
pointed to Johnson as an example of the need for judicial reform in North Carolina and as a reason
to elect new justices to the North Carolina Supreme Court. See news articles cited supra note 116.
127. For a discussion of the potential revival of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims
that were left unlitigated due to the absence of physical injury, see supra notes 113-15 and accompa-
nying text.
128. As discussed earlier, however, the severity of the mental distress may be subject to expert
psychiatric evaluation. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
129. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
130. Id. at 312, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting). See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
132. In his dissent, Justice Meyer suggested that when a plaintiff brings an action for both emo-
tional distress and wrongful death, the claims should be joined to curtail the risk of "inconsistent




the jury not to include them. 133 Assuming that Johnson does represent a signifi-
cant expansion of liability, the financial burden on defendants may be increased
if plaintiffs are permitted to bring negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims independently of other related claims they may have.134
Fortunately, Johnson's rejection of the physical injury requirement will pro-
mote more honest pleadings. The requirement originally evolved as the courts
sought a means of differentiating between serious and trivial claims. 13 5 When a
plaintiff genuinely does suffer serious physical effects as a result of negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff will continue to allege such factors to
demonstrate the extent of his emotional harm. Such "physical manifestations"
as sleeplessness, irritability, and inability to concentrate, however, have been
found to satisfy the physical injury requirement when the plaintiff's claim was
otherwise valid.t 36 These allegations were often only tangentially related to the
basis of the claim and were included in the pleadings for the sole purpose of
fulfilling the physical injury requirement. Johnson, then, may curb the artificial-
ity formerly involved in alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress. Repu-
diation of the physical injury requirement should have little, if any, effect on the
risk of fraudulent claims; at the very least, its absence should not increase their
likelihood. 137
The long-term import of Johnson is less clear. By conclusively rejecting a
physical injury requirement and dismissing it as "arbitrary," the majority left
the lower courts with no specific threshold requirements or rules of law by
which to screen claims for validity. The majority reviewed the tests followed by
other jurisdictions1 38 and noted the absence of any "single clear doctrine to
which it can be said that a majority of states adhere." 139 A number of states,
however, reject the approach of the "new" North Carolina standard in favor of
more definitive guidelines. 4°
Illustrative of states that have rejected a standard similar to that established
in Johnson is a recent California case, Thing v. La Chusa.141 In La Chusa the
133. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting). Several supreme court opinions have addressed the possibility of
"double recovery" in light of the difficulties faced by juries as they try to apportion damages between
the distress caused by negligence and the distress caused by the loss of, or injury to, a relation. See
cases cited supra note 44.
134. Because any award for negligent infliction of emotional distress must first be predicated on
a finding of negligence, joinder of these related claims would be eminently sensible. See N.C.R. Civ.
PRO. 18(a); see also C. WILSON, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 18-2, at 356 (1989)
("[Rule 18(a) does not] permit claim-splitting in violation of the common law principle that all
damages incurred as a result of a single injury must be recovered in one lawsuit.").
135. See Byrd, supra note 37, at 458.
136. See, eg., cases cited supra note 117.
137. One commentator addressed the risk of fraudulent claims as follows: "If recovery is limited
to instances where it would be generally viewed as appropriate and not excessive, then, by definition,
the defendant's liability is commensurate with the damage that the defendant's conduct caused.
Further, the judicial system would not be overburdened by administering fair and proper claims."
Comment, supra note 60, at 819.
138. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 288-90, 395 S.E.2d at 88-89.
139. Id. at 290, 395 S.E.2d at 89.
140. For a listing of common restrictions applied in other jurisdictions, see, eg., cases cited supra
note 59.
141. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
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California Supreme Court declared the Dillon v. Legg 142 test unworkable due to
its tendency to create "ever widening circles of liability. ' 14 3 The Dillon decision
spawned the "foreseeable plaintiff" test, which facilitated recovery on the basis
of "the neutral principles of foreseeability, proximate cause and consequential
injury that generally govern tort law." 144
The Dillon test required the California courts to take certain factors "into
account" to determine foreseeability: specifically, (1) whether the plaintiff was
in close proximity to the scene of the accident, (2) whether the plaintiff's emo-
tional distress was the result of the "sensory and contemporaneous observance
of the accident," and (3) whether the plaintiff was "closely related" to the vic-
tim.145 The Dillon test did not call for a physical injury to the plaintiff, but was
otherwise more restrictive regarding the class of plaintiffs eligible to recover than
is Johnson.
In place of Dillon, the La Chusa court set forth a list of requirements that
could be waived or excused only under "exceptional circumstances." 146 The
court held that
a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by ob-
serving the negligently inflicted injury to a third person if, but only if,
said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injured victim; (2) is present
at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is
then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result
suffers serious emotional distress-a reaction beyond that which would
be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal
response to the circumstances. 147
The court explained that reliance on the concepts of foreseeability and proxi-
mate causation was unsatisfactory because "reliance on foreseeability of injury
alone in finding a duty, and thus a right to recover, is not adequate when the
damages sought are for an intangible injury." 148 Significantly, the Dillon test
condemned as unworkable by the La Chusa court held that the plaintiff's right
to recover was limited only by the "general rules of tort law.., long applied to
all other types of injury." 149 The abandoned.Dillon standards are generally con-
sistent with those recently adopted in Johnson.150
The Johnson court attempted to rest a controversial holding on undeniable
142. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (en banc).
143. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d at 653, 771 P.2d at 819, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
144. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 737, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
145. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
146. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d at 668 n.10, 771 P.2d at 829 n.10, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880 n.10.
147. Id. at 667-68, 771 P.2d at 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81 (footnotes omitted).
148. Id. at 664, 771 P.2d at 826, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
149. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
150. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304-05, 395 S.E.2d at 97-98. The Johnson standard is as follows:
[T]o state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege that
(1) the defendant negligently engaged in conduct, (2) it was reasonably foreseeable that
such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress (often referred to as
'mental anguish'), and (3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional
distress.
Id. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
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principles of fairness. Under traditional and certainly well-established tort prin-
ciples of recovery, any party that shows his injury to be the foreseeable or proxi-
mate result of the unreasonable negligence of another is entitled to be
compensated for that injury.15 1 Under this doctrine, the mental anguish caused
by the stillbirth of a child and attributable to the negligence of professionals
entrusted to provide competent medical care qualifies as a compensable in-
jury.152 Against this precept, however, the courts should have weighed the in-
terests of society in being free from unreasonable liability and in being permitted
to undertake activities that may involve risk.'5 3 In that obligation, the Johnson
decision falls short. The repercussions of the case range far beyond the limited
holding warranted by the narrow facts before the Johnson court; indeed, the
same standards apply to a mother who loses her unborn child to professional
negligence as to a bystander who suffers emotional distress as a result of an
injury to a third party caused by only ordinary negligence.
The very nature of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress man-
dates a limitation on the ability to recover.15 4 Standards of "foreseeability" and
"proximate cause" are rarely applied in their purest sense, but traditionally are
tempered by policy considerations and the common-sense notion that after the
reaching of an admittedly arbitrary line, forcing defendants to assume the risk of
liability simply becomes unfair. When the chain of causation is real but none-
theless grossly attenuated, no principles of deterrence may be served, and the
ability to guard against causing injury to another is so negligible as to be reduced
to a question of luck. The experience of other jurisdictions warns that standards
of foreseeability and proximate cause in negligent infliction of emotional distress
cases foster uncertainty:
It is apparent that reliance on foreseeability of injury alone in finding a
duty, and thus a right to recover, is not adequate when the damages
sought are for an intangible injury. In order to avoid limitless liability
out of all proportion to the degree of a defendant's negligence, and
against which it is impossible to insure without imposing unacceptable
costs on those among whom the risk is to be spread, the right to re-
cover for negligently caused emotional distress must be limited.155
The need for fact-specific restrictions is made all the more compelling by
the court's assurance that "ordinary negligence will suffice."' 156 Further, the
151. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
152. The Johnsons' claim was dismissed prior to trial, and at the time of this writing no finding
of negligence or other wrongdoing has yet been lodged against defendants as a result of the trial.
153. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). In Carroll
Towing, Judge Learned Hand introduced his famous equation distinguishing those risks that are
worth taking from those that are not. For the text of the equation and Justice Meyer's application of
the principle to Johnson, see supra notes 55-57.
154. This is particularly true with respect to bystander recovery cases that turn on the relational
interest between the bystander plaintiff and the directly injured victim; such situations "create the
possibility of liability to a large number of people .... Under these circumstances the fear of an
indefinite liability is a legitimate one, and the need to impose reasonable limits upon the extent of a
defendant's responsibility clearly exists." Byrd, supra note 37, at 448.
155. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 664, 771 P.2d 814, 826-27, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 877-78
(1989).
156. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
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court stipulated that the validity of negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims must be determined case by case; 157 however, an ad hoe approach surely
will foster further uncertainty in this area of law, resulting in the disparate treat-
ment of cases. 158 The Johnson court also explained that "our trial courts have
adequate means available to them for disposing of improper claims for negligent
infliction of emotional distress and for adjusting excessive or inadequate ver-
dicts." 159 The court quoted Chappell v. Ellis:16
But it is urged that the principle [of recovery for mental anguish,] ... if
carried out to its fullest extent, would directly lead to the recovery of
damages for all kinds of mental suffering. It may be, but we feel com-
pelled to carry out a principle only to its necessary and logical results,
and not to its furthest theoretical limit, in disregard of other essential
principles.1 61
The experience of other jurisdictions suggests that the court is overly opti-
mistic. Dillon v. Legg162 enumerated specific factors to be considered by the
trial judges just as the Johnson court did, but in practice the standard proved to
be too expansive. The recent La Chusa163 decision recognized the failings of
Dillon, and spoke to the very hazards that the North Carolina Supreme Court
invites in Johnson:
The Dillon court anticipated and accepted uncertainty in the short
term in application of its holding, but was confident that the bounda-
ries of this [negligent infliction of emotional distress] action could be
drawn in future cases. In sum... the Dillon court was satisfied that
trial and appellate courts would be able to determine the existence of a
duty because the court would know it when it saw it. Underscoring
the questionable validity of that assumption, however, was the obvious
and unaddressed problem that the injured party, the negligent
tortfeasor, their insurers, and their attorneys had no means short of
157. Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98.
158. This approach is consistent with the North Carolina Supreme Court's traditional treatment
of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Professor Byrd writes that
a tendency exists to view cases involving mental anguish claims on an ad hoe basis, an
approach that the court itself suggested in the Williamson case. Apart from the general
unsatisfactory nature of this approach in deciding important legal issues, it involves a real
danger that the sensible and sound development in the law that has occurred will uninten-
tionally be undermined in later decisions, and the uncertainties that arise out of the Stan-
back case illustrate this danger.
Byrd, supra note 37, at 468. The "danger" predicted by Professor Byrd was realized in Johnson,
which disapproved both Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979), disapproved on
other grounds in Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981), and Williamson v. Ben-
nett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960). Johnson, 327 N.C. at 299-304, 396 S.E.2d at 94-97.
159. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 306, 395 S.E.2d at 98.
160. 123 N.C. 259, 31 S.E. 709 (1898).
161. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 306, 395 S.E.2d at 98 (quoting Chappell, 123 N.C. at 263, 31 S.E. at
711). Contra Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 673, 771 P.2d 814, 833, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 884
(1989) (Kaufman, J., concurring). The La Chusa court observed that "Dillon's confident prediction
that future courts would be able to fix just and sensible boundaries on bystander liability has been
found to be wholly illusory-both in theory and in practice." Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring).
162. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (en bane). For a listing of the Dillon
factors, see supra text accompanying note 145.
163. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
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suit by which to determine if a duty such as to impose liability for
damages would be found in cases other than those that were "on all
fours" with Dillon. 64
The Johnson decision suggests that bringing every case to trial is acceptable;
because the case offers no rules or standards by which a claim might be chal-
lenged, the effect of Johnson may be to discourage the worthwhile goal of out-of-
court settlement. 165
Moreover, the Johnson court erroneously elected to recognize the same
standards for recovery for both directly injured plaintiffs and bystander plain-
tiffs. 16 6 The court should have examined the two issues separately and imposed
reasonable judicial limits on claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The court declined to develop viable alternatives to the rejected physical injury
requirement, although other options would permit recovery without opening the
door to indeterminate liability. For example, the court could have held that the
standards applicable to recovery for punitive damages apply by analogy to re-
covery for directly injured plaintiffs. Further, the court could have used a modi-
fied version of the La Chusa test for bystander plaintiffs.
Although imposing meaningful limitations on the right of directly injured
victims of negligently inflicted emotional distress to recover for merely part of
their injuries rather than to be fully compensated is nearly impossible, an alter-
native does exist. Instead of focusing the standards of recovery on the nature of
the plaintiff's injury, the nature of the defendant's harmful and injurious con-
duct should be determinative.1 67 A standard allowing extensive liability for "or-
dinary negligence" 168 is too easily met; instead, the court should require
plaintiffs to forecast evidence that, if believed, would prove defendant's conduct
to be gross, wanton, or willful negligence. 169 Trial courts are already familiar
with this standard. Indeed, the standards for recovery for punitive damages are
set forth in the North Carolina pattern jury instructions:
[Punitive damages] may only be awarded when the jury finds that the
164. Id. at 655, 771 P.2d at 821, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
165. An alternative argument could be made that the absence of a physical injury requirement
will in fact encourage settlement by making trial more likely, and summary judgment for defendants
less likely. Contra La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d at 655, 771 P.2d at 821, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (discussing
the "problem that the injured party, the negligent tortfeasor, their insurers, and their attorneys had
no means short of suit by which to determine if a duty such as to impose liability for damages would
be found" in cases falling under Dillon).
166. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
167. Interview with Samuel 0. Southern, Esq., Poyner & Spruill, in Raleigh, N. C. (Jan. 28,
1991). Mr. Southern, expressing the concerns of many practicing attorneys, advocated adoption of a
more reasonable limitation to the scope of this tort. Mr. Southern's suggestion: "Plaintiff states a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress only where the facts alleged in the complaint, if
believed, would give rise to a claim for punitive damages." Id.
168. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
169. For example, suppose plaintiff brings a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
on grounds that she suffered severe mental distress after being "almost struck" by defendant's auto-
mobile. "One result: if [plaintiff's] claim alleged that she suffered emotional injury when she was
'almost struck' by [defendant's] automobile which he was negligently operating, she would not get to
the jury. But if the pleadings and evidence established that [defendant] was drunk and doing 80 mph
in a school zone, she would carry her case to the jury." Letter from Samuel 0. Southern, Esq. to
Tracy L. Hamrick (Jan. 30, 1991).
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conduct of the defendant is so outrageous as to justify punishing him
or making an example of him. In a case of alleged negligence, punitive
damages may be awarded upon a showing that the negligence was
gross, willful, or wanton. Negligence is gross, willful or wanton when
the wrongdoer acts with a conscious and intentional disregard of, and
indifference to, the rights and safety of others.
Upon a showing of gross, willful or wanton negligence, whether to
award punitive damages and, within reasonable limits, the amount to
be awarded are matters within the sound discretion of the jury.170
As a result, the trial courts could apply this standard easily and consistently.
Professor Prosser provides further comment on the nature of gross, wanton,
or willful negligence. He would apply the terms to "conduct which is still, at
essence, negligent, rather than actually intended to do harm, but which is so far
from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if it were so
intended."' 17 1 This standard strikes a workable balance between plaintiffs' inter-
ests in recovering for emotional injury and the simple inability of the average
citizen to proceed through life without ever doing the sort of negligent acts that
will, under Johnson, permit recovery by emotionally injured plaintiffs.
In the area of bystander recovery, the physical injury requirement was
equally ineffective, although the need for a better, more consistent limitation on
liability was apparent. 172 The Johnson court, by refusing to recognize either the
qualitatively different nature of bystander recovery or its very real potential to
foster liability beyond all reasonable bounds, leaves to the state courts a complex
question and no clues to the answer.
The standards recently adopted by the California Supreme Court in La
Chusa are reasonable and fair, and offer a valuable blueprint for liability limita-
tion as it pertains to bystander recovery. At the least, they offer a more sensible
launching point, if the perimeters of the tort are to be redefined. 173 The La
Chusa court recounted the difficulties brought about by Dillon's broad rule and
concluded that plaintiffs may recover damages for emotional distress incurred
during the observation of a negligently inflicted injury to a third person if the
bystander plaintiff (1) is "closely related" to the directly injured victim; (2) is
"present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is
then aware that it is causing injury to the victim"; and (3) personally suffers
170. NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN INSTRUcTIONS - CIVIL 810.01 (Feb. 1986).
171. W. PROSSER, supra note 151, § 34, at 212-13.
172. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
173. One commentator observed that:
The failure of the common law courts to recognize and utilize their ability to change
procedural rules and to adjust remedies may contribute significantly to the difficulties they
encounter when called upon to expand or contract substantive rights. In such situations
they tend to act as if their only choice is between full recovery or none at all, with the
burden of proof remaining the same as in most other civil actions. The effect may well be
to retard needed reform, to prevent the courts from experimenting with techniques
designed to allay fears of the catastrophes changes might bring, and sometimes.., to
replace old problems with equally troubling new ones.
Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress" Making "The Punish-
ment Fit the Crime" 1 HAw. L. REv. 35, 36 (1979).
1736 [Vol. 69
TORT LAW
serious emotional distress as a result of the event. 174
The La Chusa court would limit recovery to "[close] relatives residing in
the same household, or parents, siblings, children, and grandparents of the vic-
tim," unless "exceptional circumstances" otherwise justify recovery. 17 5 The
legal relationship between the parties, however, should be given a more generous
interpretation than that allowed by the La Chusa court. Instead, non-family
members should be permitted to overcome the presumption against their recov-
ery if they can conclusively establish the presence of a relationship between
themselves and the directly injured victim that is essentially equivalent to famil-
ial or marital ties.
The additional requirement that the bystander plaintiff apprehend the in-
jury to the victim while present at the scene of the injury derives from the need
to assure that a bystander plaintiff who recovers for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress does so as a result of his personal reaction to the distressing event,
as differentiated from grief or suffering prompted solely by sympathy for the
victim. The La Chusa court pointed out that "[t]he impact of personally observ-
ing the injury... [is likely to] distinguish[] the plaintiff's resultant emotional
distress from the emotion felt when one learns of the injury or death of a loved
one from another, or observes pain and suffering but not the traumatic cause of
the injury." 176 In a sense, a bystander plaintiff is compensated for being forced
by a defendant's negligence to share in the distressing experience itself. The
requirement does not limit a bystander plaintiff's ability to pursue any other tort
claims that may arise on the facts. 177
In sum, trial courts deserve more than ambiguous "factors," 17 8 although
they should be allotted enough discretion to validate claims brought by the by-
stander plaintiff who may not squarely meet the La Chusa requirements but
whose claim is nonetheless compelling. Insofar as the physical injury require-
ment limited recovery by bystander plaintiffs, as it did by directly injured plain-
tiffs, the added "protection" of the physical injury requirement was so unfairly
arbitrary as to outweigh any beneficial function the rule might have served.
The Johnson court discredits these concerns and imposes on the trial courts
174. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 667-68, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 880-
81. The La Chusa court defined serious emotional distress as "a reaction beyond that which would
be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to the circum-
stances." Id.
175. Id. at 667 n.10, 771 P.2d at 829 n.10, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880 n.10. The La Chusa court
limited bystander recovery to persons related by blood or marriage on the presumption that they are
more likely to sustain severe emotional distress as a result of the injury to their loved one than would
a disinterested witness. The court conceded that "[s]uch limitations are indisputably arbitrary since
it is foreseeable that in some cases unrelated persons have a relationship to the victim or are so
affected by the traumatic event that they suffer equivalent emotional distress" but argued that
"drawing arbitrary lines is unavoidable if we are to limit liability and establish meaningful rules for
application by litigants and lower courts." Id. at 666, 771 P.2d at 828, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
176. Id. at 666 & n.9, 771 P.2d at 828 & n.9, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 879 & n.9.
177. The facts may support a wrongful death claim, for example. For the argument that negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress claims should be joined to related tort claims, see supra note 134
and accompanying text.
178. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98. The "factors" named by the court are readily
understandable, but their relative weight is left undefined. Id.
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the duty to establish new, more meaningful standards for recovery as the tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress develops. The court offers no reason
why the most relevant limitations are still to be discovered, or why the job falls
to the trial courts. This lack of explanation is particularly disturbing given that
the North Carolina Supreme Court's experience with the tort of negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress is extensive. 179
The Johnson court's conclusion that the physical injury requirement oper-
ated in an arbitrary fashion is supported on varying grounds. The most obvious
source of support is the disproportionality between allowing recovery for mental
distress damages when accompanied by an insignificant injury as compared to
the denial of recovery for truly severe mental anguish when a plaintiff neglected
to characterize the symptoms of his distress as "physical" injury. 180 Though the
physical injury requirement promoted a valid evidentiary purpose in that it
helped to distinguish severe mental distress from momentary or insignificant
emotional upsets, its tendency to validate or invalidate emotional distress claims
on unfairly arbitrary grounds greatly outweighed its usefulness. The court
should be commended for rejecting such a rule, but faulted for not replacing it
with a better one.
TRACY L. HAMRICK
179. Justice Meyer observed: "The majority opinion is exceedingly (and in my view unnecessa-
rily) critical of the care this Court has previously exercised in this area. Besides being inaccurate,
these statements do nothing to instill confidence in this Court's opinions." Johnson, 327 N.C. at 315,
395 S.E.2d at 104 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Webb expressed the same view: "I do not believe
the Court of Appeals has been wrong in the way it has interpreted our cases." Id. at 318, 395 S.E.2d
at 106 (Webb, J., dissenting).
The tone of the majority opinion is surprisingly censorious in its discussion of what it repeatedly
identified as miscategorizations of North Carolina law. In light of the court's concession that this
area of law is not clear, its insistence on deciding negligent infliction of emotional distress cases on an
ad hoc basis without any threshold requirements, and its own multiple contributions to the prevail-
ing uncertainty, this posture is unwarranted.
180. The disproportionality of the requirement has often been criticized in scholarly journals.
For example, one commentator noted that "[t]he physical manifestation requirement has been criti-
cized as being overinclusive, in that it permits recovery for demonstrably trivial mental distress
accompanied by physical symptoms, and underinclusive, since serious distress is noncompensable
absent the happenstance of subsequent physical symptoms." Comment, supra note 60, at 801-02.
This criticism has been emphasized by the jurisdictions that have declined to adopt a physical
injury requirement. See, e.g., Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 437 (Me.
1982) (physical injury requirement is over- and underinclusive); James v. Leib, 221 Neb. 47, 58, 375
N.W.2d 109, 116 (1985) (same). For other criticisms of the requirement, see, eg., Taylor v. Baptist
Medical Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981) (rejecting requirement because current medical
technology allows assessment of mental injury without reliance on "procrustean principles which
have little or no resemblance to medical realities"); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 159, 404 A.2d 672,
678 (1979) (same; medical advances have "discredited these hoary beliefs").
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Ellis v. Northern Star Co.: Libel in a Business Setting Subject
to Mandatory Treble Damages Under North Carolina General
Statutes Sections 75-1.1 and 75-16
In the United States, commercial activities take place in a market system in
which private buyers and sellers trade money for goods and services. Federal
and state governments provide structure and order to the market system
through selective regulation. The realm of regulation includes prohibitions
against unfair competition and trade practices. In North Carolina, General
Statutes section 75-1.11 stands at the center of the law of unfair competition and
trade practices. Section 75-1.1, enacted in 1969,2 is enforceable in a private
damage action brought by an aggrieved competitor or consumer; the accompa-
nying section 75-16 provides automatic trebling of damages awarded in such an
action. 3 To establish a violation of section 75-1.1, a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant engaged in "[u]nfair methods of competition" or "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce."'4 The statutory language of section
75-1.1 does not delineate the scope of its protection; rather, the courts define the
parameters of the statute through the process of "judicial inclusion and
exclusion. ''5
In Ellis v. Northern Star Co. 6 the North Carolina Supreme Court broadened
the realm of protection provided by section 75-1.1 by holding that libel per se in
a business setting constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice in or affecting com-
mercb in violation of the section.7 The significance of this holding stems from
the automatic treble damages that accompany a violation of section 75-1.1,8
whereas the common-law remedy for libel per se consists merely of actual and
punitive damages.9 This extension of the protective shield of section 75-1.1 oc-
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988). Section 75-1.1 provides, in pertinent part, that "[u]nfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." Id. § 75-1.1(a). For a thorough discussion of § 75-1.1,
see Aycock, North Carolina Law on Antitrust and Consumer Protection, 60 N.C.L. REv. 205, 210-23
(1982).
2. Act of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988)).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1988). Section 75-16 provides:
If any person shall be injured or the business of any person, firm or corporation shall
be broken up, destroyed or injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other person,
firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such person, firm or
corporation so injured shall have a right of action on account of such injury done, and if
damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.
Id.
4. Id. § 75-1.1(a). For the text of section 75-1.1(a), see supra note 1.
5. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931); see infra text accompa-
nying note 58.
6. 326 N.C. 219, 388 S.E.2d 127 (1990).
7. Id. at 225, 388 S.E.2d at 131. For the North Carolina common-law definition of libel per
se, see infra text accompanying notes 47-48.
8. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
9. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 227, 388 S.E.2d at 132.
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curred with minimal justification by the court, 10 and despite a strong dissent
that the communication in question was not even a libel per se.11
This Note analyzes the Ellis decision's broadening of section 75-1.1 in light
of prior case law concerning libel per se in a business context and unfair trade
practices. The analysis includes a comparison of the North Carolina unfair
trade practices scheme with that used in several major jurisdictions. This Note
concludes that the expansion of section 75-1.1 in Ellis was not well supported,
and was a step towards over-restriction of commercial transactions.
Ellis Brokerage Company, Inc. (Ellis Brokerage) was a North Carolina
food broker that served as a middleman between large-quantity food buyers,
such as hospitals and school systems, and food producers. 12 The defendant,
Northern Star Company (Northern Star), was a potato processor based in Min-
nesota and a client of Ellis Brokerage since 1981.13 Between 1981 and 1986 Ellis
Brokerage increased Northern Star's annual sales in eastern North Carolina
from zero to approximately $640,000.14
On June 20, 1986, Earl Ellis, the only full-time employee of Ellis Brokerage,
received Northern Star potato pricing information over the telephone from
Thomas Kenney, Northern Star's senior vice president for sales.' 5 On June 23
Ellis sent price lists based on the information to several potential buyers. 16 By a
letter dated August 29, 1986, Kenney notified Ellis that Northern Star was ter-
minating its brokerage arrangement with Ellis Brokerage. 17 Finally, on Septem-
ber 5 Kenney sent a letter to several of the buyers who received the June 23 price
list from Ellis Brokerage.18 The letter contained the following language:
We have recently received copies of a price list sent to you from
Ellis Brokerage Company regarding pricing on Northern Star potato
products. These prices were noted for bids only, delivered by Northern
Star.
We at Northern Star Company did not authorize such a price list
and therefore cannot honor the prices as quoted on June 23, 1986.19
On the basis of this letter, Earl Ellis and Ellis Brokerage sued Northern Star and
Thomas Kenney individually.20
The plaintiffs' original action asserted that the letter of September 5, 1986,
was "libelous per se and an unfair or deceptive act affecting commerce" in viola-
10. Id. at 225-26, 388 S.E.2d at 131.
11. Id. at 228-31, 388 S.E.2d at 132-34 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 221, 388 S.E.2d at 128.
13. Id. at 221, 388 S.E.2d at 128-29.
14. Id. at 221-22, 388 S.E.2d at 129. Ellis Brokerage received a 3% commission for orders
brokered on behalf of Northern Star. Defendant-Appellants' Brief at 4, Ellis (No. 192PA89). Com-
missions from Northern Star constituted "at least 80% of [the] commissions" of Ellis Brokerage. Id.
15. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 221-22, 388 S.E.2d at 128-29.
16. Id. at 222, 388 S.E.2d at 129.
17. Id.; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2, Ellis (No. 192PA89).
18. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 222, 388 S.E.2d at 129.
19. Id.; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 14, Ellis (No. 192PA89).
20. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 222, 388 S.E.2d at 129.
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tion of section 75-1.1.21 The plaintiffs amended their complaint to include alle-
gations of "breach of a covenant of good faith, breach of contract through
unreasonable termination, tortious interference with business relations, and un-
just enrichment .... The defendants counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty
and breach of contract."'22 Earl Ellis's testimony at trial included a discussion
he had with a customer of Ellis Brokerage who received the Northern Star letter,
stating that the customer "was going to look for other sources to get his potatoes
because he didn't know whether he could trust me or Northern Star."'2 3 The
jury found that the defendants had libeled Ellis Brokerage and awarded $32,500
in compensatory damages and $12,500 in punitive damages.24 The trial court,
however, granted the defendants' motions for directed verdicts on all other
claims, including the defendants' alleged violation of section 75-1.1.25
Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed the decision of the trial court and
the North Carolina Supreme Court considered two issues: whether the North-
ern Star letter of September 5, 1986, was libelous per se, as found by the jury,
and whether libel per se of a plaintiff relating to its business "constitutes an
unfair or deceptive act affecting commerce in violation of" section 75-1.1.26 The
supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding that the letter was libelous per se,
rejecting the defendants' argument that the letter was "not defamatory at all or,
alternatively... susceptible of both defamatory and nondefamatory interpreta-
tions." 27 Justice Mitchell, writing for the court, stated that "[w]hether a publi-
cation is one of the type that properly may be deemed libelous per se is a
question of law to be decided initially by the trial court," and he asserted that
the trial court properly decided that issue.28 After that step, the jury must de-
cide if the publication was actually libelous per se, and the supreme court agreed
with the jury's affirmative resolution of that issue in this case.29 The court, how-
ever, was not unanimous on the issue of libel per se. In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Meyer, joined by Justice Whichard, stated that the "defendant's letter
was clearly not defamatory per se, and the issue should not have been submitted
to the jury."30
The court then considered an issue of first impression: whether libel per se
in a business setting is an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of sec-
tion 75-1.1.31 In holding that libel per se of this type is within the realm of
section 75-1.1, the court analogized libel per se in a business setting to false
21. Id.
22. Id. The parties settled the breach of contract claim and counterclaim prior to trial. Id.
23. Id. at 224, 388 S.E.2d at 130.
24. Id. at 222, 227, 388 S.E.2d at 129, 132. The jury found that "the defendants had not libeled
the individual plaintiff Earl Ellis." Id. at 222, 388 S.E.2d at 129.
25. Id. at 222, 338 S.E.2d at 129.
26. Id. at 221, 388 S.E.2d at 128.
27. Id. at 224, 388 S.E.2d at 130. For "words to be libelous perse [they] must be susceptible of
but one meaning." Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 786, 195 S.E. 55, 60 (1938).
28. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 224, 388 S.E.2d at 130; see Flake, 212 N.C. at 785, 195 S.E. at 59.
29. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 224-25, 388 S.E.2d at 130-31.
30. Id. at 230, 388 S.E.2d at 134 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 225-26, 388 S.E.2d at 131.
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advertising and fraud, both of which the court previously had found to violate
the statute.32 Because libel per se in a business setting did not fall within the
category of "transactions already subject to pervasive and intricate statutory
regulation,"' 33 the court summarily deemed it to be an act in violation of section
75-1.1, justifying an award of treble damages under section 75-16.34 The court
applied this decision to the facts at hand and decided that the trial court erred in
granting the defendants' motion for directed verdicts on the unfair trade practice
claim.35 Because the defendants' act violated section 75-1.1, and since the jury
found that Ellis Brokerage suffered actual damages to its business reputation
caused by the libel, the court directed the jury on remand to award Ellis Broker-
age a choice of damages: $32,500 in actual damages automatically trebled to a
sum of $97,500 under section 75-16, or the previously calculated libel award of
$45,000.36
As a backdrop to analysis of the Ellis decision, North Carolina law covering
trade libel, defamation, and unfair trade practices will be discussed. The doc-
trine of trade libel, or disparagement, provides a common-law cause of action for
injured plaintiffs engaged in business in North Carolina, as well as a number of
other jurisdictions.3 7 One definition of the cause of action is as follows:
[D]isparagement... may consist of the publication of matter deroga-
tory to the plaintiff's title to his property, or its quality, or to his busi-
ness in general, or even to some element of his personal affairs, of a
kind calculated to prevent others from dealing with him, or otherwise
to interfere with his relations with others to his disadvantage.3 s
The development of the trade libel cause of action in North Carolina
reached its peak in the 1942 case of Carolina Aniline & Extract Co. v. Ray.39 In
Carolina Aniline, the plaintiff sold almost its entire production operation to the
defendant, then purchased new equipment and continued its business at another
location.4° The defendant wrote the plaintiff's customers letters that explained
the purchase, stated that it would "manufacture identically the same products
under [its] own trade names," and directly compared its lower prices with those
of the plaintiff.4 1 The plaintiff alleged that the letters were "false, deceptive and
32. Id. at 225, 388 S.E.2d at 131; see infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
33. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 225, 388 S.E.2d at 131. The court previously applied this limitation to
securities transactions in Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 275, 333 S.E.2d 236, 241
(1985); see infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
34. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 226, 388 S.E.2d at 131.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 227-28, 388 S.E.2d at 132; see supra note 24 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs may
elect to recover either punitive damages under a common-law claim or treble damages under § 75-
16, but not both. See Marshall v. Miller, 47 N.C. App. 530, 542, 268 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1980), modified
and aff'd, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
37. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text. Other names for the tort of trade libel
include "injurious falsehood," "commercial disparagement," "disparagement of property," and
"slander of goods." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 128, at 962-63 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter LAW OF TORTS].
38. LAW OF TORTS, supra note 37, § 128, at 967.
39. 221 N.C. 269, 20 S.E.2d 59 (1942).
40. Id. at 270, 20 S.E.2d at 60.
41. Id. at 270-71, 20 S.E.2d at 60.
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intended to deceive and did deceive plaintiff's customers." 42 In reversing the
trial court's grant of nonsuit for the defendant, the court expressed the rationale
that unfair competition occurrs whenever "'the public is likely to be
deceived.' "43 The court clarified very little about the trade libel cause of action,
however, and did not even label the action by any of the traditional phrases such
as "trade libel", "disparagement", or "injurious falsehood". 44 Since Carolina
Aniline, the cause of action for disparagement has not developed and injured
plaintiffs in similar circumstances instead have pursued a cause of action for
defamation.45
Defamation is that which tends "to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill
or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or
unpleasant feelings or opinions against him." 46 North Carolina courts recognize
three categories of defamatory material:
(1) Publications which are obviously defamatory and which are
termed libels per se; (2) publications which are susceptible of two rea-
sonable interpretations, one of which is defamatory and the other is
not; and (3) publications which are not obviously defamatory, but
which become so when considered in connection with innuendo, collo-
quium and explanatory circumstances.4 7
Furthermore,
a publication is libelous per se, or actionable per se, if, when considered
alone without innuendo: (1) It charges that a person has committed
an infamous crime; (2) it charges a person with having an infectious
disease; (3) it tends to subject one to ridicule, contempt, or disgrace; or
(4) it tends to impeach one in his trade or profession. 48
The courts have interpreted the fourth category of libel per se, applied in
Ellis, in a number of cases. In Badame v. Lampke,4 9 the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant, a direct competitor, spoke words over the telephone to a customer
that implied that the plaintiff engaged in "shady deals," and thereby impaired
the plaintiff's business reputation.50 Holding that the words spoken by the de-
fendant were actionable per se for "charg[ing] the plaintiff with a dishonorable
42. Id. at 270, 20 S.E.2d at 60.
43. Id. at 272, 20 S.E.2d at 61 (quoting 63 C.J. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names, and Unfair Compe-
tition § 112, at 415 (1933)).
44. One point of clarification made by the court was the following:
[I]n order to escape liability for unfair competition, statements made for the purpose of
inducing a competitor's customers to purchase the advertiser's products by making the
express statement that his products'possess all the qualities of the products of another...
must be true, or the injured party will be entitled to relief.
Id.
45. See Comment, Unfair Competition-Law of Unfair Competition in North Carolina, 46
N.C.L. REV. 856, 877-78 (1968). For a discussion of Carolina Aniline and the status of the dispar-
agement cause of action in North Carolina, see id. at 874-78.
46. LAW OF TORTS, supra note 37, § 111, at 773.
47. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 785, 195 S.E. 55, 59 (1938).
48. Id. at 787, 195 S.E. at 60.
49. 242 N.C. 755, 89 S.E.2d 466 (1955).
50. Id. at 755-56, 89 S.E.2d at 467.
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course of business conduct,"15 1 the supreme court noted that the words "must
contain an imputation necessarily hurtful in its effect on [the plaintiff's] busi-
ness." 52 More recently, in Matthews, Cremins, McLean, Inc. v. Nichter,s 3 the
court of appeals held that letters sent by defendant media buying service to tele-
vision stations, which asserted that the plaintiff advertising agency breached its
contract and failed to pay its bills, were libelous per se.54 The court's rationale
was that the communication of such assertions to third parties "clearly tend[ed]
to disparage plaintiff's integrity in its business dealings."s"
While the trade libel and defamation causes of action exist within the com-
mon law of North Carolina, the law of unfair trade practices flourishes within
the confines of North Carolina General Statutes section 75-1.1. In 1977 the
general assembly amended the original language of section 75-1.156 in order to
conform to the exact wording of its federal counterpart, section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.57 Rather than enumerate a list of specific illegal acts,
practices, and methods of competition, the general assembly chose to follow
Congress's definition in "adopt[ing] a phrase which.., does not 'admit of pre-
cise definition, but the meaning and application of which must be arrived at by
what [the Supreme Court] elsewhere has called "the gradual process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion."' ".58
The North Carolina Supreme Court examined section 75-1.1 for the first
time in Hardy v. Toler.5 9 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
automobile dealer made false representations concerning the condition of a car
at the time of purchaseA0 In holding that as a matter of law the false representa-
tions made by defendant to plaintiff violated section 75-1.1,61 the court noted
that "[s]ome guidance may be obtained by reference to federal decisions on ap-
peals from the Federal Trade Commission since the language of [section] 75-1.1
closely parallels that of the Federal Trade Commission Act." 62 The court also
51. Id. at 757, 89 S.E.2d at 468.
52. Id.
53. 42 N.C. App. 184, 256 S.E.2d 261, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 569, 261 S.E.2d 123 (1979).
54. Id. at 188, 256 S.E.2d at 264.
55. Id. For other North Carolina cases dealing with the business impeachment category of libel
per se, see, eg., Lay v. Gazette Publishing Co., 209 N.C. 134, 183 S.E. 416 (1936) (libel per se found
when a newspaper incorrectly published that the plaintiff was the leader of a strike and had been
arrested for trespassing); Broadway v. Cope, 208 N.C. 85, 179 S.E. 452 (1935) (statement by butcher
that his competitor had slaughtered a cow bitten by a mad dog was defamatory per se); U v. Duke
Univ., 91 N.C. App. 171, 371 S.E.2d 701 (statements by defendant to plaintiff's colleague that plain-
tiff was a liar, deceitful, absolutely useless, and a fraud impeached plaintiff in his profession and were
slanderous per se), disc rev. denied, 323 N.C. 629, 374 S.E.2d 590 (1988); Talbert v. Mauney, 80
N.C. App. 477, 343 S.E.2d 5 (1986) (allegations that president of bank published statements imput-
ing that plaintiff forged his letters of credit and was a drug dealer alleged slander per se).
56. Act of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, §§ 1-2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 984 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988)). For the amended text of § 75-1.1(a), see supra note 1.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988).
58. Federal Trade Comm'n v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 312 (1934) (quoting Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931)).
59. 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975).
60. Id. at 304, 218 S.E.2d at 343.
61. Id. at 311, 218 S.E.2d at 347.
62. Id. at 308, 218 S.E.2d at 345.
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established the bifurcated process used in cases under section 75-1.1, whereby
"the jury... determine[s] the facts, and based on the jury's finding, the court...
determine[s] as a matter of law whether the defendant engaged in unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce."'63
In Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.,64 plaintiff real estate de-
velopers alleged that the defendant mortgage broker and mortgagor "entered
into a deliberate course of conduct which was designed to force [the plaintiff]
into an untenable economic position so that it would be unable to complete" the
development of a shopping center.65 The court provided some guidance on the
scope of section 75-1.1 by stating that "[w]hat is an unfair or deceptive trade
practice usually depends upon the facts of each case and the impact the practice
has in the marketplace." 66 Furthermore, a practice is unfair when it "offends
established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, op-
pressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers," 67 or when it
"amounts to an inequitable assertion of [a party's] power or position." 68 The
court applied these guidelines to the defendants' conduct and concluded that it
was not unfair or deceptive.69
The court made two significant points in Marshall v. Miller,70 an action by
a consumer for misrepresentation. First, the court held that the intent or good
faith belief of a party is irrelevant to the determination of the unfairness or de-
ceptiveness of a particular act.7 1 Second, the court justified automatic treble
damages. While discussing section 75-16 and treble damages, the court con-
cluded that "[a]bsent statutory language making trebling discretionary with the
trial judge.., the Legislature intended trebling of any damages assessed to be
automatic once a violation [of section 75-1.1] is shown."7 2 The rationale offered
for the automatic trebling scheme under section 75-16 was that "it makes more
economically feasible the bringing of an action where the possible money dam-
ages are limited, and thus encourages private enforcement" and "it increases the
incentive for reaching a settlement."173
The court limited the application of section 75-1.1 in Skinner v. E.F. Hutton
& Co.,74 when it held that because securities transactions "'were already subject
63. Id. at 310, 218 S.E.2d at 346-47.
64. 300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610 (1980).
65. Id. at 251, 266 S.E.2d at 614. The defendants' course of conduct included the tendering of
a mortgage for the shopping center, which was conditioned on the plaintiffs' ability to secure an
interim construction loan as well as particular lease commitments. Id. at 250, 266 S.E.2d at 613.
When the plaintiffs failed to obtain the construction loan or a lease commitment from a bank, the
defendant mortgagor terminated the mortgage. Id. at 251, 266 S.E.2d at 614.
66. Id. at 262-63, 266 S.E.2d at 621.
67. Id. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621. The court also noted that "[t]he concept of 'unfairness' is
broader than and includes the concept of 'deception."' Id.
68. Id. at 264, 266 S.E.2d at 622.
69. Id. at 266, 266 S.E.2d at 623.
70. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
71. Id. at 548-49, 276 S.E.2d at 403.
72. Id. at 547, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
73. Id. at 549, 276 S.E.2d at 403-04.
74. 314 N.C. 267, 333 S.E.2d 236 (1985).
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to pervasive and intricate regulation under the North Carolina Securities Act, as
well as the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,'"
they were beyond the scope of the statute.75 The judicial exclusion of transac-
tions subject to statutory regulation apart from section 75-1.1 reflected the
court's concern for over-penalizing a party already subject to sanctions.7 6
The court attempted to interpret "commerce," as used in section 75-1.1(b),
in Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Systems, Inc.7 7 For legislative intent, the court
looked to the original version of section 75-1.1(b), which applied to "dealings
between persons engaged in business, and between persons engaged in business
and the consuming public."'78 The court noted that "individual consumers are
not the only ones protected" by the language of the statute,79 but found that
"section [75-1.1(b)] is not broad enough... to encompass 'all forms of business
activities.' -80
The development of North Carolina law on libel and unfair trade practices
converged in the Ellis decision. The first question answered by the court in Ellis
concerned the libelous nature of the letter mailed by defendant Northern Star.81
Arguably, plaintiff Ellis Brokerage could have brought a common-law action for
trade libel or disparagement. After all, the plaintiff's libel per se claim, which
was premised on injury to its business relationships with customers allegedly
caused by Northern Star's letter, appears to fit within the definition of disparage-
ment.82 The failure of the plaintiff to raise this cause of action in an appropriate
fact scenario testifies to the lifeless state of the disparagement cause of action in
North Carolina, 83 despite its viability in other jurisdictions. 84
75. Id. at 275, 333 S.E.2d at 241 (quoting Lindner v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 761 F.2d
162, 167 (4th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted)); see also Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Hunsucker, 38
N.C. App. 414, 420-21, 248 S.E.2d 567, 570 (1978) (commodities transactions not within the scope
of § 75-1.1 due to the existence of a federal scheme of regulation), disc rev. denied, 296 N.C. 583,
254 S.E.2d 32 (1979).
76. Skinner, 314 N.C. at 274, 333 S.E.2d at 241 ("[A]pplication of the statute ... would expose
a party violating the statute to a host of legislatively created sanctions in addition to those sought in
the private action.").
77. 81 N.C. App. 1, 22-23, 344 S.E.2d 82, 94-95 (1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 319 N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d 578 (1987). Section 75-1.1(b) provides: "For purposes of this
section, 'commerce' includes all business activities, however denominated, but does not include pro-
fessional services rendered by a member of a learned profession." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b)
(1988).
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (1969). The original version of § 75-1.1(b) provided:
The purpose of this section is to declare, and to provide civil legal means to maintain,
ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in business, and between persons
engaged in business and the consuming public within this State, to the end that good faith
and fair dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of commerce be had in this State.
Id.
79. Olivetti, 81 N.C. App. at 23, 344 S.E.2d at 95.
80. Id. at 22, 344 S.E.2d at 94 (quoting Threatt v. Hiers, 76 N.C. App. 521, 523, 333 S.E.2d
772, 773 (1985), disc rev. denied, 315 N.C. 397, 338 S.E.2d 887 (1986)).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
82. See supra text accompanying note 38.
83. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also UNITED STATES TRADEMARK ASSOCIA-
TION, STATE TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW NC-14 (1991) [hereinafter UNFAIR
COMPETITION] ("There are no reported decisions on [the] subject [of trade disparagement or trade
libel] by North Carolina courts.").
84. See infra text accompanying note 124.
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In the absence of a body of common law on disparagement on which to
rely, Ellis Brokerage brought a successful action for libel per se. The supreme
court provided the following explanation for its affirmation of the trial court's
finding of libel per se:
The language "[w]e at Northern Star did not authorize such a price
list," taken in the context of the entire letter, can only be read to mean
that Ellis Brokerage Company, acting in its capacity as broker for
Northern Star, did an unauthorized act. Whether that act was pub-
lishing certain unauthorized prices within a price list or publishing the
entire price list itself without authorization is of no import; either read-
ing is defamatory and impeaches Ellis Brokerage in its trade as a food
broker.8 5
It is not entirely clear why this language is defamatory and impeaching. As
pointed out by Justice Meyer in his dissenting opinion, the language in question,
"when read by a typical recipient of [the] letter, could very reasonably be inter-
preted to mean that there was a simple breakdown in communications or an
inadvertent mistake in the price list through the fault of either or both par-
ties."18 6 If the accusation that a food broker acted without authority connotes a
lack of scrupulous business practices or integrity in the eyes of its customers,
and the customers have come to expect those qualities from the broker, the case
for libel per se is clear. If the defendant communicated an accusation of re-
peated mistakes in price listings or habitual unauthorized listings on the part of
the plaintiff, there is also a sound basis for a libel per se claim.8 7
In this case, however, Northern Star's letter "does not rise to the level of
accusing [Ellis Brokerage] of incompetence or untrustworthiness, nor would a
typical buyer automatically reach that conclusion." 's Whereas the findings of
libel per se in Badame, Matthews, and other North Carolina cases dealing with
defamation in a business context8 9 were based on language "contain[ing] an im-
putation which [was] necessarily harmful in its effect on plaintiffs' business," 90
Justice Meyer presented a strong argument that the court's finding in Ellis did
not rest on so solid a foundation. 91 Conversely, Justice Mitchell, writing for the
majority, provided scant justification for the holding, thereby accepting a mini-
mal standard for finding libel per se in a business setting. While this part of the
court's holding is of only secondary importance, it is noteworthy for the shadow
that it casts over business communications.
The substance of Ellis lies in the supreme court's treatment of the question
of first impression whether libel per se is an unfair or deceptive trade practice in
violation of section 75-1.1. The court emphasized that the existence of "perva-
85. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 224, 388 S.E.2d at 130.
86. Id. at 229, 388 S.E.2d at 133 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
89. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
90. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 229, 388 S.E.2d at 133 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur courts have tended to recognize more blatantly deroga-
tory statements than the one at issue here as defamatory per se in the business context."); see supra
note 55.
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sive and intricate statutory regulation" for a particular type of transaction would
provide an exception to the protective shield of section 75-1.1, but that no such
limitation applied to libel per se of a type impeaching a party in its business.92
While the court did not explain the exception, the probable rationale is that an
injured plaintiff would have a sufficient avenue of recourse under the specifically
tailored statutory regulation and would not need the protections of section 75-
1.1. 93 Although libel per se is not addressed by statute in North Carolina, it is
the subject of a well-developed common-law cause of action.94 As in Ellis, a
plaintiff who can show that an injury was proximately caused by a libelous state-
ment likely will receive compensatory and punitive damages.95 Common law, in
this instance, thus provides as effective and sufficient a remedy for the injured
party as statutory regulation provides in the securities arena.96 A party suing
for libel has the option of selecting higher damages under section 75-1.1 and the
accompanying section 75-16, while a plaintiff injured under a statutorily regu-
lated transaction is limited to actual and compensatory damages.97 The com-
mon-law protection from libel is pervasive, like that of a statutory scheme, and
logically the court should exclude libel per se from protection under section 75-
1.1.
As further justification for the categorization of libel per se in a business
setting as an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of section 75-1.1, the
Ellis court pointed out that both false advertising and fraud had been found to
violate the statute.9s The court cited a fraud case, Hardy v. Toler,99 in which a
plaintiff consumer recovered under sections 75-1.1 and 75-16 for misrepre-
sentations made by the defendant automobile dealer at the time of purchase of a
car. 10 0 The court also cited a false advertising case, Winston Realty Co. v.
G.H. G., Inc.,11 in which the plaintiff corporation hired the defendant personnel
agency for the purpose of filling a bookkeeping position.10 2 The plaintiff filled
the position with someone who ultimately embezzled $24,000 and committed
92. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 225, 388 S.E.2d at 131.
93. Additionally, it would be inequitable to penalize a defendant already subject to statutory
sanctions. The court employed such reasoning in cases involving securities and commodities trans-
actions. See Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 274, 333 S.E.2d 236, 241 (1985) (securities
transactions); Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Hunsucker, 38 N.C. App. 414, 420-21, 248 S.E.2d 567,
570 (1978) (commodities transactions), disc rev. denied, 296 N.C. 583, 254 S.E.2d 32 (1979).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
95. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 225, 388 S.E.2d at 130-31.
96. This result occurs notwithstanding the legislative intent behind the enactment of § 75-1.1,
which noted that "common law remedies had proved often ineffective." See, eg., Marshall v. Miller,
302 N.C. 539, 543, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981).
97. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
98. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 225, 388 S.E.2d at 131.
99. 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975); see supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
100. Hardy, 288 N.C. at 311, 218 S.E.2d at 347. The misrepresentations included the following:
The automobile had 79,000 miles on it instead of the 21,000 registered on the odometer; the vehicle
had been sold twice before, but was represented as having only one previous owner; and the pur-
chaser was not told that the automobile had been damaged in a collision. Id. at 304, 218 S.E.2d at
343.
101. 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985).
102. Id. at 92, 331 S.E.2d at 678.
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other financial improprieties.10 3 The defendant advertised that it "pre-
screened" job applicants, but failed to conduct a reference check or background
investigation with regard to any criminal activity by the job applicant. 104 The
court held that the plaintiff could recover for the defendant's false advertising
under section 75-1.1.105 In both Hardy and Winston Realty, the injured plaintiff
was a consumer of the defendant's goods or services. This is a significant dis-
tinction from Ellis, in which plaintiff Ellis Brokerage was not a consumer of
defendant Northern Star's products, but rather a conduit for its products. In the
cited cases the plaintiffs' direct reliance on the acts of the defendants necessi-
tated the broad protections of section 75-1.1 to provide the plaintiffs with re-
course. Conversely, in Ellis the alleged libel did not cause Ellis Brokerage to
rely on Northern Star, and Ellis did have an available common-law remedy.
The court did not address these differences and failed to explain its reliance on
the cited examples in reaching its conclusion. 106 The court's silence calls into
question the soundness of its holding.
Another concern prompted by the court's inclusion of libel per se in a busi-
ness context within section 75-1.1 is the danger that communications found to
be libelous may vary widely as to the degree of harm and injury they cause.
Justice Meyer reflected this concern by pointing out that the language found to
be libelous in Ellis was much less derogatory than statements the North Caro-
lina courts traditionally have found to be libelous in a business context.10 7
Viewing the libel in Ellis as occurring near the low end of the libel spectrum, in
terms of degree of imputed harm, the supreme court has paved the way for lower
courts to treat many business communications that, prior to Ellis, flowed with
impunity, as unfair acts under section 75-1.1. Communications between persons
engaged in business are undoubtedly activities within the realm of "commerce"
and thereby trigger analysis under section 75-1..108 The court's prior interpre-
tation of unfair acts in Johnson as those that are "immoral, unethical, oppres-
sive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers,"109 however,
provides little in the way of limitations. With the exception of "substantially
injurious to consumers," each of the delineated characteristics is subjective,
thereby providing minimal guidance. In the case of libel per se, an extremely
defamatory statement in a business context very well could fall under one or
more of those labels and have a devastating effect on a plaintiff. Such a strong
libel, however, certainly would be actionable for under a libel suit, which would
obviate the need for the protection of section 75-1.1. Ellis does not present such
a strong case and it is very difficult to label the Ellis language, "[w]e at Northern
103. Id. at 93, 331 S.E.2d at 679.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 97, 331 S.E.2d at 681.
106. The court's entire commentary was: "We have concluded, for example, that both false
advertising and fraud violate [§ 75-1.1].... [L]ike fraud and false advertising, a libelperse of a type
impeaching a party in its business activities is an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce in
violation of [§] 75-1.1." Ellis, 326 N.C. at 225-26, 388 S.E.2d at 131.
107. See supra note 91.
108. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
109. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 263, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621 (1980).
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Star did not authorize such a price list," as satisfying the Johnson interpreta-
tion.110 The court failed to apply the useful test of "the impact the practice has
in the marketplace,"111 which appears to be minimal in the case of libel, due to
the infrequency of the transgression. Thus, the Ellis holding expands the appli-
cability of section 75-1.1, but provides no analytical framework to guide the
lower courts in determining what constitutes a violation of the statute.112
The holding that libel per se in a business context violates section 75-1.1 is
not significant simply because it classifies libel as an unfair or deceptive trade
practice. Rather, it is the attachment of automatic treble damages provided by
section 75-16 that provides the real bite. 113 If the court finds a violation of
section 75-1.1, it must treble the compensatory damages established by the
jury. 114 The legislative intent behind section 75-16 included a desire to increase
the economic feasibility of "bringing... an action where the possible money
damages are limited, and thus encourage[] private enforcement."' 1 5 In a libel
case such as Ellis, monetary damages would be "limited" to compensatory and
punitive damages-a sufficient common-law remedy. Providing the plaintiff
with the choice between a common-law remedy and automatically trebled actual
damages under section 75-16116 exceeds the legslative intent. The automatic
trebling does not take into account the nature of the particular transaction; in
Ellis for example, the existence of libel was strongly questioned. 117 Judicial de-
termination of libel is too uncertain a process to subject to automatic treble dam-
ages; the imposition of such damages could inequitably penalize a defendant.
A brief survey illustrates where the North Carolina unfair or deceptive
trade practices act stands in relation to the schemes of other states."I8 The stat-
utes of thirty-two states proscribe unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 119
Thirty-four states list certain acts or practices as unlawful; North Carolina does
not.' 20 Statutory lists serve the important function of providing predictability as
to potential liability for unfair trade practices. North Carolina is one of twenty
110. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 222, 388 S.E.2d at 129; see Johnson, 300 N.C. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621.
111. Johnson, 300 N.C. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621.
112. For a list of the types of actiyities to which § 75-1.1 has been applied, see Note, Olivetti
Corp. v. Ames Business Systems, Inc- Recovery of Lost Profits for a Violation of North Carolina
General Statutes Section 75-L1, 65 N.C.L. REv. 1169, 1178-79 (1987).
113. For the text of § 75-16, see supra note 3.
114. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 547, 276 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-16 (1988).
115. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 549, 276 S.E.2d at 403-04.
116. A plaintiff may elect either a common-law remedy including punitive damages or trebled
actual damages under § 75-16, but not both. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. For an
examination of the availability of punitive or treble damages, see Note, Unfair Trade Practices and
Unfair Methods of Competition in North Carolina: Are Both Treble and Punitive Damages Availablefor Violations of Section 75-1.1?, 62 N.C.L. REv. 1139 (1984).
117. Ellis, 326 N.C. at 228-31, 388 S.E.2d at 132-34 (Meyer, J., dissenting); seesupra notes 86-91
and accompanying text.
118. For purposes of this summary, the District of Columbia is treated as a state.
119. See Leaffer & Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The
Private Uses of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. RV. 521, 531, 560-64
app. (1980).
120. See id. Some of the state statutes that list unlawful practices also include a catch-all phrase
designed to include nonlisted practices. Id. at 531.
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states that make available double or treble plaintiff's actual damages in private
actions for injuries resulting from unfair or deceptive trade practices. 121 Among
the states that provide treble damages, only five, including North Carolina, pro-
vide mandatory treble damages. 122 Eighteen states have statutory provisions
specifically prohibiting disparagement or trade libel,123 while fourteen states rec-
ognize a common-law disparagement cause of action. 124 In ten states, including
North Carolina, a common-law libel cause of action allows plaintiffs to recover
for disparagement-type injuries, while in several other states, libel statutes pro-
vide for recovery. 125 Overall, North Carolina's unfair or deceptive trade prac-
tices act, with its automatic treble damages and lack of statutory list, is broader
and more generous than the parallel acts of many other states; its common-law
remedy for disparagement or trade libel is on par with about half of the states.
Finally, application of the disparagement and unfair trade practice schemes
of three leading commercial states-California, New York, and Texas-to the
facts of Ellis yields significantly different results from those of the North Caro-
lina approach. In California there is an established common-law cause of action
for trade libel. 126 The cause of action requires a publication that induces others
not to deal with the plaintiff, as well as a showing of special damages. 127 Apply-
ing the facts of Ellis, the plaintiff could successfully bring such a cause of action
if it could prove that the letter from Northern Star injured its reputation and
thereby caused customers to terminate their business relationships. Under this
cause of action, Ellis Brokerage could recover specific lost sales and punitive
damages upon proof of actual damages. 128 This result parallels the one under
121. See UNFAIR CoMPErrrIoN, supra note 83 (includes "Trade Disparagement or Trade Libel"
subsections for each state).
122. The other four are California, Colorado, Hawaii, and New Jersey. See CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 17082 (West 1987); COLO. REv. STAT. § 6-1-113(2)(a) (Supp. 1990) (treble damages or
$250, whichever is greater); HAw. REv. STAT. § 480-13(a)(1) (Supp. 1990) (treble damages or
$1000, whichever is greater); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 1989). In states with treble damages
that are not mandatory, such damages may be awarded at the discretion of the court, or for viola-
tions that are "knowing or intentional." Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 119, at 532.
123. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b)(7) (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-88-106(a)(2)
(1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-105(1)(h) (Supp. 1990); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2532(a)(8)
(1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904(g) (1981); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-372(a)(8), -393(b)(8) (1989
& Supp. 1990); HAw. REV. STAT. § 481A-3(a)(8) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 48-603(8) (Supp. 1990);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 312, § 2(8) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 1212(1)(H) (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.44(1)(8) (West Supp. 1991); NEn. REV. STAT.§ 87-302(a)(8) (Supp. 1990); NEV. REv. STAT. § 598.410(8) (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-
2(D)(8) (Supp. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.02(H) (Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 78, § 53(a)(8) (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.608(1)(h) (1989); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.46(b)(8) (Vernon 1987). A typical statute contains language that prohibits "disparaging
the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading representation of fact." IDAHO
CODE § 48-603(8) (Supp. 1990). An example of a more explicit statute, which leaves less room for
misinterpretation, is: "It shall be a violation of this chapter, whether or not any consumer is in fact
misled, deceived or damaged thereby, for any person to... disparage the goods, services or business
of another by false or misleading representations of material facts." D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904(g)
(1981).
124. See UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 83.
125. Id.
126. Id. at CA-18.1.
127. Id. at CA-19.
128. Id.
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the North Carolina common-law libel cause of action.129 Application of Cali-
fornia's unfair and deceptive trade practices act provides different results, how-
ever. The act contains a broad statement of scope, 130 like North Carolina, and it
also provides mandatory treble damages. 13 1 The important distinction, how-
ever, is that under California's law only consumers and direct competitors may
bring actions. 132 Thus, a California plaintiff in the situation of Ellis Brokerage
would be entitled to equitable common-law damages but not statutory treble
damages, unlike the result in North Carolina.
New York has a common-law cause of action for disparagement that re-
quires a showing of malice, falsity of the statement, and special damages. 133
Since there is no indication that the statement made by Northern Star was false,
it is unlikely that Ellis Brokerage would succeed under New York's disparage-
ment cause of action. Like North Carolina, New York also has a broadly
worded deceptive trade practices act that provides a private cause of action for
both consumers and other persons injured by violations.1 34 This consumer-ori-
ented act, however, limits remedies to the greater of actual damages or fifty
dollars, and places a cap on discretionary treble damages of $1000.135 Under
the facts of Ellis, a best-case scenario for the plaintiff in New York would be
recovery of $32,500 in actual damages plus $1000 in discretionary treble dam-
ages-well below the $97,500 provided by North Carolina law. 136
Texas recognizes a common-law cause of action for disparagement that pro-
tects "the economic interests of the injured party against pecuniary lOSS."'1 3 7
Disparagement requires "publication... falsity, malice, lack of privilege, and
special damages."138 The Ellis facts likely would not satisfy the element of fal-
sity and therefore would not lead to recovery of damages for lost profits, which
are available under the cause of action.139
129. See supra text accompanying note 24.
130. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17001 (West 1987). The statute provides in part that the
purpose of the act is to "foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair, dishonest, decep-
tive, destructive, fraudulent and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is
destroyed or prevented." Id.
131. Id. § 17082.
132. Id. §§ 17021, 17070; see Harris v. Capitol Records Distrib. Corp., 64 Cal. 2d 454, 460-61,
413 P.2d 139, 143-44, 50 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543-44 (1966) (requiring that a competitor be in "primary"
or direct competition with wrongdoer in order to bring an action under California's Unfair Practices
Act).
133. UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 83, at NY-23.
134. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 1988).
135. Discretionary treble damages will only be awarded if a violation of the statute is willful or
knowing. UNFAIR COMPETrION, supra note 83, at NY-8.
136. The best-case scenario is unlikely, as the courts have interpreted the scope of New York's
deceptive practices act to exclude "private, non-consumer transactions of a non-recurring type with-
out implications for the public." Id. at NY-7; see Genesco Entertainment v. Koch, 593 F. Supp. 743,
752 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Arguably, a transaction like that of Ellis would not meet the limited interpre-
tation of the scope of the act, since it was between business entities (food supplier, broker, and
institutional buyers), and was a one-time communication. See supra text accompanying notes 12-19.
137. Hurlbut v. Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex. 1987). There is a separate
cause of action for defamation, which is intended "to protect the personal reputation of the injured
party." Id.
138. Id.
139. UNFAIR COMPETrmON, supra note 83, at TX-38.1 to TX-38.2.
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The Texas deceptive trade practices act includes a broad prohibition against
any "[flalse, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade or commerce," as well as a list of twenty-four acts considered per se false,
misleading, or deceptive. 140 Included among the enumerated acts is "disparag-
ing the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading representa-
tion of facts." 141 The cause of action provided by the statute is available to
"consumers," with "consumer" defined as "an individual, partnership, corpora-
tion.., who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services." 14 2
Remedies for an injured consumer include actual damages and discretionary
treble damages "[i]f the trier of fact finds that the conduct of the defendant was
committed knowingly." 143 Thus, unlike North Carolina's scheme, the Texas
statutory scheme is explicit as to its inclusion of disparagement as a violation
and does not mandate automatic treble damages. A plaintiff such as Ellis Bro-
kerage could recover treble damages nearly equivalent to those provided by the
North Carolina statute, but only if the defendant's conduct was intentional. The
application of the Ellis scenario to appropriate law in California, New York, and
Texas illustrates that North Carolina's statutory scheme is out of step, due to its
combination of broadness and unconditional, unlimited treble damages.
When the general assembly enacted North Carolina General Statutes sec-
tions 75-1.1 and 75-16, it intended to "provide civil means to maintain ethical
standards of dealings between persons engaged in business and the consuming
public... and to enable a person injured by [unfair or] deceptive acts or prac-
tices to recover ... damages from a wrongdoer." 144 The legislature created a
repository into which the courts could selectively place practices deemed to be
unfair or deceptive through the continuous process of judicial inclusion and ex-
clusion. The legislature also provided a substantial remedy for injured parties in
the form of treble damages. Standing apart from all but a handful of states, 145
the legislature implemented, and the courts have enforced, automatic treble
damages. While this protection provides sufficient recourse for injured parties,
and actually may improve the ethics of the marketplace, there is the potential for
the protection to become too restrictive. The decision of the supreme court in
Ellis is a step in that direction. With brevity and minimal justification, and with-
out any analysis of marketplace impact, the court added libel per se in a business
context to the stockpile of unfair acts. In so doing, the court displayed an eager-
ness to expand section 75-1.1 to include a practice that already had sufficient
140. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon 1987).
141. Id. § 17.46(b)(8).
142. Id. § 17.45(4). The term "consumer" excludes a "business consumer" with assets of $25
million or more, or under the ownership or control of a corporation or entity with assets of $25
million or more. Id.
143. Id. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991). The statute defines the discretionary treble damages
as "[no] more than three times the amount of actual damages in excess of $1000." Id.
144. Hardy v. Toler, 24 N.C. App. 625, 630-31, 211 S.E.2d 809, 813, modified on other grounds,
288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975). For the statement of this intent in the original version of§ 75-
1.l(b), see supra note 78.
145. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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remedies under common law. 146 This willingness to summarily expand protec-
tions in commerce could ultimately have a chilling effect on business transac-
tions and the marketplace in general. North Carolina should consider the
protective, yet more moderate, unfair trade practice schemes of other states that
are leaders in commerce.147
One option for improving the effectiveness of section 75-1.1 would be for
the North Carolina General Assembly to clarify the statute by expressly includ-
ing or excluding of particular practices. By amending the statute in that way,
the legislature would provide warning to potential transgressors as well as con-
crete guidance to the courts. Alternatively, the legislature might consider imple-
menting discretionary treble damages instead of the automatic treble damages of
section 75-16. Discretionary trebling would eliminate the harshness of uni-
formly applying treble damages to all unfair trade practices, regardless of the
nature of a particular act, while retaining the penalty for egregious acts.
In the absence of any legislative action, the onus will fall on the North
Carolina judiciary to effectively define the parameters of the statute. The courts
should view each decision involving the statute as an opportunity to clarify the
analytical framework for determining what constitutes an unfair or deceptive
trade practice. The courts should include in this framework an analysis of the
impact the alleged violation has upon the marketplace. This analysis should
consider the availability of remedies through other causes of action, as well as
the derivative effects of automatic treble damages; the Ellis court ignored these
considerations. It is imperative that the courts carry out the process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion with a high degree of care and strike a balance between
over-inclusion and over-exclusion. Failure to do so will have a detrimental im-
pact on the commercial climate in North Carolina.
PAUL M. SARACENI
146. The expansion occurred in a case in which the court's standard for libel was particularly
lenient. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 126-43 and accompanying text.
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